To an aerospace engineer, the most important factors governing success are thrust, drag, and lift. For those within His Majesty’s (HM) Government responsible for delivering complex programmes, it is these three factors alongside funding – and politics. When a nation has space ambitions, funding and political ambition run the risk of being divergent as a result of planning fallacies and strategic misrepresentation.
In 1962, the United Kingdom (UK) became the third country after the United States (US) and the Soviet Union to operate in space with the launch of Ariel 1, a programme of six research satellites developed with the US’ National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). It went on to develop Black Arrow, a launcher programme which, despite being cancelled due to domestic economic pressures and political focus on other complex programmes such as Polaris and Concorde, placed the British-built Prospero satellite into a near-polar orbit in 1971. This enabled HM Government to lay the groundwork for creating a strong satellite production sector through a focus on research and satellite engineering and instrumentation.
In 2010, the Space Innovation and Growth Strategy set a target to capture 10% of the global space market over the following 20 years (i.e., by 2030) to establish the UK as one of the world’s leading space nations. This goal was reiterated by the 2015 National Space Policy. With the publication of the National Space Strategy in 2021, however, HM Government quietly dropped this target, with the British share of the global market stagnating around 5-6%.
Since 2021, the UK has provided an abundance of policy and strategy around space – including the National Space Strategy in Action, the Defence Space Strategy, the Defence Industrial Strategy, the Space Industrial Plan, the Modern Industrial Strategy (which also spun out the Advance Manufacturing Sector Plan, covering inter alia opportunities for the space industry), and the UK Space Strategy, which was published in September 2026.
Does the latest in a long bibliography of government guidance provide a foundation for future growth, and is it ambitious enough to meet national security and resilience challenges in the current geopolitical environment? Or is the Space Strategy the classic Punch caricature of the curate’s egg?
Before addressing that question, the political context is important. Since 2020, Britain has seen five prime ministers in 10 Downing Street, nine secretaries of state responsible for the UK Space Agency, and five secretaries of state for defence. With this comes a desire to do what is best for HM Government, but the inevitable burden on briefing by officials and a changing world has placed a challenge on successive leadership.
The economic factor
The Space Strategy recognises that ‘space is unequivocally a priority for the UK and for this government’, and that it underpins a significant contribution to Britain’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 18%. Yet, the technical delivery annex and opaque funding envelope remain modest relative to that dependence – and far below the scale of investment and risk‑taking now visible in near-peer nations and global commercial actors.
In stark contrast, the US allocates approximately 0.3-0.4% of its GDP to space (roughly US$80-$100+ billion [£65-£75+ billion]), with a heavy slant towards military capability. While America is an outlier, spending more than half of the global space budget, France’s National Space Strategy 2025-2040 earmarks €3 billion (£2.5 billion) – around 0.1% of its GDP – to its public space budget, whereas the UK spends 0.05% on space. Compare this to British welfare spending at around 10% of GDP and the well-clarioned 2.3% on defence. The UK may talk like a space power, but funding and its approach place it as a mid-tier player, mismatched to its economic dependence on space capabilities.
Having said that, there are several clear pointers within the new Space Strategy:
Defence and national security are now the organising logic: The largest lines (satellite communications and Space Domain Awareness [SDA]) are explicitly security-driven; a clear shift from 2021’s private investment framing. Additionally, prioritising In-Orbit Servicing and Manufacture (ISAM) and Access to Space is a clear signal from HM Government.
The Space Strategy is a consolidation exercise, not a funding boost: The value-add is a single, costed, trackable plan across the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and civil space, not new Treasury money. There are, however, several inconsistencies.
The funded period is four years; the ambition is ten: Beyond the 2029-2030 financial year, there are no committed means except select Defence Investment Plan items, leaving the Space Strategy’s later ambitions unfunded on paper.
Governance has yet to be tested: The proposed new approach to cross-government procurement using the Enterprise Space Category (ESC) has not been used, and it is unclear how the ‘One Government’ approach will be represented at cabinet committee level.
International space commitments
The above points also need to be set in a global context. Within Europe, Germany, France, Poland, Norway, and others recognise the operational advantage of space, as well as its risk to infrastructure failure and economic opportunity. Germany has committed €35 billion (£29.5 billion) to 2030 for military space programmes and is seeking to procure a large satellite constellation, as well as exploring offensive capabilities. France is committing a total of €10.2 billion (£8.6 billion) to 2030 for military space purposes, and Emmanuel Macron, President of France, has been unequivocal in stating that reliance on a third great power or a private space entity is ‘out of the question’. Similarly allied nations such as Canada have also significantly boosted their commitment to military space and, by extension, their domestic space sectors.
Beyond Europe, the case for space is not only a commercial and scientific one. Levers of national power are woven into nations’ aspirations for space. Jared Isaacman, Administrator of NASA, has laid out a vision to the Moon and Mars, partnering with nations that support American ambitions and values. This framing creates a strategic frontier where leadership, not accommodation, is the goal.
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) continues along a state-backed, highly consistent, step-by-step approach to the Moon based on its Long March class of rockets, as well as supporting scientific research through its own Tiangong space station. India continues to diversify from a rapidly maturing state-based space sector into a commercial competitor for access to Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and scientific missions to the Moon. These examples demonstrate soft power by other means.
By contrast, the Space Strategy emphasises ‘deep collaboration with allies old and new’ and rules‑shaping through international bodies such as the United Nations’ Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). However, it stops short of defining missions or red lines that would signal true leadership.
Conclusion
Taken together, the Space Strategy reads as if it understands the new space era perfectly, then chooses for Britain to participate rather than to lead. It describes an approach of competitiveness and intervention, acknowledges that space underpins a huge share of GDP, and recognises intensifying geopolitical competition. However, compared to the mission‑driven ambition of the US, the aggressive repositioning opportunities created by Russia’s commercial decline, and India’s confident nurturing of firms like Skyroot Aerospace, the UK’s approach is cautious.
HM Government has found the right rhetoric, and has delivered far greater transparency and specificity than previous strategies. This is welcomed by the space sector. What is now required is a willingness to match that rhetoric with investment, mission clarity, and risk‑taking commensurate with the economic and security dependence that the UK Space Strategy openly describes.
Ian Annett is the former Deputy CEO of the UK Space Agency, and spent over 30 years in the Royal Navy as a weapons and communications specialist. He sits on the Executive Committee of UKSpace, and chairs the UKSpace Launch Committee alongside his own consultancy, Celestial Fix Ltd., providing advice on defence and civil space matters. He is also a strategic adviser on space to PA Consulting and a Board Adviser to Astroscale UK.
This article is part of the Council on Geostrategy’s Space Power Enterprise.
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