The land-sea distinction is extremely important, but I think another distinction needs to be added within the maritime domain itself: sea denial is not sea control.
Uncrewed systems are dramatically lowering the cost of preventing an adversary from using maritime space, while raising the cost of keeping crewed vessels inside it. That gives the attacker unprecedented leverage in imposing risk.
But pushing a fleet away or striking a ship is not the same as controlling the sea. Escort, protection of sea lanes, persistent presence, sensing, defence, and freedom of manoeuvre require a broader and more sustainable force architecture.
The deeper maritime revolution may therefore be not simply that drones favour offence, but that they have made sea denial far cheaper than sea control.
While drone warfare on land is dominated by short-range tactical FPVs and swarm dynamics, the maritime domain demands long-range autonomous navigation, robust satellite/mesh links, and complex payload integration against moving surface threats.
The sea-based drone revolution writes its own rules.
A long article which offers little value and no useful remedy. Whether it is accepted or not, the speed of technical developments is too fast for the old pedantic approach to defence and security measures. The UK's government and the political system is somewhat archaic in its long winded processes, unable or unwilling to adapt and thus fails to realise the compelling need for a genuine fusion and streamlining of process; the article suggests this, or rather infers this.
The traditional virtues of people in all facets of the military [Armed Forces] must never be forgotten. Technology aids decision making, provides timely information and precision weapons' launches, but it is trained people with broad experiences that generate real capacity and capability.
The other element is a real and supportive level of finance, namely, an actual figure of annual spending with an annual increase to take account of inflation; GDP fluctuates and the MoD needs to work of set amounts.
The land-sea distinction is extremely important, but I think another distinction needs to be added within the maritime domain itself: sea denial is not sea control.
Uncrewed systems are dramatically lowering the cost of preventing an adversary from using maritime space, while raising the cost of keeping crewed vessels inside it. That gives the attacker unprecedented leverage in imposing risk.
But pushing a fleet away or striking a ship is not the same as controlling the sea. Escort, protection of sea lanes, persistent presence, sensing, defence, and freedom of manoeuvre require a broader and more sustainable force architecture.
The deeper maritime revolution may therefore be not simply that drones favour offence, but that they have made sea denial far cheaper than sea control.
A crucial distinction H.I. Sutton.
While drone warfare on land is dominated by short-range tactical FPVs and swarm dynamics, the maritime domain demands long-range autonomous navigation, robust satellite/mesh links, and complex payload integration against moving surface threats.
The sea-based drone revolution writes its own rules.
#StrikeWebAnalyst #NavalWarfare #MaritimeDrones #USVs #DefenseTech
Nice post, good pointers and helps understand more the impact of unmanned systems in combat applications.
A long article which offers little value and no useful remedy. Whether it is accepted or not, the speed of technical developments is too fast for the old pedantic approach to defence and security measures. The UK's government and the political system is somewhat archaic in its long winded processes, unable or unwilling to adapt and thus fails to realise the compelling need for a genuine fusion and streamlining of process; the article suggests this, or rather infers this.
The traditional virtues of people in all facets of the military [Armed Forces] must never be forgotten. Technology aids decision making, provides timely information and precision weapons' launches, but it is trained people with broad experiences that generate real capacity and capability.
The other element is a real and supportive level of finance, namely, an actual figure of annual spending with an annual increase to take account of inflation; GDP fluctuates and the MoD needs to work of set amounts.