An interesting article. Distancing from US dependency should be pursued as quickly as possible. For that reason I believe the decision to purchase F35A Lightnings for a future UK tactical nuclear capability is an expensive strategic mistake. I understand all of the tactical nuclear weapons will be under US control at all times with use subject to the agreement of the US President. Does anyone really think that the US would authorise non-US use given their reluctance to support engagement in the Ukraine war. Although 'operationally independent' even the UK's strategic deterrent delivery system is vulnerable to being 'recalled' if the UK diverges too far from US interests.
This is exactly right. Our existing dependence on the US for our strategic nuclear capability already raises questions about its credibility. The point about needing a sub-strategic capability is right, but expanding US dependence to pursue it is not very… strategic.
An interesting article but there is a gross insufficiency for funding defence in its current parlous state. Having sat on the NPG for a number of years this is academic as things stand. The F35A purchase is not clever when Tempest should be the primary capability thereby ensuring sovereign control which does not exist with the US about-turn in so much.
Besides that, the US has four US Air Force bases in UK, some with bombers equipped with nuclear weapons, a US Air Force base in Incirlik, Turkey with nuclear weapons, and who knows how many nuclear submarines attached to the Sixth Fleet of the US Navy floating around undetected in the Mediterranean Sea, all with Tomahawk cruise missiles with nuclear weapons. The Russians are well aware of all this.
How or why would Putin invade Eastern or Western Europe when he can’t even prevail in Ukraine after four years of missiles, drones, mercenaries, and hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers? The whole concept of him invading Europe is absurd.
I must however point to some misunderstandings regarding the French deterrent.
While French doctrine does NOT recognize any interest in the idea of gradual escalation, and relies instead on last warning followed by immediate and absolute final escalation, France does retain the option of sub-strategic strikes.
This possibility is offered by the Tête Nucléaire Aéroportée, or TNA, which arms the ASMP-A cruise missile, itself operated from French Rafales (both in the Armée de l'Air and in the Marine Nationale, the latter providing nuclear options from the Chartles-de-Gaulle carrier).
TNA is an ajustable warhead, with a maximum power of 300 kt. But it can be limited to an ouput of 120 kt, officially (possibly smaller?).
120 kt is not big enough for a strategic strike. And while it is superior to what is usually referred to as "tactical nukes" (roughly 50 to 100 kt), it can certainly be referred to as "sub-strategic".
In other words, just because French doctrine says one thing, does not mean France is unable to do something else entirely.
I fail to see how Britain's " operationally independent strategic nuclear force assigned to NATO" provides any advantage.
First, "operationally independent" is jargon for "not independent", if I may stress. I do not need to dwelve on this aspect.
Second, is it operationally independent, or is it assigned to NATO? Those seem to be mutually exclusive ideas. If a decision by the British government is submitted to NATO consultation, NATO consensus or NATO agreed-upon intesrest, then it cannot be said to be independent. Because conditions will apply to the British decision-making process.
Furthermore, it certainly did not escape you that the very idea of NATO is being questioned. POTUS made it quite clear that he does not feel bound to any responsibility regarding the security of Europe. And his Secretary of State followed up, explaining that the USA's engagements towards Europe would have to be re-examined.
As it stands, anyway, Britain's deterrent is purely strategic and oceanic, and I do not see a reliable cause to believe that the UK would consider Eastern or Northern European interests to be so fundamental to the British nation as to justify using its deterrent, and to then call for massive retaliation onto the UK. Britain is a rater small territory when compared to the consequences of massive strategic strikes, so who would believe that the existence of the UK and its people would be put on the balance to protect Talinn or Vilnius?
That is certainly where the proposition of a sub-strategic deterrent becomes useful.
I've long concluded that the UK and Germany are bound to cooperate in the development of missiles providing a continental deterrent, regardless of the bomb's actual power. That is because Trident makes the UK's intercontinental deterrent dependent on the US, and considering uncertainty in the strategic relationship, it is a good idea to seek independent means of delivery on a continental scale, where threats are the most obvious.
But does this mean seeking sub-strategic capabilities? If one believes in gradual escalation that could somehow be controlled, maybe so.
I'm a follower of the French doctrine on this, I think any use of any nucloear weapon ends with total Apocalypse. But still, we can discuss the matter, theoretically.
Would Central European countries like Poland agree to British tactical nukes exploding on their land? I doubt it, especially if the UK decides on its own. Would the UK risk total retaliation to stop an invasion in Poland? Maybe, maybe not. Would those countries agree to have British nukes on their land that they would hold no decision power over? I doubt it, again, they'd be seeking some kind of double-key agreement like they thought they could have with the US. Would they seek to be transferred both the weapons and the power to put them into action? They'd try, no doubt, in clear violation of the NPT. And it would be irresponsible to let them have it.
Somehow, the new French concept of "advanced detterence" seems workable and credible, because it relies on non-negotiable unity of French detterence means and decision-making. France will not negotiate with others during a crisis before making up its mind on firing nukes or not. The idea is rather to forge a shared understanding of the situations which should require the use of France's detterent to protect others. But that comes long before the crisis, and cannot be rediscussed during the crisis. It's basically a form of courtesy, and a way to improve thinking in advance. But it comes with no strings attached regarding the sovereign nature of the French decision. That is in fact substantially different from a dtterent "assgned to NATO" or to post-NATO alliances.
Those who wish to benefit from the French umbrella must only accept two things: to contribute to the conventional aspect of implementing the French detterent (providing fighters for nuclear raids, or investing in forward detection structures); and they must agree to harbour some French weapons, not so much because it's better to have them placed forward, but because then those countries become targets for an enemy seeking to destroy a dispersed French detterent. You get the umbrella, you must get some of the risk as well. But you do not get a say in how the button will be or will not be pressed.
The UK seems a very long way from this. For now, I think investing in a strictly continental-ranged vectors is the best idea. It safeguards the UK's independance from American impredictability. The issue of sub-strategic options to protect others is much too complex for the short term.
An interesting article. Distancing from US dependency should be pursued as quickly as possible. For that reason I believe the decision to purchase F35A Lightnings for a future UK tactical nuclear capability is an expensive strategic mistake. I understand all of the tactical nuclear weapons will be under US control at all times with use subject to the agreement of the US President. Does anyone really think that the US would authorise non-US use given their reluctance to support engagement in the Ukraine war. Although 'operationally independent' even the UK's strategic deterrent delivery system is vulnerable to being 'recalled' if the UK diverges too far from US interests.
This is exactly right. Our existing dependence on the US for our strategic nuclear capability already raises questions about its credibility. The point about needing a sub-strategic capability is right, but expanding US dependence to pursue it is not very… strategic.
An interesting article but there is a gross insufficiency for funding defence in its current parlous state. Having sat on the NPG for a number of years this is academic as things stand. The F35A purchase is not clever when Tempest should be the primary capability thereby ensuring sovereign control which does not exist with the US about-turn in so much.
Besides that, the US has four US Air Force bases in UK, some with bombers equipped with nuclear weapons, a US Air Force base in Incirlik, Turkey with nuclear weapons, and who knows how many nuclear submarines attached to the Sixth Fleet of the US Navy floating around undetected in the Mediterranean Sea, all with Tomahawk cruise missiles with nuclear weapons. The Russians are well aware of all this.
How or why would Putin invade Eastern or Western Europe when he can’t even prevail in Ukraine after four years of missiles, drones, mercenaries, and hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers? The whole concept of him invading Europe is absurd.
A very interesting paper, thanks for sharing it.
I must however point to some misunderstandings regarding the French deterrent.
While French doctrine does NOT recognize any interest in the idea of gradual escalation, and relies instead on last warning followed by immediate and absolute final escalation, France does retain the option of sub-strategic strikes.
This possibility is offered by the Tête Nucléaire Aéroportée, or TNA, which arms the ASMP-A cruise missile, itself operated from French Rafales (both in the Armée de l'Air and in the Marine Nationale, the latter providing nuclear options from the Chartles-de-Gaulle carrier).
TNA is an ajustable warhead, with a maximum power of 300 kt. But it can be limited to an ouput of 120 kt, officially (possibly smaller?).
120 kt is not big enough for a strategic strike. And while it is superior to what is usually referred to as "tactical nukes" (roughly 50 to 100 kt), it can certainly be referred to as "sub-strategic".
In other words, just because French doctrine says one thing, does not mean France is unable to do something else entirely.
I fail to see how Britain's " operationally independent strategic nuclear force assigned to NATO" provides any advantage.
First, "operationally independent" is jargon for "not independent", if I may stress. I do not need to dwelve on this aspect.
Second, is it operationally independent, or is it assigned to NATO? Those seem to be mutually exclusive ideas. If a decision by the British government is submitted to NATO consultation, NATO consensus or NATO agreed-upon intesrest, then it cannot be said to be independent. Because conditions will apply to the British decision-making process.
Furthermore, it certainly did not escape you that the very idea of NATO is being questioned. POTUS made it quite clear that he does not feel bound to any responsibility regarding the security of Europe. And his Secretary of State followed up, explaining that the USA's engagements towards Europe would have to be re-examined.
As it stands, anyway, Britain's deterrent is purely strategic and oceanic, and I do not see a reliable cause to believe that the UK would consider Eastern or Northern European interests to be so fundamental to the British nation as to justify using its deterrent, and to then call for massive retaliation onto the UK. Britain is a rater small territory when compared to the consequences of massive strategic strikes, so who would believe that the existence of the UK and its people would be put on the balance to protect Talinn or Vilnius?
That is certainly where the proposition of a sub-strategic deterrent becomes useful.
I've long concluded that the UK and Germany are bound to cooperate in the development of missiles providing a continental deterrent, regardless of the bomb's actual power. That is because Trident makes the UK's intercontinental deterrent dependent on the US, and considering uncertainty in the strategic relationship, it is a good idea to seek independent means of delivery on a continental scale, where threats are the most obvious.
But does this mean seeking sub-strategic capabilities? If one believes in gradual escalation that could somehow be controlled, maybe so.
I'm a follower of the French doctrine on this, I think any use of any nucloear weapon ends with total Apocalypse. But still, we can discuss the matter, theoretically.
Would Central European countries like Poland agree to British tactical nukes exploding on their land? I doubt it, especially if the UK decides on its own. Would the UK risk total retaliation to stop an invasion in Poland? Maybe, maybe not. Would those countries agree to have British nukes on their land that they would hold no decision power over? I doubt it, again, they'd be seeking some kind of double-key agreement like they thought they could have with the US. Would they seek to be transferred both the weapons and the power to put them into action? They'd try, no doubt, in clear violation of the NPT. And it would be irresponsible to let them have it.
Somehow, the new French concept of "advanced detterence" seems workable and credible, because it relies on non-negotiable unity of French detterence means and decision-making. France will not negotiate with others during a crisis before making up its mind on firing nukes or not. The idea is rather to forge a shared understanding of the situations which should require the use of France's detterent to protect others. But that comes long before the crisis, and cannot be rediscussed during the crisis. It's basically a form of courtesy, and a way to improve thinking in advance. But it comes with no strings attached regarding the sovereign nature of the French decision. That is in fact substantially different from a dtterent "assgned to NATO" or to post-NATO alliances.
Those who wish to benefit from the French umbrella must only accept two things: to contribute to the conventional aspect of implementing the French detterent (providing fighters for nuclear raids, or investing in forward detection structures); and they must agree to harbour some French weapons, not so much because it's better to have them placed forward, but because then those countries become targets for an enemy seeking to destroy a dispersed French detterent. You get the umbrella, you must get some of the risk as well. But you do not get a say in how the button will be or will not be pressed.
The UK seems a very long way from this. For now, I think investing in a strictly continental-ranged vectors is the best idea. It safeguards the UK's independance from American impredictability. The issue of sub-strategic options to protect others is much too complex for the short term.
Thanks, important but isn’t there overall a much simpler truth:
Europeans need a new umbrella, independent from US
UK and France can not finance a full umbrella by themselves
So Europeans have to find a way to pay and at the same time get access to decision making and potentiall even assets on the ground