Future combat aircraft: How Britain can balance mass and development
The Memorandum | No. 18.2024
His Majesty’s (HM) Government is currently undertaking a Strategic Defence Review (SDR). But with tight budgets and a deteriorating geopolitical environment, the United Kingdom’s (UK) combat air capabilities are facing strain. Establishing control of the sky – in conjunction with allies – and then exploiting that control to interdict an enemy’s ground forces, and strike their key enablers, has been a cornerstone of defence thinking in the UK for decades.
However, the Defence Select Committee identified (as has the Air Chief Marshal himself) serious concerns that cuts to the Royal Air Force (RAF) has left Britain with too few combat aircraft to deter and defend against aggression, even if the current types in service are more capable than their predecessors.
The UK often opts for short-term pain with the promise of long-term gain when it comes to defence capabilities, but the current environment means that this should not be the approach today.
Britain should ensure it generates sufficient mass in the air in the short term, while at the same time balancing ambitions in the emerging technological arms race.
The UK has roughly 151 combat aircraft (120 Eurofighter Typhoons, entering service in 2003, and 31 F-35B Lightning IIs), down from 200 in 2017. The gruelling attritional warfare seen in Ukraine is a powerful reminder of the heavy costs British and allied land forces may face should the RAF and allied air forces fail to achieve air superiority and sufficiently degrade enemy air defences.
The F-35B Lightning II is Britain’s premier combat air capability and where the RAF should focus future efforts to generate mass. Entering service in 2018, the F-35B has been integrated under joint command into the RAF and Royal Navy. Currently, ten nations, including Britain, operate one or more of the three variants – A, B and C – of the F-35 Lightning II, with a further nine having them on order. Slated as ‘the centrepiece of 21st century global security’, the F-35 is widely replacing fourth generation fighters among Britain’s allies and partners. Having its roots in the early 1990s Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) programme, the F-35 was always intended to be a ‘jack-of-all-trades’, capable of accomplishing missions, including in heavily contested air space, ranging from ground-attack, to fleet air defence.
As the sole ‘Level 1 Partner’ of the JSF programme, the UK enjoyed significant input for the design and now manufacture of the F-35. Having contributed US$2 billion (£1.573 billion) in 2001, Britain obtained a 25% stake in the System Design and Demonstration phase. More than 15% of all individual F-35s (regardless of variant) are built in the UK. These early input costs will lead to wide reaching economic benefits. Analysts estimate that by 2046 alone, the F-35 will have generated a gross added value of roughly £45.2 billion and created 20,000 jobs in the UK – a strong reminder of the benefits of investing in the British defence industry, whether on sovereign or collaborative projects.
The F-35 is a formidable platform and is better understood as an element of command and control, rather than just another fighter jet. Through sensor fusion, it is able to collect and analyse battlespace intelligence, which is then communicated to the aircraft’s pilot and beyond. As a result, the F-35 has emerged as central to the ‘loyal wingman’ concept, in which uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) can be assigned by pilots to gather data or conduct electronic warfare.
Core differences separate each variant of the F-35. Designed for land-based deployment from runways, or even highways, the F-35A is the most ubiquitous variant. Large orders have reduced costs and the F-35A has the cheapest flyaway cost of the variants (approximately £64 million). In comparison the F-35B – of which Britain is one of four operators – is the only variant capable of short takeoff and vertical landing, akin to the Sea Harrier, allowing the F-35B to operate from aircraft carriers without catapults or arrester wires. The F-35B however, remains the most expensive variant at roughly £84 million per airframe. Currently operated only by the United States (US) Navy and US Marine Corps, F-35C was designed to fulfil carrier-based operational requirements, intended to replace fourth generation F/A-18C/D aircraft. Found aboard the US Navy’s nuclear-powered carriers, the F-35C relies on catapult-assisted take-off but arrested recovery. For Britain, F-35C procurement is a non-starter, unless there is a significant retrofit (incurring significant costs and time in refit) for both Queen Elizabeth class carriers.
As the likelihood of a peer-to-peer conflict rises, Britain cannot rely on a shared fleet of just 31 F-35Bs, even if the total rises to 74 by 2033.
As a potential solution, the Defence Committee in the House of Commons recommended in 2o23 that the then-government consider ‘the advantages that would be offered by a mixed fleet of both A and B variants’. Regardless of the fleet’s make up, uncertainty over future procurement has a knock-on effect for other British combat air capabilities. It is therefore clear that the UK cannot afford to retain this ambiguity on the future of the F-35 fleet. For industry, indecision by HM Government stands to cast the future of an entire supply chain into doubt.
Alongside the F-35, the long-term future of the UK’s combat air capabilities is centred on the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP). GCAP will see Britain, Italy and Japan collaborate to develop a sixth generation aircraft, with service entry set for 2035. Many have warned the financial assumptions around GCAP grossly underestimate how much the programme will cost, but those involved say that through lessons learnt on previous projects, costs can be kept down. Rough estimates suggest that GCAP development and procurement will require up to £50 billion between the three partners, with the UK having so far spent and/or committed £14 billion to 2035.
This is an expensive programme but one which will provide important capabilities and bring a suite of economic benefits. However, funding GCAP without negatively impacting Britain’s combat air capabilities between now and 2035 will require either an increase in defence spending beyond 2.5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or cuts elsewhere.
So what capabilities will GCAP provide? Understandably, many of the details will remain secret, but a lifesize concept model was unveiled at this year’s Farnborough Air Show. This model showed a large, stealthy aircraft with sizable delta wings, which will allow for an impressive range and payload. Large wings enable more fuel to be carried and the size of the aircraft will create a large internal weapons bay. Some said this hinted at GCAP being a missile ‘truck’ primarily focused on the long-range strike role, akin to the F-111. Yet a long-range and an increased payload also makes for a capable air superiority platform; the US is considering using the B-21 bomber in such a way, given delays to its own sixth generation fighter programme.
A longer range and payload will compensate for areas where the F-35 has limitations. Further to this, costs can be reduced by designing GCAP to complement rather than duplicate F-35 capabilities where possible, which makes sense given the two platforms will serve together into the 2070s. This could see GCAP acting as aerial ‘quarterbacks’ – directing other assets, receiving information from them, and carrying additional missiles. Against peer adversaries, GCAP aircraft carrying a number of long-range air-to-air missiles could keep the skies clear, allowing F-35s to focus on the suppression or destruction of enemy air defences.
An additional benefit of focusing on how GCAP can best complement the capabilities of the F-35 is in the export market. As already mentioned, over 3,500 F-35 airframes are expected to be delivered to 19 operators. If F-35 operators believe GCAP offers the best version of a sixth generation aircraft to complement their F-35 fleet, the possibilities for export orders (and the economic benefit they bring) increases greatly.
However, funding the full complement of F-35s (138) and the development of GCAP simultaneously will be a challenge for Britain, unless the political will is found to shift economic resources to defence. But, procuring a number of the less expensive F-35A and resisting temptations to pursue a ‘gold plated’ version of GCAP (by minimising duplication of some of the F-35’s more expensive capabilities) could reduce some of the costs. Yet this alone will not be enough. Some analysts will raise the potential for uncrewed combat aerial vehicles (UCAV) – a type of UAS dedicated to the combat role – to provide more cost effective mass, but UCAVs should not be seen as a silver bullet to reducing costs. Drones are becoming more complex and expensive and the command and control of UCAVs in contested airspace is a risk – as Russia discovered recently when it lost control of its most advanced UCAV in Ukraine.
In reality, to rebuild Britain’s combat air capabilities, decision makers face two options. The first is to increase defence spending beyond the planned 2.5% of GDP. This would be the most preferable over the long-term, especially given the myriad other pressing needs to regenerate mass, develop new cutting-edge technologies, and recapitalise enablers and industry. If this does not happen, then the UK will face tough choices on what to de-prioritise across the military. In this resource constrained environment, Britain should lean into its strengths in the air and maritime domains. This makes even more sense given the large-scale expansion of the land forces of many of the UK’s allies in Europe, in particular Poland.
Benedict Baxendale-Smith is an Associate Fellow in Maritime Strategy at the Council on Geostrategy.
William Freer is a Research Fellow in National Security at the Council on Geostrategy, where he works on strategic advantage and maritime affairs.
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What do you think about this Memorandum? Why not leave a comment below?
The key question is whether or not the GCAP should or will eventually merge with the FCAS program. It seems logical to pool resources amongst allies facing common threats, why this wasn't done originally is beyond me, maybe part of the then government's 'Brexit-drive' to separate from pan-European defence, but that surely is a secondary consideration now given the need to create economies of scale and expedite this capability in sufficient numbers to be meaningful on the battlefield.
This article, whilst “worthy” repeats much that is nonsense. The oft repeated line that the U.K. defence budget is too small does not bear rigorous analysis (the second biggest defence budget in NATO), neither does the comments about GCAP. We have an equipment budget of circa £30bn and much of the equipment renewal programme; T-26, T-31, Boxer etc will be paid for by 2030. We need less emotive repetition and more dispassionate holistic analysis in our military commentary.