I would respectfully suggest today’s RN leadership knows little of its post-1945 history; where such stark force design changes always result in capability losses. Somewhere the ghosts of Duncan Sandys, Denis Healy and John Nott are laughing.
Admiral sir, i found this a well structured and adept analysis of exactly the issue the RN faces as warfare develops and we seek the next generation of capability and a pathway to the future. My respectful challenge though; you posit there needs to be a shift in thinking and risk taking to realise the hybrid navy. You yourself, and your contempories in recently departed senior leadership positions, clearly have the intelligence, talent and understanding to identify the end point that needs to be reached during this transition you identify. Indeed many of them write strikingly similar articles when they departed service. Here is my challenge; why did so many, now armchair admirals and generals and air marshalls, fail to move the needle when they were in the service and were able to affect the direction of travel, fail to do any of what you suggest we should do now? I whole heartedly agree this is the direction we should go, your arcticle is right; but it is challenging in the reality of the products on offer by so many companies, kraken included. You yourself were the 2 star in charge of dev div, the flag officer most able to affect the policy to shape this directional shift you now suggest, having left your brothers and sisters in arms for the private sector you now suggest we should embrace. Why is this option that you, and so many others with equivolent credentials and greater to yours, so clearly recognised in policy (which is free to change by the way, unlike so many procurement projects) find so impossible to take when in service rather outside it? That is my challenge. Why is it (from the bottom looking up) so many of our senior leaders are able to see the problem and yet do so little about it, I make two exceptions from immediate (last 2 years ish) experience, the first sea lord's direction and frankley, sage warnings, and Rear Admiral Rimmington's (dir fgen) leadership in that cause (I cannot speak for others as I don't have specific knowlegde in that regard). Sir, to remain frank, I tire of former seniors retiring moving to civilian jobs and finally speaking from a pedestal about how defence should be while so many talented officers and ratings continue to deliver the direction of government to meet the national need, and they do that every single day despite the policy issues that could have been dealt with by so many now out of the service.
An interesting article. There remain, and have always been, big problems with the Armed Forces' desire to have omnicapable "exquisite" systems. If funds were not an issue, so be it, though reality such as proper funding and a stated clear and affordable foreign policy is beyond the scope of the politicians and their advisers.
The reality is and must be tailored accordingly. The Highly effective T45 [excluding its reliability record] and the production of the T26 are very expensive, and I would argue unaffordable in the existing set of limited horizons of our political masters.. Both vessels are much heavier than any destroyer or frigate in previous generations of RN vessels. Whereas, focusing on less exclusive vessels that are well armed and able to be produced at higher volume offers sound investment and capability.
The T31 is such a ship with the capacity to adjust capabilities according to evolving technology, whether it be surface, sub surface or aerial systems. The price of such a RN vessel offers four or more for a T26. Furthermore, no mention of corvettes are mentioned - the ones sold to Oman may also be a sound choice - small, yes, but once again a similar variant would provide a capable surface vessel to 'look after' the EEZ and GIUK and provide more for the overseas territories who are regularly neglected due to a lack of RN vessels.
Thus, by referring to the corvette as T20, and with the T31 there would be limited point in breaking the already limited funding for a new exquisite destroyer or a future T26. This approach would amplify the hybrid nature of tomorrow's needs, offer more hulls and retain a maritime capability with greater capacity.
The RN won the backing of Brown for the Carriers but they still lack an effective air wing, are proving to be unreliable and are very expensive vessels which provide a impressive vision but without real capability of UK plc ownership.
There are two problems that pull modern navies in different directions. The first is distributed lethality. Warships are outrageously expensive and rather vulnerable. If one gets hit, you lose a huge amount of capability and possibly many sailors. Unmanned vessels give you a wider sensor network, a bigger armory, etc. The challenge is it’s all experimental so it will cost more and take longer than anyone will expect.
The opposite problem is that modern navies run on data, absolutely insane amounts of data. A single F-35 or high-end drone or towed sonar array continuously streams gigabytes of information. These ships are data centers floating in the ocean. Providing the compute, the insane amount of electricity required and the thermal management (often the hardest) is extremely difficult. Smaller ships just do not have the capacity to do this, even without the hotel load.
Carriers are a 50 year investment and so they always evolve. The F-35 is a great plane and strangely, integration has gone better for the RN than for the Americans. A carrier offers an insane amount of sea control simply because of the helicopter capacity. There were serious doubts about anyone being able to get an unmanned jet off a ski-ramp, but the RN seems very confident and plans to begin trials within 18 months. If successful, it will be remarkable engineering.
The Type 26 and 31 are very different platforms despite being similar sized. The T-26 costs 4x more because of the acoustic isolation, the high-end radar, the towed sonar array, the additional weapons, and the extra compute needed for it all. The T-31 is a lower end platform not designed to hunt subs in the North Atlantic.
Fair enough. I am aware of much that you refer to. The carriers are a topic I will put to one side, other than the complete cost for these over- sized ships [for our needs] did not take account of a shortfall in RN avavability of escorts and RFA. T31s could have autonomous anti-sub capabilies, albeit a lighter tonnage than the too expensive T26; the T45 could be, and should be, shelved by adjusting T26 to a full AD capacity - they are large enough. The Admirals would be reluctant to admit this but realism, roles and capacity is what is needed, not exquisite vessels and insufficient numbers.
Good article. We have yet to see that feedback loop operate at anywhere near the speed required. Past experience shows it is possible, but culture and risk tolerance matter. Furthermore, I think a third condition is the expert delivery agent capacity to drive the programme and ensure it integrates and evolves to meet the changing threat and user feedback. We are still overwhelmingly configured to deliver and support traditional capabilities.
I would respectfully suggest today’s RN leadership knows little of its post-1945 history; where such stark force design changes always result in capability losses. Somewhere the ghosts of Duncan Sandys, Denis Healy and John Nott are laughing.
https://warontherocks.com/2026-and-all-that-another-benchmark-year-in-royal-navy-decline/
Admiral sir, i found this a well structured and adept analysis of exactly the issue the RN faces as warfare develops and we seek the next generation of capability and a pathway to the future. My respectful challenge though; you posit there needs to be a shift in thinking and risk taking to realise the hybrid navy. You yourself, and your contempories in recently departed senior leadership positions, clearly have the intelligence, talent and understanding to identify the end point that needs to be reached during this transition you identify. Indeed many of them write strikingly similar articles when they departed service. Here is my challenge; why did so many, now armchair admirals and generals and air marshalls, fail to move the needle when they were in the service and were able to affect the direction of travel, fail to do any of what you suggest we should do now? I whole heartedly agree this is the direction we should go, your arcticle is right; but it is challenging in the reality of the products on offer by so many companies, kraken included. You yourself were the 2 star in charge of dev div, the flag officer most able to affect the policy to shape this directional shift you now suggest, having left your brothers and sisters in arms for the private sector you now suggest we should embrace. Why is this option that you, and so many others with equivolent credentials and greater to yours, so clearly recognised in policy (which is free to change by the way, unlike so many procurement projects) find so impossible to take when in service rather outside it? That is my challenge. Why is it (from the bottom looking up) so many of our senior leaders are able to see the problem and yet do so little about it, I make two exceptions from immediate (last 2 years ish) experience, the first sea lord's direction and frankley, sage warnings, and Rear Admiral Rimmington's (dir fgen) leadership in that cause (I cannot speak for others as I don't have specific knowlegde in that regard). Sir, to remain frank, I tire of former seniors retiring moving to civilian jobs and finally speaking from a pedestal about how defence should be while so many talented officers and ratings continue to deliver the direction of government to meet the national need, and they do that every single day despite the policy issues that could have been dealt with by so many now out of the service.
An interesting article. There remain, and have always been, big problems with the Armed Forces' desire to have omnicapable "exquisite" systems. If funds were not an issue, so be it, though reality such as proper funding and a stated clear and affordable foreign policy is beyond the scope of the politicians and their advisers.
The reality is and must be tailored accordingly. The Highly effective T45 [excluding its reliability record] and the production of the T26 are very expensive, and I would argue unaffordable in the existing set of limited horizons of our political masters.. Both vessels are much heavier than any destroyer or frigate in previous generations of RN vessels. Whereas, focusing on less exclusive vessels that are well armed and able to be produced at higher volume offers sound investment and capability.
The T31 is such a ship with the capacity to adjust capabilities according to evolving technology, whether it be surface, sub surface or aerial systems. The price of such a RN vessel offers four or more for a T26. Furthermore, no mention of corvettes are mentioned - the ones sold to Oman may also be a sound choice - small, yes, but once again a similar variant would provide a capable surface vessel to 'look after' the EEZ and GIUK and provide more for the overseas territories who are regularly neglected due to a lack of RN vessels.
Thus, by referring to the corvette as T20, and with the T31 there would be limited point in breaking the already limited funding for a new exquisite destroyer or a future T26. This approach would amplify the hybrid nature of tomorrow's needs, offer more hulls and retain a maritime capability with greater capacity.
The RN won the backing of Brown for the Carriers but they still lack an effective air wing, are proving to be unreliable and are very expensive vessels which provide a impressive vision but without real capability of UK plc ownership.
There are two problems that pull modern navies in different directions. The first is distributed lethality. Warships are outrageously expensive and rather vulnerable. If one gets hit, you lose a huge amount of capability and possibly many sailors. Unmanned vessels give you a wider sensor network, a bigger armory, etc. The challenge is it’s all experimental so it will cost more and take longer than anyone will expect.
The opposite problem is that modern navies run on data, absolutely insane amounts of data. A single F-35 or high-end drone or towed sonar array continuously streams gigabytes of information. These ships are data centers floating in the ocean. Providing the compute, the insane amount of electricity required and the thermal management (often the hardest) is extremely difficult. Smaller ships just do not have the capacity to do this, even without the hotel load.
Carriers are a 50 year investment and so they always evolve. The F-35 is a great plane and strangely, integration has gone better for the RN than for the Americans. A carrier offers an insane amount of sea control simply because of the helicopter capacity. There were serious doubts about anyone being able to get an unmanned jet off a ski-ramp, but the RN seems very confident and plans to begin trials within 18 months. If successful, it will be remarkable engineering.
The Type 26 and 31 are very different platforms despite being similar sized. The T-26 costs 4x more because of the acoustic isolation, the high-end radar, the towed sonar array, the additional weapons, and the extra compute needed for it all. The T-31 is a lower end platform not designed to hunt subs in the North Atlantic.
Fair enough. I am aware of much that you refer to. The carriers are a topic I will put to one side, other than the complete cost for these over- sized ships [for our needs] did not take account of a shortfall in RN avavability of escorts and RFA. T31s could have autonomous anti-sub capabilies, albeit a lighter tonnage than the too expensive T26; the T45 could be, and should be, shelved by adjusting T26 to a full AD capacity - they are large enough. The Admirals would be reluctant to admit this but realism, roles and capacity is what is needed, not exquisite vessels and insufficient numbers.
Good article. We have yet to see that feedback loop operate at anywhere near the speed required. Past experience shows it is possible, but culture and risk tolerance matter. Furthermore, I think a third condition is the expert delivery agent capacity to drive the programme and ensure it integrates and evolves to meet the changing threat and user feedback. We are still overwhelmingly configured to deliver and support traditional capabilities.