A turning point for British-German naval cooperation
The Memorandum | No. 20.2024
Russia has, by its own hand, transformed the security landscape in Europe. In the post-February 2022 world, Europeans face an aggressive expansionist power in Europe, while facing threats to good order at sea in the Red and South China seas. Fortunately, Germany and the United Kingdom (UK) share much more than external dangers: their armed forces are in transitional phases, both in terms of reorganising current forces and in recapitalising new or lapsed capabilities. Given their cultural and linguistic links, their combined economic strength and geographic proximity, London and Berlin have an exceptional opportunity to cooperate further, not least at sea. The upcoming bilateral cooperation treaty, which will build on the landmark Trinity House Agreement of 23rd October 2024, provides the ideal moment to realise the prospect of deeper and more meaningful naval cooperation.
Just three days after Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine, Olaf Scholz, Chancellor of Germany, spoke of a ‘turning point’ – or ‘Zeitenwende’ – in European history. During that same speech, he announced a onetime ‘special budget’ for the German Armed Forces worth €100 billion (£83.5 billion) – money that pushes German defence spending over the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) 2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) target until 2028. In addition, Boris Pistorius, German Minister of Defence, has set his sights on making the German Armed Forces ‘fit for war’ – ‘Kriegstüchtig’ – by 2029.
A key product of this turning point in German policy was the production of the country’s first-ever National Security Strategy (NSS) in June 2023. Above all, the NSS portrays Germany as an indivisibly European and NATO power pledged to defend the open international order. The Federal Ministry of Defence subsequently produced Germany’s first-ever Defence Policy Guidelines (DPG), analogous to the UK’s Defence Command Papers (DCP). Indeed, the 2023 DPG and DCP are strikingly similar – both emphasise resilience, international cooperation and the importance of military-industrial partnerships.
This about-face in German defence policy comes as national policymakers come to terms with the threat the Kremlin presents to European security. In the maritime domain, Russia is an ambitious and expansionist power seeking to disrupt the status quo and reclaim the old glory days of the Soviet Union’s Red Navy. The areas where Germany’s wish for stability at sea clashes most obviously with Russia’s intention to disrupt and interfere, come in the Baltic Sea and North Atlantic. In the Baltic, several high-voltage energy cables currently service Germany, including the ‘Baltic Cable’ connecting Lübeck to Herrenwyk in Sweden. Not to be ignored are the Baltic Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminals at Mukran and Lubmin, now a critical part of Germany’s energy infrastructure as the country ends its absolute dependence on Russian pipeline gas.
In the North Atlantic, Germany is reliant like any other European nation on the uninterrupted flow of data through the many transatlantic submarine communications cables. Increased Russian activity over and around these cables has already led six nations – including Germany and Britain – to sign an agreement furthering cooperation in protecting underwater infrastructure.
In the military sphere, Germany and Britain already enjoy strong bonds. The German Navy, for its part, has stood up a new NATO headquarters for maritime operations which should reach Full Operational Capability in 2025 - the UK is assisting in this endeavour and already sends a liaison officer. The fact that Rostock, on the German Baltic coastline, is home to this headquarters indicates a recognition that controlling and exploiting the Baltic Sea, rather than simply denying it to Russia, is now the order of the day. In the air, Germany will soon acquire American P-8 Poseidon Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA), the first of which are scheduled to arrive in early 2025. Britain, the United States (US) and Norway already operate these platforms. Crucially, the German Air Force is also acquiring F-35A Lightning II fighter jets, with deliveries from the initial order of 35 aircraft starting in 2026.
While the German defence establishment is in a transitional phase, it is important to note that of the three services, the German Navy is the lowest priority for ‘watershed’ funding. The 2024 Armaments Report showed that €86.6 billion (£72.3 billion) of the €100bn special budget had already either been spent or committed to future projects. Naval platforms will receive only €8.8 billion (£7.35 billion) from this fund.
This reflects Germany’s natural and historical tendency towards being primarily a terrestrial power, and the fact that German sees Russia principally as a land threat. Greater cooperation can help each country play to its military and cultural strengths.
The German Navy has traditionally been designed to protect northern European waters; fundamentally, it is not looking to be a global maritime power. At present it operates 11 major surface combatants, three air-defence destroyers and eight frigates, the latter split evenly between the older F125 class and more modern F127 class. Five 2,000-ton corvettes complete the line-up. Below the waves, Germany operates a proven submarine fleet of six diesel-electric submarines. Additionally, it has a range of replenishment vessels; three solid-support ships, two ageing tankers and six smaller submarine/Mine Countermeasures (MCM) tenders. Finally, 12 small remote-controlled mine clearance boats support the ten crewed MCM vessels.
Current plans for 2035 and beyond envisage the introduction of up to six large uncrewed underwater vehicles to complement conventional submarines and up to 28 fixed and rotary wing Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles (UAV). Meanwhile, 18 ‘Future Combat Surface Systems’, uncrewed surface combatants, will complement the smaller corvettes. All these are merely concepts at this stage, with no design in the public domain.
The Trinity House Agreement has built momentum which the two powers should broaden, deepen, and accelerate.
The following recommendations are readily achievable, because the relationship and interests of Britain and Germany are already so close:
Britain should explore German participation in the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF). The JEF provides a framework for cooperation in the Baltic, Arctic and Atlantic. Though all its members are now part of NATO, it is a key enabler of security in the Euro-Atlantic area. Germany is conspicuous in its absence from the group.
Germany should be invited to join the trilateral UK-US-Norwegian Poseidon P-8 MPA agreement. Currently, this allows US Navy P-8 MPA to fly out of RAF Lossiemouth in Scotland, while both the Royal Air Force (RAF) and US Navy aircraft fly from Evenes Air Station in northern Norway. The Trinity House Agreement allows German P-8 MPA to fly from Lossiemouth; this recommendation is simply the next logical step.
Germany and Britain should cooperate wherever possible in the design and construction of the F127/Type 83 anti-air warfare combatants. As two nations with strong naval shipbuilding infrastructure at comparable stages of next-generation shipbuilding, this would be mutually beneficial. Joint acquisition of the Naval Strike Missile, perhaps facilitated by the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR), may form part of this effort.
Germany and the UK should assign permanent exchange officers on a German and a British warship. This would work much in the same way that the Navigator of USS Winston S. Churchill is from the Royal Navy, or the Italian Navy sends one of its Officers of the Watch to HMS Prince of Wales. Though the Royal and German navies do in fact have such an arrangement, the Royal Navy has ‘gapped’ this position for several years.
The Royal Navy should formally recognise and champion language skills. It would do well to embrace the attitude that all language skills are in the service’s interest and be proactive, by recognising and capturing language skills in service personnel as soon as they have completed training.
This is the way to build on the Trinity House Agreement of October 2024. The Royal and German navies should cooperate wherever possible, because moments like these are precious and rare.
James Shelley is a Royal Navy Young Officer undertaking Phase 2 Warfare Officer training. He writes here strictly in a personal capacity.
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