Shape and Support: The British Army in the Indo-Pacific
Shape and Support: The British Army in the Indo-Pacific
The Memorandum | No. 12.2024
The Indo-Pacific is primarily a maritime theatre; nevertheless, the British Army has a significant contribution to make to the United Kingdom’s (UK) defence commitments in the region. Three years on from the Indo-Pacific ‘tilt’, and with a new strategic review in the works, the potential advantages offered by the British Army’s Indo-Pacific presence should be exploited to greater effect.
The four pillars of UK foreign policy described in the Integrated Review ‘Refresh’ 2023 (IRR) were ‘Shape the International Environment’, ‘Deter, Defend, and Compete’, ‘Address Vulnerabilities’, and ‘Generate Strategic Advantage.’ In addition, Britain’s primary interests in the Indo-Pacific are economic, with ‘economy’ and ‘trade’ being mentioned significantly more than ‘security’ in the IRR. Despite a change of government, a significant shift in outlook is unlikely to arise from the upcoming Strategic Defence Review - the language used by Labour ministers regarding the Indo-Pacific continue to emphasise an economy-first approach. As such, the Army’s Indo-Pacific contribution should be seen in the light of the IRR pillars and this economic imperative.
The British Army’s current laydown in the Indo-Pacific is modest, predominantly based around the Brunei Garrison (now a Land Regional Hub) of a Gurkha Resident Infantry Battalion (RIB), and the contribution of personnel to the regional defence attaché network. If required, the RIB could be reinforced with light expeditionary forces from 16 Air Assault Brigade Combat Team or other elements of UK 1st Division, though the logistical burden on the already-overtasked British airlift fleet to transport and sustain such forces would be significant. Finally, there is a frequent drumbeat of small-to-medium exercises with key partners, including Japan, Australia and the United States (US).
This represents an increase in activity since 2021. However, a single light infantry battalion and an uptick in exercises do not represent a major military presence. Nor do they necessarily meet the 2021 Integrated Review’s ambition to be the Indo-Pacific’s ‘European partner with the broadest, most integrated presence’, as France has several thousand military personnel in the region to protect its island territories. Comparatively, Britain’s terrestrial footprint is decidedly modest; it should also be noted that the RIB exists at the request of the Sultan of Brunei, who will likely have to be consulted over its deployment.
However, what the British Army should not be doing is trying to strengthen its Indo-Pacific forces to a credible warfighting capability. In the context of stretched budgets and conflicting priorities, it is difficult to envision a scenario in which British troops would be able to make a credible contribution to allied forces in Asia without significantly degrading much needed combat power in Europe. More fundamentally, it remains unclear whether a sizeable build-up of British land power would be at all useful to the UK’s regional allies. Indeed, a recent RAND study reflected that even the US Army, with all its forward deployed mass, would likely take on an enabling function in support of other branches of the military in any potential conflict in the theatre. Furthermore, in case of a major conflict with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) or on the Korean peninsula, it would likely be in the UK’s national interest to reinforce the Euro-Atlantic or the Middle East so that the US could redeploy much-needed assets to the Indo Pacific.
However, full-scale war is far less likely than a long period of competition; it is here where the Army can add considerable value, especially to ‘Shaping the International Environment’, without a significantly larger footprint.
Although it is primarily a maritime theatre, the militaries of many Indo-Pacific nations are dominated by ground forces; indeed, armies often wield significant political influence in ‘middle ground’ states such as Thailand, Pakistan and Vietnam. As such, the use of British Army personnel, whether as defence attachés, liaison officers or in exercises, can prove highly useful for leveraging contacts and developing common culture to generate influence and exploit opportunities, both military and economic.
Training and partnership opportunities need to be rigorously targeted and sustained. Small scale short-term training teams focussing on basic military skills or low-level exercises – common practice in Africa and the Middle East – are unlikely to appeal to many middle ground nations who have proud military traditions and are well aware that the British Army is unlikely to fight alongside them in full-scale war.
Instead, opportunities with middle ground powers should centre on particular force-multiplying capabilities which the British Army possesses in greater numbers and with more expertise than other services. This includes electronic warfare, information operations, operational planning, explosive ordnance disposal, and counter-terrorism expertise, all of which are likely to be well received in the region. Training can transition into partnered activities; an example might be British Army information operations specialists training and then partnering with regional counterparts on countering dis/mis/mal-information from hostile actors.
If well-coordinated with industry and across government, developed relationships may lead to economic opportunities; one of the UK’s primary defence export advantages compared to the US –arguably Britain’s key competitor in the Indo-Pacific defence market – is the lack of restrictive International Traffic in Arms Regulations. Using land forces to demonstrate and promote British technology could therefore enhance the economic focus of London’s foreign policy in the region.
The Brunei RIB might be too small a force for warfighting – it is however very capable of many other activities, from humanitarian aid and disaster relief (HADR) to low-intensity security functions. In a region acutely vulnerable to climate change, HADR in particular will become an increasingly anticipated task. As such, the British Army should ensure that the force is task-organised, trained and equipped specifically to respond quickly to crises; this may include bolstered enablers, stores, and greater availability of drones, small ground vehicles such as quad bikes, and boats for littoral and riverine operations. The Land Regional Hub of Brunei will need further modest investment to ensure that it can support this force, and occasional surges of personnel.
Any interventions, whether humanitarian or kinetic, will almost certainly be alongside allies. In particular, US, Australian and French regional forces are the UK’s most likely operational allies in the region and should be focused on as priority partners for larger-scale exercises and integration.
Ensuring there is sufficient logistical capacity to support the UK’s contributions will be a challenging, but necessary problem to solve in order to guarantee credibility and the avoidance of burdening allies. Furthermore, noting the Australian Army’s avowed new focus on littoral warfare, the involvement of British Army personnel in select exercises will enable greater experience and experimentation in a form of warfare of growing importance to both the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic theatres.
Finally, the British Army should also integrate more closely with the Royal Navy through the establishment of liaison officers and more regular training between the RIB and regional naval assets. Any Indo-Pacific operation is likely to be joint with a distinct maritime and/or littoral flavour. As a result, Army personnel will more often than not find themselves operating from, and to, the sea, and therefore in partnership with the Royal Navy.
The Army is not the prime instrument of British influence in the Indo-Pacific, and never will be. However, it offers key shaping and enabling capabilities for a relatively modest uplift of personnel and equipment, and British land forces provide a solid permanent example of UK commitment to the region.
Matthew Palmer is an officer in the British Army and a Richmond Fellow at the Royal Navy Strategic Studies Centre. His views are his own and do not represent those of the British Army, Royal Navy or Ministry of Defence.
To stay up to date with Britain’s World, please subscribe or pledge your support!
What do you think about this Memorandum? Why not leave a comment below?