Welcome to the 56th Cable, our weekly roundup of British foreign and defence policy.
The last few days have seen a flurry of diplomatic activity to find a way to end Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Donald Trump, President of the United States (US), hosted Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, in Alaska on 15th August, before welcoming Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of Ukraine, to Washington on 18th August. Sir Keir Starmer, Prime Minister, and the leaders of France, Germany, Italy, Finland, the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), also flew to Washington to support Ukrainian diplomatic efforts.
While great significance was placed on both of these summits, the impact they will have on the conflict remains inconclusive. On the one hand, Putin gained a political victory by meeting Trump, but failed to convince him to support Moscow’s desired territorial swap. Likewise, Zelenskyy enjoyed a more positive reception in the White House compared to his visit in February, with Trump taking a firmer stance on providing security guarantees to Ukraine, suggesting that the US would support a European-led mission and the creation of an Article Five-like mechanism for Kyiv. Yet, these proposals were vague and lacked practical detail.
One particularly interesting outcome from Monday’s summit was the suggestion of a meeting between Putin and Zelenskyy, to be followed by a trilateral summit between Kyiv, Washington and Moscow. While the odds of such a meeting taking place are low, the ball is firmly back in Russia’s court, as such a meeting occurring depends on Putin’s willingness to participate, and treat Zelenskyy as an equal.
Welcome back to The Cable!
On 14th August, Sir Keir commemorated the 80th anniversary of the Allies’ victory over Japan (VJ Day) and the end of the Second World War, with a reception at 10 Downing Street. There, the Prime Minister gave a speech honouring the sacrifices made to ensure ‘the freedoms and values that we fight for’. Drawing parallels to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Sir Keir said that Kyiv is ‘fighting for the same values as we were fighting for’.
The recently announced ‘Test in Ukraine’ initiative – whereby international defence companies can send their equipment and technology for combat testing on the front lines of Ukraine – has seen a total of 45 companies apply. While the participants have not been disclosed, a spokesperson from Brave 1 – a coordination platform created by the Government of Ukraine running the initiative – told DSEI Gateway that the companies come from the UK, Australia, North America and Taiwan. Brave 1 has identified ten priority areas for the initiative to focus on, including drones, Artificial Intelligence (AI), electronic warfare and missiles.
For additional defence news stories, follow this link to the DSEI Gateway news portal.
Last week, HMS Prince of Wales, the Royal Navy aircraft carrier and flagship of the UK-led Carrier Strike Group 2025 (CSG2025), arrived at Yokosuka Naval Base in Japan, beginning a three-week visit to the island nation. This follows the completion of a nine-day multinational naval exercise in the Philippine Sea, which saw CSG2025 operating alongside three other battlegroups: the USS George Washington’s Carrier Strike Group Five, the US Marine Corps’ Amphibious Ready Group (centred on USS America) and the Japanese Kaga Battle Group.
On 14th August, Adm. Sir Tony Radakin, Chief of the Defence Staff, gave a speech to the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. Sir Tony laid out an optimistic appraisal of the UK and NATO security and geopolitical position, saying that while we are living in a ‘more dangerous era’, Britain ‘remains safe; NATO is stronger, Russia is weak; and the West has the military, economic and intellectual heft needed to buttress the global system’. He also highlighted the many challenges which the UK and its allies and partners face, in particular slim defence budgets at a time of growing operation demands upon the armed forces, and most importantly the development of key emerging technologies, especially AI. He concluded his speech by calling for Britain and NATO nations to consider AI in the same way as the development of nuclear weapons and for allies to collaborate on such endeavours to maintain advantages ‘across the instruments of power’.
The foreign ministers of the UK, France and Germany – the European Three (E3) – sent a letter to the United Nations (UN) stating that they were prepared to trigger a ‘snapback’ mechanism to reinstate sanctions on Iran, unless Tehran resumes negotiations over its nuclear programme. While offering to extend negotiations with the Iranian regime until the end of August, the letter indicated that the E3 would enforce ‘severe sanctions’ unless Iran agreed to limit its nuclear programme.
New analysis from the Financial Times shows that solar power generation in Britain so far this year has surpassed the total generated in 2024, with approximately 10% of the UK’s electricity since January coming from solar power. This results from the rapid expansion of solar technology and a beneficial climate.
How competitors frame Britain
Zheng Zeguang, Ambassador to the UK from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), wrote an op-ed in The Guardian last week, calling for Beijing and London to recall the spirit of ‘cooperation’ and ‘solidarity’ between the two countries during the Second World War to ‘work together’ and fight ‘aggression and fascism’ today. This begs the question: why is the PRC supporting Russia, and not the UK and its allies, in relation to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine?
Following the diplomatic efforts by the US, Britain and other European nations to find a diplomatic solution to the war in Ukraine, TASS reported on Maria Zakharova, Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, calling on the UK to ‘refrain from actions that undermine Russia and the US’ efforts to settle the Ukrainian conflict’. Zakharova went on to warn Britain to ‘abandon’ its ‘ risky and ill-considered geopolitical gambits’. A hard pill to swallow, considering the only country engaged in ill-considered geopolitical gambits is Russia, attempting to conquer its neighbour.
Coalition of the not quite able?
Recent events following the Alaska summit have led to a resurgence in ‘back of napkin’ net assessments of European NATO’s ability to go toe-to-toe with Putin’s Russia in strategic competition, and potentially even an outbreak of direct hostilities. On paper, European NATO stacks up well; it has around three times the population (440 million versus 144 million) and several times the economic weight in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) compared to Russia.
Even in terms of military strength, despite years of underinvestment, European NATO countries possess roughly equal numbers of brigades to Russia, and more heavy equipment (which, in many cases, is superior equipment). Yet, original plans for a European ‘Reassurance Force’ have been, according to reports, altered significantly. So why is it that European NATO’s strength on paper has not translated into an ability to deploy a reassurance force to Ukraine and uphold NATO’s Article Five simultaneously?
Readiness, enablers, sustainment, logistics. These are the ‘unsexy’ parts of defence. European forces have long taken ‘holidays’ – to use the wording of Gen. Christopher Cavoli, the previous Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) – on these critical capabilities. Having an armoured brigade exist in theory is not the same as having one which can be deployed at short notice to where it needs to go, to fight effectively, and to stay in the fight. These functions add significantly to the actual cost of equipping a brigade (the same is true of warships at sea and squadrons in the sky), and were some of the first savings made in the ‘peace dividend’ drives of the 1990s. Exercise and live-firing budgets as a total proportion of overall budgets were reduced by enormous factors.
In 2024, NATO conducted a large-scale reinforcement exercise called ‘STEADFAST DEFENDER’ which involved over 90,000 personnel. This was the largest exercise the alliance had conducted since the end of the Cold War, but it serves as a stark reminder of how far NATO has fallen from its Cold War levels of readiness. For comparison, NATO used to conduct multi-division reinforcement exercises almost every year between 1969 and the end of the Cold War – known as the ‘Reforger’ (return of forces to Germany) exercises. The modern Russian army is not the threat the Red Army once was, but most of European NATO is still a long way off the mark it should be at.
It should be no surprise that the original reports of potential plans for a larger reassurance force have supposedly come down to ‘tripwire’ forces or even just a handful of training personnel and air patrols. On paper, European NATO allies should be able to field a division or corps just beyond the alliance’s frontline, but the risk assessment of some allies and the general lack of readiness, logistics and enablers have prevented a wider set of options from being realised.
The last couple of months should serve as a further wake-up call for European NATO countries who have not already done so to step up and properly invest in defence, particularly as the US doubles down on the Indo-Pacific region.
If you found this Cable useful, please subscribe or pledge your support!
What do you think about this Cable? Why not leave a comment below?