Evolving Britain’s Indo-Pacific engagement
The Memorandum | No. 08.2024
The previous British government’s decision to formalise the Indo-Pacific as a fundamental ‘pillar’ of the United Kingdom’s (UK) foreign policy was built on a recognition of the importance of the region to Britain in both the present and future. The confluence of strategic, economic and political factors that influenced this evolution of British strategy has shown no signs of abating, and the newly-elected government should approach the region with renewed alacrity.
The ‘epoch-defining challenge’ – as the Integrated Review Refresh put it – of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) may be reviewed, but Chinese geopolitical revisionism will continue. Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, has a vision for an alternative global order which has little respect for international law, the independent foreign policy choices of other nations, and human rights, and initial efforts to implement it have been most profound – and brazen – in the Indo-Pacific. It makes sense for Britain to aid countries in the region resisting Chinese pressure especially given the UK’s record of standing up for a free and open international order. Additionally, Britain’s economic stake in the Indo-Pacific is closely linked to regional stability and openness, as the Indo-Pacific serves as both a geographical area for trade and an economic engagement opportunity for the UK.
It also makes strategic sense as the security issues of the UK’s home region, the Euro-Atlantic, are converging with those of the Indo-Pacific. Beijing’s support for Moscow’s war efforts in Ukraine are growing more overt, with North Korea’s support wholly unconcealed, and Houthi actions in the Red Sea threaten to sever the narrow maritime artery connecting the two theatres. Instability breeds instability and hunkering down in the North Atlantic is not an option for a globally connected island nation such as the UK. Britain also has long-standing defence relations in the Indo-Pacific which it would be unwise to forget; the most important of these being the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) between the UK, Australia, Singapore, Malaysia and New Zealand – one of the most quietly successful security arrangements since the 1970s.
The Indo-Pacific is home to key allies and partners, old and new. Indeed, a common misconception of the UK’s Indo-Pacific policy under the previous government was that it was a hubristic effort inspired by nostalgia for empire. In reality, it was Britain engaging to coordinate more effectively with its regional allies and partners to uphold the region’s economic architecture and security concerns. Key British relationships in the Indo-Pacific also support British security more broadly, with AUKUS and the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) occupying central positions in the development of the UK’s next-generation platforms. Relations with some of Europe’s key powers deserve attention to restore damaged trust, particularly as the dissipation of Brexit’s legacy accelerates with the convincing defeat of the Conservative Party in the General Election. But the key partnerships which have been established, or bolstered, in the Indo-Pacific should not be left to diminish as a result.
There is a real problem that at times His Majesty’s (HM) Government ‘wants to play in every area’, and a more cutthroat UK foreign policy which reprioritises certain regions and avenues over others would be a welcome sharpening of British power and focus on its interests.
The Indo-Pacific, however, would not be the place to start winding down. It is also important to recognise that, so far, the UK has achieved diplomatic and strategic wins in the region which greatly outsize the resources used to achieve them.
This fact is exemplified by the flexibility of British diplomats in engaging the region’s myriad mini- and multilateral institutions, and the success of the two offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) in facilitating exercises with regional partners and contributing to local maritime security. Resource scarcity will nonetheless continue to be an issue for British foreign policy, and the UK under Labour should continue to find ways to maximise strategic and political gains while minimising the resources expended to achieve them.
Diplomacy will be key here, and it is encouraging to see David Lammy, Foreign Secretary, visit one of the Indo-Pacific’s premier powers, India, in only his third week in office, and receive an audience with Nardendra Modi, Prime Minister of India, before heading off to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Foreign Minister’s Meeting in Laos. Achieving ‘dialogue partner’ status within ASEAN was one of the biggest – and cheapest – diplomatic coups for the UK as it sought to engage more with the Indo-Pacific. Maintaining a connection with the multilateral will be key for Britain’s Indo-Pacific position, particularly as HM Government desires to integrate itself further into ASEAN through membership of the ASEAN Regional Forum. Similarly, Britain should continue to engage closely with the Pacific Island Forum as a ‘partner’ and seek ways to integrate itself more effectively and extend its responsibilities in environmental stewardship.
An enhanced military presence preceded these successes in diplomatic engagement. A two-pronged approach of small-scale permanent deployments, and sizable ‘pulsed’ deployments yielded significant results in convincing local actors of London’s intent to have a say in upholding regional security.
If the new government were to abandon Britain’s Indo-Pacific military presence, all it would currently bring home are two OPVs. These are lightly armed vessels designed for persistent constabulary work. Their return to the Euro-Atlantic would make no difference in deterring Russia nor save much money; the average annual running and maintenance costs of an OPV are only £13 million per year.
The work of the humble OPV is valuable. Although their ability to deter Chinese aggression is limited, they help bolster maritime stability and complicate Beijing’s preference for bilateral approaches (where Beijing can maximise leverage) as such vessels are used primarily in multilateral efforts. If the UK is to have a real impact on Indo-Pacific security, it should steadily commit more and expand its military presence. Labour’s recommitment to the 2025 Carrier Strike Group deployment has been a very welcome sign of recognition of this.
The near future should see a rotational deployment of a British nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) to Australia through AUKUS and potentially the replacement of the two OPVs with one or two of the new Type 31 frigates. The Royal Navy plans to build seven Astute class SSNs and will, by the early 2030s, have around 24 escorts (destroyers and frigates). This means that, owing to naval maintenance schedules, on a good day the UK would have two (possibly three) SSNs and eight or nine escorts available for tasking. These new deployments would clearly constitute a larger share of Britain’s overall military capability. But when considering the importance of the Indo-Pacific to British interests, and when factoring in the limited involvement of the British Army or the Royal Air Force, the presence of an SSN and one or two frigates seems an appropriate and manageable apportioning of Britain’s military strength .
Another factor to consider is that naval presence has a small footprint and is highly mobile. British naval assets can take full advantage of the UK’s growing number of basing agreements with key partners in the region and have little additional requirements – the vessels themselves are a home for their crews. Additionally, although the vessels would be in the Indo-Pacific, they could be redeployed swiftly back to the Euro-Atlantic in an emergency, with the only factor being how many days of steaming it would take to return.
Britain has proved it can have an outsized impact in the Indo-Pacific – economically, diplomatically, and strategically – compared to the cost used to obtain it. Building on this cost-effective approach to the region will be crucial for Labour’s foreign policy going forward. But so will crafting the UK’s Indo-Pacific policy so that it is both more responsive to and embedded in the region. This will see Britain continue to make strides in the Indo-Pacific, which HM Government has rightly chosen to engage with greater readiness due to both the strength of its partnerships there, and their importance to global security.
William Freer is a Research Fellow in National Security at the Council on Geostrategy, where he works on strategic advantage and maritime affairs.
Patrick Triglavcanin is the Geoffrey Whiskard Associate Fellow in AUKUS and Britain in the Indo-Pacific at the Council on Geostrategy.
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