There is absolutely no point in considering this point until Britain has armed forces capable of delivering action and keeping it supplied . We therefore need to expand RN and the Marines dramatically with modern ships and infrastructure and have supply agreements with Singapore and Japan . Our capabilities should cover our friends above plus South Korea , Thailand , Malaysia and Brunei , plus Commonwealth members in the Pacific, not to forget support for and coordination with Australian and NZ forces .
Brillaint roundup of perspectives here. The piece really nails how Europe's Indo-Pacific engagement isnt about overstretch but about protecting thier own economic interests. I think Freer's point about "where maximum strategic effect can be attained" is key here, because even smaller, persistent naval presense can complicate adversary calculus without drawing down critical Euro-Atlantic assets. The France example shows how even a middle power can maintain meaningful influence through consistency rather than scale.
It's all well and good to hypothesise what the UK could, or should, provide in maritime assets, alas we have too little. The lack of trained and experienced people, with too few maritime platforms that are deployable is a clear defect. Politicians have not provided any serious improvements to the RN, let alone the Armed Forces for far too many years. The evidence of threats and the need for more defence has been absolutely clear but still huge sums of money are given to curry favour rather than for national needs.
There is absolutely no point in considering this point until Britain has armed forces capable of delivering action and keeping it supplied . We therefore need to expand RN and the Marines dramatically with modern ships and infrastructure and have supply agreements with Singapore and Japan . Our capabilities should cover our friends above plus South Korea , Thailand , Malaysia and Brunei , plus Commonwealth members in the Pacific, not to forget support for and coordination with Australian and NZ forces .
Brillaint roundup of perspectives here. The piece really nails how Europe's Indo-Pacific engagement isnt about overstretch but about protecting thier own economic interests. I think Freer's point about "where maximum strategic effect can be attained" is key here, because even smaller, persistent naval presense can complicate adversary calculus without drawing down critical Euro-Atlantic assets. The France example shows how even a middle power can maintain meaningful influence through consistency rather than scale.
It's all well and good to hypothesise what the UK could, or should, provide in maritime assets, alas we have too little. The lack of trained and experienced people, with too few maritime platforms that are deployable is a clear defect. Politicians have not provided any serious improvements to the RN, let alone the Armed Forces for far too many years. The evidence of threats and the need for more defence has been absolutely clear but still huge sums of money are given to curry favour rather than for national needs.