As 2025 draws to a close, Britain’s World is taking a retrospective look at the past year’s geopolitical developments for this week’s Big Ask. As noted in His Majesty’s (HM) Government’s Strategic Defence Review (SDR) and National Security Strategy (NSS), both published in June, the world is becoming increasingly volatile as hostile states jostle for power and influence.
As we enter a more volatile era, even the most satisfied countries – including the United States (US) – have embraced proactive strategic postures, which are shifting in response to the changing balance of economic and military power. Middle and smaller-sized countries are also in flux as allegiances and loyalties shift. So, for the final Big Ask of the year, we asked ten experts: Which country punched above its weight the most in 2025?
Senior Research Fellow, Polish Institute of International Affairs, and Senior Lecturer, Warsaw School of Economics (SGH)
From a Polish perspective, the countries that punched most above their weight in 2025 were Ukraine and Hungary. The first was due to its transformation from a recipient of external support into an actor increasingly shaping the policy choices of its allies, despite sustained – and at times overbearing – Russian military pressure. It preserved its state cohesion and adapted its force structure to impose substantial military and economic costs on a far larger adversary. Since Russia has, according to its own propaganda, been fighting a war against the ‘collective West’, Ukrainian resistance has fundamentally reduced Russian military pressure on North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) territory.
By contrast, Hungary’s repeated use of vetoes and procedural delays concerning military assistance to Ukraine, sanctions implementation and common funding mechanisms illustrated how institutional leverage within the European Union (EU), and indirectly within NATO, can be employed to slow collective action. The strategic lessons from both cases align with the emphasis in the SDR and NSS on alliance cohesion, speed of decision-making, and resilience against coercion and internal fragmentation.
Overall, Ukraine helped to sustain international attention on Central and Eastern Europe amid competing global crises, reinforcing Poland’s longstanding assessment that Russia remains the primary threat to European security. On the other hand, Hungary emerged as a leader in obstruction within EU decision-making, over time emboldening populist narratives in Slovakia and Czechia.
Senior Lecturer in National Security Studies, King’s College London
Qatar punched above its weight most clearly in 2025 through sustained diplomatic mediation, even after absorbing direct security pressure.
At the regional level, Qatar has continued to consolidate relations with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt following the end of the Gulf blockade. By 2025, this rapprochement has translated into restored diplomatic engagement and greater strategic room for manoeuvre, strengthening Qatar’s position as a regional interlocutor rather than an outlier.
Internationally, Qatar has remained central to negotiations related to the conflict in Gaza, hosting indirect talks between Israel and Hamas and working with the US and Egypt on hostage exchanges and humanitarian access. This role continued despite heightened pressure. In 2025, Qatar was directly affected by Israeli military action on its soil, an escalation which raised the political and security costs of mediation. At the same time, Iranian attacks linked to wider regional escalation generated visible domestic unease, sharpening public concern about Qatar being drawn into external conflicts. Qatar’s response was deliberately restrained: it avoided escalation and maintained diplomatic channels, continuing to host negotiations.
Concurrently, Qatar has also sustained its role as a diplomatic interface on Afghanistan, facilitating dialogue on humanitarian access and sanctions exemptions. This mediation capacity has been reinforced by longer-term investments in soft power, from Al Jazeera’s global reach to the reputational capital generated through the International Federation of Football Associations (FIFA) World Cup in 2022 and international convening of platforms such as the annual Doha Forum, which have enhanced Qatar’s visibility and credibility with diverse actors.
Accordingly, what distinguishes Qatar’s performance in 2025 is that it has maintained a diplomatic posture under direct provocation, contributing in an outsized manner to international security. By prioritising continuity over retaliation, Qatar has demonstrated how a small state can exercise strength through restraint, while preserving, and indeed growing, its strategic relevance.
British Defence Attaché to Ukraine (2008-2011) and Russia (2019-2022)
2025 was another difficult year for Russia. Its economy remained under deep strain and new energy, financial and exports sanctions impacted the Kremlin’s revenues. Growth was down, the deficit widened, inflation remained high, living standards declined, taxes rose, non-defence spending was slashed and the sugar rush of wartime spending ran its course. In Ukraine, the Russian Armed Forces failed to achieve a strategic breakthrough. A glacial advance on the battlefield came at enormous human cost. Hopes for a better relationship with Washington under Donald Trump, President of the US, were frustrated.
Yet, despite evident shortcomings in Russia’s state power, it proved resilient and determined. The Kremlin continues to exert strength and influence above its apparent weight, with expert predictions from free and open nations of impending economic or military collapse proven incorrect – again. Russia continues to test European nations with unconventional operations below the threshold of war. Defence spending grew, and it retained the military initiative in Ukraine with incremental gains achieved. The Russian Armed Forces also continued to fill its ranks.
Thanks to Trumpian capriciousness, demands for an immediate ceasefire and truly punishing sanctions were avoided with economic statecraft ‘designed to inflict costs for and deter bad behaviour [reduced] to a bargaining chip’. Russia retains significant influence in the so-called ‘Global South’, supplying arms, energy and security, while deepening ties with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), India and an expanded cast of BRICS+ nations.
Notwithstanding its myriad economic, military and societal problems, Russia continues to punch above its weight psychologically in the imaginations of European leaders, judging by recent, unsubstantiated statements about the risk of a direct military attack against NATO. Russia’s strategic weakness does not stop it remaining the sum of all our fears.
Research Fellow (National Security), Council on Geostrategy
Australia should be highlighted as a country that has ‘punched above its weight’ in 2025. Though an advanced economy, Australia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ranks only 15th globally, behind countries such as Brazil, Canada, Spain and Mexico. Yet, Australia has shown the impact a country can have when it believes in its own agency and how this can be maximised through alliances and partnerships.
Australia is becoming a linchpin in Indo-Pacific security, deepening ties with local and like-minded partners, while carefully managing relationships with the US, its primary defence partner and the PRC, its primary economic partner. Simultaneously, Australia is modernising its armed forces, focusing them on its most important strategic needs.
A healthy debate exists in Australia regarding specific approaches and the gap between ambition and funding. Although fair challenges are raised, compared with near-peers, Australia has more ambition and energy. It is expanding its surface fleet and acquiring nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs). It possesses a balanced and modern air force, including (for now) the world’s second largest F-35 fleet. It is nurturing its defence industrial base and experimenting with autonomous platforms, such as the Ghost Shark and Ghost Bat. Australia has also deepened a number of key relations in 2025 in particular with Japan, Indonesia and the UK.
If countries want to think about how they can punch above their weight, they could do worse than looking at Australia. There have been fewer cases of unbacked grandiose statements. Instead, Australia has got on with serious delivery – not without its challenges of course – of its bold but realistic defence strategy, seeking to maximise security for a reasonable cost.
Executive Editor, Internationale Politik Quarterly and Internationale Politik
Arguing that Germany punched above its weight this year would be a stretch by any measure. Yet, there is a case to be made that the turn it took in 2025 may well register among the most consequential geopolitical developments.
Shocked by the speech given by JD Vance, Vice President of the US, at the Munich Security Conference in February, and the way he and Trump treated Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of Ukraine, in the White House the same month, convinced Friedrich Merz, then incoming Chancellor of Germany, to throw fiscal orthodoxy overboard and perform a spectacular U-turn.
With his Christian Social Union of Bavaria (CSU) coalition partner and the Greens – who deserve special mention – Merz got the votes to reform Germany’s constitutional ‘debt brake’ to allow a debt-financed €500 billion (£437.9 billion) in infrastructure expenditure and potentially unlimited defence spending.
After years of getting nowhere near NATO’s 2% of GDP goal, Germany will be one of a select few countries that will have no trouble reaching the newly requested 5% target. On a single day this week, the Bundestag greenlit spending of €50 billion (£43.8 billion) for military equipment; Berlin used to outlay such a sum, just about, in a year.
By 2029, Germany’s defence budget will be greater than €150 billion (£131.4 billion), outspending everyone else in Europe. Merz and his cabinet no longer have illusions about Vladimir Putin’s Russia – and none about Trump’s US either. The acute threat of war and the need to quickly improve European deterrence is a newfound and widely shared consensus.
The Federal Ministry of Defence’s desire to make up for decades of neglect is palpable. The focus is on filling capability gaps, and as fast as possible – existing ones and those which American retrenchment might widen.
If Germany succeeds in anchoring its rapid rearmament in a cooperative European framework, working closely with Poland and, beyond the EU, making the most of the newly affirmed partnership with Britain, it will start pulling its weight militarily in a way not seen for some time. That is good news for a European continent that may find itself alone in the future – but it should not allow itself to be outclassed.
Senior Adviser for Geopolitics, Centre for Risk Studies, and Convenor, Geopolitical Risk Analysis Study Group, University of Cambridge
In 2025, Israel has demonstrated an ability to generate military and political outcomes far exceeding what would normally be expected of a small state with a citizen army, limited strategic depth and wide-scale international opposition. Operating simultaneously across several theatres, Israel showed a level of resilience, reach and effectiveness unusual for a country of only ten million people.
In Gaza, Israel eliminated much of Hamas’ senior leadership and severely degraded its operational capabilities, dismantling command structures, destroying military infrastructure and sharply reducing the group’s capacity for large-scale attacks. While Hamas was not eradicated, Israel achieved clear tactical and operational superiority. In Lebanon, Israel maintained deterrence against Hezbollah, preventing escalation into a full-scale war and preserving freedom of action along its northern border.
Further afield, Israel demonstrated unprecedented reach in its confrontation with Iran in June. Sustained Israeli airstrikes on Iranian military and nuclear-related infrastructure demonstrated its long-range capabilities and paved the way for decisive American strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan – as well as affirmation of the US’ willingness to defend Israel.
Despite wartime pressures, Israel also maintained its position as a global technology leader. Its startup ecosystem ranked third in the world, drawing significant foreign investment, while economic growth remained high for a developed country, at around 2.8%.
There is more than one reason for Israel’s outsized power; from its high levels of national resolve, the effectiveness of its military and intelligence services, the strength of its economy and its special relationship with the US. 2025 has shown it to be the strongest single state in its region, both in military and political terms, and one of the strongest small states in the world.
Senior Researcher, Coalition for Global Prosperity
Throughout 2025, Europe has come under pressure from an unpredictable US leadership, highlighted by J. D. Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Conference in February and the National Security Strategy in December. In this context, the true test of a country’s ability to punch above its weight is its ability to navigate this turbulence and emerge stronger. Enter Finland.
Despite an economy one-hundredth the size of the US, Finland has avoided being sidelined. Alexander Stubb, President of Finland, has proven adept at understanding US interests and psychology. A well-timed golf trip with President Trump, just weeks after a tense Oval Office meeting between the US and Ukraine, allowed Stubb to effectively make Europe’s case, emphasising Finland’s historical experience.
Similarly, while many countries across the world have seen ties with Washington weaken, Finland’s have strengthened. Stubb’s ‘reverse Kennedy’ approach – doing more for US interests to ensure greater US engagement in Finland’s – has paid off. Trump has, in essence, entrusted Arctic security to US-Finnish cooperation, a region of growing importance to Washington due to Russia-PRC cooperation and its vast resources. An agreement to co-build 11 new icebreakers, alongside Finland’s commitment to meet the NATO 5% defence spending target early, has made Helsinki a model partner.
In 2025, Finland has not only been able to navigate a mercurial US administration, something many have tried and failed to do, but has also bagged itself a seat on the top table, among the European powers of the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Italy.
PhD Student, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University
In 2025, Japan demonstrated a presence ‘greater than a punch’ against the dual challenges of Russia and the PRC by combining various methods. Against Russia, it continued supporting Ukraine and imposing sanctions, standing shoulder-to-shoulder with the Group of Seven (G7) and European nations to uphold the international order. Its sustained role in raising the cost of aggression, despite its geographical distance from the conflict, proved its reliability to its allies.
Regarding the PRC, the key point was not only military buildup, but also multilateralising deterrence through cooperative arrangements. Centered on the American-Japanese alliance, Japan steadily advanced a ‘networked deterrence’ system linking the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic. This was achieved through cumulative efforts: joint exercises, mutual access arrangements, intelligence sharing and joint statements with the Philippines, Australia, the UK and Europe (including NATO).
Furthermore, anticipating a Taiwan contingency, Japan advanced practical civilian protection measures, such as evacuation plans for the Sakishima Islands. Through capacity-building support such as Official Security Assistance (OSA), Japan institutionalised coastal surveillance, Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and Synthetic-Aperture Radar (SAR)/surveillance assistance to Southeast Asia and beyond, elevating crisis management capabilities which function effectively on the ground.
These moves exemplify how Japan, while acknowledging its own constraints, has transformed resources into an ‘amplifier for cooperation’ to expand its influence.
Research Fellow (Indo-Pacific Geopolitics), Council on Geostrategy, and PhD Student, Department of International History, London School of Economics and Political Science
British leaders are rarely popular in both Brussels and Washington. Yet, Sir Keir Starmer, Prime Minister, appears a deft operator on both sides of the Atlantic, achieving this in the most trying of circumstances.
Sir Keir and Trump are not political bedfellows. Moreover, the Trump administration has hit friends and foes alike with tariffs and brought into question Washington’s commitment to European security. Yet, the Prime Minister has been able to engage Trump on Ukraine and has committed to increasing defence spending, with little protest at home despite testing financial circumstances. The UK was also first in line when it came to ironing out trade differences.
Deals and partnerships have also been made with the EU and key European allies on trade, security, migrations and youth mobility. HM Government has proven that it is possible for Britain to be ‘a good European’ nation post-Brexit. The UK’s leading role in the Coalition of the Willing this year to support Ukraine against Russia’s ongoing invasion is undoubtedly the clearest and most important example of their commitment to the continent.
At the same time, with the deployment of the Carrier Strike Group 2025 to the region, Britain projected its military power into the Indo-Pacific – reinforcing the point that ‘NATO-first’ does not mean NATO only. The Royal Navy’s passage through the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea supported stability and reaffirmed freedom of navigation in these contested waters. Joint drills and exercises also have helped deepen important partnerships in the region, notably with Australia and Japan.
In opposition, Labour may have scoffed at the term ‘Global Britain’, but in 2025, it has delivered exactly that.
Programme Director for Security Studies, Centre for Defence Strategies, and Joint Programme Leader, Future of Ukraine Programme, Centre for Geopolitics, University of Cambridge
Politically and diplomatically, Kyiv proved highly effective at a moment when international commitments were fragile and external support increasingly contested. Ukraine succeeded in anchoring European backing and contributed directly to landmark decisions on long-term financial assistance, defence cooperation and the immobilisation – and potential future use – of Russian sovereign assets.
Crucially, Kyiv helped to shift the European debate away from short-term crisis management towards structural security solutions, positioning Ukraine not merely as a recipient of aid, but as an active contributor to European stability.
Militarily, despite persistent Russian propaganda and sceptical forecasts in parts of Russian and European media, Ukraine confounded expectations. The defence of Kupiansk and Pokrovsk remained intact, disproving assumptions of imminent Ukrainian collapse and demonstrating continued operational resilience under extreme pressure.
Second, European nations as a united force also punched above their weight. Despite repeated attempts by adversaries to portray Europe as divided or strategically paralysed, 2025 marked a year of growing political resolve. Most notably, the EU adopted a historic decision to phase out imports of Russian gas fully. Only a short time ago, Russian gas accounted for around 45% of EU imports. That share has now fallen to below 13%, with binding legal timelines set: a complete phase-out of Russian Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) by the end of 2026, and of pipeline gas by autumn 2027. This is not merely an energy policy decision, but a strategic act with long-term geopolitical consequences.
Taken together, 2025 was not defined by the dominance of a single power, but by unexpected agency. Ukraine exceeded expectations under existential pressure and its European allies demonstrated growing strategic coherence. In that sense, the year marked a quiet but significant rebalancing of influence in Europe’s security landscape.
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