This retained reliance on GDP or GDP per capita is silly. The qualitative composition of an economy (e.g., what contributes do a given GDP) is extremely important in evaluating any sort of power projection abilities. For instance, an economy largely based on services will not be able to muster the same military capacity as an equally large economy with a strong heavy industry sector.
Hence it doesn't really make sense to say the UK or France (let alone Italy) are ALONE possess a greater 'national power' than Russia even if they have larger economies in quantitative terms. It is obviously true that Russia has a greater *industrial capacity* as is needed in times of war, whereas the UK would have more difficulty transitioning into a war economy. Plus, a lot of the UK economy, especially in terms of defence, is integrated in and dominated by the US, taking away from its strategic autonomy and ability to act in a truly sovereign manner. By contrast, Russia has been 'sanctions proofing' its economy and bolstering its own 'independent' industrial capacity since the 2008 Georgia War. Thus, the UK's (and all of Europe's) power is heavily limited by what the Americans want. We could not conduct a serious military operation without American support. Even during the Libya campaign the UK and France were running out of munitions, and that was just an air war.
On top of that, in military terms this downplays the factor of manpower. If the Russian invasion of Ukraine has shown anything, it's that modern peer-to-peer warfare among technologically advanced militaries is very attritional and has a strong defender bias. The days of grand manoeuvres a la Blitzkrieg are gone. Even w/ the significant advantages Russia has over Ukraine it has been making progress very slowly-but its overall advantage has come from the overall quantity of soldiers (whereas Ukraine has had to resort to unpopular and poorly conducted conscription that has resulted in a massively lowered infantry quality) and quantity of equipment, even if it's older than what the west has.
The west, especially the UK and Europe, has a far smaller stock to rely on which would run out quickly in a war with anyone serious (e.g., not against a withered Iraqi Army or a weak Taliban, neither of whom could contest air control).
If it is even possible to quantify 'national power' (I think it is possible in a crude sense, though you'd still need a far more complex calculation than anything you've suggested here!) then simply realities on the ground clearly show that Russia, for all the aspects in which it is declining, retains an individually greater power projection ability than anyone bar the US and China.
It is certainly true that smaller economies can have distinct advantages over larger ones if they control certain commodities or manufactures, or financial services. We will explore this point more in future iterations of ‘Kratos’. But the idea that Russia has greater industrial capacity than the United Kingdom, as you suggest, is not clear at all. According to IMF data, Britain’s industrial output is larger than Russia’s, despite the fact that as a sector industry matters less to the United Kingdom’s economic composition. British manufactures will be qualitatively superior, as well.
I find many of your other assertions rather problematic. For example, I do not see how Russia ‘retains an individually greater power projection ability than anyone bar the US and China’ when it has failed to defeat a country significantly weaker and smaller than itself which is right next door. Russia lacks aircraft carriers (unlike Britain), has withdrawn from Tartus (its only overseas naval base), has witnessed the decimation of the Black Sea fleet, and continues to burn through much of its pre-2022 armaments. The invasion has come at great cost to Russia, a cost which will have a damaging and distorting impact on the Russian economy for many years to come.
This retained reliance on GDP or GDP per capita is silly. The qualitative composition of an economy (e.g., what contributes do a given GDP) is extremely important in evaluating any sort of power projection abilities. For instance, an economy largely based on services will not be able to muster the same military capacity as an equally large economy with a strong heavy industry sector.
Hence it doesn't really make sense to say the UK or France (let alone Italy) are ALONE possess a greater 'national power' than Russia even if they have larger economies in quantitative terms. It is obviously true that Russia has a greater *industrial capacity* as is needed in times of war, whereas the UK would have more difficulty transitioning into a war economy. Plus, a lot of the UK economy, especially in terms of defence, is integrated in and dominated by the US, taking away from its strategic autonomy and ability to act in a truly sovereign manner. By contrast, Russia has been 'sanctions proofing' its economy and bolstering its own 'independent' industrial capacity since the 2008 Georgia War. Thus, the UK's (and all of Europe's) power is heavily limited by what the Americans want. We could not conduct a serious military operation without American support. Even during the Libya campaign the UK and France were running out of munitions, and that was just an air war.
On top of that, in military terms this downplays the factor of manpower. If the Russian invasion of Ukraine has shown anything, it's that modern peer-to-peer warfare among technologically advanced militaries is very attritional and has a strong defender bias. The days of grand manoeuvres a la Blitzkrieg are gone. Even w/ the significant advantages Russia has over Ukraine it has been making progress very slowly-but its overall advantage has come from the overall quantity of soldiers (whereas Ukraine has had to resort to unpopular and poorly conducted conscription that has resulted in a massively lowered infantry quality) and quantity of equipment, even if it's older than what the west has.
The west, especially the UK and Europe, has a far smaller stock to rely on which would run out quickly in a war with anyone serious (e.g., not against a withered Iraqi Army or a weak Taliban, neither of whom could contest air control).
If it is even possible to quantify 'national power' (I think it is possible in a crude sense, though you'd still need a far more complex calculation than anything you've suggested here!) then simply realities on the ground clearly show that Russia, for all the aspects in which it is declining, retains an individually greater power projection ability than anyone bar the US and China.
It is certainly true that smaller economies can have distinct advantages over larger ones if they control certain commodities or manufactures, or financial services. We will explore this point more in future iterations of ‘Kratos’. But the idea that Russia has greater industrial capacity than the United Kingdom, as you suggest, is not clear at all. According to IMF data, Britain’s industrial output is larger than Russia’s, despite the fact that as a sector industry matters less to the United Kingdom’s economic composition. British manufactures will be qualitatively superior, as well.
I find many of your other assertions rather problematic. For example, I do not see how Russia ‘retains an individually greater power projection ability than anyone bar the US and China’ when it has failed to defeat a country significantly weaker and smaller than itself which is right next door. Russia lacks aircraft carriers (unlike Britain), has withdrawn from Tartus (its only overseas naval base), has witnessed the decimation of the Black Sea fleet, and continues to burn through much of its pre-2022 armaments. The invasion has come at great cost to Russia, a cost which will have a damaging and distorting impact on the Russian economy for many years to come.