Last month Sir Keir Starmer, Prime Minister, travelled to Eastern Europe to further the United Kingdom’s (UK) interests in the region. His first stop was Ukraine, where His Majesty’s (HM) Government signed a 100-year partnership with Kyiv, following the agreements of 2024 and 2020. This was followed by a visit to Warsaw, where Britain began negotiations to enter into a new defence treaty with Poland, building on the British-Polish agreements of 2023 and 2018. The two capitals foresee the deepest and broadest treaty they have ever entered into, reflecting their shared threat assessment in relation to the contemporary geopolitics of Europe.
As has been apparent for some years, Poland and Ukraine are increasingly central to British interests. There was some concern in British strategic circles that the new Labour government would overlook these important countries and return to the old British ‘default setting’ of prioritising the so-called ‘E3 format’ with France and Germany. Last month’s visit shows this fear may have been premature.
What is driving this renewed focus? To begin with, the relationship with Warsaw will be particularly significant during the first half of 2025, as Poland is President of the Council of the European Union (EU). It is thought the new Labour government wishes to change the nature of the relationship between London and Brussels.
This will not be easy; Brussels’ lack of geopolitical acumen may lead it to prioritise supplemental issues instead of the big strategic picture. And Britain seems unsure of what it wants from any new UK-EU relationship. Due to the pro-European inclination of the new Polish government, it is not clear if enhanced British-Polish relations will shift any dials in Brussels, but it would hardly be unhelpful.
But Poland and Ukraine are important beyond the EU. In Ukraine’s case, the reason should be obvious: with limited help from its Euro-Atlantic partners, Ukraine is absorbing Russia’s blows, to the extent that the threat posed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) by the Russian Armed Forces has been greatly reduced. Russia has lost over 2,650 tanks, over 6,470 armoured vehicles, perhaps in excess of 22,000 artillery systems, as well as over 830,000 casualties since February 2022.
In exchange, Russia has been forced to mobilise 7% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for war – according to the Ministry of Defence more than what it spends on education and health combined – all to seize and hold just 20% of Ukrainian territory. As such, Ukraine stands as a kind of outer bulwark for NATO, which is, beyond the ethical principle of helping a fellow democracy resist an authoritarian aggressor, the reason why the UK has prioritised keeping Ukrainians in the fight for their own survival.
Poland has also grown in geopolitical prominence. First, the Polish economy has expanded significantly since the 2000s; it is now the industrial colossus of Eastern Europe. In 2004, when Poland joined the EU, its GDP per capita was approximately one quarter of the bloc’s; in 2025, it is estimated to be around a half – a phenomenal achievement. Poland may never exceed EU output per capita, but it may reach parity with the rest of the EU by mid-century.
Second, in part due to Russia’s revisionist intent and aggression, Poland is now central to the new front line dividing Europe. It is no surprise that Warsaw has underway the most ambitious military modernisation and buildup programme of any nation in Europe: by the early 2030s, the Polish Armed Forces should be able to field six divisions, of which one will be armoured – due to a procurement of 820 K2 main battle tanks from South Korea – and four will be fully mechanised. Poland is also modernising its navy and air force, with three British-designed Type 31 class frigates, and 32 F-35A Lightning II Joint Combat Aircraft from the United States (US), meaning it will soon have one of the most potent armed forces in Europe.
Of course France and Germany – and Italy, due to the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) – will remain important to the UK, but Poland and Ukraine have joined them as Britain’s first rank European allies.
Over the last ten years, the geoeconomic and geopolitical centre of gravity has shifted to the east of NATO and is unlikely to be drawn back anytime soon.
At any rate, since the Kremlin sent assassins armed with nerve agents to kill British residents in Salisbury in 2018, HM Government has continued to take a very different approach to Russia to Berlin and Paris. Unlike France and Germany, the UK steered clear of the forlorn Normandy Format and Minsk agreements; instead it opted to train the Ukrainian Armed Forces through Operation ORBITAL.
Moving forward, the UK should strengthen its eastern partnerships. Both the new security and defence treaty with Poland and the 100-year pact with Ukraine should be seen as equal to the Lancaster House and Trinity House agreements, respectively, as well as the starting point for future cooperation.
Without a shift in French nuclear doctrine and a real German commitment to modernise the Bundeswehr, the British-Polish-Ukrainian trio will become more and more central to defending the open international order in Europe.
At this vantage point, it remains unclear the extent to which Donald Trump, President of the US, will revert to America’s pre-Second World War geostrategy of something approximating ‘hemispheric defence’. What is clear is that the new administration will demand – even coerce – European allies to do more to defend their own region; these ‘new realists’ intend to free up US resources in Europe to enable Washington to push back more forcefully against the expansive thrusts of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the Indo-Pacific. Should the new America reduce its footprint in Europe, the UK needs to be ready to work with its most capable and insightful allies and partners to plug the gaps.
This is where a stronger Poland and Ukraine will come into their own – along with the nations of the Joint Expeditionary Force (including Finland and Sweden, both now NATO members), and Romania – to hold the front line and maintain order in Britain’s own home area. By getting ahead of the US, London may be able to convince the new Trump administration to think again about the importance of the Euro-Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific.
So, just as it was central to the construction of the Euro-Atlantic area, Britain should position itself as central to its maintenance under increasingly different and difficult circumstances. Without stronger linkages to the countries which really matter in the contemporary era – Poland and Ukraine – it will be impossible to uphold a ‘NATO-first’ defence posture. The new Labour government is right to take these relationships forward; the question now is: how will it maximise their potential?
James Rogers is Co-founder and Director of Research at the Council on Geostrategy.
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