Is Britain returning to its default position on Europe?
The Big Ask | No. 18.2024
Over the last decade, the United Kingdom (UK) has developed deeper political and defence relationships with countries in Eastern and Northern Europe rather than prioritising traditional European powers, such as France and Germany. However, since taking power in July 2024, Labour has sought to ‘reset’ relations with the European Union (EU) and individual countries in Europe. In particular, this endeavour has focused on improving ties with Germany. The announcement last week by His Majesty’s (HM) Government on a new UK-Germany defence agreement is the culmination of this early effort. So, in this week’s Big Ask, we asked nine experts: Is Britain returning to its default position on Europe?
Head of the Department of Politics, University of Surrey
Throughout its long history as an EU Member State, the UK always preferred to keep its options open. In many policy areas, this meant ensuring opt-ins were the default position relative to binding EU legislation. However, in foreign and defence policy, Britain ensured that its individual bilateral relations with security-oriented European states remained strong. Long-standing accords underwrote these alliances such as the Lancaster House Treaties with France, or group-based defence contracts such as the Eurofighter Typhoon programme, or maintaining its own leadership position within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).
From HM Government’s perspective, European security is a collective effort, to be achieved through either a defence organisation such as NATO, or – albeit more messily – as a concerted coalition of EU countries committed to the long-term goal of coordinating, even harmonising, their defence hardware with agreed security goals.
The recent Trinity House Agreement – representing the sweeping bilateral defence pact between Britain and Germany – essentially extends the Lancaster House template of deep project-specific cooperation with Germany, looping in joint missile development, Baltic-based troop exercises and hosting submarine-hunting planes in Scotland. Where Trinity differs – and a positive sign for enhanced UK defence commitment within Europe – is the establishment in Britain of a major artillery factory by the weapons manufacturer Rheinmetall. Aligning defence industries, rather than just seasonal defence activities, not only confirms, but consolidates the British default back to Europe.
Dr Przemysław Biskup
Senior Research Fellow, Polish Institute of International Affairs and Senior Lecturer, Warsaw School of Economics
Surmising from the first actions of the Labour government, it seems that in the context of the worsening geopolitical environment its instinct is to shift post-Brexit Britain significantly closer to the EU’s leading countries in Western Europe by forging a particularly close collaboration with France and Germany (the E3 group). From this perspective, the Trinity House Agreement completes the 2010 UK-France Lancaster House Treaty and the 2020 France-Germany Aachen Treaty. However, the E3 consolidation is a necessary, but insufficient, condition for the new British strategy’s success.
Its sustainable success will also depend on parallel consolidation of ties forged by the preceding Conservative governments with the countries along the eastern flank of NATO (and the EU). In the aftermath of Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, these countries – from the Nordic states to Romania – have emerged as Europe’s new security and defence axis. The eastern flank countries not only share Britain’s appreciation for transatlantic cooperation but also a growing number of defence-industrial interests (exemplified by inclusion of the CAMM surface-to-air missile family into Poland’s Narew anti-air and anti-ballistic defence system). These new realities on the ground seem to be recognised during the first foreign trip of David Lammy, Foreign Secretary, to Germany, Poland and Sweden in July 2024.
In view of the E3 format consolidation and an expected UK-EU defence cooperation agreement, the EU’s eastern flank countries will insist on developing a decision-making model within this framework which will effectively represent the voices of all EU countries (including Poland, which signed a defence cooperation treaty with the UK in 2017).
Deputy director, Centre for European Reform
Has Britain really not prioritised relations with France and Germany? With France, implementation of the Lancaster House Treaties has continued, including in the nuclear domain. Likewise, in 2018, Gavin Williamson and Ursula von der Leyen, the then defence ministers of the UK and Germany, signed a ‘Joint Vision Statement’ on bilateral defence co-operation. The visit to Berlin by Rishi Sunak, then Prime Minister, in April 2024 also focused on deepening defence and security cooperation. So the new agreement reflects more continuity than change.
The new element in the last decade was Britain’s return to Northern Europe, neglected since NATO’s AFNORTHWEST command at High Wycombe closed in 2000. After Russia’s 2014 land-grab in Ukraine, HM Government rightly sought to increase its military contribution to Northern and Eastern Europe, both through NATO’s enhanced forward presence in Estonia, and through the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) with Nordic and Baltic partners. In Central Europe, Britain has focused on developing security ties with Poland.
The 2017 UK-Poland defence and security treaty, although wide in scope, has concentrated on capability development – reflecting the increase in Polish defence spending – rather than the deployment of British forces.
The UK now has a good balance of partnerships in Europe; the challenge is to resource them properly when budgets are tight.
Research Fellow, Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Brexit seismically changed Britain’s political and economic relations with Europe. Its wider effects will still sometimes influence the UK’s security and defence relations with the EU, but Britain’s strategic outlook on Europe remains largely in tune with its tradition. Supporting American leadership and acting as a guiding power in NATO.
In Nordic, Baltic and eastern NATO capitals, the UK is still seen as the most effective European military power. Recent domestic political instability was viewed as likely to risk London’s role in collective security, but encouraging strategic trend lines also prevailed. Britain backstopped Finnish and Swedish applications for NATO by providing security assurances during their ratification period. Since 2014, the UK has successfully led the enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) battlegroup in Estonia. Similarly, the JEF has developed strongly under British leadership. London consistently engages with other NATO powers to meet European security aims.
A renewed UK-Germany security partnership is positive for NATO’s northern and eastern flanks. Germany’s focus on NATO’s frontline defence is evolving through its EFP battlegroup leadership in Lithuania. Enhanced UK-German cooperation can drive a stronger and more European centric NATO to alleviate some United States (US) burden-sharing concerns likely from whichever presidential candidate enters the White House in 2025.
Freelance Security and Defence Consultant
The UK has recognised the necessity of utilising existing and future networks across Europe to the fullest extent possible. Britain’s recent bilateral commitment with Germany in the Trinity House Agreement also seeds potential to revive the UK-French Lancaster House Treaties. Such moves depart from the Eurosceptic trajectory expressed at the height of Brexit, but there is no set policy position to ‘default’ to.
From standing as a founding member of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952, calling for autonomous European security and defence at St. Malo in 1998, to leaving the Common Security and Defence Policy in 2016, Britain has been instrumental, yet equivocal on bolstering security and defence efforts in Europe. The UK’s pivot to Eastern and Northern Europe was as practical as it was ideological. As articulated in the 2023 Integrated Review Refresh, strategic decisions occur within a ‘more contested and volatile world.’
Assessing the current threat landscape to conclude stronger ties with France and Germany is the only realistic course for UK security. This not only breathes life into the illusion of the E3 grouping but also reaffirms Britain’s position as the transatlantic intermediary for integrated action. It is important to remember that the St. Malo position in 1998 was based on recognising the realities of geography and the limitations of a US defence guarantee.
While sympathetic to a Blairite position on drawing closer to Europe, the UK under Labour maintains the trajectory of a more global focus established under the Conservatives, only with more pragmatism and stronger potential for renewed international leadership.
Director, Democratic Strategy Initiative, Berlin
The Labour government’s EU ‘reset’ is welcome but, so far, rests on an outdated view of Europe. The flagship UK-Germany defence agreement will be a good step if it is given real substance and money. Given the history of recent UK-German cooperation, that’s a big ‘if’. It gets bigger still when considering Germany’s self-imposed fiscal strait-jacket, poor record on defence and failed geostrategic transformation (the so-called Zeitenwende). What is more, Germany has become something of an unconstructive blocker in EU and NATO affairs – obstructing common defence spending, tariffs in response to unfair Chinese trade practices and a path for Ukraine’s NATO membership. None of these positions are in Britain’s, or Europe’s interest.
Much like the recent NATO ‘Quad’ meeting (UK, US, France and Germany), HM Government’s reset ignores where the real action and real progress on ensuring European security and prosperity is: in the continent’s East and North, with Poland, the Baltic states, Czechia and several of the Nordic countries in the vanguard. Closer cooperation with traditional European powers such as France and Germany is good if it drives mutual, positive change, but it is also in Britain’s interest to recognise and act on the leadership being shown by other Europeans.
Programme Director for Security Studies,Centre for Defence Strategies
Is Britain returning to its default position on Europe? The Trinity House Agreement suggests so, as it marks a renewed, pragmatic approach to European security partnerships, distinct from recent turbulence in British-EU relations. The new treaty is set to strengthen UK-German relations and bolster European security by expanding joint defence capabilities in armoured vehicles and artillery. This ambitious pact not only ramps up defence industry cooperation but also enables German Navy aircraft to operate from RAF Lossiemouth, supporting NATO’s defence and deterrence efforts in Northern Europe – a key strategic priority for both nations.
As Europe’s largest economies and biggest defence spenders, Britain and Germany lead the continent in supporting Ukraine, contributing billions of US dollars in military, humanitarian, and economic aid. This agreement signals a major ‘reset’ in UK-European ties, forging a bolder and deeper UK-German defence alliance. Grounded in industrial and economic collaboration, as well as shared policy and operational goals, the Trinity House Agreement sets a robust stage for the forthcoming UK-German Treaty, anticipated to be signed in early 2025.
Professor of International Relations, University of Kent
While it has maintained its geopolitical place in Europe, over the last decade Britain has often looked to be less certain in the European role which it is seeking. In large part, this has been because the preoccupation with its prospective relationship with the EU has overshadowed the necessary clarity of purpose in its broader European strategy. The UK’s default position is to be a Euro-Atlantic power, maintaining a leading position in managing the international relations of Europe in association with key actors, primarily through alliances, and predominantly through its key security institutions.
Britain demonstrated its attunement to its core function in Europe by responding to Russia’s war on Ukraine by mobilising diplomatic and military resources to support Kyiv. Alongside Europe’s other strategically astute states, it understands that the new centre of European security is Ukraine, and the nature of the future security order in Europe will depend on the outcome of that war.
It is sensible diplomatic hygiene to have good working relationships with European neighbours. However, measuring success through the ability to reach agreements conflates means with ends. Consequently, the Trinity House Agreement reached with Germany will only be of value to the UK if it delivers meaningful additional security capacity for Britain in Europe.
Freelance political and defence consultant and former Clerk to the Defence Committee in the House of Commons (2005-2016)
The new government has explicitly presented the recent Trinity House Agreement with Germany as its equivalent to the former Conservative government’s Lancaster House Treaties with France, an extensive and deep bilateral cooperation on defence and security. There is, however, a further purpose behind it, as part of a ‘reset’ of relations with the EU. HM Government sees it as a step towards ‘an ambitious new UK-EU security pact’ promised in Labour’s 2024 election manifesto.
As with many governments coming to power after a long period in opposition, Labour has not yet fully absorbed the reality of priorities. It promised cooperation with the EU, bilateral agreements with European allies, closer working with JEF partners, and renewed commitment to NATO and to the AUKUS partnership.
It may not be possible or even desirable to achieve all of these. There is an inherent tension between NATO and the weak defence structures of the EU. The Strategic Defence Review’s (SDR) terms of reference protect a ‘NATO first’ policy, AUKUS and ties to the Indo-Pacific, the Arabian Gulf and the Middle East, so working with France and Germany in other contexts may be compromised. Everything should be provisional until the SDR is delivered next year, but HM Government needs to clarify its top priority. That has to be NATO.
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