Four years on, what should Britain do to expedite a Ukrainian victory?
The Big Ask | No. 08.2026
Tuesday marked four years since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began. The ‘special military operation’, which Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, expected to last only a handful of days, has degenerated into a grinding war of attrition reminiscent of the Western Front during the First World War – and has cost the lives of over one million people fighting for the Kremlin.
Russia has also made itself an international pariah. Its economy suffers difficulties, and free and open nations continue to uphold sanctions regimes against the Kremlin while providing political, financial and military aid to Ukraine. Ensuring Kyiv emerges triumphant is a top strategic priority for the United Kingdom (UK), as continental security hinges on preventing further Russian aggression against sovereign European nations. As such, for this week’s Big Ask, we asked eight experts: Four years on, what should Britain do to expedite a Ukrainian victory?
Senior Research Fellow, Polish Institute of International Affairs, and Senior Lecturer, Warsaw School of Economics (SGH)
Over the past four years of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Britain has played a disproportionately significant role in sustaining Ukraine. The UK moved early in providing lethal aid, trained Ukrainian personnel, supplied advanced defence systems, financial assistance, shared intelligence, and coordinated sanctions and diplomatic support across North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the G7. This engagement was institutionalised through the 2024 UK–Ukraine Agreement on Security Co-operation under the Conservative government and deepened by the 2025 ‘100-year partnership’ under their Labour successors, signalling a long-term British commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty, reconstruction, and defence integration. Nonetheless, expediting a Ukrainian victory into the war’s fifth year now requires translating this activism into durable strategic leadership. As the United States (US) reduces its conventional presence and political bandwidth in Europe, Britain needs to assume greater responsibility within NATO, particularly as a pivotal Northern Flank power securing the High North and North Atlantic approaches.
However, such leadership must rest on capability. The UK needs to accelerate modernisation and expansion of its armed forces in line with evolving NATO’s Hague 2025 funding thresholds, rebuilding deployable mass, replenishing munitions stockpiles, and scaling defence-industrial output through sustained procurement. Meeting these requirements will require a much more open and comprehensive domestic debate on defence prioritisation within fiscal and budgetary constraints. If Britain is to anchor European deterrence and help bring the war to a favourable conclusion, defence needs a structurally higher priority in public expenditure.
Deputy Director, Centre for European Reform
The first thing the UK needs is to be honest with itself about three things:
Firstly, peace is not around the corner. Putin has no interest in peace, except on terms that amount to Ukraine’s surrender.
Secondly, Ukraine’s resilience is not infinite. European nations cannot rely indefinitely on the Ukrainians’ ability to withstand the terrible conditions the Kremlin is inflicting on them without breaking.
Thirdly, Donald Trump, President of the United States, is not on Ukraine’s side, nor that of Europe. Trump has sought to bully Ukraine into making concessions that would fatally undermine it militarily and politically, almost guaranteeing renewed conflict in Europe.
Against that background, Britain and its allies and partners must treat Ukraine’s security as their own: if Ukraine loses, Putin will target another state, perhaps a NATO ally. They should step up sanctions, including by seizing ‘shadow fleet’ tankers transporting Russian oil. They should invest in rapidly increasing defence production, for themselves and Ukraine, even if that means an increase in budget deficits. And they should put aircraft in the skies over Ukraine to blunt the Kremlin’s efforts to destroy Ukraine’s economy and society – all without waiting for a peace deal or an American ‘backstop’ that will not come.
None of those steps will guarantee that Ukraine defeats Russia and regains territory, but without them, a Russian victory will become more likely.
British Defence Attaché to Ukraine (2008-2011) and Russia (2019-2022)
Ukraine will not prevail militarily nor restore its 2022 borders, let alone those of 1991, by force.
Ukrainian fighting spirit and ingenuity, together with western support, have slowed but not stemmed Russia’s grinding military advance. Ukraine remains at a disadvantage in terms of men, materiel, and money, and is under significant battlefield and societal pressure. Russia can mobilise more of its national strength, even if it has proven unable to date to leverage its numerical advantage decisively.
Locked in a trial of endurance to exhaust each other’s will and capacity to fight on, it will be resources, not warfare, that will prove decisive, assuming equal commitment to the cause by both sides. For his part, being unserious about peace, Putin is determined to subjugate Ukraine. For theirs, Ukrainians do not support a peace deal on the Kremlin’s punitive terms.
In this war of attrition, it is the party being attrited that will lose first. With the US havering, the UK and Europe must act to ensure this is not Ukraine and make the war too costly for Russia to continue. The reactive incrementalism of the past four years, providing just enough aid for Ukraine’s survival but not to allow it to regain the initiative, should be replaced by concerted proactive policies to provide Ukraine with durable financial and economic support; remove battlefield, support, and logistic bottlenecks; assist Ukrainian domestic defence production, in particular for deep strike; and enhance and actually enforce economic sanctions against Russia.
International Fellow, Council on Geostrategy, and Assistant Professor of International Relations, University of Waterloo (Canada)
Carl von Clausewitz once observed that ‘everything in war is very simple but the simplest thing is difficult.’ And indeed, identifying what Ukraine needs for achieving victory is straightforward: in the absence of direct military intervention on the part of others, Ukraine must receive robust and persistent defence industrial support so that it can not only withstand attacks on the ground and in the air, but that it can also undermine Russia’s ability to occupy its territory for good. Unfortunately, European countries have been slow in stepping up military production to backstop Ukraine’s defence needs. They are yet to produce a coherent, well-resourced vision for how Ukraine could inflict strategic defeat on Russia. These failures illuminate why Washington exerts as much influence on Ukraine’s future as it does under President Donald Trump.
Thankfully, London has been one of the most clear-eyed and forward-thinking supporters of Kyiv, assuming key leadership roles in coordinating military aid while vouching for its interests in international discussions. Yet much more remains to be done. The new Ukrspecsystems factory in Great Britain offers a model for further defence industrial cooperation between the two countries. Such investments reinforce the fighting ability of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and ensure that no agreement on European security could be struck at the expense of Ukraine or, for that matter, Great Britain and other like-minded NATO members.
Doctoral Fellow and PhD Candidate, University of Surrey
Whilst Ukraine’s victory mostly hinges on Ukraine, with outside European actors increasingly becoming irrelevant amidst their reticence to perform real war-changing actions, the UK at least has the strongest set of available tools to help a Ukrainian victory come around. These revolve around three core pillars: troops, trade, and ties.
For troops, it has been suggested that British troops could be deployed to Ukraine, as many as 5,000–15,000, to perform non-combat roles. This does not go far enough. For Britain to make a real impact, we should consider a wider-ranging operation to secure and protect key cities, such as Kyiv, Lviv, and Uzhhorod, to allow Ukrainian troops to be remobilised towards the frontline and to facilitate the reopening of civilian and permanent military logistics, as well as allowing British troops real learnings in warfare if positioned closer to the front.
In trade, Britain has been entrepreneurial, but this should be deepened. Alongside pushing for loan relief, the UK should use trade mechanisms to keep the Ukrainian economy strong, encouraging its opening into the UK and Europe. This supports its ability to last economically until victory and attempt to mitigate the exploitative practice of operating and taking capital away from Ukraine itself.
Lastly is ties, referring to the need to keep Ukraine in the diplomatic picture. At the United Nations, NATO, in discussions with the European Union, and especially in bilateral relationships in Asia and Africa, Ukraine should be highlighted hand-in-hand with the UK. The more the UK can support in tackling misinformation and pushing back Russian influence, the more pressure can be kept away from Ukraine to capitulate to false negotiations.
Whilst we can be proud of the UK’s role in Ukraine, it pales in comparison to what individual Ukrainians are doing to reach victory. It is within Britain’s grasp to help Ukraine win if we really wanted it to; let us at least meet them halfway.
Adjunct Fellow, Council on Geostrategy
Beyond the current level of support, the UK must hasten its activity in three key areas. The first is to work with allies to proactively counter and defeat Russian activity abroad, including neutering Russia’s ability to fuel its war. Continued dismantling of the ‘shadow fleet’ and severing the supply of key western components that are still found in Russian weaponry are priorities, as are combatting Russian influence operations, both in Europe and in key middle-ground powers.
The second is to build up its military and industrial capacity significantly, both to rearm its own forces and to supply Ukraine. A strong British military is required to constrain Russian strategic options, while uninterrupted flows of British equipment – especially critical enablers – can decisively contribute to a Ukrainian victory.
Finally, the UK must continue to argue successfully for the necessity of a comprehensive Russian defeat for global security, to both domestic and foreign audiences. War fatigue, budgetary pressures, and hostile narratives – especially from populist parties – will all contribute to declining support for Ukraine if left to fester. British politicians must continue to clearly explain to both the British public and audiences abroad why the benefits of a Ukrainian victory far exceed the potential costs.
Co-founder (Research), Council on Geostrategy
From autumn 2021 to summer 2022, Britain led the European response to Ukraine. Not only did it provide vital political support for the Ukrainians, but it also led the way in issuing lethal weaponry, advice, and intelligence, as well as support from other European allies. But more than that, it reinforced deterrence along NATO’s central front, not least by providing Sweden and Finland with security assurances once they decided to join NATO. The UK saw Russia’s imperialist assault on Ukraine as a threat to national and European security, but it was also keen to re-establish its position as Europe’s leading power after the tumult of Brexit. Other Europeans took note: Britain did much to re-establish its strategic indispensability.
The UK needs to go back to the confidence and boldness of that era. It is fine to plan for after a potential settlement, but first Vladimir Putin must be brought to heel. Waiting for the US to act or lead is no longer tenable; UK interests in Ukraine are greater than those of the Americans. Along with Germany, Britain should convene a vanguard of like-minded European countries, along with Ukraine, and establish a clear plan for Ukrainian victory within two to three years. It should then provide the political cover and resources, alongside its European allies, to fund the Ukrainian war effort. With clear and decisive British and European backing, Russia may lose the will to continue, enhancing the prospect that its grisly war will come to an end.
Adjunct Fellow, Council on Geostrategy, and Senior Lecturer, School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews
So many changes have overtaken the world in the past four years that we must force ourselves to remember the destabilising nature of Vladimir Putin’s aggression. Knowing what is at stake in Ukraine should buttress our commitment to it.
What the UK should immediately do is board and seize ‘shadow fleet’ tankers transiting the North Sea and English Channel to export Putin’s oil and gas overseas. It is a national disgrace that we have not stopped and boarded a single ‘shadow fleet’ vessel while the French have boarded two, Sweden boarded one, Finland boarded one, and the Germans forced one to turn around. Russia’s warmaking depends on its oil and gas exports, which we have tolerated due to our lack of imagination.
We should also work alongside European allies to extend anti-drone and anti-missile defences over western Ukraine. US and British fighter jets shot down Iranian drones and missiles bound for Israel, proving that manned aircraft can efficiently protect civilians from drone and cruise missile attacks. Are Ukrainians less deserving of protection than Israelis? Does Britain have fewer of a commitment to Ukraine’s security than Israel’s? If the answer to either of these questions is no, then we league together with close European allies, deploy fighter jets to Polish and Romanian airfields, and from there declare an air protection zone extending over western Ukraine. The fate of the Russo-Ukrainian War is still up for grabs, and Ukraine’s security is indissociable from our own.
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