Welcome to the 62nd Cable, our weekly roundup of British foreign and defence policy.
On 28th September, Moldova held its parliamentary elections. The results showed a clear victory for the pro-European Union (EU) Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) with at least 50% of the vote, despite Russian efforts to destabilise the country. For the Kremlin, the defeat of its political allies is another nail in the coffin of its dream of maintaining control over countries once under Soviet occupation or influence, and putting pressure on Ukraine from its border with Moldova.
On the other hand, the result is a clear victory for the EU, which has invested significantly in Moldova in recent years. Likewise, with Chișinău beginning accession talks in 2024, this vote is another indicator that Moldova sees its future as part of Europe rather than a satellite of Russia.
There are many challenges still in store for the small republic, which is likely to face repercussions from the Kremlin. It will be up to the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and particularly the United Kingdom (UK) Germany and Poland, to guarantee Moldovan sovereignty, and in doing so, enhance their own credibility in the region.
Welcome back to The Cable!
On 26th September, Sir Keir Starmer, Prime Minister, spoke with several world leaders:
Sir Keir called Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, President of Turkey, to discuss the ongoing crisis in the Middle East. The Prime Minister explained His Majesty’s (HM) Government’s decision to recognise a Palestinian state, and called for international partners from the region to ‘make practical progress’ to secure a pathway to peace and ensure the viability of a two-state solution.
Sir Keir hosted Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada, at 10 Downing Street, where they discussed Russia’s recent incursions of NATO airspace in recent weeks. Both leaders condemned the incursions into Poland, Romania and Estonia as ‘reckless’ behaviour, and reiterated the importance of intensifying international pressure on Russia. The pair also discussed their countries’ recent recognition of the State of Palestine and enhancing economic growth through the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).
The Prime Minister also hosted Anthony Albanese, Prime Minister of Australia, where they discussed their close bilateral ties. Both leaders stated their desire to explore opportunities to ‘harness Australia’s critical mineral reserves’ for both civilian and military needs. They also reaffirmed their commitment to AUKUS and support for Ukraine.
HMS Somerset, a Type 23 frigate, announced the first successful test of the new Naval Strike Missile (NSM) at a Norwegian Arctic rocket range during Exercise AEGIR 25. The NSM is set to replace the Harpoon missile system, providing increased range and precision capabilities. It will be deployed on a number of the Royal Navy’s current escort fleet and will later complement the heavier Stratus (previously called the ‘future cruise and anti-ship missile’) in next-generation naval vessels, such as the Type 26 frigate.
Last week, David Lammy, Deputy Prime Minister, gave a speech at the United Nations (UN) Security Council meeting on Artificial Intelligence (AI), in which he stated that: ‘We must ensure AI strengthens peace and security’. After highlighting the multiple benefits which AI could bring, Lammy laid out the multitude of risks and challenges this nascent technology could also cause, from disinformation to new chemical and biological weapons. He then went on to call for additional safeguards and guardrails to be developed at the international level.
The UK and Canada have begun negotiations to participate in the EU’s Security Action for Europe (SAFE) defence fund, a mechanism designed to enable common procurements among EU member and partner states. These negotiations will focus on the financial contributions which both nations will have to pay for access to the defence loans. While certain EU countries, such as France, call for higher contributions, others are keen to ensure Ottawa and London can participate in SAFE.
For additional defence news stories, follow this link to the DSEI Gateway news portal.
The European Three (E3) nations – Britain, France and Germany – have activated ‘snapback sanctions’ on Iran following the failure of Tehran to limit its nuclear programme, as stipulated in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement of 2015. In a joint statement by the E3, they regretted the need to reimpose sanctions on Iran, but urged all UN member states to implement them. The statement concluded by reiterating that the E3 nations will ‘continue to work with all parties towards a new diplomatic solution to ensure Iran never gets a nuclear weapon’.
New data released by the Department of Energy Security and Net Zero shows the installed solar power capacity in the UK. The data suggests that, as of the end of August 2025, there is a total of 19.6 gigawatts (GW) of solar capacity in Britain across 1,869,000 installations. Between August 2024 and August 2025, the UK saw solar capacity increase by 9.8%, a capacity increase of 1.7 GW. However, as approximately 68% of solar panels imported by Britain originate from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), this increase of capacity brings with it greater dependency on Chinese technology, which often contains parts produced using forced labour in Xinjiang.
How competitors frame Britain
TASS reported on comments made by Dmitry Peskov, Press Secretary of the President of the Russia, in which he suggested that the future of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) should ‘begin between Moscow and Washington’ but should also consider the ‘nuclear arsenals of London and Paris’. Peskov explained his rationale by stating that Britain and France are ‘part of the overall problem of global European security and strategic stability’. At a time when Russian state media regularly threatens the UK with nuclear annihilation, perhaps Peskov should focus on his own country’s failures.
At the UN General Assembly, Sergei Lavrov, Foreign Minister of Russia, stated that European countries have allowed Ukraine to ‘commit acts of terror, extrajudicial executions and reckless sabotage’ due to their obsession with the ‘utopian goal of inflicting a strategic defeat on Russia.’ Lavrov is up to his usual tricks, forgetting that it is his country which is engaged in a war of conquest. Britain, alongside a plethora of European countries, has no interest in defeating Russia; their sole occupation is preventing Ukraine from being violated by its aggressive neighbour.
Back to the future: Kremlin-NATO air incursions past and present
On the night of 9th-10th September, around 24 Russian drones entered Polish airspace. It is unclear whether this was by mistake or intentional, as this is not the first time Russian drones have entered NATO airspace during their bombardments of Ukraine. However, several days later, on 19th September, three (armed) Russian MIG-31s – a multi-role interceptor and strike aircraft – entered Estonian airspace for a total of 12 minutes. This incursion was undoubtedly intentional, and a provocative attempt to probe NATO responses.
Air incursions are nothing new, yet this recent case was brazen in its timing and duration. It has led to fresh questions about whether NATO’s current rules of engagement and response mechanisms are suitable.
During the Cold War, when tensions between the Kremlin and NATO were often high, it was understood that acts such as this were dangerous, and would undoubtedly lead to aircraft being shot down at a minimum. In fact, even outside of proxy conflicts such as the Korean or Vietnam wars, this did happen on occasion.
Famously, the Soviets shot down an American U-2 spy plane in 1960, but this was by no means the only incident. Some other examples include when the Soviets downed an American maritime patrol aircraft in 1950, and again in 1964 when an American RB-66 light bomber was shot down over East Germany (its navigation equipment had malfunctioned). There were even rarer cases of minor air skirmishes, such as a 1952 incident which resulted in a Soviet loss of multiple MIG-15 fighters, kept closely under wraps by both sides.
NATO and Warsaw Pact airspace was much more closely guarded during the Cold War, but the knowledge that incursions would most likely lead to aircraft being shot down meant both sides tended to avoid making incursions in the first place. This helped avoid the risk of escalation, and it is no coincidence that most incidents occurred in the early phases of the Cold War. There are lessons to be learnt.
To be clear, this does not mean automatically shooting down Russian aircraft the second they enter NATO airspace, but foreign armed aircraft loitering for several minutes violates allies’ sovereignty. The lack of a firm response only encourages further probing actions.
NATO should explore options for establishing firmer rules of engagement, to include shooting down Russian aircraft which do not immediately leave NATO airspace when instructed to do so. The alliance should also consider options for horizontal escalation, such as seizing one or more Russian ‘shadow fleet’ tankers, for example, in response to a provocation.
Risk tolerance in too many NATO members is concerningly low, which ironically increases risks by emboldening adversaries. It is time that old Cold War muscle memories were exercised once more.
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