The wider European defence development and production landscape faces widely acknowledged challenges related to scale and fragmentation. The most effective means of overcoming these challenges is multilateral collaboration, but this is hard to push through with so many decision-making centres involved.
As the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) two largest European defence spenders, and building on their long history of close collaboration, the United Kingdom (UK) and Germany can not only deepen their own relationship but also act as continental leaders, bringing in other countries and overcoming over-duplication. The follow-through on the Trinity House Agreement represents a timely opportunity for London and Berlin to overcome existing barriers and requirement differences to identify how and where they can catalyse shared defence industrial objectives.
A shared threat assessment
Unlike some European NATO countries further from the alliance’s borders, Britain and Germany currently have a largely similar understanding of the threats faced on the eastern flank. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has since been accompanied by a continent-wide campaign of sub-threshold warfare, which shows no signs of slowing. The two countries also face the rising threat of the influence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and increased Russian and Chinese coordination, creating the possibility of a multifront conflict. Given the impact this is having on the global military posture of the United States (US), the need for a multifront mindset continues to grow.
Historically, both Berlin and London have had deep ties to Washington: the UK with its ‘special relationship’ and Germany as the host of the majority of US forces in Europe. Both are also deeply intertwined with the American defence industrial base which, should a multifront crisis erupt, Washington will mobilise towards meeting the demands of war in the Western Pacific.
This is already being seen with changes that the US has forced in the prioritisation of weapons order deliveries, delaying European countries’ orders as a result of the conflict against Iran. The UK and Germany have the potential to fill this gap in order for European NATO to ensure it has the necessary productive capacity to show the Kremlin that it could sustain a continental peer conflict. To do this, however, requires both countries to overcome outstanding barriers and, where they exist, compromise on existing requirement divergences.
Differing senses of urgency
It is clear that Berlin has now developed a greater sense of urgency than London. If Britain does not follow suit, it risks being left behind. Projected German defence spending is now set to consume one third of the federal budget by 2027. Germany is even changing its debt rules it has stood by so steadfastly for years to allow for more investment in defence. In comparison, under the 2026 Defence Investment Plan (DIP), the UK plans to spend £79.1 billion in 2029-2030, while Germany plans to spend around €184 billion (£157 billion) in 2030.
Additionally the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) provides a timeline to 2035. Many of the capability investments outlined in the two documents will come well into the 2030s. However, numerous estimates – apparently including NATO’s own – assume that the Kremlin will be able to mount a serious challenge by 2029-2030. A similar sluggish attitude has been taken in the UK towards increased defence spending: the DIP was delayed by almost a year, having initially been planned for release in the autumn of 2025. The plan is also not comprehensive: it leaves a £5 billion shortfall.
These urgency differences are not insurmountable, nor a reason against closer cooperation, but they are a hindrance. Unless Britain is willing to deliver more of a frontloaded increase in defence investment, it will miss out on near-term collaboration opportunities with European NATO’s largest defence spender. This divergent sense of urgency will also undermine both countries’ ability to bring together allies behind them. If this can be overcome, and it is ‘simply’ a matter of political choice and public diplomacy in Westminster, there are abundant opportunities for deeper collaboration.
Accelerating procurement
It is not enough to build an efficient multilateral rearmament effort; rearmament efforts need to deliver capability faster. ‘Peacetime’ timelines of multiple years from development to operational status and prolonged construction times for equipment needs to be reduced. This will necessitate a move towards investing more in lower-cost programmes and ‘80% solutions’ that can be delivered more quickly. Both the UK and Germany have experience in developing such capabilities – for example, the Raven air defence system for Ukraine.
Focusing on the bigger picture is also key to cutting through technical deliberations, preventing partners from getting lost in smaller – although important – technical and political debates over workshare and capability requirements, as seen in the delays and eventual cancellation of the French-German-Spanish next-generation fighter component of the Future Combat Air System (FCAS).
A deeper British-German relationship is critical to prevent recurring technical and political debates. More effective bilateral processes have already been established, but much remains to be done regarding unnecessarily complex regulatory systems that reduce speed through duplication, a lack of testing, and increased bureaucracy. Both countries need to work together to mitigate these issues and prioritise speed. Ultimately, overcoming potential technical and workshare disagreements will require top-down compromise from politicians in both countries.
Deep precision strike
British-German defence capability collaboration has already made headway into concrete capabilities such as Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), armoured mobility such as the Boxer, and increasingly on deep precision strike. Conversations between British and German teams have built the human and communications infrastructure to work towards milestones such as developing a 2,000+ kilometre range for deep precision strike. Looking forward, the UK will lead on producing a new long-range missile based on mature technologies, entering service around 2030, and invest in Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV) technology, which Germany is taking the lead on.
Despite these strong foundations and positive steps, there are still potential barriers to the delivery of these systems, as they cannot necessarily be delivered at speed (noting the 2030 delivery estimate), nor are they immediately interoperable – requiring integration with launch platforms for example. These complex systems require survivability, manoeuvre at speed, and stealth – all of which have long lead times, pushing back delivery beyond 2030.
Deep precision strike is an expensive business; one European countries have long been reluctant to fund and over-reliant upon the US for. One of the keys to reinforcing the work underway will be to unlock more funding, either in-country or through joint funding mechanisms. When Security Action For Europe (SAFE) negotiations reopen again, reasonable access terms for Britain would go a long way in unlocking further funding for shared deep precision strike programmes.
Additional capability areas
Nuclear capabilities and the space domain represent further areas for potential British-German collaboration, specifically where dependency on the US is currently excessive. Consider space capabilities as a case in point: with both the PRC and Russia taking steps to challenge the space domain, the UK and Germany should adapt, integrating space into their strategic thinking as previously done with drones and cyber warfare.
Likewise, as Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) increasingly becomes the backbone of all military domains, closing space-based ISR gaps is critical to European NATO’s ability to operate at scale in the event that US forces and enablers are focused elsewhere. Discussions are happening with Germany on joining ODIN’S EYE, a missile early warning system funded through the European Union’s (EU) European Defence Fund.
Like deep precision strike, one of the biggest barriers to space-based capabilities is cost. Duplicating the suite of American capabilities that European NATO relies on would be prohibitively expensive, but building in a targeted selection of multilateral space-based capabilities would bolster overall alliance space posture and act as a hedge against American distraction. Germany has committed €35 billion (£30 billion) over several years but Britain is lagging behind: the DIP only committed £3.2 billion over the next four years.
Conclusion
There is a great deal of alignment between London and Berlin on national security conversations, both domestically and bilaterally. Yet, despite these similar threat assessments and the shared acknowledgement of the worsening Euro-Atlantic security environment, a divergence has emerged.
Germany clearly now has a far greater sense of urgency, as demonstrated by its fiscal and political actions. The Trinity House Agreement outlines where both countries intend to work closer together and plenty of good work has already been started, but much remains to be done. Current and future efforts would be aided greatly if the UK were to develop the same sense of urgency. Through both wider and deeper cooperation on capabilities, Britain and Germany can lead European NATO in preparing deterrence before the point of potential crisis comes.
Ellie Drake is Operations Officer at the Council on Geostrategy.
William Freer is Research Fellow (National Security) at the Council on Geostrategy.
This article is the result of a half-day conference held on 15th July 2026 in partnership with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) UK and Ireland. This was the third in a series of events in 2026 that the Council on Geostrategy is organising with KAS to encourage closer defence cooperation between Britain and Germany.
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What do you think about this Memorandum? Why not leave a comment below?
I think the author’s are viewing the German defence sector with rose tinted glasses. Recent German internal coverage shows the German army and navy with significant problems in all areas including recruitment and maintenance of weapons systems and obviously in procurement. The fact that they have decided to loosen fiscal rules and throw money at procurement doesn’t solve underlying problems. A fantasy armed service is fantasy until delivered.
The lazy tabloid depiction of U.K. defence spending is also not useful. The government have been attempting to have a fully funded transparent procurement process, rather than previous governments fantasy DIP. Instead of “experts” applauding this they have joined the tabloid chorus line.