Recent tensions in the Middle East have exposed a deeper structural dilemma in the United Kingdom’s (UK) defence policy. Operational readiness shortfalls have undermined perceptions of British leadership, while the economic consequences of renewed instability risk further constraining defence spending. A recent research briefing from the House of Commons Library suggests that the ongoing Iran conflict will intensify inflationary pressures, eroding the real value of current defence budgets and complicating the delivery of an ambitious industrial strategy. At the same time, Britain faces a renewed alliance dilemma: a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) that must either adapt to the United States (US) under Donald Trump’s presidency, or for the possibility of no America in the alliance at all.
Despite clear British strategic intent to mobilise industry at wartime pace, defence procurement remains constrained by persistent institutional inertia and fragmentation. In practice, this exposes a tension between intent and implementation.
The UK recognises the need for faster capability generation and greater industrial mobilisation, but it attempts to achieve these objectives through national mechanisms rather than collective ones. Nevertheless, Britain does not need to invent a new procurement model. Rather, it should better employ its existing multinational frameworks.
There is little resistance to the idea that faster, harmonious military procurement is urgent.
The Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) provides such a mechanism. A dynamic UK-led coalition of ten high-trust northern European states, it has proven its value through rapid crisis response, interoperability, and credible deterrence in the High North, Baltic, and North Atlantic theatres. It also holds considerably more potential; alongside its flexible operating framework, it is a structured procurement powerhouse. Already well-aligned, the JEF could aggregate demand, and procure primarily through the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA). This would deliver shared capability at scale, fortify NATO’s northern flank, and cement British leadership in practical terms.
There is little resistance to the idea that faster, harmonious military procurement is urgent. In March 2026, the UK, Finland, and the Netherlands issued a joint statement announcing a new mechanism by 2027 to pool demand, accelerate procurement of critical capabilities such as munitions, and expand industrial capacity. Explicitly open to ‘like-minded partners’, this idea is exactly what the JEF can deliver. NSPA could give it scalable procurement.
Europe is rearming amid rising threats, but fragmented national procurement risks turning higher budgets into duplicated systems, delayed deliveries, and fragile sustainment. The JEF offers a firm basis upon which to build.
The procurement challenge and next phase of the JEF
Defence procurement in Europe suffers from three persistent flaws: duplication, procurement delays, and inadequate through-life support. Allies routinely acquire similar capabilities – e.g., maritime patrol aircraft, air defence systems, anti-submarine sensors, and secure communications – through separate national processes.
NSPA exists to improve this. Such duplication misses opportunities to reduce unit costs, can produce incompatible standards, and leaves sustainment chains fragmented across borders, which ultimately undermines operational readiness. In a contested, complex environment, operating demands seamless integration, and these inefficiencies must be avoided.
The JEF is uniquely positioned to address this. Its ten member states (Britain, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden) share converging threat perceptions and a common strategic geography. The JEF’s very purpose emphasises pooling high-readiness shared resources in support of NATO, creating fertile ground for harmonised requirements.
By identifying shared needs early, say for long-range sensors, missile defence enablers, deployable logistics, or munitions stockpiles, the JEF can aggregate demand, standardise specifications, and leverage collective scale. This turns political cohesion into military effect.
NSPA: Ready-made, already-paid
NSPA provides the ideal mechanism for the JEF. As NATO’s primary acquisition and logistics mechanism, it manages everything from initial procurement and competitive tendering to life-cycle sustainment, fuel supply, airlift, and repair services for allies and partners. All alliance members have access to NSPA by virtue of their NATO fees. It would be wasteful not to maximise its utility.
His Majesty’s (HM) Government guidance explicitly endorses NSPA for multinational projects, noting its ability to balance industrial participation while delivering economies of scale. NSPA’s track record is strong: multinational contracts for Stinger missile extensions, Allied Ground Surveillance (AGS) radar maintenance, and high-ranked repair facilities demonstrate how NSPA aggregates demand into tangible outcomes.
One of NSPA’s recent munitions procurements shows it can operate at scale. US$11 billion (£8.2 billion) was spent on various munitions, including US$5.6 billion (£4.2 billion) for Patriot missiles, which involved building a factory for their production in Germany. This is an organisation able to do the business that NATO members require.
Imagine pooled demand for air defence spares, maritime surveillance networks, digital command systems, or prepositioned logistics modules. These enablers, rather than prestige platforms, are where aggregation can yield impressive returns, resulting in lower costs, faster fielding, and sustainment resilience.
The UK-Finland-Netherlands statement could lead directly to this. It targets joint procurement of munitions and equipment by 2027 to accelerate delivery and boost production capacity. Imagine pooled demand for air defence spares, maritime surveillance networks, digital command systems, or prepositioned logistics modules. These enablers, rather than prestige platforms, are where aggregation can yield impressive returns, resulting in lower costs, faster fielding, and sustainment resilience. NSPA’s competitive processes ensure transparency and value, while its multinational model distributes industrial benefits fairly.
Fortifying NATO’s northern flank
By building within NATO, a JEF-NSPA procurement pipeline would strengthen the alliance. Deterrence rests on interoperable, sustainable forces, capable of rapid reinforcement across domains. However, NATO’s own assessments highlight persistent gaps in demand coordination and industrial surge capacity. With increased coherence on the alliance’s northern flank, the JEF would deliver a more coherent capability package that could activate even before a crisis, from Baltic reinforcement to High North patrols.
This approach aligns seamlessly with NATO’s Defence Production Action Plan and emerging lessons from partnerships with Ukraine, such as drone sustainment and undersea defence. The UK-Finland-Netherlands idea, with its focus on munitions and industrial scaling, fits perfectly as a JEF prototype: by expanding it multilaterally through NSPA, it would create a regional force multiplier that enhances alliance-wide readiness without waiting for 32-nation consensus.
British leadership made concrete and credible
For the UK, this subject is about more than capability; it is about leadership. As the JEF’s framework nation since its inception in 2014, Britain has shaped its strategic identity and hosted key exercises. However, rhetorical leadership alone no longer suffices. The UK-Finland-Netherlands statement exemplifies the concrete action required: by launching a financing tool explicitly open to like-minded partners, Britain has already begun convening procurement cooperation among core JEF members. Folding this into a broader JEF-NSPA framework would elevate that initiative, positioning the UK as the indispensable convener for northern European defence.
This matters politically. Nordic and Baltic partners value not just solidarity, but delivery as well: coherence, shared stockpiles, reliable sustainment, and systems that actually integrate under fire. By championing aggregation from within the JEF and NATO, Britain would deepen that trust, sidestep European Union (EU)-centric funding debates where it prioritises value over access, and reaffirm its role as the continent’s agile security anchor. In an era of American strategic rebalancing and European industrial strain, such leadership would resonate from Tallinn to Tromsø.
A disciplined path forward
Implementation demands focus, not ambition. The JEF should start small, convening a procurement working group to identify achievable priority areas where needs align unequivocally. Munitions, logistics packages, secure communications, air defence enablers, and undersea surveillance could all be areas to build on existing equipment programmes. The next step would be to harmonise requirements through existing JEF channels, then route consolidated demand through NSPA tenders.
Governance would be straightforward: a JEF procurement board for prioritisation and NSPA for execution, with transparency on industrial offsets. Early wins, for instance a shared spares pipeline, build momentum; risks such as bureaucratic inertia or parochial industry lobbying are real, but would be mitigated by the bilateral precedent and NSPA’s proven track record. Over time, this could evolve into a standing JEF capability fund, mirroring the new trilateral mechanism but scaled for the full coalition.
The strategic imperative
Demand aggregation via the NSPA would transform the JEF from a promising minilateral into a European procurement vanguard. It would yield operationally relevant forces, a fortified NATO, and British leadership that delivers enduring value. The JEF has both precedent and momentum. In a continent racing to convert euros into effects, this is how northern Europe leads and wins.
This strategic logic is further reinforced by Canada’s increasing engagement with the JEF. Ottawa has recently increased defence spending to 2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), while Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada, signalled plans at the JEF Leaders’ Summit in March 2026 to deepen collaboration with the group, including on capability development. Canada’s involvement is strategically significant, not only because of mutual interests in High North security, but because it expands the scale of potential demand aggregation.
Together, the JEF and Canada account for a total defence spend of US$226 billion (£168.5 billion), representing a higher average share of GDP than the rest of European NATO. While the absolute figure remains lower than the combined spending of the other 19 European allies – US$333.3 billion (£248.6 billion) – the proportionate investment reflects a coalition of states already demonstrating strong political willingness to prioritise defence.
Such alignment creates favourable conditions for deeper procurement cooperation through NSPA. Canada’s direction for defence procurement and industry is harmonious with the JEF. It can only strengthen the group by increasing the JEF’s economic clout and enhancing its ability to act as a coherent, market-shaping procurement bloc rather than a loose aggregation of national buyers.
You can go your own way
Two further advantages arise from such a framework. First, it would expand the JEF’s capacity to support Ukraine. Aggregated procurement through existing NSPA-Ukraine coordination mechanisms would enable larger and more predictable orders to the defence industry, accelerating production while ensuring sustained delivery at lower marginal cost. The political agility of the JEF as a minilateral framework has already been demonstrated: during the first year of Russia’s full-scale invasion, its ten members provided security assistance equivalent to Ukraine reaching 1.53% of GDP, exceeding the 0.29% provided by the rest of European NATO. This exemplifies how an NSPA JEF-Canada framework would be uniquely positioned to mobilise higher, faster, and more strategically aligned support for Ukraine.
Second, the framework would mitigate uncertainty surrounding the long-term trajectory of American engagement in European security. Although the US maintains an annual defence budget of US$980 billion (£730.8 billion), its commitments are global in scope. By contrast, the strategic focus of a JEF-Canada grouping is regional, centred on the security of the North Atlantic, Baltic Sea, and High North.
At a moment when the transatlantic security order faces renewed uncertainty, the strategic question for European nations is no longer whether to rearm, but how to do so effectively. The JEF provides a ready-made solution.
While the US accounts for roughly 60% of total NATO defence spending, research suggests that only a small proportion of this expenditure is directed specifically towards European defence. Estimates indicate that replacing American capabilities in Europe could cost approximately US$1 trillion (£745.7 billion) over a 25 year period, or US$40 billion (£29.8 billion) per year. This scale of potential exposure underscores the strategic logic of deeper regional cooperation.
In this context, a JEF-Canada procurement framework offers a practical mechanism for reducing vulnerability to fluctuations in American commitments. By pooling resources, synchronising procurement cycles, and focusing investment on NATO’s northern and transatlantic flanks, the coalition could assume a greater share of regional security responsibilities without attempting to replicate the global military power of the US. This was the JEF’s original raison d’être at its inception in 2014.
At a moment when the transatlantic security order faces renewed uncertainty, the strategic question for European nations is no longer whether to rearm, but how to do so effectively. The JEF provides a ready-made solution. By transforming a flexible coalition into a coordinated procurement bloc, northern European allies can convert collective resolve into industrial power, and ensure that UK-led defence ambitions are converted into credible military capability.
Benedict Baxendale-Smith is an Adjunct Fellow at the Council on Geostrategy and PhD Student in Defence Studies at King’s College London. His research focuses on British and Australian maritime strategies in the Indo-Pacific amid American-Chinese strategic competition.
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You pays your money and you gets what you gets, and the UK is not paying enough. Productivity across the nation is low, government employment policies are misdirected, if directed at all, and defence is still on a back burner. The UK is walking into the same trap Sweden went into in the 70s and 80s. Too much spent on welfare and health and not enough on driving up industry, and, in particular, defence.