Why NATO should cover Hawaii
The Memorandum | No. 02.2024
Imagine this: United States (US)-People’s Republic of China (PRC) tensions over Taiwan escalate to boiling point. Hours after a Chinese missile attack on the US state of Hawaii, the US president calls upon regional and global allies and partners to discuss next steps. US officials in Brussels request clarity as to whether the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) will trigger Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The silence is deafening. Worse still, apart from quick affirmations from a few traditionally close allies – such as the United Kingdom (UK) and the Netherlands – it is unclear whether many NATO member states will even cease trade with the PRC, much less commit to a war. Some note that Hawaii is excluded from an automatic trigger of Article 5 by Article 6. Almost immediately, the alliance is thrown into one of the deepest crises of its history.
While this scenario is, in many ways, at the extreme end of the possible, it illustrates a potential crisis-in-waiting for the alliance. As allies convene in Washington for the NATO’s 75th anniversary summit this week, they should consider scenarios of this kind. They should reflect on the implications of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan and what the alliance can and should do now to deter and, if deterrence fails, respond to such a conflict.
In a recent speech, Jens Stoltenberg, Secretary General of NATO, noted that ‘NATO’s core business’ is that of deterrence. His second theme was Ukraine, and his third strengthening global partnerships, ‘especially in the Indo-Pacific’ due to the interplay between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific. Explicitly noting the invitations to the ‘IP4’ (Indo-Pacific Four: Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea), the secretary general raised strategic linkages between the alliance’s adversaries, such as Chinese and North Korean support for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Given these themes – deterrence and the importance of the Indo-Pacific – it is astonishing that Hawaii’s exclusion from the Washington Treaty is not, at a minimum, an agenda item at the summit. Its continued exclusion – a historical relic of the Cold War – is remarkable given its criticality to American deterrence strategy in the Indo-Pacific.
So, how did we get here? At the time of signing, the allies saw little threat of Chinese naval or air power. Fast forward to 2024 – during which time the PRC undertook one of the largest military build-ups since the Second World War – and a situation arises where the US might be attacked in the Indo-Pacific and NATO could just sit by and do little. If that happened, not only would it lead to a serious crisis within the alliance, but it would represent a missed opportunity to deter a Chinese attack on Taiwan in the first place.
The time is thus ripe to address this gaping hole in the alliance, and there is no shortage of reasons to justify that change.
First, the inclusion of Hawaii – home of Indo-Pacific Command and multiple bases and an essential node in the US capacity to defend Taiwan – into NATO defence commitments would de facto add to overall US deterrence efforts over Taiwan.
Second, NATO is not merely a military actor. It holds competence across all areas of DIME (diplomacy, information, military, economy). Case in point: its total economic weight amounts to £30.6 trillion (US$39.6 trillion), with half of the world’s top ten economies as member states. This represents huge pre-conflict deterrence value for a PRC intent on maintaining economic growth for the sake of internal security.
Third, NATO has much political and diplomatic deterrence value since many NATO allies have strong ties to parts of the ‘middle ground’ (or ‘Global South’) and reach inside the Indo-Pacific. At a tactical level, this plays out in the information space where NATO messaging and signalling could help the US and Taiwan in international forums.
Fourth, even if NATO commitments did not prevent a conflict, they could play a helpful role in the Euro-Atlantic by interdicting Chinese trade and energy supplies. This would represent a serious challenge to the Chinese economy, which depends heavily on exports to Europe.
Given these themes – deterrence and the importance of the Indo-Pacific – it is astonishing that Hawaii’s exclusion from the Washington Treaty is not, at a minimum, an agenda item at the summit.
While these are strong arguments, some have argued that the US agreed to a treaty which excluded Hawaii and changing that fact is impossible. This is a specious argument, which ignores how the security environment in the Indo-Pacific has drastically deteriorated since the 1950s, making it nearly impossible for the US to address its threats and challenges on its own. Adapting to the new environment is a must and deterring PRC aggression should be the number one priority.
Another argument is that NATO should not act out-of-area. This claim, however, conveniently forgets that NATO has been expanding remits and members from its earliest days – when it was based around the English Channel – to incorporate West Germany, Greece, and Turkey, and to carry out operations in Afghanistan. Adjusting NATO to defend the collective interest of its members is what NATO has been all about – and deterring a war with the PRC is in the collective interests of all NATO members.
Furthermore, if the US were to be at war with a near-peer adversary such as the PRC, any out-of-area considerations would be meaningless. The draw on US military resources from the Euro-Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific would substantially drain NATO capability and capacity, as the Americans may be compelled to engage Chinese naval units and maritime shipping globally.
Some Europeans are also open about not wanting to get dragged into a war with the PRC over Taiwan. To them, this is an ‘American problem’, and NATO already has its hands full with Russia. This is problematic, at least for three reasons.
For starters, the US is NATO’s most powerful member and the drain on its resources and capabilities would impact NATO allies, whether they like it or not.
Second, this view does not take into account US domestic politics and the American people, who would note the amount of blood and treasure poured into European security since 1941. Here, the geography is emotive and pertinent. It was, after all, Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941 which directly led to US involvement in the Second World War where the US embraced a ‘Europe First’ approach to prosecuting the war.
Third, and finally, some will argue that it is the US itself which wants Europe to focus on Russia, so it can focus on the PRC. This is true to an extent but misses the point: NATO’s deterrent value across DIME counts and could substantially undermine the PRC’s resolve before a war starts. Allies should consider all measures to prevent such a war and NATO deterrence should be operationalised in support of its largest member.
As leaders from across NATO meet in Washington to consider the world around them and make sure that the alliance’s deterrence and defence architecture is fit for purpose across the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific, they should take this opportunity to include Hawaii into Article 5 considerations. Doing so would not solve all problems – far from it – but it would be a step in the right direction and could prevent a catastrophe.
Dr John Hemmings is Senior Advisor at the Pacific Forum. David Santoro is the President and CEO of the Pacific Forum. This Memorandum is an adapted version of an article published by the Pacific Forum and is reproduced with permission.
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