Last week, the Indo-Pacific region was the focal point of British foreign policy. On Thursday, 24th July, the United Kingdom (UK) signed a Free Trade Agreement with India, which is expected to boost the British economy by £4.8 billion a year, as well as attracting £6 billion of investment by both British and Indian companies. The following day, the UK and Australia signed a 50-year defence treaty – the Geelong Treaty – in Darwin next to the newly arrived HMS Prince of Wales. This deal sought to enhance the existing defence relationship created by the AUKUS minilateral initiative and came after a significant British contribution to the Australian military exercise TALISMAN SABRE.
This was a significant week for the UK’s approach to the Indo-Pacific, but it also raises many questions. Some commentators argue that the recent deals represent a ‘high-water mark’ in Britain’s Indo-Pacific commitments, while others see them as a portent of future UK presence in the region. With these views in mind, for this week’s Big Ask, we asked five experts: What should be next for British policy in the Indo-Pacific?
Senior Analyst, Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Britain strongly underlined its defence presence and the depth of its strategic relationship with Australia this past week, with the visit of the UK-led Carrier Strike Group 2025 (CSG2025) and the conclusion of a new bilateral treaty on AUKUS submarine cooperation. The ‘2+2’ AUKMIN meeting between the defence and foreign ministers of both nations delivered a 67-paragraph joint statement containing firm messages for allies and adversaries alike.
Added to this, the UK-India Free Trade Agreement and forthcoming Japan leg of CSG2025’s regional deployment suggest there is real momentum in Britain’s Indo-Pacific policy, even if the Labour government has yet to identify its own label to replace the previous Conservative administration’s ‘tilt’.
The UK’s role and presence is becoming more important for Australia, Japan and other countries, given their uncertainty about the United States’ (US) commitment under the Trump administration and the concerted security challenges from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Russia and North Korea.
For Australia, the new treaty is a timely demonstration of momentum and commitment within AUKUS. This should serve as a reminder to Canberra of London’s usefulness as a third party to steady the ship, at a time when the initiative is under review in Washington and when some in the Trump administration are highly sceptical about the need for a European defence presence in the Indo-Pacific.
Yet, there is still a sense that His Majesty’s (HM) Government hasn’t entirely convinced itself about its regional role, beyond the ‘prosperity’ part of the equation. Strong demand signals from Australia and Japan, including public ones, will be needed to ensure Britain’s strategic presence remains persistent.
Deputy Director (Geopolitics), Council on Geostrategy
Outside of AUKUS, there are two touchpoints for the UK’s defence policy in the Indo-Pacific which should be prioritised over coming years, since they will contribute to regional deterrence and include elements of ‘force integration’.
Firstly, Britain should support regional defence industrial market integration. The UK has strong partnerships with allies such as Australia, Japan and the US, but it should lean into defence industrial multilateralism efforts like the Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience (PIPIR), and think how it can bring its experiences in the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR) and the Eurofighter Typhoon programme to help countries in the region harmonise on regulations, create frameworks for cooperation and co-produce top-tier equipment. It has a lot it can bring to the table, and can benefit from access to other defence partners.
Secondly, Britain’s defence posture should be enhanced. While the UK and other European nations should focus their force postures in Europe, this doesn’t mean defence lacks a role in the Indo-Pacific. Rather, the Ministry of Defence should focus on facilitating regional interoperability and interchangeability at the planning and fighting levels. The fact is that in a Taiwan-related contingency, there may well be a call for integrating British forces into American-led ‘kill webs’, such as Indo-Pacific Command’s (INDOPACOM) Joint Fires Network. This should be accompanied by greater political-military integration, perhaps to include a UK Consulate in Hawaii, which would increase British integration and influence in INDOPACOM.
Expert Associate, National Security College, Australian National University
Despite growing pressures in Europe, and reportedly to Washington’s displeasure, the UK continues to pursue an active Indo-Pacific economic and security policy. This is well justified. The Indo-Pacific is the world’s economic centre of gravity, and sustained engagement offers strategic and economic dividends. The recent Free Trade Agreement with India underscores this imperative, building on earlier initiatives such as Britain’s accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the UK-Australia trade deal, both reflecting bipartisan commitment to the region.
On the security front, the deployment of CSG2025 demonstrated a meaningful presence, even as Britain’s strategic posture remains centred around the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Defence industrial engagement has deepened through AUKUS and the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), both of which involve Indo-Pacific partners.
However, strategic rhetoric must align with reality. Assertions about the UK’s willingness to fight in the Indo-Pacific, absent corresponding military capability, risk undermining its credibility. Britain’s contribution to regional security should focus on strengthening defence industrial cooperation, building maritime capacity with partners and supporting a stable balance of power through diplomacy and trade. Managing expectations with clarity and consistency will ensure that British policy is seen as reliable and serious, not overstated or symbolic.
PhD Student, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University
Peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait are critical to Japan’s national security. A crisis in Taiwan would threaten Japan’s sea lines of communication and destabilise the entire East Asian security environment. From Tokyo’s perspective, the UK has a vital role to play in helping to deter such a crisis.
First, Britain should maintain a clear and consistent military presence in the Indo-Pacific. The 50-year UK-Australia defence agreement signed last week is a strong symbol of long-term commitment. To operationalise this, Britain should conduct regular freedom of navigation operations near Taiwan and join multinational maritime exercises with Japan, the US and Australia.
Second, the UK should actively support the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ vision shared with Japan. This includes reaffirming the importance of peace in the Taiwan Strait through multilateral platforms like the Group of Seven (G7), and issuing clear diplomatic signals to deter Chinese aggression or coercion.
Third, Britain should deepen strategic coordination with Indo-Pacific democracies in preparation for any Taiwan contingency. Participation in frameworks such as the Quad and enhanced defence cooperation with Japan and Australia can strengthen regional deterrence.
Finally, to mitigate the economic risks of a Taiwan conflict, the UK should work with Japan to build more resilient supply chains and enhance economic security cooperation.
If Britain sustains these efforts, Japan will regard it as an indispensable partner in securing a stable and rules-based Indo-Pacific order.
Research Fellow (Indo-Pacific Geopolitics), Council on Geostrategy, and PhD Student, Department of International History, London School of Economics and Political Science
‘UK “ready to fight” in Pacific: Healey’ ran across the top of Tuesday’s Taipei Times. Elsewhere, the Defence Secretary’s remarks on fighting alongside Australia in the region have been interpreted as a signal that the UK would commit militarily in a conflict over Taiwan.
Healey has, however, said he was talking in ‘general terms’, and it seems plausible that he was speaking more about Britain’s political readiness. Nevertheless, it raises questions about HM Government’s commitment to the region. ‘NATO First’ may not mean ‘NATO only’, but what this means exactly for the UK’s military presence in the Indo-Pacific is unclear.
An interpretation of June’s Strategic Defence Review is that, going forwards, Britain will help partners in the region from afar. Beyond Europe, the Review emphasised the UK’s role in building collective defence industrial capacity – here, AUKUS and GCAP were held up as exemplars.
However, both deterring and waging war (as Healey suggests Britain might) or even comprehensively maintaining maritime freedom of navigation requires a naval presence. The two Offshore Patrol Vessels permanently stationed in the Indo-Pacific help with the latter but, in the future, will they be replaced by new, more versatile Type 31 frigates? And what of ‘pulsed’ deployments going forwards? Following the successes of Operation HIGHMAST, will a Carrier Strike Group return to the region?
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