Last month, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicted that in 2026, the United Kingdom (UK) will have the second fastest-growing economy in the Group of Seven (G7) – a multilateral grouping comprising the world’s largest and most advanced economies. By 2030, it is projected to leap over Japan to re-emerge as the world’s fifth biggest economy.
Britain has also surged to the forefront of geopolitical developments through the establishment of AUKUS and reinforcement of Ukraine and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), to say nothing of its aircraft carrier deployments to the Indo-Pacific, which all complement its traditional multilateral and bilateral relationships.
However, despite these achievements, the discourse of British economic and political decline has grown louder. So, for this week’s Big Ask, we asked nine experts: Is Britain now a rising power?
Director of International Strategy, TheCityUK, and Adjunct Fellow, Council on Geostrategy
We are living through a significant era of changing global power dynamics. Economic power is becoming more dispersed, with a general shift to emerging economies in the East. Within this global context, ‘rising power’ is not a label one would naturally apply to the UK. Being the second fastest-growing economy in the G7 simply means that Britain is the ‘best of the rest’ after the United States (US), which has been pulling away from other advanced economies since 2008.
However, the UK is well-placed to lay claim to being a ‘leading middle power’ – not a position many would have predicted would be possible throughout the Brexit years.
It is easy to trot out that Britain remains one of the world’s largest economies; a permanent member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council; a nuclear power; a leading member of organisations such as the G7, the Group of 20 (G20) and NATO; that London continues to be a major financial centre; and British culture, education and innovation maintain significant global reach. The UK’s success in reaching new economic and diplomatic agreements with countries and groupings from the US to Japan, India, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and likely soon the Gulf Cooperation Council underlines that these strengths are substantive and enduring.
But, ultimately, global power and influence begin at home. Britain should confront its deep-rooted domestic productivity, investment and fiscal challenges to maximise the potential of this relatively strong global position and fulfil the role which so many hope it can.
Research Fellow (National Security), Council on Geostrategy
For many years, there has been a perception that the UK has been in decline. ‘Power’, in the international setting, is a notoriously difficult concept to define and quantify. Nonetheless, most indicators between today and the end of the Second World War show that, despite a few British resurgences – such as in the 1980s and 2000s – the perception has some truth to it.
Yet, this relative decline looks set to become a thing of the past. The problem, however, is that this perception of decline is so deeply rooted that it has led to a prolonged culture of managed decline. Such a culture often sees good money thrown after bad, aiming to ease symptoms rather than grapple with structural problems.
The future of Britain’s power position in the international system actually looks quite bright. Some estimates expect the UK’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to overtake that of Germany at some point in the 2030s. This would place Britain firmly in fourth place in global rankings in terms of GDP, with no country close on its heels (black swan events aside).
Barring a brief stint in the 2000s, the UK has not occupied this fourth spot since the 1960s. In addition to its growing relative economic power, Britain will continue to hold an enviable amount of influence from its technological, military, and cultural capacity, expertise and capabilities.
This is not to say that the UK is not without problems: economic inactivity, ballooning welfare costs, deepening debt, growing issues of societal incohesion, and sky high energy costs, to name just a few. These will undoubtedly continue to hold back Britain’s rise, but if their causes can be tackled, they will unlock a rise which is even greater.
Chief Executive Officer, Centre for Economic Security
While the UK’s economic growth prospects are positive over the medium term, and a lot is being done to straighten out the challenging budgetary conditions of the present, economic growth is ephemeral, and a difficult target to hit. In fact, this focus on growth is misleading – whether the economy expands or shrinks by 0.5% is irrelevant to the real challenges that people face on a daily basis. His Majesty’s (HM) Government’s recognition that the term ‘economic security’ makes people feel more secure provides public credibility to the work it needs to do in forming a more specific definition, which is creating the institutional flexibility and preparedness to adjust to crises as they unfold.
The need for the British economy to be adaptable to challenges cannot be ignored – not just the obvious attacks on economic infrastructure, such as cyber or severed cables, but also in terms of capacity to borrow and to allocate resources where the challenges arise quickly and effectively. Additionally, the UK should learn to use its economic power levers in trade and finance ‘offensively’. Accepting that challenges exist could unlock new mechanisms for borrowing in the form of ‘economic security bonds’.
Britain is leading in understanding these threats, and how they play out with voters and with businesses and finance. There is a need for global leadership here, because the world is only just beginning to realise that economic warfare exists. Many are still reluctant to use the term, but the UK can lead in focusing political minds – particularly in Europe – around the fact that there is a problem, and the potential for a full-blown kinetic war.
Britain has the potential to be a rising power if it can take this narrative, coordinate it across government (including HM Treasury) and help people understand that economic conflict does not necessarily mean an inevitable kinetic conflict. If it takes charge in helping others understand the nature of this problem, it is possible that its economic power levers become credible – because they can adjust flexibly to the challenges the world faces.
Columnist, Progressive Britain
It is easiest to list the old and new assets which can either maintain the UK’s status or make it a rising nation. It is harder to know how British politicians and entrepreneurs will make the most of them in an age of deep distrust, polarisation and populism that make bipartisan and multipartisan support for long-term projects so difficult to win and sustain.
The positives are significant hard military power; respected and efficient intelligence services, plus the Five Eyes partnership; permanent membership of the UN Security Council; a leading role in NATO, the G7 and the Commonwealth; and plenty of soft power such as the English language, world-renowned universities, cultural institutions and media.
The UK also has the sixth-largest national economy, the second-largest financial centre and a strong technology sector, which puts it ahead in Artificial Intelligence (AI). It could also become a clean energy superpower thanks to renewables. Brexit inevitably impacted the country, but HM Government is repairing relations with the European Union (EU), and could be nimbler thanks to trade agreements with the EU, the US and India.
However, productivity growth is relatively weak, causing a significant fiscal shortfall, while national debt of over 100% of GDP constrains public spending and investment in the NHS and infrastructure – as well as causing severe challenges in expanding public services and housing affordability. A major obstacle to rising further is Britain’s ageing population and declining numbers of young workers to provide the tax base.
Yet, the UK has been decisive in preventing an abrupt American rupture with NATO, which would send defence bills rocketing across Europe. This is a signal achievement, but the jury is out on whether longstanding advantages in diplomacy, defence, soft power and finance can increase Britain’s power.
Senior Lecturer in Economic Warfare Education, King’s College London
The IMF’s projection for the UK to become the second fastest-growing economy in the G7 in 2026 is based on selective statistics, which should be interpreted with caution. Overreliance on aggregate macroeconomic indicators such as GDP for political judgement can be misleading. Such indicators do not necessarily reflect the underlying health of the economy and its potential for development and wellbeing.
Moreover, even these indicators offer little ground for optimism. Inflation, for example, is projected at 2.5% in 2026, while household demand continues to decline as real incomes are squeezed by high energy taxes and stagnating wages.
Britain falls short on key economic traits typical of a rising power, such as an expanding global footprint in supply chains, services and manufacturing. Historically, economic ‘rise’ has been driven by sustained growth rooted in innovation, infrastructure investment, industrialisation and strong domestic labour markets. Crucially, rising powers use economic statecraft to enhance their investment climate, global image and influence. In the UK’s case, the opposite seems to be happening: growth is sluggish, investment is falling and international confidence is waning.
Why? June’s 10-year Modern Industrial Strategy 2025 reads more like a wish list than a coherent strategy based on a clear understanding of available means and how to deploy them effectively. Tight securitisation, sanctions and export controls have led to overcompliance and heightened risk aversion, significantly undermining Britain’s investment appeal. Meanwhile, the push for military industrialisation is unlikely to be the rising tide that lifts all boats. Instead, it risks diverting resources from sustainable development and fuelling inflation across multiple sectors.
Researcher, School of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent
Framing the UK as a rising power assumes linear ascent, whereas its current posture reflects strategic recovery more than systemic rise. Britain has endured a turbulent decade: Brexit, domestic political instability and the return of conflict to Europe.
Yet, the UK remains institutionally embedded in core mechanisms of international cooperation, and continues to project influence. While the IMF’s short-term economic forecast disrupts narratives of post-Brexit deterioration, Britain’s distinctiveness lies less in material ascent than in its resilience – the capacity to absorb disruption while sustaining strategic intent.
The ‘Global Britain’ agenda has nonetheless initiated a reorientation of foreign policy beyond Europe, as evidenced by an expanded diplomatic presence in the Indo-Pacific and continued engagement with multilateral institutions. The UK has played a visible role in supporting Ukraine, providing early military assistance and sustained defence commitments which reinforce NATO’s eastern posture. This reflects a dual orientation of re-engagement in Europe alongside global repositioning – not structural ascent, but adaptive relevance.
While Britain may not fit traditional criteria of material or systemic terms of a rising power, it remains a mid-ranking, globally situated state and an ideationally active actor. Its future relevance will hinge not on scale, but on whether it can transform resilience into strategic coherence.
Co-founder (Research), Council on Geostrategy
Although it is projected to leap over Japan by 2030 and maybe Germany by 2035, the UK’s relative ascent will be more by default than by design. Most of its peers – Japan, France and Germany – are just doing worse, as crippling demographic and economic problems drag them down. The real country to measure oneself against is the US: not since the 1950s has it loomed over its allies in the way it currently does. The challenge of today is not American decline, but the descent of Japan and Western Europe.
Britain has the capacity to surge. Its demographic profile is healthier, it has more top-tier research universities than any country other than the US, and it ranks first for future possibilities. It also suffers from a lower degree of energy dependence than most of its peers, and the countries it is dependent on – such as Norway – are very close friends. It just needs to do everything in its power to cut the cost of energy.
What the UK lacks is confidence and drive. True, it has sketched out a new position through AUKUS and in Europe through supporting Ukraine, but it needs to step up in NATO as America steps out. If Britain establishes a clear plan to pour in resources – 5% of GDP – to recapitalise its defences, it will not only retain, but will even compound its lead in the 2030s.
What the UK should do is cultivate its ‘strategic indispensability’. It should pursue the military capabilities – a stronger navy and air force, sub-strategic nuclear weapons and next-generation enablers – its allies and partners want, and leverage them actively for strategic and economic benefit. To do that, Britain needs to rebuild a national powerbase through strategic design: liberalise planning laws to enable more nuclear power plants, and plough investment into more roads, railways and mass transit, and more and more houses.
The Rt. Hon. Anne-Marie Trevelyan
Minister for the Indo-Pacific (2022-2024) and Secretary of State for International Trade (2021-2022)
The UK is the sixth-largest economy in the world, despite being but a small island on the edge of the European continent, as some like to suggest. It is a nation of creators and innovators, and global investment continues to flow into every part of the country. Its closest trading partner, the US, imported £60 billion of British goods and £137 billion of services in 2024, and the UK imported £57 billion of goods and £61 billion of services from the US.
Britain remains America’s most trusted defence partner; two of the Five Eyes who share more than with any other nation. As a critical NATO member, with a continued commitment to put its nuclear deterrent at NATO’s disposal, the UK is critical to defending the US’ eastern seaboard and ensuring NATO’s defensive posture.
Britain continues to be a respected and trusted partner globally, which never ceases to make me proud of my country wherever I travel. With new trade deals negotiated with the EU, the US, India, Australia and New Zealand, among many more since it left the EU, as well as new security and green economy agreements with many more nations, it brings serious commitment to these new relationships.
Many of these are in the Indo-Pacific, a conscious focus by governments post-Brexit as the UK’s freedom to strengthen partnerships was returned to it. The Indo-Pacific is where all the economic growth will be found in the decades ahead, and brings huge opportunities for Britain.
In order for the UK’s potential for growth and influence to continue in the decades ahead, it will be vital that Britain maintains its focus on economic growth at home, enabling private capital to invest and thrive, and taking risks rewarded through government policies which respect and encourage employment and training of our next generations.
Former Director General for Security Policy, Ministry of Defence (2014-2018), Visiting Professor, King’s College London, and Honorary Fellow, Council on Geostrategy
A state’s relative power in the international arena has a number of sources, including economic, technological and military. Focusing on the latter, the UK has relatively small, but proficient, armed forces with a broad spectrum of capabilities, including nuclear submarines and weapons. It also has a well-developed strategic culture, with a sophisticated understanding of geopolitical trends and potential responses. The defence budget is also now steadily increasing.
For much of its recent history, Britain has managed significant international challenges together with allies. It has been able to leverage its military proficiency and defence industrial capacity to build and deepen partnerships with other states, which give it greater global reach as well as within its own Euro-Atlantic region. Recent examples have included AUKUS with the US and Australia, the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) with Italy and Japan, and the Type 26 frigate partnership with Norway.
For decades, the UK saw itself as Europe’s leading military power with the largest defence budget. While that budget is rising, as noted, it is being outpaced by others – notably Germany, which is on course to have a defence budget by 2029 almost double that of Britain. While the UK has a close defence partnership with Germany, built over many decades and reinforced by last year’s Trinity House Agreement, the relative scale of effort could diminish its influence within NATO. However, if Britain can leverage its intellectual and industrial capabilities even more effectively, it can continue to be a front-rank player in Euro-Atlantic and global security.
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