Exit ‘Fourth battle of the Atlantic’; enter ‘Battle of the Bastions’: Part 2
The Memorandum | No. 48.2025
This Memorandum consists of two parts. Part 1 explains the importance of establishing a bastion in the High North to Russia and Britain; Part 2 explores how the UK can build the strongest version of its ‘Atlantic Bastion’.
Leading, fighting, winning
A more forward approach to the Royal Navy’s ‘Atlantic Bastion’ would require a number of changes to today’s posture, many of which are already being actioned. Integration will be key. The High North, from the Norwegian Sea to the Kola Peninsula, is a littoral environment, containing the borders of three North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies. The British Armed Forces will need to work together more closely, and even closer with Norway, Sweden and Finland, than they already do.
The Royal Navy cannot build a bastion alone. Royal Air Force (RAF) capabilities, including airborne surveillance, fighter cover, tankers and Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA), will play a significant role. The British Army – alongside the Royal Marines – will also be needed to operate in the mountainous and littoral environment of the High North to bolster the bastion.
In the battle of the bastions, the Royal Navy will play the leading role in containing Russia’s High North capabilities. Its tasks would be centred around forward patrolling of the Bear Gap to keep Russian naval platforms at a safe distance from targets in the United Kingdom (UK) and Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) in the North Sea. It would also contribute to the gradual destruction of Russia’s Anti-Access/Aerial Denial (A2/AD) network in the High North to expose the Northern Sea Route to interdiction and hold at risk key military sites.
Patrolling the Bear Gap will be challenging. It will be done under the nose of Russian air and missile power, and the maritime environment (i.e., sea state and temperatures) is extreme. Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) platforms will require staying power against both the Russians and the environment. Only those NATO platforms which are built for peer naval conflict will be able to contribute, but the list of said platforms is currently too short.
An additional point worth considering is the transit times from bases in the British Isles to the High North. Given the capabilities of the Royal Navy’s nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), Britain should discuss the use of Olavsvern in northern Norway for Astute class submarines. As a forward operating base, Olavsvern could help the Royal Navy boost the amount of time its submarines can remain on-station, though this would of course require investment to realise. The trip from the Barents Sea to Faslane and back is around 100 hours at 30 knots; to Olavsvern and back is fewer than 20 (plus time for reloading in both cases).
In a more forward vision of Atlantic Bastion, the role of the Royal Navy’s aircraft carriers grows in importance. During the Cold War, the United States (US) Navy would ‘hide’ its carriers in Norwegian fjords, cleared beforehand by ASW platforms and then closed off via naval mines. Vestfjorden was a particular favourite due to its size and location; in the far north of Norway, it is 155 kilometres (km) long and tens of kilometres wide.
Operating from Vestfjorden, the carrier airwing would be able to contribute to dominating the overlapping zones of the two bastions: Murmansk is 695km away; well within the 830km combat radius of the F-35B Lighting II Joint Combat Aircraft. This importance only grows when considering the limited number of airbases in the High North across Norway, Sweden and Finland, and that those which do exist are known locations which could face heavy attacks, forcing them to be evacuated until Russia’s ability to attack them has been reduced.
From the carriers, the airwing can play several roles. Firstly, as a stealth aircraft brimming with sensors, F-35B Lightning IIs can be positioned within closer range of Russian weapons than most other platforms. Whereas mass use of attritable platforms might fulfil similar roles in some theatres, given the logistics challenge of continually resupplying said systems to the High North, stealth has a premium over attritability.
Carrier F-35B Lightning IIs could then queue in other aircraft to launch weapons from a safer distance. With air-to-air missiles, the carrier’s airwing can also provide aircover for ASW ships operating in the Bear Gap. When they eventually receive their own stand-in – or ideally stand-off – weapons, they could contribute to Suppression or Destruction of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD/DEAD) and strike operations. As the hybrid airwing takes shape, further opportunities open up – for example, ASW drones can help to cover the Bear Gap.
During Exercise TALISMAN SABRE in summer 2025, HMS Prince of Wales achieved 16 sorties in a day with 19 aircraft onboard, and in Exercise FALCON STRIKE achieved 36 sorties in a day with 24 aircraft onboard. This may not seem particularly high, but other examples put it into perspective. The French Navy’s Charles De Gaulle carrier averaged 11 sorties per day in 2011 off the Libyan coast, and the Ukrainian Air Force – having been forced to operate in a more survivable, but less efficient, dispersed manner – averaged 25 sorties per day between February 2022 and August 2023. The airwing therefore should be able to achieve 36-72 fast jet sorties daily (up to two per 36 airframes, depending on a wide number of variables), plus a number of uncrewed system sorties.
The strength and capabilities of the carrier airwing will not be sufficient on their own. Close coordination with the RAF will be necessary to achieve the desired level of superiority in the High North.
This would be a massive boost to NATO airpower in the High North, where the RAF would be operating at long distances and regional allies would be operating in a dispersed manner. In the near future, carrier strike groups should find the time to exercise in this manner; the manner in which they intend to fight. Positioned in Vestfjorden, the airwing should see how many sorties it can generate, demonstrating to the Kremlin what it would have to contend with.
However, the strength and capabilities of the carrier airwing will not be sufficient on their own. Close coordination with the RAF will be necessary to achieve the desired level of superiority in the High North. Domain awareness will be bolstered by the E-7 Wedgetail, the radar of which covers over 400km. The P-8A Poseidon MPA brings a suite of ASW capabilities, and Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft can shuttle both long-range air-to-air missiles and cruise missiles to the region. However, the range at which these platforms will have to operate is extreme. It is roughly 2,000km to Bear Island from RAF Lossiemouth – roughly the same distance from RAF Akrotiri to Yemen.
Tanker support from its 14 Voyager tankers will be vital to sustaining the RAF’s contribution. Given the limited numbers of P-8As and E-7s on order, the ability to maintain a persistent presence will be a challenge. Providing the RAF with boom refuelling capabilities should be a high priority. It is also worth noting that in its air campaign against Iran in June 2025, Israel’s seven tankers averaged between them 100 air-to-air refuellings each day. Crew fatigue quickly became a problem.
Maritime strategy does not only involve the sea and air – the role of amphibious and land forces must also be considered. While the Royal Navy and RAF are already thinking about integration in the High North, the Royal Navy’s discussions with their land counterparts have barely occurred. The UK Commando Force (UKCF) – predominantly formed of the Royal Marines and attached Army Commandos – comprises the bulk of Britain’s cold weather warfare specialists, conducting regular training in Norway at Camp Viking. The UKCF offers a mobile and flexible littoral force to complement sea and air power – assisting in protecting the coastal ‘flank’ of northern Norway, taking and holding vital ground alongside occasional raiding.
However, the UKCF is currently not optimised for such a task. Firstly, its ability to deploy from the sea en masse has been severely curtailed by the lack of available amphibious warfare vessels. Secondly, the UKCF lacks long-ranged weaponry which could menace Russian forces at distance. As such, it should explore possibilities for acquiring long-ranged missiles, able to be launched from light vehicles.
Outside the Commandos, further consideration should be given to the role of the British Army, which has been intensifying its activity in Scandinavia. Particular note should be made of the Ranger Regiment and 16 Air Assault Brigade. The Ranger Regiment is a special operations-capable force designed for strategic reconnaissance and partner-building, which has been conducting significant training with Nordic allies. Rangers would play a key role in early responses along NATO’s eastern flank, potentially including activity which supports maritime efforts such as integration with the UKCF, counter-hybrid and saboteur activity, and supporting local forces along the Russian border and coastal regions.
16 Air Assault Brigade is Britain’s primary rapid reaction force, and in times of crisis would likely be the first major UK land force deployed to the High North. It could add significant firepower to the contested zone, such as its own organic artillery or the British Army’s Apache Attack Helicopters – the latter a capability which none of the Nordic nations operate. However, it should be noted that these forces are currently allocated to the theatre-agnostic Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, and hard choices would have to be made regarding resource allocation and availability.
Integration with Nordic allies is paramount, both in strategy and interoperability. The UK’s approach intersects with Norwegian defence plans and is illustrative of how a greater British focus on the Bear Gap creates deeper synergies with regional defence plans.
Following years of underinvestment and the Kremlin’s continued emphasis on its High North capabilities, much work needs to be done to ensure the UK’s dominance.
This is where the UK’s leadership through the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) is crucial. Continuing the expansion and depth of JEF training exercises, exchanges and minilateral meetings, as well as closer procurement coordination, will be a key avenue to deepening the relationships with Nordic nations and trialling strategies and tactics for successfully contesting the High North. The recent UK-Norway Defence Agreement is exactly the kind of action which is needed.
Ensuring the dominance of the British-led Atlantic Bastion will be one the most significant contributions to deterrence in NATO. It will safeguard the alliance’s nuclear forces; defend critical infrastructure, and SLOCs vital to the economic prosperity and defence plans of alliance members; and hold at risk key Russian economic and military interests.
Yet, following years of underinvestment and the Kremlin’s continued emphasis on its High North capabilities, much work needs to be done to ensure the UK’s dominance. Through a combination of ensuring the emphasis of Atlantic Bastion as currently envisioned is moved ‘upthreat’, and the Bastion (in its wider and more integrated interpretation) is provided with a primacy on funding priorities, this will be possible.
Such an effort cannot be undertaken by the Royal Navy alone. It will require political leadership in British defence policy to make Atlantic Bastion a national defence priority. Clear maritime superiority must be reacquired.
William Freer is a Research Fellow in National Security at the Council on Geostrategy and an Associate Fellow at the Royal Navy Strategic Studies Centre.
Matthew Palmer is a former British Army Officer, the Sir John Moore Adjunct Fellow at the Council of Geostrategy and a Richmond Fellow of the Royal Navy Strategic Studies Centre. He also writes in a personal capacity at Cracking Defence.
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Excellent article. Atlantic Bastion is a timely reminder that geography still shapes strategy. Britain’s position in the North Atlantic and High North is not peripheral, but central to NATO’s deterrence.