Should Britain (and key European powers) now follow Trump’s lead on Russia and Ukraine?
The Big Ask | No. 34.2025
Last week’s summit in Alaska between Donald Trump, President of the United States (US) and Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, marked a turning point in the American attitude towards the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Although no definitive outcomes were achieved, Trump notably shifted his stance from supporting a ceasefire to seeking a permanent peace deal, as well as voicing his approval for security guarantees for Ukraine similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) Article Five.
However, Trump’s proactive approach towards ending Russia’s full-scale invasion of its neighbour – including advising against Ukraine regaining control of the illegally occupied Crimean peninsula – has caused concern in European nations, including the United Kingdom (UK). These high stakes form the basis for this week’s Big Ask, in which we asked ten experts: Should Britain (and key European powers) now follow Trump’s lead on Russia and Ukraine?
Senior Research Fellow, Polish Institute of International Affairs, and Senior Lecturer, Warsaw School of Economics (SGH)
Trump’s voicing of support for a permanent peace deal in Ukraine emphasises the most difficult questions in Ukraine’s dialogue with its allies and in its domestic debate, while a hitherto-pursued ceasefire would allow it to resolve these questions at a later stage.
International recognition of Russia’s armed annexations would break the principle of inviolability of internationally recognised borders – fundamental to European order after the Second World War – hence the necessity of buy-in from Ukraine. This only seems possible on the condition of Russian recognition of Ukraine’s right to integrate freely with liberal, democratic nations, including the European Union (EU) and NATO.
Such a deal would require credible allied guarantees, which in turn call for a stabilisation force to be sent to Ukraine by the ‘coalition of the willing’, as well as hugely increased European investment into arming Ukraine. These efforts would need to be made on top of NATO countries’ domestic armaments programmes.
The burden would need to be carried mostly by the allies further from the eastern flank to enable the flank countries (e.g., Finland, the Baltic states and Poland) to focus on protecting NATO’s border. In the face of the new American defence posture and June’s summit in The Hague, such developments are necessary, and feasible with the right amount of determination. Poland, for example, has demonstrated that domestic challenges can be alleviated by national leaders presenting their electorates with a trade-off at stake.
Executive Editor, Internationale Politik Quarterly and Internationale Politik
The UK and Europeans should follow Trump’s lead up to a point. They had a much better meeting at the White House, and earlier than they expected. Friedrich Merz, Chancellor of Germany, got called ‘a friend’, and was complimented on his tanned complexion.
Alongside Emmanuel Macron, President of France, and Giorgia Meloni, Prime Minister of Italy, Merz dared to push Trump a little on the questions of a ceasefire and security guarantees. As a result, the US ‘backstop’ seemed to have made an appearance, with Trump agreeing to some sort of American role in backing the effort of the British and French-led coalition of the willing for Ukrainian security post-invasion.
This ‘US leadership of sorts’ is highly fragile, however. It remains unclear whether it will lead to any progress, given that Trump apparently continues to misread Putin. Worse, any appearance of Washington taking the lead again reawakens deep-seated German foreign policy impulses that many hoped had been overcome with the constitution of the Merz cabinet. Already, Johann Wadephul, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, has been musing unhelpfully on whether sending German troops to Ukraine wouldn’t amount to pushing the Bundeswehr too hard.
It would be fatal if the current flurry of Trumpian diplomacy fosters the impression – at least in London and Berlin – that someone else will once again solve Europe’s security problems. Instead, the UK, Germany and their European allies and partners need to develop greater resolve to act – on their own if necessary.
Chief Executive Officer, Geopolitics and Security Studies Centre
Britain and key European powers shouldn’t ‘follow’ Trump; rather, they should use the Alaska hinge to shape outcomes. Before the summit, Europeans were often sidelined in Ukraine peace talks; afterwards, engagement with Trump’s circle has intensified. This has given Ukraine’s European allies leverage to steady the narrative.
Trump’s push for a near-term meeting between Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of Ukraine, and Putin is an opportunity for Europe. Merz has already attached a timetable of two weeks, which places accountability on the Kremlin. If Moscow balks, the pressure shifts back to Trump to explain why Putin remains unaccountable.
From a Baltic perspective, a ‘peace’ which accepts a land grab would erode the European security order and only delay Russia’s next phase of aggression. The task for London, Berlin and Paris is to turn vague talk of ‘NATO-level’ assurances into credible deterrence: sustained air and maritime presence, expanded intelligence support, robust munitions and training pipelines, and – where needed – a coalition of the willing approach. Yet, there should also be an acknowledgement that all of this ultimately depends on American commitment.
In short, the UK and its European allies and partners should align with Washington where it strengthens Ukraine and alliance cohesion, and resist any drift toward a deal scripted in the Kremlin. Europe’s method remains architecture, not theatre – quiet, durable and focused on making Russian evasion costly and Ukrainian security real.
Dr Donatas Kupciunas
Baltic Fellow, Centre for Geopolitics, University of Cambridge
The Trump administration has openly admitted that continuing the proxy war against Russia in Ukraine is no longer feasible. Russian successes on the battlefield and the high costs of the conflict, as well as the need for rapprochement with Russia in balancing the People’s Republic of China (PRC), pushed the administration to disown the war as a neocon fallacy.
Currently, the US is looking for a way to disengage from the conflict in Ukraine. Its idea is to cede responsibility to Europe. Despite their bravado, the Europeans know that without continued American support, Ukraine would lose territory at a much faster rate than it does today.
In the Baltic states, which have put all their eggs in the US basket since the 1990s, Russian-American rapprochement is perceived as a nightmare scenario. Britain and other European countries are therefore desperate to find ways to keep the US in Ukraine and away from Russia.
Agreeing to pay for American military support for Ukraine is one such attempt. However, there is only so much that Ukraine’s European allies can do. A US commitment to defending Ukraine in the future peace settlement is hardly imaginable. The UK and key European powers are therefore in a pickle, whether they follow Trump’s lead or not.
Doctoral Fellow, Centre for Britain and Europe, University of Surrey
The threat landscape that American policymakers are beholden to is shifting every day, based on the whims of Trump and his accomplices. For Britain and Europe, the primary threat to security should remain clear; and that is Russia.
Replicating US actions to placate the illegitimate Russian leader in Alaska should be avoided at all costs on this side of the Atlantic. Nevertheless, the following discussion in Washington involving Zelenskyy showed that there are some positive outcomes to this new approach, notably the suggestion of security guarantees.
Rather than following this news-cycle-designed American negotiation tactic, British and European leaders should aim to create alternative pathways and negotiations with Ukraine to ensure that continued support is not contingent on volatile – and likely disrespected – negotiations with Russia. This should include more advances on the side of EU integration, defining the parameters of the coalition of the willing, and continuing Ramstein-format and NATO Group meetings involving Ukraine.
As I write this contribution from Ukraine, and presently under air raid sirens, I am only further assured that Trump’s lead on the conflict has provided no additional security or help for the Ukrainian people. British and European leaders should focus on what will actually help to end the invasion in a Ukrainian victory. Ensuring the quickest integration into the EU and NATO is the only security guarantee that will stand the test of time.
Senior Adviser for Geopolitics, Centre for Risk Studies, and Convenor, Geopolitical Risk Analysis Study Group, University of Cambridge
What is the alternative to following Trump’s lead? As a matter of justice and security, the UK may want to continue the conflict until Ukraine ultimately defeats Russia on the battlefield, but this is impossible if Washington has a different idea.
A victory for Ukraine depends fundamentally on the willingness of the US, as the world’s only superpower, to back the country politically, militarily and financially. However, if Washington’s policy is now to pursue peace based on the facts on the ground as they stand, then that is the reality to which Britain and other European countries must adapt.
That said, the American position is not yet fixed, and Washington is, in some measure, reliant on the UK and Europeans to implement its plans for Ukraine, giving His Majesty’s (HM) Government some means to influence the eventual peace deal in line with its interests and preferences. Most obviously, the US needs Europeans to provide personnel for the so-called ‘reassurance force’, which they can leverage to achieve a better outcome in relation to the question of where the new border lies between Ukraine and Russia.
In the meantime, Britain and its European allies and partners will have to take the lead over the wider and longer-term question of securing the continent against an emboldened Russia which, among other things, will mean reinforcing the frontline in the Baltic states, Poland, Romania and perhaps also Moldova.
In this respect it is reassuring that – although very belatedly – the Europeans are finally mobilising and rearming, something which the US has long demanded, and will hopefully persuade Washington to follow Europe’s lead.
Analyst, Italian Embassy in London (2014-2024)
Six months of European summitry have failed to materialise alternatives to American leadership. There are no more European ‘boots on the ground’ than before, sanctions have stayed more or less the same, and the European boost in financial support for Kyiv is ephemeral.
‘It is foolish or folly to think that today’s Europe could manage on its own…to drive a wedge between the two shores of the Atlantic does nothing but weaken the entire West and benefit hostile actors’, was Meloni’s assessment in March. This is no counsel of despair.
Since then, Meloni has been shoring up White House support for Ukraine – with JD Vance, Vice President of the US, remarking that ‘she can deliver an extraordinarily direct message without coming across as offensive’ – increasing the tempo of Italian military aid while rewiring Italian statecraft.
Italy is set to spend 2% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence for the first time since 1989. It is expanding its high-readiness military units, and its defence planning assumptions are also growing in ambition: from a six to eight-month high-intensity regional deployment by 2026 to a 12-month or longer deployment beyond Europe and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) by 2030.
This took some soul-searching. In 2024, the Italian government admitted ‘the failure’ of Italy’s decade-long and multi-billion euro peacekeeping operation in Lebanon. ‘Multilateralism is dead’, Guido Crosetto, Minister of Defence of Italy, recently argued off-the-cuff, ‘and to speak as if Europe still mattered’ would be a delusion.
Europe shouldn’t repeat its 2022 mistake, when squabbling over negotiating formats and seats at the table distracted some European countries from providing military assistance to stymie Russia’s invasion. The main, ready weapon that Europe can collectively reach for is the economic weapon, if it can find the courage to seize Russian state assets and enforce sanctions.
Chief Executive Officer, New Strategy Centre
The US can stop the Ukraine conflict – alongside the UK and key European powers – or it can force a superficial deal which will not last long. If there are no real security guarantees, and only a piece of paper signed by Putin with his promise not to attack Ukraine and Europe, Russia will restart its invasion.
Putin’s objective remains the destruction of Ukraine, but Ukraine cannot be defeated if it maintains access to the Black Sea. If he is able, Putin will occupy Ukraine’s entire coastline in order to turn it into a landlocked country. From there, the occupation of Moldova would be just one step away.
To avoid this scenario, Ukraine should maintain a well-equipped military force of at least 500,000 troops. The coalition of the willing should ensure on-the-ground support, monitor a peace agreement in the Black Sea and protect energy projects, and assist Ukraine in the air domain. The US should contribute to coalition efforts with intelligence, logistics and air support.
Britain is jointly leading a Maritime Capability Coalition with Norway to support Ukraine’s maritime fleet development. A free and open Black Sea should represent a key objective for HM Government, alongside its allies in Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey.
Senior Lecturer, School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews
It is unclear what Trump and Putin agreed to in Alaska, if anything. The two leaders clearly indicated that no peace agreement or ceasefire was negotiated, nor did they release a joint statement.
What is clear, however, is that earlier this year, Trump asked Putin for an unconditional ceasefire and went into this meeting proposing ‘land swaps’, whereby Russia would relinquish some of its illegally occupied Ukrainian territory in exchange for land which it has thus far failed to conquer. Putin appears to have rejected Trump’s proposals.
Since then, Trump and his entourage have floated a number of ideas, including:
Ukraine’s de jure recognition of Russian ownership of Crimea;
Ukraine evacuating its troops from the 15% of the Donbas which Russia has not occupied; and
Ukraine renouncing future NATO membership in exchange for a nebulous ‘iron clad’ American security guarantee.
The UK and other European countries should support Ukraine’s rejection of these proposals.
These concessions are too great. Russia has struggled and failed for years to conquer the Donbas. Contrary to Russian expectations, much of the region’s population fought for Ukraine in 2014-2015, and Ukraine’s armed forces have efficaciously defended the territory since February 2022. Today, the Donbas is one of the most fortified regions on Earth, and Russia’s rate of advance is as sluggish as the worst battles of the First World War.
Handing the Donbas, and its fortifications, to Russia would be an error on par with handing Hitler the Sudetenland in 1938, along with the Czechoslovak fortifications located there. In both cases, seemingly minor territorial concessions can undermine the defence of a whole nation. Likewise, recognising Crimea as lawful Russian territory would undermine international norms against changing borders through aggression.
Such a recognition would likely encourage Putin, who already illegally occupies portions of Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine, into coercing the international community to recognise Russia’s other land grabs. In other words, conceding to Russian demands would merely invite further Russian aggression.
Professor of International Politics, Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of Birmingham
The outcome of the Trump-Putin summit in Alaska last Friday has already been superseded by Monday’s meeting between Trump and Zelenskyy in the White House.
Talk of land swaps has been replaced by discussions on security guarantees. This is an agenda that favours Kyiv more than Moscow. But Trump has made clear any such guarantees will not involve American boots on the ground.
A meaningful security guarantee must have a deterrent effect. It is no good having a paper guarantee after Russia has invaded. Ukraine is not a NATO member, and so will never enjoy a formal Article Five arrangement. But Mark Rutte, Secretary General of NATO, has suggested that Ukraine needs an ‘Article Five-type’ guarantee; a suggestion repeated by Meloni.
If this is the case, then the implication is that Europeans need to emplace forces in Ukraine, just as they have done along NATO’s eastern flank. Sir Keir Starmer, Prime Minister, as well as Macron and Merz, have not gone that far – although all support a European ‘reassurance force’ of some sort. But that construct is frustratingly vague.
Trump has been consistent in placing this big decision in the laps of Europeans. They can prevaricate and fudge and leave Ukraine open to future Russian aggression, or they can deploy force – whose job is to assist Ukraine in its defence.
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