After 1,000 days of war, what is next for Ukraine?
The Big Ask | No. 21.2024
19th November will mark 1,000 days since Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This grim milestone comes at a time of increasing uncertainty for Kyiv, particularly following the re-election of Donald Trump to the White House. However, the outcome of the war is far from decided, as Ukraine remains steadfast in its fight against Moscow, holding onto territory in Russia’s Kursk Oblast and inflicting heavy casualties on the invading forces. So, in this week’s Big Ask, we asked ten experts: After 1,000 days of war, what is next for Ukraine?
Sir Michael Fallon
Secretary of State for Defence (2014-2017)
Wars end. Long or short, they come to an end eventually. But it’s hard to see this one ending easily or suddenly. First, the end should be sustainable. Ukraine has been invaded twice in the last ten years, with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and Ukraine’s other allies failing to deter Russia each time. Any settlement should be enforceable, and should prevent Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, from restarting his war in three, five or ten years’ time. That might mean deploying NATO troops on the ground to secure the ceasefire, as in Kosovo, and then providing Ukraine with a permanent air defence shield against future missile attack.
Second, it is not for London, Paris or Washington to rule on territory. Only Ukraine can decide if it’s prepared to cede any land at all, in return for future allied protection. Any change to current borders should also consider Ukraine’s neighbours and the future security of the Black Sea region.
Third, the cost of reconstruction will need to be shared between Russia and Ukraine’s allies and partners. Russian assets, legally frozen under international sanctions, should be the first to be called upon. The European Union (EU) and World Bank should co-ordinate long-term funding of the infrastructure needed to restore Ukraine’s economy and improve its access to free and open markets.
British Defence Attaché to Ukraine (2008-2011) and Russia (2019-2022)
As Ukrainians fight on for their liberty, their prospects look precarious. Russia is maintaining a very slow, costly advance in the Donbas, while Ukraine’s Kursk incursion has failed to distract the Kremlin. After 1,000 days of war, Ukrainian troops are exhausted, and international support, as evinced at the Group of 20 (G20) and United Nations (UN) General Assembly, is waning.
Although relaxation of the use of allied long-range missiles inside Russia is welcome, this is unlikely to change the trajectory of the war nor impact Russia’s relative advantage of men, materiel and money. Over the winter, Russia will continue to pummel Ukrainian cities, while further substantial backing from the United States (US) is uncertain.
The immediate future will be very difficult, with a concomitant effect on civilian morale. Many in Europe and North America want to see the conflict ‘settled’ in 2025 through a ceasefire, de facto partition, and Ukrainian neutrality. But there should be peace with honour, not a repeat of the disreputable Minsk process.
It is unclear whether Donald Trump, President-elect of the US, can or will use all levers of American power to persuade Putin to compromise on his maximalist demands on Ukrainian demilitarisation, and an enduring Russian role in Ukrainian foreign and domestic affairs, rightly unacceptable to Kyiv. Nor that Trump will extend US arms or security guarantees to prevent further fighting at a time of Putin’s choosing after a temporary pause. Hard times lie ahead.
Director, Mayak Intelligence
Will this war last another 1,000 days? The bad news is that it might – but not at its current intensity, at least. Russia is taking terrible losses, not just in battlefield casualties, but the distortion of its economy, the degradation of its society, its increasing dependence on the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Yet even if it cannot sustain its current level of losses – there is a clear intent to erase the Kursk salient and push forward the front lines in Donbas by the start of 2025, to which end it is accepting losses around double its recruitment rate – it can likely cope with the war for some years to come.
Can Ukraine? That is much less clear, as it continues to resist a mass mobilisation, and as its efforts to build a domestic arms industry adequate to leave it less susceptible to the ebb and flow of allied aid is likely to take years, not weeks. With Trump at least outwardly committed to imposing a ceasefire and Europe wobbling, it may well be that, whatever Kremlin claims that it would reject such an outcome, this is what will happen.
A ceasefire is not a peace though. The Kremlin will rebuild its forces and retain the capacity at any time to resume hostilities. Ukraine will need all its resolve – and its friends – not only to make itself too tough a nut for the Russians to crack, but also to use any pause in the fighting to redouble its efforts to get what it really needs, the kind of serious and credible security guarantee that so far only NATO’s Article 5 truly offers.
Associate Professor of International Relations, University of Waterloo
A military operation which Russia intended to last several days is now being counted in four digits. For Ukraine, the war has been devastating in a way that few of its partners in the Euro-Atlantic community truly appreciate. At the moment, Russia is making the most territorial gains it has in a while. The Ukrainian economy has been severely crippled and many Ukrainians are experiencing hardship and trauma.
No one is sure what to expect from the incoming Trump administration. Optimists and pessimists alike have good reasons to feel how they do because of the mixed signals that Trump’s cabinet choices convey. The legacy of Joe Biden, the outgoing President of the US, is thus an under-equipped Ukraine which now must confront this uncertainty.
Yet, as much as Ukraine’s own struggles are evident, the wildcard, as ever, remains the Russian home-front. Driving growth in Russia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is massive military expenditure, disguising the significant distortions that the war has created in the Russian economy. Prices are soaring and interest rates are at 20 year highs. There is no sign of these pressures letting up anytime soon. Russian society is still placid, but how long can it bear the Kremlin consistently and aggressively choosing guns over butter?
Eastern European Analyst, Polish Institute of International Affairs
The 19th November marked 1,000 days since Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine. However, the war really started 3,925 days ago – in 2014, when Russia seized Crimea and invaded the Donbas. Back then, the world somehow reacted little. On 24th February 2022, the free world again failed to respond. Countries such as Poland or Britain which have long understood the threat from Russia, helped from day one and even before.
However, many countries were initially reluctant to assist. They learned nothing from 2014. It was only after Kyiv’s heroic defence and Russia’s war atrocities, including the murder of civilians, that aid began to flow, though the level of assistance never reached a point where Kyiv could effectively repel the Russian invasion. Most decisions to transfer advanced equipment and munitions were late. It seems that ten years of war experience with Russia has taught Euro-Atlantic nations nothing, giving Moscow permission to pursue its aggressive policy.
Will the 1,010th day since the invasion and the 3,935th day of the war differ from the previous ones? Not if Ukraine’s partners cannot learn from recent events. Things which were important in 2014 and 2022 remain the same. It is time to demonstrate strength, unity, and resolve to counter Russia’s actions effectively. Of course, it is necessary not only to learn lessons but also to adapt to the new reality which is coming with the return of Trump.
While Ukrainians are pinning their hopes on his unpredictability, other partners should take a step forward and focus on consolidating their position and speaking with one strong voice. A special position belongs to Britain and Poland, but also to the countries of the Baltic region, as those who understand the Russian threat well.
Co-founder and Director of Research, Council on Geostrategy
Ukraine must decide what’s next for itself. The problem is that, in January, Trump may attempt to force a ceasefire. Essentially, he has one of three options: 1. Provide Ukraine with more weapons and support to force the Russians to the negotiating table on favourable terms; 2. Demand that Ukraine offer territorial concessions to secure a ceasefire, leaving Russia as a victor of sorts; 3. Ask Ukraine to accept territorial concessions in exchange for security guarantees over what remains of Ukraine.
It is still unclear which of these options Trump will offer or attempt to pursue. If it is the first option, he will look to European countries to provide support. If it is the third option, he may expect the United Kingdom (UK) to lead in providing the security guarantees Ukraine would need to prevent future Russian aggression. If it is the second option, Ukraine will have an enormous challenge to overcome. So too will European countries such as the Baltic and Nordic states, Poland and the UK. They do not wish to see a Russian victory, especially one where the Kremlin would be free to foment conflict in the rest of Ukraine, or re-invade in the future.
At the moment, Britain, Poland, Ukraine and the Baltic and Nordic states should be working together to prevent a poor outcome – especially the second option. If Trump pushes for an immediate ceasefire on terms unfavourable to Ukraine, they need to be ready to offer an alternative – and be ready to back it up with actions. There is no time to lose.
Inaugural Senior Fellow for Military Studies, Lowy Institute and retired Major General, Australian Army
Even though the situation for Ukraine at the 1,000-day mark of this war is grim, the trajectory of the war is not set in stone. What changes might be required from Kyiv to prevent continued Russian gains on the battlefield and in the infosphere, and to delay any US attempt at forcing Ukrainians to the negotiating table under unfavourable terms?
First, Ukraine needs to conduct an honest and ruthless re-assessment of its military strategy. The 2024 strategy has seen Russia retain the strategic initiative, with Ukraine losing territory at an accelerating pace, the conduct of an offensive in Kursk which has not achieved its objectives and drawn valuable resources from defending eastern Ukraine, and the decline in Ukrainian strategic influence. New ideas and perhaps new leadership will be required moving forward.
Second, Ukraine needs to continue to work on communicating the impacts of a Russian victory. Apart from the Baltic nations, Poland, and Finland, most Euro-Atlantic national leaders cannot envisage the full implications of a potential Russian victory. The Ukrainian government must convince its allies to be more afraid of Russian victory than a Russian loss.
Third, Kyiv will need to resolve the personnel challenges faced by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. This will require more systemic change in the Ukrainian military. And, while Ukraine faces difficult demography issues, it may have to override these concerns if it wishes to retain a sovereign nation which can ponder such challenges in the future.
Finally, Ukraine will need to change its partners’ perceptions about its prospects. It must not only be winning the war, but it must also be seen to be doing so. And Kyiv will need to convince allied governments, especially the incoming Trump administration, that this war, thrust upon the Ukrainian people, is worth fighting because it is seeking to prevent a much greater evil perpetrated by Putin and his cronies – in Ukraine and beyond.
British Ambassador to Ukraine (2019-2023)
It has not been 1,000 days of war. I have not calculated the exact number of days since Russia invaded the East of Ukraine in 2014 and annexed Crimea illegally. But that is when I date Russia’s invasion from because that is when all Ukrainians see this ugly chapter opening. People died during that 2014 invasion – indeed, people died on the Maidan, protesting for the right to aspire to EU membership, prompting the 2014 invasion – and people have died since then, before Russia launched a full scale invasion of the entire country in 2022.
Crimea was transformed between 2014 and 2022 into a combination of a military zone designed to threaten Ukraine’s southern and eastern regions, and a detention location for soldiers, civilians, as well as a way stop for illegally-abducted Ukrainian children. The biggest difference between the two periods has been in the reaction of Ukraine’s partners.
So what next for Ukraine? They fight. They continue to fight on every front – military, economy, energy, the stealing of their children, the force fed disinformation dividing societies in illegally occupied regions. They fight it all. That is what’s next, and for as long as Russia remains set on its apparent goal of subjugating Ukraine – an objective no negotiating stance yet shows any sign of dimming.
Programme Director for Security Studies, Centre for Defence Strategies and Joint Programme Leader of the Future of Ukraine Programme, Centre for Geopolitics
For 1,000 days, global institutions and hesitant governments have wavered – 1,000 days of endless discussions, disputes, and the pervasive fear of escalation. The re-election of Trump has only heightened speculation about what his presidency could mean for Ukraine.
Both political parties in the US largely align in their view on how the conflict should conclude: while neither opposes Ukraine’s ambition to reclaim its 1991 borders outright, both consider it an unrealistic goal. Trump however, appears driven to end the war and secure his legacy as a peacemaker. His aim is to reach an agreement early in his term, one which would prevent a larger-scale conflict from reigniting. For Trump, success lies in achieving an enduring peace – not a tenuous ceasefire that could crumble during his time in office.
Recent, albeit limited, measures by NATO hint at a shift toward containing the emerging Russian-North Korean cooperation. Although delayed, these moves mark the beginning of a necessary strategy. Moreover, new threats are emerging as seen with the missile which hit Dnipro yesterday, which might have been an intercontinental ballistic missile. Looking ahead, the emphasis should be on enhancing joint defence production between Ukraine and its partners and politically broadening the scope of strategic operations, including ‘deep strikes’.
Without firm security guarantees, Ukraine remains exposed to future Russian aggression. A ceasefire under current conditions risks setting a dangerous precedent, one which would drag Europe back into an era when borders could be redrawn by force. Such a result would not only signify a strategic defeat for Ukraine, but for Euro-Atlantic countries as well.
The stakes are high, and only steadfast, systematic support for Ukraine can deter Russian ambitions and pave the way for a just, lasting peace. A Russian defeat would send a clear message to potential aggressors that expansionist dreams will be met with resolute opposition, putting an end to the aspirations of the CRINK.
H.E. Amb. Gen. Valerii Zaluzhnyi*
Ukrainian Ambassador to the United Kingdom, and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (2021-2024)
This week marks 1,000 days since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. What began as an uneven confrontation quickly evolved into a critical lesson for global military strategists. Precision weapons, drones, and satellite systems– tools swiftly mastered by Ukrainians –have inflicted significant losses on Russian forces. HIMARS rocket artillery and FGM-148 Javelin and Stugna-P anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM) have become enduring symbols of effectiveness, even against an enemy with superior numbers.
However, technologies initially designed to provide one side with an advantage quickly became accessible to both. Precision weapons, drones, and satellite systems now define the success of operations. Yet, the growing use of these systems has also introduced new challenges: electronic warfare, which undermines the accuracy of strikes, and the constant saturation of the battlefield with reconnaissance systems that shift operations in real-time, creating what is often referred to as a ‘stalemate’. This scenario echoes the positional battles of the First World War, where defensive technologies significantly outpaced offensive ones.
Still, Ukraine is already paving the way forward. The future of warfare lies in autonomous systems, artificial intelligence, and cost-effective, yet highly precise, weapons. Drone swarms, laser-guided navigation, and autonomous strikes on strategic targets are no longer distant possibilities but matters of time. The war has entered a new era, and the victor will be the one who first masters these harsh new rules.
This war has proven that the battlefield is no longer confined to the front lines. Infrastructure, logistics, and the economy have all become targets. At the same time, Ukraine has shown that resilience, creativity, and international support can alter the course of history.
To fight an evil that does not relent and holds superiority in forces and resources requires innovation –innovation in technologies, strategies, communication, and every aspect of the response. Breaking away from the familiar and traditional, embracing creativity, and preparing for change must be integral to a broader strategy.
A thousand days. Ukraine has not only endured but rewritten the rules of the game. And the world will remember this lesson for a long time to come.
*Author writes strictly in a personal capacity.
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