The June 2025 speech by Gen. Sir Roly Walker, Chief of the General Staff, at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) laid out an ambitious vision: ‘double then triple the fighting power of our land forces, by 2027 and 2030 respectively’, to be achieved through increased lethality, digital integration and ‘growth through transformation’. It is intellectually compelling, operationally sound and strategically necessary.
The question is whether it is funded, whether it forces the hard choices it implies, and whether the British Army can close the gap between its stated ambitions and its actual resources. Within this, the key question is whether the Army can construct a credible force able to fight and deter threats effectively, or if it will continue with an unsustainable narrative that yields minimal results.
The current state of the British Army
At present, the Army consists of around 73,000 regular soldiers and about 30,000 reservists, all funded by a defence budget of approximately £57 billion. This budget not only supports the Army, but also covers the Royal Navy, the Royal Air Force (RAF), nuclear deterrence and personnel costs, leaving little room for extensive military expansion. Thus, the expectation that the Army can maintain multiple divisions is questionable.
Russia’s ongoing full-scale invasion of Ukraine emphasises the importance of scale and preparedness in modern warfare, as well as the advances in modern technology. Success requires not just military strength, but also societal commitment, resilience to losses and the ability to sustain production over time. However, the United Kingdom (UK) is unlikely to mobilise at that level unless faced with a significant threat to national security. The British Army must therefore operate within the limits of what it can realistically sustain.
Vision for the future
Sir Roly proposes a transformative approach to how the Army operates, emphasising capabilities that can deliver effective results without requiring massive troop numbers. His plan focuses on enhancing military efficiency through innovative technologies and integration rather than relying solely on traditional methods of deployment.
Sir Roly also talked about the ‘20/40/40’ concept outlined in 2025’s Strategic Defence Review (SDR). The concept is a more tech-driven approach, where 20% of combat capability will be traditional platforms such as tanks, artillery and attack helicopters; 40% will rely on expendable, autonomous systems such as loitering munitions and kamikaze drones; and the remaining 40% will consist of reusable, Artificial Intelligence (AI)-enabled assets such as surveillance drones that can operate with or without human input.
This model aims to reduce costs associated with traditional military assets while still delivering impactful results. Even so, the feasibility of this transition currently hinges on allocating sufficient financial resources and personnel. The current budget – and the much-delayed Defence Investment Plan – simply does not provide enough leeway to implement this ambitious vision without making sacrifices.
The 20/40/40 concept also raises the question of what happens when the survivable 20% is damaged, destroyed or killed? After all, the enemy gets a vote, and will also employ large numbers of autonomous and attritable weapons. Alongside enhanced lethality, the need for Counter-Uncrewed Aerial System (C-UAS) capabilities which can keep up with evolving threats is increasingly urgent.
Addressing the challenges
The current structure of the British Army is constrained by financial realities, which do not appear to be improving at the moment. While Sir Roly has set ambitious goals, the available resources do not align with these aspirations. A practical assessment suggests that maintaining two operational divisions is becoming increasingly challenging, and there is no second echelon, let alone a third. A more feasible approach may involve focusing on a single, well-resourced division which can balance operational needs with budget constraints while the other division provides a second echelon.
Strengthening these functions – outside of the elements discussed in the 20/40/40 approach – will be key to unlocking the fighting potential of allied armies as they grow in size.
The Army should also strengthen essential support roles, such as logistics (including medical capacity) and intelligence functions, which are critical to successful operations. Across European North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies, there is a widely acknowledged gap in the depth and breadth of the enablers required to conduct modern, high-intensity fighting, especially as the United States (US) – the traditional provider of such capabilities – reviews its posture in Europe.
Strengthening these functions – outside of the elements discussed in the 20/40/40 approach – will be key to unlocking the fighting potential of allied armies as they grow in size. Poland alone will soon field 24 combat brigades plus hundreds of thousands of reserves. The ability to provide meaningful enablers or support functions would greatly bolster the UK’s influence within the alliance.
Specialist forces, including units designed for training and partnerships with allied nations, play a vital role in ongoing strategic competition, although they should be carefully prioritised against pressing threats. Additionally, maintaining minimal expeditionary capabilities allows Britain to respond to crises affecting its interests, even if on a smaller scale. Such capabilities should not aim for global power projection, but enabling effective deterrence against immediate threats.
Legacy platforms without a transformation path consume budget that should fund autonomous systems. A 50/50 split between crewed and autonomous systems is the correct strategic direction. However, it requires explicitly naming which traditional programmes will need to accept reduced procurement numbers. Ajax, Boxer and recapitalised Multiple Rocket Launch Systems (MLRS) may all be necessary, but the quantities should be determined by what the transformation model actually requires; not by what was originally planned before autonomous systems changed the calculus.
Finally, as recently reported by the Parliamentary Defence Committee, the UK also needs to consider its commitment to its NATO Article Three duty of maintaining a comprehensive plan to resist armed attack. The committee’s report argues that both homeland defence and the protection of British Overseas Territories have fallen behind the threat environment, and need to be resourced properly.
Optimising reserves
Reconfiguring the Army Reserve to focus on specialist surge capabilities rather than broad mobilisation is crucial. Instead of attempting to maintain infantry battalions that cannot operate effectively, reserves should be centred around areas where civilian skills can significantly expand military capacities during crises. This includes sectors such as medical services, logistics, cyber operations, engineering and civil-military cooperation.
However, this will require His Majesty’s (HM) Government to commit more resources. The SDR only promised to grow the number of active reservists ‘by 20% when funding allows, most likely in the 2030s’ – which is not soon enough.
The industrial base gamble
‘Growth through transformation’ is compelling, but operationally uncertain. Creating thousands of jobs in AI, robotics and software could genuinely transform both fighting power and the UK’s defence-industrial base.
However, this assumes that industry delivers viable attritable platforms at promised cost and scale; that perpetual prototyping accelerates, rather than fragments, capability development; that risk capital invests beyond the initial £400 million earmarked in the SDR despite inevitable programme failures; and that export markets materialise for British autonomous systems in a competitive global market. Project ASGARD demonstrates proof of concept with 20 industry partners. Scaling this to corps level and building a sustainable industrial base is a different challenge entirely – and one without precedent in recent British defence procurement.
The gamble is worth taking. But, it requires honest acknowledgement of risk, fallback plans if industrial transformation underperforms and sustained investment beyond initial allocations when perpetual prototyping encounters inevitable setbacks. Transformation cannot be an excuse to avoid the hard choices about legacy programmes. It must happen alongside them, not instead of them.
A strategic approach to the future
The future path for the British Army requires aligning its ambitions with practical realities. Sir Roly’s vision represents a forward-thinking initiative that could enhance military readiness through innovation and strategic improvements. However, turning this vision into a reality calls for significant commitment and a willingness to make difficult decisions about funding and resource distribution.
For the vision to become a reality, HM Government should show political courage and make tough decisions. It is essential that military leaders provide an honest assessment of their capabilities and make choices that align with realistic assessments of risks and resources – as Sir Richard Knighton, Chief of the Defence Staff, has openly stated, there is a £28 billion shortfall. This may mean curtailing certain commitments and capabilities that are less effective in serving the UK’s strategic interests.
The focus could be on developing a single, robust division capable of taking on critical operations, while simultaneously improving key support capabilities. The second division could be considered as a second echelon force at a reduced readiness level. Additionally, there is a need to consider homeland defence seriously, along with the other services, and develop a meaningful plan to meet Article Three requirements.
This strategy reflects a genuine commitment to fulfilling Britain’s responsibilities within NATO while maintaining flexibility for crisis management. Ultimately, the British Army should assess its abilities candidly, and be willing to prioritise what is essential to ensure long-term effectiveness.
By making focused investments in a streamlined structure, the British Army can fulfil its commitments more effectively. This requires accepting that not all existing roles or capabilities can be maintained as they are if the Army is to enhance its overall effectiveness.
At this crucial juncture, the Army must balance its aspirations with the realities of its funding and capabilities. Of course, should the level of defence investment HM Government is willing to provide grow, and timelines be brought forward, then plans could look beyond the approach outlined here. The proposed vision from Sir Roly presents an opportunity to rethink the future of military readiness through innovative approaches and better resource management. However, achieving these goals requires political will, clarity in decision-making and a commitment to recognising the true landscape of military needs.
By making focused investments in a streamlined structure, the British Army can fulfil its commitments more effectively. This requires accepting that not all existing roles or capabilities can be maintained as they are if the Army is to enhance its overall effectiveness. The way forward should be centred on realistic expectations and a cohesive strategy to ensure the British Army remains a relevant and capable force in a complex global environment.
Rory Copinger-Symes CBE retired from the Royal Marines as a Brigadier, having served with US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) in Hawaii from 2016 to 2020. He is a Senior Adviser to Bondi Partners and SecureCloud+, a Non-Executive Director at Halo International Group and an associate with Quirk Solutions. He serves as a Trustee of the Royal Marines Charity and runs the Commando Spirit alcohol brand.
This article is part of the Council on Geostrategy’s Strategic Defence Unit.
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What do you think about this Memorandum? Why not leave a comment below?
Many would support the case for focusing on HMG providing one, not two Divisions. Unfortunately we seem to have made a committment to our NATO Allies that we will provide two Divisions, and it will need some astute diplomacy to explain why we have changed that position. Some NATO Govts may well not accept that we have "financial realities" that constrain us. They would point to the £24bn of Russian assets currently frozen in UK banks, and argue that those assets could be repurposed (not seized). As ever lawyers disagree
(https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-10034/CBP-10034.pdf)
about the legality of such an action but to date the Kremlin has not gone to any international tribunals about HMG's decision to repurpose the interest from these assets. The principal opposition from some senior officials is that it would discourage foreign govts from depositing assets in the City of London, but again so far there seems to be no evidence that repurposing the interest from Russian assets has made a difference. Of course an additional £24bn may not be enough to provide two Divisions but at least it would help.
The other issue that many of our Allies might be questioning is why we seem unwilling to properly consider a substantial and rapid increase in both Regular and Reserve personnel. Poland, Germany and France are all increasing their numbers but there appears to be a degree of self censorship by senior military officers about the need for more people. Autonomous drone swarms may reduce the numbers of personnel needed to operate drones but we are not there yet,
(https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2026/03/24/autonomous-swarms-are-the-future-of-drone-warfare)
and in any case the enemy will have a say in how useful these swarms may be. From an HMT perspective you can see how they can be assessed as being more efficient by reducing the RDEL budget but it is the effectiveness of military capabilities that wins battles.
Mark's point about broadening the context is spot on, and the Army should not be afraid to ask questions of other parts of the MoD, or other Govt Depts. After all both the RAF and the RN have done this rather effectively over the years.
A very important and current debate and some telling points made. The context should be broadened to include the other services or environments… for example the homeland defence point just in air defence whether air or land based has a potentially hugely distorting effect if taken seriously. It also involves a more clear NATO assessment of what it wants nations to prioritise and where… a debate in which we must fully participate - but also listen. I look forward to other comments!