The case for a national conversation on resilience: The Strategic Defence Review redux
The Memorandum | No. 22.2026
In April 2026, Lord Robertson, former Secretary of State for Defence and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Secretary General, stated that the United Kingdom (UK) is ‘under-prepared. We are under-insured. We are under attack.’ Britain, he argued, is fundamentally unready to meet global threats.
Preparedness is not simply a nation’s ability to respond and recover from an emergency crisis. It is also a test of a nation’s resilience – its preparedness for emergencies including pandemics, extreme weather, terror attacks, and war.
Risks can be acute or chronic. Chronic risks pose challenges that erode the economy and societal cohesion, and manifest over a longer timeframe. To withstand concurrent or consecutive crises, a nation must have readiness through the building of systemic endurance across society.
Britain understands this. So, why is it so difficult to start a national conversation on threats, risks, and national resilience?
Security and national resilience: Mutually interdependent
The British public appears to have a tendency to view national security threats as singular events. While attacks such as the 2018 Novichok poisonings, the 2006 polonium poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko, or routine cyber attacks attributable to adversaries are taken seriously at national, political, and military and security service levels, they do not generate a national conversation on British security, or how resilient the UK is to sustained attacks on its soil; even though adversaries are clearly systematically testing national resilience.
This is not scaremongering. Clarity and realism are needed. Being better prepared comes from starting a national conversation on resilience, because crisis is becoming the norm.
The view seems to be that British security is reserved for uniformed personnel and security services. The 2025 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) prioritised ‘warfighting readiness’. Furthermore, an entire section was devoted to the rebuilding of Defence Medical Services readiness for high-intensity peer conflict: since most defence medical personnel work in the National Health Service (NHS), the Department for Health and Social Care (DHSC) needs to be able to address the handling of mass casualties and the clinical challenges of a reduction in workforce capacity in the event of a major military deployment.
It is also a given that the British Armed Forces will be mobilised to assist civil society in dealing with natural disasters and pandemics through Military Assistance to Civilian Authorities (MACA) tasking. However, if it comes to war, their priority is warfighting. In this instance, civil society will likely need to fend for itself and even assist the military – as experienced in Ukraine.
This is not scaremongering. Clarity and realism are needed. Being better prepared comes from starting a national conversation on resilience, because crisis is becoming the norm. Taking action only when under pressure is not always going to be enough; building national resilience is a more cost-effective endeavour.
Starting a national conversation on risks and threats
In April 2026, Dr Fiona Hill, one of the chief writers of the SDR, asserted that during focus groups, many understood the threats to British security – primarily cyber attacks, but also risks to Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) and undersea cables. It seems that the public is ready for a clear narrative on public roles and responsibilities for risks, threats, preparedness, response and recovery. Furthermore, the National Security Strategy (NSS) recognised that ‘without security and resilience at home, we cannot deliver economic growth or any of the other government missions to improve the lives of the British people’.
A perennial problem is that defence and welfare are viewed as a zero-sum ‘guns versus butter’ trade-off between national security and societal needs. However, recent conversations about food and energy security are in fact both matters for national security and societal needs. Food, health, energy, and environment security are good indicators of national resilience. Germany and the Nordic countries treat national infrastructure, such as roads, rail, education, and health services – all institutions the UK tends to view as societal needs – as part of national defence, because robust infrastructure is needed in an emergency.
NATO’s baseline requirements for national resilience, as required under Article 3 of the NATO Charter, would be a good starting point for a national conversation. Article 3 acts as the foundational requirement for NATO’s ability to defend itself, ensuring members do not just depend on collective protection, but are actively building domestic capacity. It focuses on resilience, especially in energy, transport, communications, and emergency services.
Britain has a lot of work to do. Years of austerity across public services and an overreliance on ‘just-in-time’ supply chains heighten the UK’s vulnerabilities.
Undergirding civil preparedness is societal resilience. NATO member states are expected to measure their level of preparedness against seven baseline requirements for national resilience: continuity of government, resilient energy supplies, ability to deal with the uncontrolled movement of people, resilient food and water supplies, ability to deal with mass casualties and disruptive health crises, resilient civil communication systems, and resilient transport systems.
Here, Britain has a lot of work to do. Years of austerity across public services and an overreliance on ‘just-in-time’ supply chains heighten the UK’s vulnerabilities. The FM Global Resilience Index for 2026 ranked Britain as the 14th most resilient country, but revealed challenges and areas of vulnerability, particularly regarding inflation, climate exposure, and climate risk awareness.
The National Preparedness Commission’s 2025 industrial resilience report highlighted a key vulnerability in the UK’s heavy reliance on imported materials to make most of its critical items – such as defence equipment, electronics, pharmaceuticals, energy, and food. In response to His Majesty’s (HM) Government’s 2025 National Resilience Action Plan, the Commission’s August 2025 report found notable deficits in resilience awareness, in levels of preparedness among British households, and divergent willingness of said households to engage in enhancing their resilience.
Existing risk frameworks: Emergencies and resilience
The 2004 Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) is the main source of legislation on civil emergencies. Building upon this, the 2022 UK Government Resilience Framework was an important step to approaching national resilience by creating a shared understanding of risks, a focus on prevention and preparation, and communicating that resilience requires a whole-of-society approach.
While developments are occurring, there are concerns over the lack of a coherent joint-up effort and an overly ‘top-down’ approach. The key issue is that preparedness and resilience are often sidelined by immediate, short-term priorities and the political necessity of dealing with current problems. In other words, emergencies are easier to manage than longer-term resilience-building. Compounding this, there is no single minister dedicated to national resilience.
The extent of resilience fragmentation requires testing and regular review. Taiwan takes a whole-of-society approach, with its Whole-of-Society Defence Resilience Committee focusing on six elements of resilience (broadly aligning with NATO’s Article 3 requirements). The Committee has run annual tabletop and small-scale exercises (an urban resilience exercise) for the past two years, and is looking to expand. Through these, the Taiwanese government has been able to stress-test and fix national resilience issues.
There is also the matter of funding. At the 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague, Britain committed to spending an additional 1.5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to ‘protect critical infrastructure, defend networks, ensure civil preparedness and resilience, innovate, and strengthen the defence industrial base’ by 2035. However, these commitments are not yet reflected in HM Government expenditure plans, nor is it clear how they will be funded due to the delaying of the Defence Readiness Bill and Defence Investment Plan.
Public information campaigns: Being realistic
The Swedish approach is to promote self-help and responsibility. Through Sweden’s Total Defence model, everyone over 18 has a legally defined role in civil resilience. Individuals are mandated to contribute to national resilience through three main areas: military, civil, or public service. If the highest threat state is declared, everyone understands their role and is prepared to act.
In 2018, the Government of Sweden issued a leaflet entitled ‘If crisis or war comes’, and in 2022 it set up the Psychological Defence Agency to tackle misinformation campaigns from foreign entities. There are also 18 voluntary defence organisations training local volunteers in specialist areas such as radio communication, transport, and logistics.
The Netherlands also promotes a whole-of-society approach, recognising that preparedness takes preparation. Its public ‘Think Ahead’ information campaigns emphasise being realistic regarding risks. The Dutch government promotes self-help in the first 72 hours of any crisis, and regularly communicates that it will probably take three days to organise assistance.
Switzerland and Germany provide websites to calculate lists of family needs for a week’s supply of food. Latvia and Lithuania distribute booklets on how to survive for 72 hours in a crisis. By contrast, Britain’s Prepare information website provides only basic information. For instance, the Prepare message on food supplies reads: ‘As with water, how much you need will vary based on your own circumstances. Don’t forget food for pets.’ Evidently, there is much to learn from other countries.
Conclusion
The UK has a long way to go, and time is not on its side. There is government recognition that resilience building and preparedness is a whole-of-society effort. Without a national conversation on threats and risks, and their agency and scale, HM Government reduces its ability to enable the British public to be prepared for the contemporary and future threat landscape. Starting a national conversation on risk is now an urgent necessity.
Dr Anisa Heritage is a Senior Lecturer at the Department of Defence and International Affairs at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. Her research focuses on changes in the international order and international security, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region.
This article was written by the author in a personal capacity. The opinions expressed are her own, and do not reflect the views of HM Government or the Ministry of Defence.
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