NATO command and control: The need for a new SACLANT
NATO command and control: The need for a new SACLANT
The Memorandum | No. 10.2024
The declaration from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) recent Washington Summit roundly condemned Russian aggression and added that as ‘we cannot discount the possibility of an attack against [our] territorial integrity…we are…strengthening our NATO command and control.’ This makes sense because the current NATO command structure, established through changes in 1997 and 2003, is optimised for expeditionary operations taking weeks to set up, rather than the significant, simultaneous decisions that would be required for defensive operations in all parts of the NATO geographic area in the event of a Russian attack. This article argues for a new structure, which could be agreed to at next year’s summit in the Netherlands.
The disparity between intent and current structure was brought into further focus by the recent announcement that Adm. Pierre Vandier, of the French Navy, will become the next Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (ACT). In itself this is good news: Adm. Vandier did much to modernise the French Navy, including with a major push to introduce uncrewed aerial systems in large numbers, and is widely recognised as an effective leader and manager. His appointment to a position which until the 2003 NATO reorganisation was Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT), does however beg the twin questions of: Who is in charge of NATO operations in the Atlantic? And do they receive sufficient attention?
NATO of course has the three star Maritime Command (MARCOM) based in Northwood, but this is under Allied Command Operations (ACO), usually an army officer whose gaze is inevitably drawn to NATO’s Eastern front. Joint Force Command Norfolk was created in 2018 to provide added focus on the Atlantic, but it is still only led by a three star and there is obvious overlap with MARCOM, including over increasingly frequent operations in the far north. The latest reports of a new Command being set up in Finland suggest that it would sit under Joint Force Command Norfolk, though defending Finland’s land border via direction from a vice admiral 5,000 miles away is not the intuitive answer.
Fortunately, the recent accession of Sweden and Finland gives not just a need to reshape things, but also an opportunity.
Of course, the politics of such a change are complex. For instance, having given the French the four star position at ACT in recognition of their reintegration into NATO’s command structure in 2009 it would be difficult to deny them an equivalent post in any restructure. However, this must be balanced with the reality that the provision of the preponderant military force to the alliance means that four star United States (US) officers must be in the main operational military positions.
In seeking a solution, it is helpful to look at the old Cold War structure, which was usefully simple. Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) commanded on land, facing east, while SACLANT commanded in the Atlantic and Mediterranean. Having a maritime focus for one of two co-equal four stars gave the Atlantic a proper level of attention. Air assets were divided between the two according to role.
What new structure might work? First, ACO needs to be freed from other tasks to focus on the alliance’s eastern terrestrial border and, to symbolise the change, have the name reverted to SACEUR. The addition of Sweden and, particularly, Finland, giving NATO a significant increase in its land border with Russia, then strongly argues for a new North-Eastern regional commander located in one of the new arrivals, with a maritime sub-component to manage the narrow Baltic Sea. At the other end of the border with Russia, Joint Forces Command Izmir could become the commander of a new South Eastern region. In the centre Joint Force Command Brunssum is currently in a legacy site too far from the new border with Russia and does not reflect the increased importance of the Polish armed forces following their recent military expansion programme – including the generation of two entire new divisions. The Joint Force Command should therefore be moved to Szczecin and take responsibility for the forces in a new North Central region, to defend NATO’s central front alongside a new similar organisation in Sibiu in Romania – these last two locations already being the site of deployable corps headquarters. This would give four major regional commands under SACEUR facing eastwards, which is necessary given the length of the border.
Meanwhile SACLANT, which would be the renamed Joint Forces Command Norfolk, would be co-located with a new Western Atlantic Area Command (WESTLANT). MARCOM would return to what it once was, Eastern Atlantic Area Command (EASTLANT), and Joint Forces Command Naples could become the new maritime commander in the Mediterranean. Issues over command of US carrier groups would be solved in the old way, with ‘Striking Force’ commands reporting directly to US officers.
Further, as NATO is now much bigger than before, a four star Support Command in Central and Western Europe would enable air defence of areas further from Russia (noting that integrated air and missile defence got significant mention in the Washington Summit Declaration) and rapid logistic support to the front line. It could be led by a French officer to balance the deletion of ACT, with subordinate commands led by a German and an Italian, and use existing bases at Ramstein and Brunssum. There would be much detail to agree, but a first sketch might be as follows:
Of course, the eventual result will be reshaped by political reality, and this is, for reasons of brevity, just a sketch. But having the start of a plausible idea is a useful first step. NATO’s command structures are not optimised for the possibility of major war, so we should act quickly to make them much more suited to new geopolitical realities. The recent Washington Summit gave a push, the target for agreeing the change should be the next such summit, scheduled for June 2025 in the Netherlands.
Andrew Livsey is a PhD student at King's College London, researching sea power thought in the Cold War.
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