As geopolitical competition intensifies, the major powers are beginning to contemplate territorial annexation, control of supply chains and trade routes, and forging spheres of influence – not dissimilar to the period which presaged the First World War. To counter this disorder, arguments have been made that so-called ‘middle powers’ should group together to frustrate geopolitical competition and uphold multilateralism.
The United Kingdom (UK) looks set to retain a significant powerbase in the 21st century. It is a nuclear-armed state, and boasts both the world’s sixth largest defence budget and Gross Domestic Product (GDP). With these indicators of power in mind, for this week’s Big Ask, we asked eight experts: Should Britain act more like a major or middle power?
Andrew Ehrhardt
Ax:son Johnson Institute for Statecraft and Diplomacy, Postdoctoral Fellow, SAIS Johns Hopkins, and Visiting Fellow, Centre for Grand Strategy, King’s College London
The concept of ‘middle powers’, as amorphous as it is, has a long tradition in ‘Western’ political and diplomatic thought. From the speech given by Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada, at Davos to the Harvard Kennedy School’s Middle Power Project, it has returned as one of the most fashionable terms in foreign policy discourse.
By most metrics, the UK could be considered a middle power. While not on the level of ‘superpowers’ such as the United States (US) and People’s Republic of China (PRC), Britain boasts impressive national capabilities and enviable positions in international fora. These are well known, though often underappreciated.
Debates over middle power status are not only distracting, but also tend to force complacency or cynicism. Where some find comfort in status, others lament what they see as an irreversible decline – a country that, on the international stage, is subject to the whims of more powerful actors.
It is important not to let categories become constraints. Whether the UK is a middle power or not is largely irrelevant to the practice of foreign policy. Here the focus must be on where, how and when Britain – undoubtedly a major player in world affairs – can and should use its capabilities and influence to shape what is a more fluid international environment.
The next five years will see the development of new economic, political and security constellations. It is imperative that His Majesty’s (HM) Government both understand how these can work in the national interest and harness the UK’s capabilities and reputation to take the initiative in forming new (or reinforcing old) alignments.
Research Fellow (National Security), Council on Geostrategy
While it is clear that Britain is not a superpower, the power base and capabilities at the disposal of HM Government are deep enough and wide enough that the UK can and should act like a major power. Even those who would claim it is more of a ‘middle’ power must recognise that Britain is first among equals. What it suffers from in this new era of geopolitical competition is not lack of resources, but a lack of confidence and lack of imagination.
This is not a dissimilar position to that which England found itself in prior to the Industrial Revolution. Grand strategies of the past also show that when the UK acted with energy and imagination, it could achieve impressive results against ostensibly far more powerful neighbours.
In a new order where powerful countries are facing fewer restraints, it is imperative that Britain act like a major power that shapes its environment, rather than a middle power subject to the prevailing winds. By becoming a global convener, with investment in the hard power – and the national economic and scientific powerbase needed to sustain it – to underpin its position, the UK will surprise itself with the results it can achieve.
At a canter, there is already a catalogue of impressive results, including AUKUS, the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) and leadership on support for Ukraine, to name just three. Imagine what Britain could do with more confidence and energy.
Of course, this would necessitate a rebalancing of the division of government spending, which will be politically challenging, but a greater ability to shape the world order during this period of transition and renegotiation may well save a reduced welfare state in the long run.
Adjunct Fellow, Council on Geostrategy, and Associate Professor in International Security and Conflict Resolution, University College London
In an international system that is currently in a state of flux as it adjusts to the changing dynamics of new notions of power in the Intelligence Age, there is a real question as to whether Britain should seek to define itself or its actions as either, and whether these definitions continue to be useful at all.
The key features of the system have irrevocably changed. Placing expected behaviour within one of these frames is likely to constrain action and creativity negatively, both militarily and diplomatically. Perhaps the question is: ‘what is it to be an “intelligent power”, “trusted-tech power” or a “frontier power”, with the capability to leverage influence quickly with key alliances which advance British interests?’
The UK should stand back and survey the long-term trajectory of its ambitions as an intelligent or frontier power and the fora which it needs to influence for a new frontier or intelligent foreign policy approach, rather than being constrained by the limits of designations from a system that may no longer be relevant.
Sam Goodman
Senior Director of Policy, China Strategic Risks Institute
Britain appears to struggle with the unique circumstance of being a major power that, in the past, has been hampered by policy decisions reflecting a declinist mentality. It is the only way one could explain the Coalition Government’s decision to decimate the defence budget, the decision to dismantle the UK’s development aid department (which was the gold standard and admired by many of its partners) and to cede control of the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT).
Such a mentality appears to suggest that the UK’s future is a binary choice between becoming more of a tributary state to the US, or rejoining the European Union (EU). This view offers Britain little autonomy of its own, and is predicated on the idea that its economy is uncompetitive, its voice irrelevant in multilateral institutions and its hard power inferior to its peers. In reality, there is much the UK could learn from other countries, such as Brazil, France, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Türkiye, all of whom punch above their weight in different aspects of foreign policy.
Britain has much to its advantage – and to the envy of its peers – from dominance in soft power to its shipbuilding industry. Its Permanent Five (P5) status at the United Nations (UN) Security Council and its nuclear deterrent ensure that even if it does not always think so, the UK will remain a major power.
Putting aside the US and the PRC, Britain sits firmly in a small group of major powers that have a sizeable military, significant soft power, a large economy and can project influence in most corners of the globe.
A wise policymaker in Whitehall should take the lessons from middle powers that punch above their weight and apply them to the UK’s unique strengths. In doing so, a middle power mentality can be turned into an advantage for a major power.
Patrick Horgan OBE
Senior Adviser, Geopolitical Strategy, GMTL Advisory Ltd.
Britain should act in a way that is consistent with its resources, capabilities and defining attributes. This statement of the obvious needs reiteration in the face of false expectations or popular assumptions that can stem from nostalgia, ignorance or the rigid tramlines of ideology and definitional labels. The UK is no superpower, but nor is it insignificant or lacking in influence in global affairs.
What is clear is that the international context in which Britain enjoyed influence and advantages well beyond those merited by sheer economic, demographic or territorial scale has changed profoundly. Strength and relevance derived from the intimacy of the ‘special relationship’ with the US is diminished; permanent representation on the UN Security Council counts for less when that body is comprehensively hobbled by the vetoes of other permanent members; and the UK’s ability to shape the agenda and approach of Europe as a whole was sacrificed on the altar of Brexit.
This altered context demands adaptation and flexibility in response. Britain has qualities that provide continued relevance and impact globally: research and universities; some areas of technology, defence and industrial expertise; finance; a nuclear deterrent; the reach of the English language; security and intelligence relationships; and alliances. These are the tools and channels to use in pursuing the UK’s national interest in a world where many countries remain keen to work with it as a partner.
Ultimately, Britain’s position in global affairs rests on the effective retention, nurturing and regeneration of inherent domestic capabilities and attributes, built on a foundation of political stability and a growing economy. If that foundation is not kept secure, any discussion of major or middle power status will be seen with hindsight as nothing but hubristic hot air.
Honorary Fellow, Council on Geostrategy, and Director, Oxford Strategy, Statecraft and Technology (Changing Character of War) Centre
As one of the wealthiest nations of the world, with a nuclear-armed navy, and membership of the Permanent Five of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, the UK is obliged to act as a significant global power. It has alliance and treaty terms it has pledged to uphold.
If it is clear it should act, the question is whether it has the capability and confidence to do so. In an era of assertive powers, Britain seems unable to grasp that the values-led order is over. It requires nothing short of a radical reassessment of its internal priorities and an acceleration of its defence modernisation.
Vague promises of future defence spending and international agreements will not secure its position as primus inter pares among medium powers. Its position necessitates not only action, but resolution in doing so.
Co-founder (Research), Council on Geostrategy
When the UK is positioned as a ‘middle power’, it cannot be an expression of status. Of the 196 states recognised by HM Government, Britain clearly sits towards the top of the global hierarchy.
True, it is not a superpower on par with the US or – to a lesser extent – the PRC, but it stands above most other countries. Within the next five years, it is projected to leap over Japan and edge closer to Germany as the world’s fifth largest economy. It remains a nuclear weapons state, a diplomatic heavyweight, and a scientific and technological power with few equals.
Asserting that the UK is a middle power is less of a statement of fact and more a statement of mind. It defangs the country, both in terms of status and policy, and represents a retreat from the burdens of leadership and a preference for subordination to international structures. Its proponents urge the country to ‘know its place’; yet, this is a self-imposed ceiling which ignores the leverage HM Government can actually hold. This mindset is a strand of isolationism, which seeks to insulate Britain from the friction that inevitably accompanies global influence.
In an era defined by renewed geopolitical confrontation, however, modesty is a strategic liability. The superpowers – even Russia – are aggressively expanding their spheres of influence. If the UK adopts the posture of a middle power, it does not correct its self-image; it merely cedes ground to authoritarian rivals who suffer no such crises of confidence.
And it will not be Britain that suffers most. It will be the nation’s smaller allies and partners.
Professor of International Relations, University of Kent
Britain should act more like a major power – not out of nostalgia, but out of necessity. In a fragmenting global order, the space for constructive ‘middle power’ cooperation does not arise spontaneously. It is created and sustained by states willing to bear the costs of leadership: underwriting institutions, enforcing norms, and shaping agendas. Without that stabilising role, multilateralism becomes procedural rather than political, and middle power coordination quickly loses traction.
Recent arguments by figures such as Carney have stressed the growing importance of middle powers in defending an open international system. But that defence depends on enabling actions conducive for such an international environment.
The UK is unusually well-placed to help provide such actions. It retains global diplomatic reach, serious intelligence and military capabilities, and deep institutional memory within the multilateral system. Acting like a major power means using those assets deliberately: setting standards, convening coalitions and accepting responsibility when rules are challenged.
If Britain retreats into a self-conception that it is one middle power among many, it risks accelerating the very fragmentation it seeks to manage. Paradoxically, the best way for the UK to support middle powers is not to join them, but to lead in a way that makes their cooperation possible.
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What do you think about the perspectives put forward in this Big Ask? Why not leave a comment below?
Are we even a middle power at this point? The changes to the budget would have to be huge. You don’t see other middle powers giving up land so easily.
This isn’t a question, is it?