How should Britain empower the Joint Expeditionary Force?
The Big Ask | No. 24.2024
On the 16th-17th of December, Tallinn, Estonia will host the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) Leaders’ Summit. The British-led minilaterial defence coalition brings together a group of like-minded nations to provide expeditionary capabilities, while also improving the integration and interoperability of its members’ armed forces. The United Kingdom (UK) as the ‘framework’ nation has guided the evolution of the JEF over the last ten years, with the minilaterial now focusing on combating hybrid threats and enhancing Northern European security.
But in a more insecure European defence environment and with the return of Donald Trump, President-elect of the United States (US), to the White House in January, therefore we asked nine experts: How should Britain empower the JEF?
Senior Research Fellow, Royal United Services Institute
The Tallinn Summit is a make-or-break moment for the JEF. It has been 186 days between the Summit and the JEF being highlighted in the Labour Party manifesto, with only preplanned JEF activity, and momentum has stalled. With the next Leaders’ Summit due in May 2025, the JEF has six months to prove its worth in a more dangerous world, otherwise confidence will erode and the minilateral group could atrophy, leading to a loss of credibility in British defence and security leaderships within Europe. The stakes are high: if His Majesty’s (HM) Government waits for the Strategic Defence Review for guidance, it will be too late.
The JEF should anticipate the growing demands over the next decade due to potential changes of American policy under the second presidency of Donald Trump, the continuing deterioration of European security, and other competing global challenges in the Middle East and Indo-Pacific. Therefore, the JEF should undertake a six month ‘policy sprint’, which should include the creation of a cross-department and all domain JEF strategy that is agreed within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).
As a quick win, the Tallinn Summit should commission a feasibility study into the creation of a ‘JEF Bank’ – modelled on a Multilateral Lending Institution – to jointly fund defence acquisitions quickly. This would meet the requirements of the HM Government’s ‘plan for change’ for national security, prosperity, and growth.
Senior Lecturer in National Security Studies, King’s College London
When the JEF was launched, Gen. Sir David Richards, then Chief of the Defence Staff, set out three key priorities for force design, all of which remain relevant today, and which Britain can advance through cooperation with the small states in the framework.
First, the ability to act jointly and with allies, as well as being able to act alone. The second Trump administration signals potential uncertainty in NATO dynamics, which only reinforces the importance of a robust and cohesive JEF. Moreover, the regional proximity to potential flashpoints of small states in the Baltic means that their understanding and positioning can enhance the JEF’s situational awareness, responsiveness, and readiness.
Second is the desire to be well equipped, but not tied to platforms. To increase interoperability, Britain should champion initiatives such as standardising equipment and bolstering logistical support for smaller members that are challenged by inherent capacity constraints. Recognising their niche areas of expertise (e.g., strategic communications in Latvia, cyber in Estonia, etc.), the UK should actively incorporate these states into strategic planning processes, ensuring that their perspectives are integral to threat assessments and decision-making. Britain can also amplify the role of small allies by investing in joint exercises tailored to hybrid warfare scenarios, where these nations’ aforementioned experience with cyber defence and resilience against disinformation would prove invaluable.
Finally, Gen. Richards emphasised the ambition to adapt as the environment changes. The JEF’s credibility depends on showcasing unity and capability, so empowering small states to lead on specific initiatives, such as Baltic security or Arctic operations, can serve to reinforce this. Taken altogether, by embracing a genuinely collaborative approach, Britain and its JEF partners can demonstrate that this is a framework that meets the aims of the past, the needs of the present, and the ambitions of the future.
Deputy director, Centre for European Reform
The Tallinn summit is an important opportunity for JEF members to shape its future. The JEF Vision agreed at the October 2023 summit already looks partly out of date. In particular, the aspiration to provide ‘a range of credible military options to respond…in scenarios ranging from sub-threshold peacetime responses through to full-spectrum interventions during times of crisis or conflict, both in its core regions and beyond’ looks well beyond the JEF’s current capacities. Moreover, it runs the risk that NATO and the JEF will find themselves competing for the same resources in a crisis.
Britain can do a number of things to maximise the JEF’s value to European security. Most importantly, it can increase its own contribution – which means spending more on defence, up to the 3% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) that several other JEF countries spend. Second, it can focus on enabling the JEF to respond effectively to sub-threshold threats – when NATO is less likely to get involved. Third, it can work to devise procedures for JEF co-operation with Germany, Poland and Belgium in the Baltic and North seas, and to ensure a smooth transfer of authority to NATO if a regional crisis escalates into conflict.
Dr Donatas Kupciunas
Baltic Fellow, Centre for Geopolitics, University of Cambridge
From the British point of view, the JEF format is another tool of deterrence against Russia, as well as a means of expanding Britain’s influence in the Baltic and in the North Atlantic without incurring any legal commitment and retaining full control of the initiative. For the member countries, especially the three small Baltic states, it is a format to keep the UK interested in their security and to signal this interest to Russia. For everyone involved, public diplomacy is thus an important function of the JEF and it could certainly be improved without much extra cost.
This could include visits of British warships in Baltic ports (similarly to the recent visits of HMS Iron Duke to Tallinn and Riga), followed by a wide public relations campaign which would involve the broader public, such as a possibility for members of the public to walk on board. Second, funding by the JEF of academic conferences and events on geopolitics, both in Britain and in the Baltic region, resulting in name recognition and improved contacts with the Baltic security community. Third, organising public crisis simulations that focus on JEF involvement in potential conflict scenarios in the region.
Research Fellow, Finnish Institute of International Affairs
The JEF is bucking a largely lacklustre trend compared to many previous minilateral defence initiatives. In the Euro-Atlantic experience, many similar initiatives have either had a limited shelf-life or have only half-heartedly muddled forward. From the 2000s, the early European Union (EU) Battlegroups have headlined these disappointing trends (although improvements are now ongoing). From its beginning in 2014, the JEF has proved different because it attracted strong ‘buy-in’ from contributing nations in Northern Europe. As the JEF’s great power framework nation, Britain’s steady leadership is the main pillar supporting this.
The UK can continue to empower the JEF by visibly maintaining the force as a central priority in its defence policy. Leading by example will continue to encourage consistent commitment from the JEF’s other members. Some have called for a widening of the JEF’s functions, but as an initiative which complements broader institutional cooperation within NATO and the EU, the JEF’s added value comes more from the quality of the military tasks it undertakes rather than their quantity.
Land exercises specific to the Northern European security context underscore the JEF’s primary value. JEF members will want to keep this purpose central while some scope to widen might be considered in cyber security as well as with naval cooperation to enhance maritime security. The latter is now a pressing common priority in Northern Europe as ‘grey zone’ interference increasingly threatens undersea infrastructure in the Baltic Sea and the North Atlantic.
Visiting Fellow, Centre for Strategic and International Studies
The first task for Sir Keir Starmer, Prime Minister, at the helm of the JEF in Tallinn next week will be to prove the group is dealing with threats to the region’s undersea cables. Just three weeks ago, two cables connecting JEF members – Finland, Lithuania and Sweden – appeared to be cut by a Chinese flagged vessel dragging its anchor along the seabed. Sir Keir’s predecessor, Rishi Sunak, responded to a similar incident before the previous JEF leaders’ meeting with a ten-year vision. Sir Keir will need to go further. He should demonstrate the group is taking determined action and practical steps to combat this acute threat.
Securing critical undersea infrastructure (CUI) will involve doing many things, but the JEF should focus on three immediate priorities:
Enhance regional maritime domain awareness through increased surveillance and information sharing to detect threats in advance;
Establish regular counter-piracy style patrols in CUI hotspots using dedicated JEF maritime assets to deter aggressors through forward presence;
Set up rapid CUI response units using dedicated JEF assets to respond to suspicious incidents or attacks.
However, protecting cables is just the tip of the iceberg. On paper, the JEF’s role ranges from ‘sub-threshold peacetime responses through to full-spectrum interventions during times of crisis or conflict, both in its core regions and beyond.’ Realising this heady ambition will help transform European defence – but it will also require Sir Keir and the UK to lead the JEF by example.
Global Europe Programme Associate, Wilson Centre
In early interactions with the new Trump administration, HM Government can make the case for the JEF as a force multiplier for European security and a solution to US burden-sharing concerns. In a recent interview, Trump reiterated he would be open to reducing American support for NATO and did not rule out the idea of withdrawing from the alliance altogether, casting doubts on continued US engagement in European security. The new administration may seek to redistribute resources to respond to instability in the Middle East or to prevent a potential conflict in the Indo-Pacific.
To address ongoing questions of burden-sharing, the Trump administration should look to the Framework Nations Concept (FNC) that led to the formation of the JEF, under which European nations stepped up to lead a configuration of NATO and non-NATO allies. Minilateral security configurations such as the JEF are vital in these uncertain times due to their flexibility and manoeuvrability. The FNC is an old idea that falls squarely in line with the views of the incoming administration: the JEF is an overlooked asset to address questions of burden-sharing, while responding to pressing security concerns in Northern Europe.
Freelance Security and Defence Consultant
Empowering JEF requires affirming the object and purpose of JEF. It is a rapid expeditionary force established with the intention of responding to the full spectrum of operations, across all domains including cyber and space. That is literally and figuratively, a lot of ground to cover. While it is ideal that an expeditionary force can respond to all threats, it may be necessary to first define and prioritise specific operations, such as monitoring, preventing, and responding to sabotage of critical national infrastructure; before scaling up to more intensive activity.
In that vein, the UK should drive improved coordination between JEF and existing forces in the High North and Baltic Sea region. For instance, if sabotage similar to the 2023 Baltic-connector pipeline incident occurs, there should be no question that the JEF is the force ready and able to investigate and respond—rapidly. Apart from amassing resources to improve deployability, this would require better communication with NATO Command, and perhaps even closer structural ties to NATO.
Furthermore, Ireland is a key basin country in the region. Irish membership in JEF would fill a geographical security gap, as well as bridge Ireland’s defence allyship (currently a member of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy, but not a member of NATO). While respecting the nation’s approach to neutrality, the UK should actively push for Irish inclusion in the framework nation concept.
The UK can empower JEF by addressing both its teleological and ontological character, campaign for pragmatic expansion of membership, and exploit existing resources that do not require an immediate increase in defence spending.
Co-founder and Director of Research, Council on Geostrategy
The JEF started out as an expeditionary concept – it’s in the name – to allow the Baltic and Northern European nations to retain out-of-area experience. Some of these joined UK-led operations in Afghanistan; when British combat forces were withdrawn in 2014, a new mechanism was required. But the intensification of the Russian threat meant that the JEF began to focus more on deterrence, particularly in the ‘grey zone’ (especially for Finland and Sweden prior to their decision to join NATO).
The new Labour government was elected in June 2024 with two key strategic objectives: 1. To implement a foreign policy founded on ‘progressive realism’; 2. To ‘reconnect’ with European allies and partners. The JEF should be central to those objectives. While initiated by a Conservative government, it is explicitly a ‘Bevinite’ approach to European affairs: it binds like-minded democratic nations through British leadership to multiply their ability to deter aggression.
To begin with, if the JEF is to reach its full potential, Britain ought to become more proactive in leading it. This means boosting defence spending to provide the enabling resources to underscore the group (and meet other JEF members’ own commitments).
With the spectre of Russian aggression and American indifference, Baltic and Nordic allies want the UK as deeply entwined in the Northern European theatre as possible. What could the JEF do to act as a vanguard for NATO, especially if Trump decides to reduce American support for the alliance? This thorny question should be central at the Tallinn summit.
Baltic and Nordic allies also seek to harden NATO’s eastern front. For this reason, a mechanism should be found to draw Poland and Romania, as well as Ukraine, into the JEF. This does not necessarily mean they should join the JEF, but it does mean they should be present at the Leaders’ Summits and able to partake in JEF exercises and operations.
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