Unwilling ears: Where next for Britain’s China policy?
The Memorandum | No. 19.2024
Britain’s approach to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) remains as confused as ever. Although no longer defining the PRC as an ‘epoch-defining challenge’, the new Labour government continues to walk the bilateral tight-rope it inherited carefully, seeking closer economic relations where appropriate and cooperation on global challenges such as climate change all while pursuing an Indo-Pacific policy which is increasingly aligning itself with that of the United States (US) and others seeking to resist Chinese assertiveness in the region.
The limits of this approach in influencing Chinese behaviour to better suit British interests are clear. The interventions of David Lammy, Foreign Secretary, regarding human rights violations within the PRC and Hong Kong, and Russia’s war against Ukraine, during his meeting with Wang Yi, Foreign Minister of the PRC, a little over a month ago seemingly fell on unwilling ears. Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), met with Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, only days later with the two promising to ‘deepen comprehensive strategic coordination’, and the ‘NSL45’ were sentenced on 18th November. The attempt by Sir Keir Starmer, Prime Minister, at raising contentious human rights and geopolitical issues with Xi during their side meeting at the G20 summit saw British journalists ushered out of the room by Chinese officials.
The United Kingdom (UK) is more or less trying to ‘have its cake and eat it’ with this tactic. In raising human rights issues, London’s intended audience is not just the CCP, but countries globally which want to see Britain continue its historical position as a champion of human rights and liberal-democratic values. Geostrategically, Britain also has an eye to the US in wanting to demonstrate its understanding of and willingness to resist aspects of Chinese behaviour not conducive to a stable international order. All the while, the UK is telling the CCP it wants to enhance cooperation bilaterally and in multilateral settings. The CCP would not be blamed for wondering if it is dealing with Dr Jekyll or Mr Hyde.
To be sure, raising contentious normative issues with the CCP in official diplomatic engagements is something the UK should be doing as opposed to employing ‘megaphone diplomacy’ or saying nothing at all. But its words in this regard are becoming increasingly cheap, particularly as polarising issues such as British arms exports to Israel encourage charges of hypocrisy from the PRC and its broad supporters. The blatant disregard the CCP has for the UK’s concerns also diminishes the effectiveness of this approach. Further still, focussing on the areas of normative divergence in the relationship risks branding Britain’s approach to the PRC with a liberal-democratic iron which many Indo-Pacific countries who Britain is pursuing closer relations do not themselves associate with.
Less discursive acrobatics and more targeted realpolitik would do well for Britain.
For example, the UK’s latest acknowledgment of the CCP’s mask-off ‘use of the N[ational] S[ecurity] L[aw] to criminalise political dissent’ could have been accompanied by an accelerated path to full citizenship for high profile Hong Kongers currently in the UK under the British National Overseas (BN(O)) scheme committed to working on the cause and aiding His Majesty’s (HM) Government actively, such as certain ex-legislators. Lofty rhetoric around climate cooperation with the world’s greatest polluter who is itself vying for climate leadership at the expense of the UK in the so-called ‘Global South’ could also be replaced by the expansion of more direct, country-specific policies aimed at advancing Net Zero transitions, such as Just-Energy Partnerships and International Climate Financing. This would be a more effective way to pursue Britain’s national interest.
As well as raising contentious geopolitical issues with the CCP, the UK also needs to continue to deepen coordination with its key allies and partners in the region when it comes to resisting assertive CCP behaviour, notably with Japan and Australia. This is now even more important since the re-election of Donald Trump; continuing to rely on American cooperation and predictability in the Indo-Pacific is now riskier. Britain should not be afraid to continue to pursue its own independent position as a Euro-Atlantic native power with a stake in the maintenance of Indo-Pacific security and the region’s economic future.
And it should not refrain from seeking to do so in tandem with others and leading when required. This will demand more adroit political messaging at home and abroad as to why Britain will continue to engage the region. It may also require being sterner with America when it comes to Indo-Pacific initiatives related to CCP behaviour which Trump may be sceptical of, but which the UK would like to see prevail, such as AUKUS. A firm approach to Trump from allies has paid dividends before.
Britain is right to put its interests first in dealing with the PRC and be explicit when engaging the CCP about doing so. However, it finds itself struggling to shake the legacy of the ‘Golden Era’ as it ties itself in rhetorical knots in pursuit of conflicting goals which are impeding the creation of a coherent policy – even strategy – for continuing to engage the PRC. British pressure is not being heeded in Zhongnanhai, and a more concentrated approach across Whitehall is required. One can hope the promised ‘China Audit’ does exactly that.
Patrick Triglavcanin is an Associate Fellow in AUKUS and Britain in the Indo-Pacific at the Council on Geostrategy.
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