While speaking in Slovenia last week, Mark Rutte, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), joked about the state of Novorossiysk, a diesel-powered submarine of the Russian Navy, which the Royal Netherlands Navy escorted through the North Sea alongside its supporting tugboat. Rutte noted the ‘broken’ state of the submarine, and remarked that it was ‘limping’ back to Russia.
Considering this, as well as the Ukrainian victories against the Black Sea Fleet since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, the capabilities of the Russian Navy have been called into question. As an adversary, however, it still warrants caution – as demonstrated on 22nd October, when the Royal Navy’s HMS Duncan was deployed on a NATO mission to shadow the Vice Admiral Kulakov, a Russian destroyer, as it traversed the English Channel. As such, for this week’s Big Ask, we asked eight experts: Is the Russian Navy a capable threat to Britain?
Adjunct Fellow, Council on Geostrategy, and PhD student, Defence Studies Department, King’s College London
Rutte’s comments should not detract from the very real threat posed by the Russian Navy to the United Kingdom (UK) and its NATO allies. Suspected technical problems are not emblematic of a navy’s ability to wage war. For instance, in February 2024, a Trident II missile failed its test launch – the second time in a decade – yet Britain’s Continuous At-Sea Deterrent (CASD) continues to achieve nuclear deterrence with its adversaries. The UK, therefore, should continue to act with its NATO allies to monitor and deter Russian naval action across its areas of responsibility.
The Kremlin’s large number of submarines (divided across its Northern, Pacific, Baltic and Black Sea fleets) are foundational to Russian naval power. Britain will therefore need to contend with increasingly sophisticated submarines, such as the Yasen-M class nuclear-powered guided missile submarine (SSGN).
In August 2025, one such SSGN approached the USS Gerald R. Ford in the North Atlantic, eliciting a multinational response to track the vessel. While an encouraging display of regional allied unity, this episode simultaneously highlighted British capability gaps, such as the inability to refuel P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft in midair due to a lack of boom-equipped tankers.
Furthermore, Moscow’s ‘shadow fleet’ also stands to threaten the critical underwater infrastructure of the UK and its allies. As a further operational demand, Britain has responded to these threats through both NATO and the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), the latter activating the NORDIC WARDEN joint response option in January 2025.
Russia continues to invest heavily in its navy, with a ₽8.4 trillion (£77.4 billion) multi-decade investment plan announced earlier this year. The UK will therefore continue to face a wide spectrum of threats, ranging from sub-threshold to conventional and nuclear. So, while a ‘limping’ Russian submarine may prove worthy of ridicule, it should not form the basis of strategic complacency.
British Defence Attaché to Ukraine (2008-2011) and Russia (2019-2022)
Asserting Russia to be a ‘great naval power’, Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, has lavished money on the Russian Navy since 2010. Despite Rutte’s ill-judged comments, the Russian Navy has come a long way since its post-Soviet collapse and operational disasters of the 2000s and 2010s. Its recent abject performance in the Black Sea should also not be extrapolated to the North Atlantic.
Here, the Northern Fleet continues to present a credible and capable threat to Britain: first, through delivery of the submarine leg of Russia’s strategic nuclear triad; second, via a greatly expanded precision-strike long-range missile capability, now deployed on almost all large surface and sub-surface vessels; third, by a fleet of modern, multi-purpose nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) to defend Russia’s deterrent and its borders; and finally, through use of specialised surface and sub-surface vessels to survey and, if necessary, sabotage the UK’s critical underwater infrastructure.
In particular, the Russian Navy can now strike British military and civilian targets from within its own fleet operating areas. This challenges the assumption that the UK’s task is to stop Russia at the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) gap to protect NATO territory and sea lines of communications. Instead, Russian naval planners recognise the opportunity to disrupt NATO without breaking into the North Atlantic.
Putin has identified the Arctic Ocean, Black Sea, Sea of Okhotsk, Bering Sea, Baltic Sea and Kuril Straits as ‘vital and strategic’ waters for Russian national security. This focus close to home is shaping the Russian Navy’s future as a defensive, sea denial, ‘mosquito’ fleet, designed to defend sea lanes of approach, deny free and open nations access to these vital waters, and deliver nuclear and conventional deterrence – albeit at the expense of other naval skills. It is not a paper tiger.
Professor of International Security and Co-Director of Security Research Institute, Lancaster University, and Visiting Fellow, Royal Navy Strategic Studies Centre
In open ocean, blue water engagements, the Russian Navy would not pose a capable peer-to-peer threat to the Royal Navy, let alone to the combined naval forces of NATO. Recent operations in the Black Sea have shown the shortcomings of Russian naval platforms, systems and tactics, but also the poor maintenance and readiness of the fleet.
Yet, in a wartime scenario, Russian cruise missile-carrying submarines would pose a threat to the UK. Indeed, they would increase attack vectors, and thus contribute to saturating British and NATO missile defence systems. That said, the ability of Russian submarines to survive NATO hunter-killers and other Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) and detection measures for long enough to be able to produce strategic effects is uncertain, and will depend on the alliance’s readiness level.
In the maritime ‘grey zone’, Russia’s civilian ‘research vessels’ and shadow fleet can conduct sub-threshold warfare, such as sabotaging undersea and offshore infrastructures (communication cables, energy connectors, oil rigs, wind farms, etc.). Malign actors with asymmetric capabilities have a comparative advantage at the sub-threshold level, since the cost of disrupting the UK’s interests is much cheaper than the financial – and often political – cost of monitoring the sea, deterring attacks and responding to them.
This is why His Majesty’s (HM) Government takes the Russian naval threat seriously, including investing in technologies and assets which should future-proof British waters against Russia’s malign activities.
Laughton Professor of Naval History, King’s College London
The Russian Navy appears to be sailing towards another Tsushima…
The recent transit of the English Channel by the distressed Novorossiysk reminds us that Russian naval history is replete with doomed voyages, with bad weather, poor seamanship and mechanical failure competing to cause fresh catastrophes – and they remain a source of grim fascination.
120 years ago, the Russian Empire relocated a battlefleet from the Baltic Sea to the Sea of Japan, sinking some British fishing boats along the way. Upon arrival, it was annihilated in the Straits of Tsushima, the narrow gap between Japan and South Korea, in a battle so one-sided as to be useless to contemporary analysts.
The latest limping passage, grimly reminiscent of that doomed voyage, has focused attention on the Russian Navy, with Rutte exploiting the occasion to subvert Putin’s narrative and mocking Russian capabilities. The Russian Navy, battered in the Black Sea, is rusting out. Only the strategic SSN force is a priority.
The sea is the domain where Russia is least capable and most vulnerable. Its shaky economy depends on exporting oil, gas, grain and fertiliser; relatively low value bulk cargoes, and easily interdicted. Economic pressure, the primary weapon of sea power, has defeated Russia on many previous occasions: in 1905, it was bankruptcy, naval humiliation and domestic unrest that forced Russia to admit defeat.
Senior Lecturer in International Politics, Aberystwyth University
At one level, the Russian Navy does not pose a credible threat to the UK. Its performance during Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has revealed serious weaknesses, even matched against a country with a tiny navy. Approximately one third of the Black Sea Fleet has been damaged or destroyed in the conflict, while both submarines and surface ships have had to be relocated away from Ukraine’s coastline to avoid further losses.
However, the less conventional roles that Russia has found for its maritime assets means that Moscow’s security threat to Britain from the sea cannot be discounted. One such role is the use of the shadow fleet. By amassing a large collection of oil tankers with obscure ownership and using evasive tactics to conceal their movements and cargoes, Russia has managed to circumvent the Group of Seven (G7) oil price cap placed on the energy it produces and thwart international efforts to reduce its most important source of revenue.
The shadow fleet is a powerful countermeasure against free and open nations’ economic sanctions, both contributing to the Kremlin’s ability to carry out acts of aggression with impunity and narrowing the range of diplomatic actions available to the UK and its allies and partners. Russia’s ability to conduct sabotage against critical undersea infrastructure poses a more direct threat to Britain, whose economy relies on a vast undersea internet cable network to transmit data.
Adjunct Fellow, Council on Geostrategy, Richmond Fellow, Royal Navy, and former officer, British Army
In short, yes, the Russian Navy is a capable threat to Britain. While it evidently has issues with the quality of both its personnel and equipment, it should not be written off just yet as a paper tiger.
For example, the Russian Northern Fleet, the most likely adversary of the Royal Navy in any conflict, currently holds in its arsenal approximately 22 submarines, ten principle surface combatants and a host of smaller armed vessels. Numbers are by no means everything, but this is still a sizeable force for the Royal Navy to contend with, not least as most Russian vessels are heavily armed with anti-ship weaponry.
The Royal Navy and allied navies likely have a qualitative advantage, but the sheer weight of fire that the Russian Navy can bring to bear should not be underestimated. Furthermore, the Royal Navy’s small fleet can scarcely afford to lose a single vessel – a fleet, it should be remembered, which has suffered equipment and workforce problems of its own.
It should also be noted that the Russian Navy is the most acute conventional threat to the British Isles themselves – Russian warships and submarines are well capable of striking land targets, as has been seen since 2022, and before. The Russian Navy might not be the most efficient enemy, but it is still a dangerous one.
Independent defence analyst, writer and illustrator
The sight of a Russian diesel-electric submarine transiting on the surface through the English Channel may have prompted some derision, but such movements are routine and unremarkable. While it is true that Russia has struggled to sustain a meaningful naval presence in the Mediterranean since the loss of access to Tartus in Syria, it would be a mistake to infer that the Russian Navy no longer poses a threat to the UK. The nature of that threat rests on different elements and capabilities.
Foremost among these are Russia’s SSNs; assets with which Moscow continues to demonstrate considerable expertise. These platforms remain capable of exerting direct and credible pressure on both naval forces and maritime trade routes. In addition, the evolution of Russian naval mine technology warrants close attention. Recent developments, such as the integration of glide bomb kits enabling aircraft to deploy mines from standoff ranges, could represent a serious threat in the congested maritime approaches to Britain.
Taken together with a growing array of sub-threshold threats to critical seabed and coastal infrastructure, Russia remains threatening. It would be prudent to regard it not as a diminished force, but as an evolving one.
PhD student, University of Portsmouth and Halmstad University
While the Russian shadow fleet continues to operate in the same waters, the visibility of the ‘limping’ Novorossiysk, which is taking the long route home from deployment in the Mediterranean via the English Channel, offers a stark contrast to the covert movements and clandestine operations expected of the nation’s vessels.
Despite evidence of the declining condition of the conventional fleet, Russia’s ongoing presence in Northern European waters presents a credible threat to the UK and its strategic assets. However, this presence is not solely naval, and involves using merchant ships as platforms for sub-threshold assaults since limited access to foreign military bases and constrained spheres of influence restrict Russia’s ability to exert sea power.
Instances such as the provocation of naval vessels and the disruption of navigational systems by the Vice Admiral Kulakov passing through the Danish Straits in early October, emphasise that the Russian Navy is still seeking to project its power through its Baltic Fleet and strengthen its presence in the North Sea to ensure its access to the Atlantic (especially following Sweden’s accession to NATO).
The Royal Navy’s ability to mitigate this more conventional threat, shown with the deployment of HMS Duncan, emphasises the value of coordination with allied forces. However, the intensified violations of Russian mercantile vessels – such as the Boracay (a tanker which deployed drones to force the closure of European Union [EU] airspace) and the Yantar (a ‘research vessel’ found with satellite images of the Irish Sea and capable of destroying or disrupting undersea cables to the UK) – expose weaknesses in Britain’s maritime infrastructure. The Russian Navy could exploit these to escalate tensions, despite the waning capabilities to direct offensive actions successfully. These demonstrate how the escalating nature of the threat posed by Russia extends beyond its navy.
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I enjoyed the takes on the threat the Russian fleet could pose to Britain. I don't doubt it could strike Britain. And test the Royal Navy if Britain fought alone for some reason.
But ultimately I assume that Russia's Northern Fleet is intended to maintain the security of its SSBN bastion. I grew up on worries that the Soviet fleet would sortie through the G-I-UK Gap to challenge the Atlantic SLOC between North America and Europe.
After the Cold War, I was surprised to read that old Soviet material suddenly open indicated the land-focused Soviets had no plans to conduct that anti-shipping campaign we feared; and were primarily concerned with bastion security and providing fire support for the ground campaign.
But of course friendly force structure must consider enemy capabilities which are slow to change rather than intentions--no matter how right your interpretation of that is--which can change overnight.
And my foundational assumption could be as wrong as my Cold War assumption. So there's that ...
Insightful. That limping submarine anecdote was funny, but your anaylsis realy highlights the complexity. It reminds me of our earlier talks on how even systems with apparent flaws can still pack a punch. A great read, especially after all the soundbites.