How should Britain define asymmetric advantage?
The Big Ask | No. 27.2025
One of His Majesty’s (HM) Government’s priorities in the 2023 Integrated Review Refresh (IRR) was to ‘generate strategic advantage’. Last month’s National Security Strategy (NSS) expanded upon this, highlighting the importance of asymmetric advantage to the defence and security of the United Kingdom (UK).
Although asymmetric advantage is one of the key elements of the ‘sovereign capabilities’ pillar of the NSS, it is not explicitly defined within the strategy. Considering this, for this week’s Big Ask, we asked eight experts: How should Britain define asymmetric advantage?
CEO and Founder, Cassi AI
The NSS places pursuit of asymmetric advantage as central to the UK’s future prosperity and security. It describes asymmetric advantage as ‘…utilising unique or cutting-edge capabilities to bolster our alliances and give us an advantage over adversaries and competitors.’ There are two problems with this: firstly, the inclusion of ‘cutting-edge’; and secondly, that the definition is circular.
Almost all major nations pursue technological advantage. It is a symmetric approach. To be asymmetrical, the Oxford English Dictionary tells us, means ‘not symmetrical, with the parts not arranged in symmetrical order’. Michael Porter, economist and business strategist, puts it better, describing how strategy is about ‘doing the same things differently, or doing different things’.
In Strategy: A History, Sir Lawrence Freedman describes how achieving asymmetric advantage is a central aim of strategists, even when capabilities are similar. Countries are looking to protect their weaknesses from competitors’ strengths, while matching their strengths to competitors’ weaknesses. The problem has been that ‘as with so many concepts, inconsistent and expansive definitions of asymmetry…drain it of meaning’.
Regarding definition, the NSS states that asymmetric advantage is ‘…advantage…’. This is circular. It does not help. It leaves those interpreting the NSS without a clear understanding of what they are supposed to achieve.
The Oxford English Dictionary comes to the rescue again. Advantage is having a ‘superior position…the position state or circumstance of being ahead of another, or of having the better of him or her’.
When seeking to achieve asymmetric advantage, we might measure whether or not the planned approach will achieve asymmetric advantage by defining it prospectively as: demonstrably matching our strengths against other’s weaknesses, in a way that we can show, probabilistically, will lead us to achieve a superior position if we are successful.
The laundry list of things which Britain has done, or might do, which follows in the section on asymmetric advantage would all fail to meet this definition. If the NSS is right, this does not bode well for the UK’s future prosperity and security. Definitions matter.
Chairman, Coltraco Ultrasonics; Director General, Durham Institute of Research, Development and Innovation (DIRDI); Director, Centre for Underwater Analysis (CUAA); Advisory Board Member, Council on Geostrategy
Asymmetric advantage can be defined as Britain’s ability to leverage its eight core national capabilities – defence, diplomacy, development, security, trade, finance, the intellectual and cultural, and science and technology – both outside of and within non-predictable conventional areas of international competition, and below established thresholds of escalation, to further national security and strategic aims successfully against adversarial states and non-state actors.
This includes, but is not limited to, the deployment of soft power, security and economic means, focused on advancing the UK’s strategic interests and potentially augmented by components of more conventional defence, security, trade and industrial activity. It also includes the capacity for Britain to defend itself against similarly defined asymmetric threats being exercised within or against the UK and its overseas interests. It can be decentralised and unconventional, but aggregates to definitive strategic advantage developed in the spaces in between existing conventional capabilities, either as part of them or generated as its own effect.
Asymmetric and strategic advantage can merge; being achieved when Britain reaches, for example, a state of strategic technological dominance over oscillating operational advantage, so that it achieves decades of ‘clear blue water’ ahead of adversarial scientific and technological contestation, in turn achieving credible British military, economic, legal and governing strategic advantage. The UK will need it more than ever, as it confronts the impact which climate change-driven environmental factors have in the underwater battlespace technologically, forestalling adversaries’ utilisation of the Arctic by dominating it instead.
Lecturer in Economic Warfare Education, King’s College London
The concept of ‘asymmetric advantage’ may appear tautological, as any form of competitive advantage implies a power asymmetry rooted in the unequal distribution of resources, synergies and efficiencies.
However, within the context of the NSS, this term takes on a more urgent and strategic significance. It signals the imperative for Britain to adapt rapidly to the growing capabilities of increasingly powerful strategic rivals by exploiting their vulnerabilities and developing innovative, unconventional practices.
Given the UK’s declining relative power in international affairs, where rhetorical aspirations increasingly outpace material capabilities, the pursuit of asymmetric advantage appears timely. It represents an urgent call to reinforce the country’s domestic socio-economic foundations and global relevance.
Despite potential benefits, however, there are two major concerns. Firstly, despite modest economic growth (an increase of 0.7% in the first quarter of 2025), the ongoing militarisation agenda (over £65 billion defence spending in 2024), and the ‘historic commitment’ made by Sir Keir Starmer, Prime Minister, to allocate 5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to national security – combined with persistent inflation and rising taxation – are likely to divert critical resources away from socio-economic priorities. While the anticipated ‘defence dividend’ may offer opportunities to create jobs and ‘revitalise industrial communities’, it also risks steering the economy towards a dangerous path of militarisation, further eroding living standards – ironically, the very element identified as a core security priority.
Secondly, the pursuit of asymmetric advantage, coupled with strict enforcement mechanisms and hawkish rhetoric – for example, ‘take extraordinary steps’, ‘sometimes acting alone’ and ‘outside our comfort zone’, ‘to an extent not seen since wartime’ – may not only exacerbate existing threats and fuel escalation, but also alienate potential allies. Moreover, the suggestion of diplomacy ‘adapting’ to economic and military measures appears problematic.
Founder, Arcipel
The third pillar of the ‘strategic framework’ in the NSS is to ‘increase sovereign and asymmetric capabilities’, but the definition of asymmetric advantage is lacking. Included under this rubric is a confusing hodge-podge of different capability areas, sub-sectors and geographies – frontier technologies such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), advanced materials, quantum computing and biomanufacturing; the Arctic and Antarctic; space; and fostering talent. All are important areas to consider, but labelling them collectively as ‘asymmetric’ appears clumsy.
Asymmetry as a strategy is intended to exploit an adversary’s vulnerabilities, by providing disproportionate effects from leveraging key technologies and capabilities. For Britain, which sees confrontation or competition with authoritarian states such as Russia or the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a key challenge in the years ahead, asymmetric advantage should be pursued in those areas where the UK excels and is able to achieve disproportionate effect, particularly in the information domain. This would include cyber security and AI, but also intelligence, space, special forces, electromagnetic spectrum operations and information operations. Harnessing both private industry and government capabilities in these areas provides a coherent strategy to deliver asymmetric effects – both during peacetime and conflict – which exploit adversary weaknesses in information, influence and control.
Co-founder (Research), Council on Geostrategy
The concept of ‘asymmetric advantage’ takes the concept of ‘strategic advantage’ – cited in the 2021 Integrated Review and the 2023 Integrated Review Refresh – to its logical conclusion. If officials embrace the logic behind the NSS, Britain should seek to create asymmetries of power in relation to other countries, particularly adversaries such as Russia and the PRC. It should use these asymmetries of power to constrain and wherever possible to press them down – but only where it has a direct and fundamental interest.
While this may appear to be a unique idea, it is deeply rooted in British strategic thinking, going all the way back to the early 19th century, if not before. Back then, a rich debate ensued between Gould Francis Leckie and Charles Pasley – authors of two of the first modern geopolitical texts – who provided alternative strategies to defeat Napoleonic France. Leckie favoured a maritime approach, using the UK’s asymmetric naval power to constrict the French Empire, while Pasley preferred to build up the British Army to meet France on land – even to establish a European continental empire.
In the end, Britain defeated France at Waterloo – on the land – but not symmetrically. It leveraged its commercial and maritime strength to fund an offensive which France could not meet: on the land, the UK fought where France was weakest – especially in Spain – but it also funded a European coalition to bleed Napoleon dry. At sea, the Royal Navy constricted France, damaging the French economy and undermining its ability to grow. All the while, Britain tried to reduce French power as efficiently as possible. And this was done from a position of symmetric disadvantage: the Napoleonic empire was far more populous than the British, and France had access to a larger tax base.
As the UK looks to degrade Russia, and constrain the PRC, once again it needs to think like early 19th century British strategists. In other words, it ought to engage in international relations through the lens of ruthless strategic calculation and relative power maximisation. In a geopolitical age, projecting strength abroad and securing the homeland depends on it.
Research Fellow (Sea Power), Council on Geostrategy
Given the apparent key status of asymmetric advantage within the NSS, an explicit definition would have been welcome – it is important that documents of this nature use terms which are properly understood by their readers, whether inside or outside of government.
Asymmetric advantage in warfare refers to a scenario wherein one side has an edge over the other for reasons unrelated to conventional military power; something other than firepower or numbers of platforms. This harks back to an old dichotomy in warfare; that of quantity versus quality. Being able to deploy a vast quantity of military assets gives a state more operational flexibility and the capability to absorb greater losses in an attritional conflict; a smaller force focused more on quality, however, can bring greater operational effectiveness and potentially negate a numerical advantage. There are various examples throughout military history where a smaller force was able to win against a larger one due to this kind of asymmetric advantage.
From the context around how the term is used in the NSS, Britain is aiming for a technological edge, using emerging innovations to offset the ability of potential adversaries to deploy military assets at scale. Technologies such as AI, uncrewed systems and so on have great potential to deliver asymmetric advantage, something which the UK requires due to lacking the resources and time to build up conventional military power to the sort of scale required to compete on pure mass in any near- or medium-term conflict. In this regard, Britain is learning from Ukraine, which has been able to hold off a far larger military force, to a large extent due to its use of such technologies.
Independent defence analyst, writer and illustrator
The reference in the NSS to ‘our competitors’ ability to deploy scale to achieve advantage’ is starkly illustrated by Russia’s daily use of hundreds of long-range drones and missiles against Ukraine. By contrast, Britain’s limited cruise missile stockpiles highlight a strategic vulnerability. Therefore, asymmetric advantage should be more than possessing a few exquisite systems which give the UK a perceived ‘specialised edge’. It should also mean being able to deploy certain capabilities at scale. Naturally, this means affordable, scalable technologies such as long-range uncrewed systems.
Britain’s true strength lies in innovation, much of which resides with small and medium enterprises. These firms are agile, creative and well-placed to produce adaptable capabilities, especially drones, which can be deployed at scale without relying on a large personnel base. Concerns around rapid obsolescence of these evolving systems are valid; what is unconventional today may be standard tomorrow. But it is also less critical for these low-cost, software-upgradable systems. Rapid technological evolution favours systems which can evolve just as quickly.
Strategically, the UK should shift from over-reliance on a few exquisite platforms towards broader adoption and stockpiling of flexible, software-upgradable uncrewed technologies. In an age where agility and volume matter as much as precision, scalable innovation – not perfection – will define competitive advantage.
Programme Director for Security Studies, Centre for Defence Strategies, and Joint Programme Leader, Future of Ukraine Programme, Centre for Geopolitics, University of Cambridge
The most striking feature of the NSS is its emphasis on ‘asymmetric advantage’ as a cornerstone of British defence. Yet, it does not define the term – an omission which risks blunting the very edge the strategy seeks to sharpen.
The UK cannot rely on mass alone. Even with higher spending, it will not match peer adversaries’ sheer numbers. Deterrence will hinge on out-thinking and out-innovating these adversaries across multiple domains. Britain’s credibility within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) – and its broader strategic influence – should rest on the distinctive capabilities it can bring to any coalition, whether AI-enabled command and control, autonomous maritime systems or advanced cyber offence.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has laid bare what genuine asymmetry looks like: first-person-view drone swarms, agile battlefield networks and rapid doctrine cycles which turn commercial technology into battlefield disruptors within days, not decades. Ukrainian resilience is already shaping modern defence.
Four pillars underpin this:
Technological edge: AI-driven decision making, quantum-secure communications and space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) are essential, not optional.
Agile doctrine: Warfighting concepts must be fluid and rapidly testable. Ukraine’s 72-hour software feedback loops set the standard.
Resilience in depth: Energy, data and logistics must survive sustained attack; civil-military partnerships must flourish.
Alliance leveraging: True asymmetry grows when allies co-innovate. This is where the UK can lead.
Building an operational architecture which fully integrates Ukraine with European partners would result in a decisive payoff: a unified Euro-Atlantic deterrence posture in which every node can draw on common data, shared munitions pipelines and interoperable autonomous platforms.
‘Asymmetric advantage’ is more than a buzzword. It is Britain’s best route to deterring aggression in a world of shrinking warning times and proliferating sub-threshold threats. By learning from Ukraine and leading within NATO, the UK can shape – not merely react to – the future security environment. In doing so, it will secure not only its own people, but the future of the entire Euro-Atlantic community.
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