In defence of the Information Research Department
The Memorandum | No. 25.2024
In an era where disinformation and so-called grey-zone threats dominate the global security agenda, the question of how best to counter coordinated onslaughts of hostile propaganda has taken on fresh urgency. Yet this challenge is far from new. It is heartening, for historians at least, that today’s commentators are looking to the recent past for insight which might illuminate the way forward.
During the Cold War, the United Kingdom (UK) took the issue seriously. The Information Research Department (IRD), housed in the Foreign Office, was created in 1948 to combat first Soviet propaganda and later propaganda from a wider range of adversaries and competitors. At its peak in the mid-1960s, it had a staff of 390 and operated as a semi-secret entity with a straightforward goal: to counter hostile narratives by raising awareness of conditions behind the Iron Curtain and by exposing competitors’ activities particularly in what is now commonly referred to as the ‘global south’.
In recent months and years, the notion of resurrecting some form of IRD has surfaced – and not without controversy. Detractors have been quick to criticise the idea, arguing that reviving such a department would tarnish Britain’s commitment to truth and transparency, or worse, sink to the levels of others by spreading false information itself. Yet these objections misinterpret both the history of the IRD and the potential of a reimagined version suited to today’s challenges.
The IRD operated in the shadows, but was not primarily a purveyor of lies. It engaged in unattributable propaganda: Her Majesty’s (HM) Government shielded its role as the source of, or its hand in the publication of, the information. This included providing material to journalists, working with publishers to support certain books, briefing and training foreign officials, and some covert activities. The latter – forgeries, fake groups, and controlled news agencies – has inevitably attracted the most attention. While it relied on deception, even covert propaganda’s central aim was to use a fake source to disseminate truthful (if selectively edited) content, including that acquired through secret means, in order to undermine authoritarian regimes and expose uncomfortable realities. Although the line between them blurred at times, outright falsehoods in content as opposed to source were few and far between. Crucially, therefore, any 21st century IRD would not necessarily be about spreading lies.
Critics also argue that the IRD was – and remains – unnecessary: the British Broadcasting Company (BBC) World Service became the gold standard for accurate news during the Cold War, while government attempts to influence opinion should be overt and acknowledged. Both of these positions are true, but the IRD never sought to displace either and neither would any modern-day iteration. Open and positive promotion of British positions and values will always take primacy.
More justifiably, critics claim that the IRD’s mission is obsolete in an era of abundant open-source intelligence and a vibrant ecosystem of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), think tanks, investigative journalists and academics. These actors play a crucial role in researching conditions inside certain countries, exposing hostile activity, and monitoring global disinformation patterns. Moreover, governments today can openly leverage declassified intelligence to inform public debate, as seen before and during Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This was obviously not an option during the Cold War, given that the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) were only avowed in 1994.
However, exposure alone is insufficient. The problem lies not only in uncovering hostile narratives, but in ensuring counter-narratives reach the intended audiences. The challenge is twofold: delivering credible messages to sceptical audiences and cutting through the noise of the information age.
Will naturally sceptical audiences in places which are hardest to reach be receptive to, say, the Defence Intelligence X feed? Likewise, it is one thing for an academic to publish a book about Russian subversion or an NGO a report on inauthentic Chinese narratives, but it is another thing entirely for that message to resonate where it matters most – among populations targeted by competitor states.
Here lies the potential for a reimagined IRD. Rather than replacing or duplicating existing efforts, it could instead complement through both advice and action.
It could advise, for example, on points of vulnerability, on who is best placed to expose or lead particular counter-narratives, on how to make the message resonate with the target audience, and even on whether to engage at all. This is an incredibly complex business with countless dilemmas involved, each requiring expertise and experience. When to expose something without it backfiring or giving airtime to the lie? For some targets, there is no such thing as bad publicity. Or when to expose without undermining trust in information more widely? If hostile states seek not only to persuade audiences of something but to induce paralysing cynicism then those on the lookout for disinformation need to be alert to the threat while not seeing it everywhere. Over-hyping, as one senior diplomat warned colleagues back in the Cold War, risked doing the disinformers’ job for them.
Beyond advising, the IRD acted in ways other entities could not, by being unattributable. They carefully considered the medium and messenger to help ensure that any message cut through among target audiences. Detractors may bristle at the notion of unattributable propaganda, but covert operations are already a fact of modern statecraft. Britain’s intelligence agencies already engage in so-called offensive cyber and intelligence effects operations.
With proper oversight, scrutiny, and authorisation procedures, a bolder approach to countering disinformation could sit alongside this, supporting broader strategic communications without compromising integrity.
And there is certainly a case to be made that SIS rather than the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) would be the more appropriate home for such operations.
Crucially, this is not a call to resurrect the old IRD wholesale. The department was of its time and had grown bloated and disconnected from the rest of government. It struggled to justify its existence as Cold War dynamics shifted, while its officers pursued some outlandish ploys which bordered on the absurd. Any contemporary re-imagination should avoid those pitfalls, focusing instead on complementing other, larger and more visible, activities.
A battle of narratives is won not by passivity but by proactive engagement. Today, hostile and competitor states exploit the tools of the digital age to spread disinformation at scale, undermining trust in democratic institutions. Without a coordinated and well-resourced effort, the UK risks ceding the field to authoritarian actors. Any IRD reimagined for the 21st century would not be a panacea. But it could provide the analytical backbone, strategic insight, and operational capacity to help reclaim the narrative – not just expose lies but tell the truth in ways which matter.
Rory Cormac is a Professor of International Relations at the University of Nottingham. He is the author of six books about covert operations and secret statecraft. His next book, Fakers, is a history of the Information Research Department.
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