The strategic threat and operational context for British defence, 2024-2050

The Memorandum | No. 15.2024

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The security and prosperity of the United Kingdom (UK) overwhelmingly depends on the global maritime supply chain. This also includes the supply of critical components to the country’s industry, including the military industrial base. In addition, Britain’s economic and energy security depends on critical maritime infrastructure: communication cables, energy connectors, offshore rigs and wind farms.

Until now, the UK and its allies have managed to control the global maritime supply chain and lead the global maritime order thanks to sustained investments in their armed forces’ ability to operate at sea, from the sea, and towards the sea. This is not limited to the navy. The ability to control the global maritime supply chain depends on an integrated force approach, all services contributing to the same goal in a multi-domain environment.

Yet, the forces of authoritarianism, including states and their non-state proxies, are increasingly disrupting the global maritime supply chain. In the foreseeable future, these disruptions are likely to further increase in the context of geopolitical competition at the systemic level.

Those malign actors are increasingly able to harness the power of new and emerging disruptive technologies: asymmetrical technologies such as drones, missiles, and Artificial Intelligence (AI)-assisted intelligence gathering and decision-making. This makes it more challenging for the UK and its allies to secure global maritime supply chains and to project power from the sea (theatre access). Based on this, the upcoming Strategic Defence Review (SDR) must clearly place the sea and the ‘maritime domain’ at its core and acknowledge from the start that the UK should prioritise the defence of global maritime trade routes and, more broadly, the ability of Britain and its allies to maintain their leadership of the global maritime order.

Consequently, and accounting for the other priorities, UK defence should be capable of fulfilling the following core roles:

• Defence of the realm: ‘Deter, defend and compete across all domains’ and across the full spectrum from peace to sub-threshold to war;

• Defence of the global maritime order: Contribute to a free and stable maritime order, by protecting and defending the sea lanes of communication, critical maritime infrastructures and global maritime supply chains; and

• Defence of the European continent: The UK cannot be safe, prosperous and free if its European allies are not.

Focusing on the second priority role (the defence of the global maritime order), the following defence functions are required in peacetime:

• Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA);

• Protection of global sea lanes of communication;

• Prepositioning, Posturing, Naval diplomacy;

• Sustain sea control in contested environments;

• Gain and maintain subthreshold and low-intensity warfare advantage at and from the sea; and 

• Constabulary function and maritime policing.

Additionally, in times of crisis or war, these functions should be complemented by:

• Establish sea control in highly contested environments;

• Deny adversaries the use of the sea;

• Secure theatre access;

• Power and forces projection (including logistics).

However, Britain is facing critical gaps in its defence capabilities, with the Royal Navy’s resources already being overstretched. Warships are agile and versatile, but they cannot be in two places at once; there are simply not enough warships to fulfil the necessary roles and functions.

It is imperative to allocate enough resources to fill in the ‘platform gap’ in the Royal Navy. His Majesty’s (HM) Government must make decisions today for the Royal Navy to be ready in 15-20 years, because of the long procurement cycle for naval platforms. Additionally, the introduction of autonomous/uncrewed vessels or fleet components will be key to improve MDA and effect-based operations from the sea.

The lack of adequate resources means that the division of tasks within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is necessary: therefore the SDR ought to ask the key question: what is the comparative advantage of the British Armed Forces and what can they offer to NATO? This is what Britain needs to prioritise, since the nation’s security depends on the alliance’s collective strength and resilience.

So what does the UK have a comparative advantage in? Alongside the US, Britain has a comparative advantage in providing capabilities for sea control and power projection from the sea. By strengthening the UK’s capacity to produce strategic effects at and from the sea, Britain will contribute to decreasing pressure on European NATO members in this area, thus freeing resources for their focus on land-based continental defence.

To sustain dominance over the global maritime order, an integrated force will have to secure and sustain warfare advantage at and from the sea.

To that effect, it is necessary to evaluate opportunities and benefits and the costs, requirements and risks associated with a targeted introduction of uncrewed/autonomous vessels and systems to add value in terms of MDA, and accelerated decision-making cycles for effects-based operations from the sea.

Uncrewed capabilities are on average less expensive to develop and procure than the Royal Navy’s more conventional capabilities. This‌ may result in more capabilities being available for missions and operations (especially for below-the-threshold functions), offsetting current gaps caused by the limited numbers of conventional warships. The adoption of uncrewed/autonomous fleets will contribute to the Royal Navy’s cyber and AI transition, which is likely to define and constrain war and warfare in the 21st century. Yet, this needs to follow a careful risk assessment process.

Information dominance and resilience in the maritime domain will be key to many operational functions and for domination across domains: ‘A prioritisation of needs (in terms of systems to defend and information to obtain) and the timely adoption of relevant technologies will enable warships to develop a large degree of communication, information, and cyber resilience, allowing command, control and communication (C3) to be efficient even in the case of cyber-attacks.’

AI and machine learning are being successfully used to enhance decision-making and targeting. This can provide asymmetrical options (as seen in Ukraine) but can also contribute to multi-domain integrated force structure operations. Indeed, as discussed with colleagues, ‘AI-enhanced networking of information’ (i.e., increased quantity and quality of information and its fast and continuous sharing between systems and platforms) enables an integrated but decentralised C3 system and an enhanced ‘common operational picture’ and information dominance. This eventually improves combat efficiency (speed and precision) and enables conducting effects-based operations, e.g., strikes which will have a disproportionate effect on the enemy command-and-control structure and paralyse its decision-making cycle.’ For the Royal Navy’s future (high intensity) operations, this can prove crucial to get the upper hand against any type of opponents.

Finally, Britain should focus on strengthening its relationship with allies and partners to enhance the country’s strategic strength. The UK’s security relies on the collective leadership of nations which wish to uphold the free and stable maritime order. To maintain this crucial dominance, the UK should:

• Establish an efficient division of tasks within NATO. Britain has a comparative advantage in the ‘maritime’, whereas the defence of the continent on land should rest on other European members;

• Act as a net provider of maritime security and maritime security capacity building to like-minded states at the global level – this requires necessary investments; and

• Reach out to ‘swing states’ beyond NATO, which have clear benefits of working with Britain to address common challenges in the maritime domain. In particular, countries which have strong maritime interests, such as Indonesia, Brazil and India, are reliant on a free and stable maritime order.

Each service should kick off the process of moving away from the notion of ‘one domain contributing to an integrated force’ towards ‘an integrated force contributing to multi-domain operations.’ If the UK wants to fulfil its defence objectives (as per the above), it is crucial to adopt a truly integrated, holistic, one-domain, one force model of planning, procurement, and fighting.

Each service should reflect on their contribution to the collective objectives, priorities and functions of UK defence. That is why the defence of the global maritime order depends not only on the Royal Navy but on the contribution of all services across physical and non-physical domains.

Prof. Basil Germond is the Co-Director of Lancaster University’s Security Research Institute and a Professor of International Security in the Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion. He is also a Visiting Fellow at the Royal Navy Strategic Studies Centre.

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