Finding a successful strategy for managing the UK-US relationship in the Trump era
The Memorandum | No. 27.2025
Ever since the re-election of Donald Trump as President of the United States (US) and the commencement of his second term, a new period of heightened uncertainty has hung over the ‘special relationship’ between the US and the United Kingdom (UK). Tensions between the new Trump administration and the rest of the world over perceived unfairness in America’s economic relationships erupted in early April, which included a baseline tariff of 10% on all British goods exported to the US. In addition to this drastic economic measure, Trump’s choice of rhetoric – alongside that of members of his administration – raised concerns in the UK after it was insinuated that Britain would not come to America’s aid if it was attacked.
Amid these actions, calls for Sir Keir Starmer, Prime Minister, to take a defiant stand have been swift and numerous. The editorial team of The Independent called for Sir Keir to ‘stand up’ to Trump. Sir Edward Davey, leader of the Liberal Democrats, stated that calling out Trump ‘was the patriotic thing to do’, as opposed to pursuing a more tactful approach. Although a bold and unyielding posture is more likely to satisfy those offended by Trump’s actions, it ignores how ineffective this strategy has been with other countries, and it disregards how antithetical this strategy is to the Prime Minister’s style of foreign policy.
Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of Ukraine, was honour-bound to contest false claims made by Trump during the infamous Oval Office meeting in February 2025, and was unceremoniously thrown out of the White House – a measure never before taken by an American president against a friendly head of state. Trump continues to demand Ukrainian – but not Russian – concessions to end Russia’s full-scale invasion of the country. This political and economic reality is what Sir Keir is up against. And, since the Strategic Defence Review continues to base national security on the assumption that the UK would not fight a war without US participation, a more cooperative approach is a more sensible course.
As June’s North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) summit demonstrated, allied palliatives – a glittering 5% standard for defence spending, a short meeting, adroit management (and fawning) by Mark Rutte, Secretary General of NATO – had Trump declaring that he loved Europe. The sentiment is likely to be transient with him, but it averted worse outcomes imagined by some, such as the repudiation of NATO’s Article 5 mutual defence commitment or using the summit to announce the complete withdrawal of American forces from Europe.
While there are tremendous upsides to courting Trump on a personal level, they may fall short of securing all of Britain’s strategic goals throughout the remainder of his second term.
There is a strong precedent for the success of this method from both Trump administrations. During his first term, Japan was held in high regard as one of the US’ closest and most favoured allies. This is largely attributable to the strategy of the late Shinzo Abe, then Prime Minister of Japan, in cultivating a close personal friendship with Trump. Abe’s efforts to foster this friendship included participating in seemingly unproductive activities such as attending barbecues, playing rounds of golf and enjoying ringside seats for sumo wrestling matches, all of which granted him unprecedented access to Trump. This translated into sometimes twice-a-week phone calls, a nullification of campaign threats against Japanese economic practices with the US and an adoption of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy originally conceptualised by Abe. In this case, there is a clear progression of the relationship from threats on the campaign trail to friendship, and ultimately the achieving of core foreign policy aims because of that friendship.
A similar process played out 5,000 miles away in Saudi Arabia. During Trump’s 2016 campaign, he criticised the country for not compensating the US for military protection, stating: ‘They should pay us…The primary reason we’re with Saudi Arabia is because we need the oil. Now we don't need the oil so much…’ Fast forward to today, and it appears that Mohammed bin Salman, Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia, has adopted Abe’s strategic friendship blueprint to great effect. Employing symbolic gestures, such as lavish welcome ceremonies and a royal purple carpet, backed by large business deals in the aerospace and defence sectors, Crown Prince Mohammed has affected a dramatic shift in Trump’s perspective, with Trump telling him during a summit ‘I like you too much’. This has provided Saudi Arabia with a real strategic payoff: the ability to buy critical defensive missiles from American defence manufacturers to protect its vulnerable oil fields as well as a $600 billion (£442 billion) investment deal, which includes access to Artificial Intelligence (AI) data centres in the US and partnerships with American tech companies to provide components critical to AI development.
While there are tremendous upsides to courting Trump on a personal level, they may fall short of securing all of Britain’s strategic goals throughout the remainder of his second term. While Japan managed to cultivate impressive access to Trump in 2016, this did not spare it from his list of countries affected by the tariffs announced in early April 2025. Japanese officials are trying to negotiate with his administration to affect a breakthrough without much success, although another 90 day delay was announced in early July. This strategy is also unlikely to subdue all of the tensions between the two countries during Trump’s second term. However, despite the shortcomings of the strategy, it remains the course of action most likely to produce reliable wins for Japan in negotiations with the Trump administration.
While this style of friendship has proven useful for Japan and Saudi Arabia, critics might point out that the actions taken by these nations border upon sycophancy. However, the style of friendship between Sir Keir and Trump need not devolve into the gratuitous flattery and obsequiousness displayed in the given examples. The Prime Minister instead has the opportunity to build a serious and professional partnership capable of producing results which will benefit the UK.
The issues which Sir Keir chooses to engage with Trump on matter less than his ability to frame himself in Trump’s eyes as a friendly face in the global policy dialogue.
For example, in a February article published in The Telegraph, Sir Keir called for Britain to do more to secure lasting peace in Ukraine, saying that the US plays a role in this as the guarantor which will prevent future attacks on Ukraine by Russia. Trump opposes this approach; he has ranged from skittish to openly hostile regarding American intervention in Ukraine. However, the Prime Minister already seems to be adopting this attitude with the recent UK-US trade deal.
The issues which Sir Keir chooses to engage with Trump on matter less than his ability to frame himself in Trump’s eyes as a friendly face in the global policy dialogue. Both leaders advocate for increased defence burden sharing by European NATO allies, and His Majesty’s (HM) Government’s announcement of an increase in defence spending spurred by Trump’s statements is a way to show sincerity in fixing this issue. With respect to public deal making, announcing to fanfare a large weapons purchase of American systems, potentially prioritising those which would help replenish the British stockpiles donated to Ukraine, can solidify the UK in Trump’s mind as a nation which he can work with, one which is open for business. Although this alone is unlikely to change Trump’s attitude towards playing the enforcer against further Russian aggression in Europe, it would give HM Government an opening to make progress with the US in creating the framework for a lasting peace deal in Ukraine.
It is important to note that this strategy hinges on the ability of Sir Keir to form a strong friendship with Trump. However, there are helpful signs that the Prime Minister will be successful if he employs this strategy. Earlier this year, for example, when asked about his relationship with Sir Keir, Trump stated: ‘I get along with him well. I like him a lot’, and ‘I may not agree with his philosophy, but I have a very good relationship with him’. This strategy also meshes well with the Prime Minister’s tactful and methodical approach to international diplomacy – he has already shown an inclination to taking this same approach in his dealings with Trump.
Reducing volatility and finding ways to advance Britain’s strategic advantage amid the geopolitical crosswinds which Trump creates is no easy task. But managing the US is often not an easy task for any prime minister.
Caleb Dixon is a research associate at the American Enterprise Institute.
Kori Schake leads its foreign and defence policy team.
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