Building the bulwark: Britain’s defence industry and commitment to Ukraine
The Cable | No. 34.2025
Welcome to the 57th Cable, our weekly roundup of British foreign and defence policy.
On Sunday, 24th August, Ukraine celebrated its 34th independence day following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. In a televised address, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of Ukraine, vowed to continue fighting, stating: ‘Ukraine has not yet won, but it has certainly not lost’ and calling for a ‘just peace…where our future will be decided only by us’.
However, with Russia gaining momentum on the battlefield and the intensification of Moscow’s aerial bombardment of Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure in recent months, pressure on Ukraine is growing. Additionally, diplomatic attempts to end the full-scale invasion have achieved little so far, with summits between Donald Trump, President of the United States (US) and Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, as well as one with Zelenskyy, failing to lead to a ceasefire agreement or a meeting between the leaders of Russia and Ukraine.
In recent weeks, the United Kingdom (UK), one of Kyiv’s staunchest allies, has announced further measures to support Ukraine. Operation INTERFLEX, the UK-led training mission for Ukrainian recruits, is being extended to the end of 2026, while the so-called ‘coalition of the willing’, spearheaded by London and Paris, continues to develop its strategy to deliver ‘robust security guarantees’ and prepare for the ‘deployment of a reassurance force’ when the hostilities end.
But European nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) remain dependent on American support to provide credible guarantees. Britain, at the forefront of the coalition of the willing, will have to dig deep to ensure Ukraine’s independence and Europe’s long-term security.
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His Majesty’s (HM) Government has announced that the UK Space Agency will join the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT) by April 2026, a move aimed at ‘streamlining support’, reducing duplication and cutting bureaucratic hurdles for Britain’s space industry. Alongside this move, DSIT published a report outlining over 60 recommendations from industry leaders on how to improve the UK’s regulations for space missions, with a focus on Rendezvous and Proximity Operations (RPO).
The Ministry of Defence (MOD) has revealed a new ‘30 by 30’ initiative to boost the cadet forces by over 40,000 (a 30% increase) by 2030. The plan – backed by £70 million in government funding – will also include new joint Army and Royal Air Force (RAF) Air Cadet centres; streamlining the adult volunteer process; improving regular and reservist support for the Cadets; and new training programmes in the Cadets to boost Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) skills, such as drone piloting for Air Cadets.
HM Government has announced that Operation INTERFLEX, the British-led mission to train Ukrainian soldiers, has been extended to ‘at least the end of 2026’. Since its inception in July 2022, Operation INTERFLEX has trained more than 50,000 recruits. The mission has also adapted ‘to best suit Ukraine’s evolving military requirements’, with additional programmes focused on developing leadership skills and instructor training.
The MOD – in partnership with the international Drone Capability Coalition (DCC) – has issued a request for information (RFI) to explore the possibility of using interceptor drones as a means to counter jet-powered one-way effector (OWE) uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs). The proliferation of jet-powered OWEs – which can operate at over 350 kilometres per hour and reach altitudes of more than 12,000 feet – has been identified as a growing threat to the British Armed Forces. According to the RFI, the MOD is looking for an affordable and scalable system which could face down swarms of adversarial drones.
For additional defence news stories, follow this link to the DSEI Gateway news portal.
Last week, Catherine West MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State (Indo-Pacific), co-chaired the second bilateral Senior Economic Dialogue in Seoul with Kim Jina, Second Vice Minister of South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the joint communique which followed the meeting, both nations reaffirmed the strength of the UK-South Korea Global Strategic Partnership and recognised both governments’ efforts to deepen cooperation across a broad range of areas, including economic security, defence-related industrial cooperation, scientific and technological innovation, renewable energy and other economic diplomacy issues.
HM Government has announced a £118 million deal to purchase six Land Ceptor air defence missile systems to enhance Britain’s air defence capabilities. The Land Ceptor forms part of a wider system called Sky Sabre, consisting of radar, command and control, and missile launchers. A full Sky Sabre battery will be capable of engaging multiple targets simultaneously at ranges up to 120 kilometres.
According to analysis by the Financial Times, more than 16.1 gigawatts (GW) of new renewable energy capacity, across 323 projects spread around the UK, were given planning permission in the second quarter of 2025. This represents a 195% rise compared to the same period last year. Likewise, over 100 planning applications were filed for energy storage projects between April and June 2025, with a combined storage capacity of 8.4GW, more than double the amount in the same quarter last year. However, the rapid growth in renewable energy infrastructure remains curtailed by slow grid connections coupled with legal challenges by local opponents to such projects.
How competitors frame Britain
Russia Today released propaganda claiming that Britain’s ‘soaring debt and borrowing costs’ might force the country to seek an International Monetary Fund (IMF) rescue package. It went on to note that HM Government’s pledge to raise military spending to 2.5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 2027 and continuing to deliver billions in military and financial aid to Ukraine is ‘squeezing already stretched public finances’. Russian state media should look at its own country’s financial situation – with high inflation, falling energy exports and growing deficits – before it lays judgement on the far larger and diverse British economy.
TASS reported on a statement made by Dmitry Peskov, Press Secretary of the President of the Russian Federation, about the potential for European troops being deployed to Ukraine following an end to hostilities. Peskov stated that the Kremlin views ‘such discussions negatively’, as most European nations are also NATO members and the ‘expansion of NATO…into Ukraine has become one of the root causes of the current conflict’. Once again, Moscow claims victimhood while continuing its imperialist conquest of its neighbour.
Anticipating the Defence Industrial Strategy
As the probable publication of the Defence Industrial Strategy 2025 approaches, previous British defence industrial documents can be examined to anticipate the contents of the upcoming strategy.
Firstly, Britain’s last Defence and Security Industrial Strategy (DSIS) was in 2021. It set out to reform procurement and acquisition, create better government-industry synergies, support greater defence exports and emphasise the development of new technologies – and to do all of this evenly across all parts of the country.
Secondly, the Modern Industrial Strategy of June 2025 put forward a ten-year plan to emphasise eight growth areas (the IS-8). These include defence, digital and technologies, financial services, life sciences, and professional and business services.
Finally, there is the Defence Industrial Strategy – Statement of Intent, which highlights six key areas. These comprise prioritising British businesses for defence investment; creating partnerships between government, industry, and allies and partners; providing certainty and stability for long-term investment; focusing on new technologies; spreading prosperity across the wider UK; and enhancing deterrence through defence industrial capability.
Drawing from this, one might predict that new technology adaption will be emphasised in the DIS, as something which is very much a part of the Strategic Defence Review’s conception of an ‘integrated force’. Such a force is reliant on new technologies for the kill chain, as well as at the backend, logistics, the supply chain, and even Research and Development (R&D). A discussion might be anticipated on how UK Defence Innovation (UKDI) will harness private innovation and R&D spending.
Regardless of this, Britain will have to work hard to raise its R&D levels, and will have to find new ways of ‘fusing’ the more innovative ‘civilian’ startups with the legacy primes. This will require market intelligence normally held by venture capitalists within the MOD.
What has thus far been missing from the preceding strategies – as in the US’ National Defence Industrial Strategy of 2024 and the UK’s Defence White Paper from 2005 – is an emphasis on education and training the workforce, and what HM Government intends to do about it. Another missing element is any sort of discussion of an implementation plan. The DSIS in 2021 lacked one, but the 2005 White Paper laid out an entire section on concrete steps which the Blair government needed to take. Let’s hope that the Defence Industrial Strategy 2025 will do likewise.
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