Russia’s regular bombardments of Ukraine, reminiscent of the airborne bombing campaigns of conflicts past, have been a reminder of the enduring nature – but evolving character – of warfare. European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), cashing in on the ‘peace dividend’, have long under-invested in air and missile defences.
Yet, to their credit, almost all European NATO members have, after too many years of feet-dragging, made significant strides in investing in their defences. Large orders of missile defences have been placed, but the recent Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace has demonstrated that cost-effective Counter-Uncrewed Aerial System (C-UAS) defences are yet to be introduced at the scale needed. The lack of C-UAS is a problem with multiple consequences, not least the threat to rear-area logistics.
NATO’s contested logistics problem
In the afterglow of victory at the end of the Cold War, NATO possessed such military dominance that it could conduct logistics efforts with almost no threat of armed interference. Members of the alliance grew too accustomed to this operating environment, and uncontested logistics became a dangerous assumption.
NATO’s logistics face four different challenges: limited infrastructure; limited lift capacity; geographic chokepoints; and limited defences. While missile defences are being expanded, the C-UAS capacity of NATO remains concerningly limited.
In any potential conflict with Russia, European NATO’s supply lines could face heavy attack. This would limit the alliance’s ability for rapid reinforcement and sustainment of forces engaged along the front line. Unlike during the Cold War, NATO’s current posture includes only small-scale forward-deployed forces; all brigade size or smaller.
NATO’s logistics face four different challenges: limited infrastructure; limited lift capacity; geographic chokepoints; and limited defences. While missile defences are being expanded, the C-UAS capacity of NATO remains concerningly limited.
NATO missile defences, given the range of most interceptor missiles, can provide cover over a wide area against the missile threat, while C-UAS defences tend to be more point-defence (e.g., much shorter ranges). Given Russia is estimated to produce 5,000 long-range strike drones a year, this is a gap which the Kremlin could exploit.
Introducing JSEC
NATO has recognised the logistics challenge, establishing the Joint Support and Enabling Command (JSEC) in 2019. But further action is needed. JSEC itself should be empowered to provide force protection for its logistics efforts, which would allow other commands to focus on other efforts.
JSEC is ‘a static operational headquarters with multinational personnel directly subordinate to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe [SACEUR]’. Its mission is to:
…contribute to enablement and help the alliance set the theatre for reinforcement by forces, if and when required. During crisis and conflict, JSEC will coordinate reinforcement by forces, and the subsequent sustainment.
Its activities are managed by a modestly sized force of 450 personnel from a wide array of alliance members. It focuses on establishing and coordinating a network of contacts, integrating relevant civilian, government and military stakeholders.
The case for a JSEC C-UAS formation
Considering the UAS threat to NATO’s logistics, and that JSEC has an unparalleled understanding of logistics pinch points and will be responsible for coordinating any logistics efforts, it is well placed to command its own force protection. JSEC’s operational experience and network of connections ensures that no other body within Europe is better placed to know where C-UAS defences would be needed most to protect rear area logistics. This leaves open the question as to how exactly to design, generate and operate such a force.
In most cases, NATO members generate their own formations, which they hand over to NATO via a process known as ‘Transfer of Authority’ (TOA). One option would be for nations to generate their own C-UAS formations, which they could then commit to JSEC. But, given the slow speed at which investment in dedicated C-UAS formations is occurring and that most C-UAS platforms will be dispersed among frontline forces, this may not be the optimal route.
An alternative path could lie in the example of NATO’s Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) fleet, managed by the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force (NAEW&CF). The fleet is currently made up of 14 E-3 Sentry aircraft, originally ordered in the 1980s and operated by a multinational crew of seconded personnel. The countries involved in the programme have collectively spent or committed £9.6 billion to date.
A similar model could be implemented to establish the JSEC C-UAS force (although it would need a better name than this, preferably without acronyms). As with the NAEW&CF, the personnel would obviously still need to be seconded.
Details of what such a force should look like in terms of equipment, organisation and integration within NATO command structures is an answer which would have to be determined by logisticians and air defence experts. However, a starting point can be outlined here.
The initial aim should be to establish a brigade-sized force – meaning three to six battalions, each made up of two to three batteries (requiring roughly a minimum of 48 C-UAS platforms, and a maximum of 216).
In use, each battalion could be concentrated to protect large strategic nodes such as port terminals, or could be spread out over a route – in particular, protecting fixed and vulnerable infrastructure such as bridges. This would help ensure vital infrastructure receives additional layers of protection, while simultaneously reducing the demands on longer-range and more expensive air defence systems, and thus creating a much more cost-effective air defence network.
Such a force would also need to be closely integrated with theatre-wide Integrated Air and Missile Defences (IAMD). It would also reduce the risk that C-UAS platforms required to cover frontline forces are pulled away to protect rear areas.
By coming under the command of JSEC, itself directly subordinate to SACEUR, this brigade would be a strategic asset. As such, the effort required to provide C-UAS protection for rear-area logistics would, in terms of planning, staffing, and equipment, be removed (or reduced) from corps-level headquarters, allowing them to focus on other matters.
The process for deciding the optimal mix and initiating procurement should begin as soon as possible. If this capability gap can be plugged, NATO’s ability to conduct logistics in a contested environment, epitomised by the proliferation of cheap strike UAS, would be far more secure.
Mobility, both strategic and tactical, should also factor into the design of such a force. Strategic mobility, in other words the ability to be transported by airlift or sealift over long distances, would be vital due to the long front NATO has with Russia. Tactical mobility, meaning that it would be best for C-UAS systems to be vehicle-mounted, will help enable the force to relocate its batteries as the flow of logistics moves with the course of the battle.
Two other factors should feature prominently in the design of this C-UAS brigade. It should aim to be operational as soon as possible, and costs should be kept low; difficult goals to achieve in tandem. This means that exquisite but capable platforms for the C-UAS role, such as the Skyranger variant of the Boxer Armoured Fighting Vehicle (AFV) – which cost £8-12 million each – should probably be ruled out. Should the traditional TOA approach be taken, this would be less of an issue, but part of the point of this article is that such orders have been slow to materialise.
There are multiple systems which could fit this bill. The TRIDON Mk2 is a Bofors 40 millimetre (mm) naval gun carried by a Scania truck; Moog and General Dynamics have partnered to create a C-UAS turret, with short-range missile launchers and a 30mm gun, mounted on the Foxhound 4x4; and Patria is exploring a C-UAS for its family of Composite Armoured Vehicles (CAVs).
The process for deciding the optimal mix and initiating procurement should begin as soon as possible. If this capability gap can be plugged, NATO’s ability to conduct logistics in a contested environment, epitomised by the proliferation of cheap strike UAS, would be far more secure.
Given the slow pace of member countries’ investment in C-UAS systems, and the fact that many of these will most likely be deployed to cover frontline forces, it makes sense for a pooled NATO effort to take up the initiative. It similarly makes sense for JSEC, given its unparalleled knowledge of logistics stakeholders and pinch points, to be the body which leads this effort and directs such a formation.
William Freer is a Research Fellow in National Security at the Council on Geostrategy and an Associate Fellow at the Royal Navy Strategic Studies Centre.
To stay up to date with Britain’s World, please subscribe or pledge your support!
What do you think about this Memorandum? Why not leave a comment below?