What does Trump’s victory mean for Britain?
The Big Ask | No. 20.2024
The outcome of the United States (US) presidential election is clear, Donald Trump has won decisively and is now the president-elect. Trump’s return to the White House will have significant implications for US foreign policy, transforming the country’s approach to global affairs. As a result, the United Kingdom (UK) will have to prepare for the potential crises and opportunities that emerge over the next four years. So, in this week’s Big Ask, we asked eight experts: What does Trump’s victory mean for Britain?
Director, British Foreign Policy Group
First and foremost, Trump’s election means the UK must urgently prioritise strengthening relations with Europe, particularly on defence. The president-elect made it clear throughout his election campaign that he hopes to bring a swift end to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with little regard for how favourable that agreement is for Kyiv. The future of Ukraine is essential not only for European security but also for Britain and its allies’ leadership and credibility on the world stage. It is therefore crucial that the UK and its European allies increase defence spending, work collaboratively, and do all they can to persuade Trump of Ukraine’s importance.
Beyond Europe, Trump’s election means Britain needs to define its approach to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) quickly, which is currently muddled and inconsistent. With Trump threatening tariffs of up to 60% on Chinese goods, His Majesty’s (HM) Government’s China audit – due to be released next year – will be essential in understanding Britain’s vulnerabilities to, and opportunities for collaboration with the PRC. However, it will need to move fast to ensure Britain is as prepared as possible for a potential escalation in US-PRC tensions under Trump. The UK will also need to think strategically about how to protect and promote the free and open international order, in order to prevent strategic rivals such as Russia and the PRC using a more absent US to build their soft power and global influence, to the detriment of British security and prosperity.
Neil Brown
Distinguished Fellow, Council on Geostrategy
Trump’s election victory carries three immediate risks that are in the UK’s gift to address before 20th January. First, by confirming the stated aim of Sir Keir Starmer, Prime Minister, to ‘spend 2.5% [of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)] on defence to respond to growing threats’ is not subject to the caveat ‘but I didn’t say when’. To do otherwise would see him called out as being unserious about defence (and rightly so) because ‘2.5% by 2030’ would be both too little and too late.
Second, policymakers need to ignore those in Whitehall who wish to seize on the ‘America first’ rhetoric of the new president and his Cabinet to find an excuse to run to the comfort blanket of Old Europe, where even accepting that threats are existential never rule out the option to do nothing about them – certainly not before Germany and France have new governments.
Third, HM Government should demonstrate Britain’s importance to global security by confirming the UK’s commitment to the AUKUS (the most important strategic alliance on the threat of the PRC), the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) – British cooperation with Europeans that Washington rates because they have been clear-eyed on global threats and willing to act – and the 2025 UK Carrier Strike Group deployment to the Indo-Pacific. The Carrier Strike Group in particular would demonstrate a UK capability the US Navy needs to be ‘in being’, at high readiness, and during a single deployment prove interoperability with allies in the Euro-Atlantic, Middle East and the Indo-Pacific, reflecting the expeditionary power necessary to meet the connected challenge of the ‘CRINK’.
Editor of London Playbook, POLITICO
A second Trump administration sets up a number of possible tensions between Britain and the US. The president-elect has made clear he wants to end Russia’s war against Ukraine fast via a deal that cedes Ukrainian territory to Russia – while HM Government has vowed to back Kyiv. Trump has suggested he will be stronger in his support of Israel than predecessors over the current conflict in the Middle East – while the Labour government is skirting a more nuanced line amid pressure from its pro-Palestine flank. Trump and his picks for top roles are ultra-hawks on Beijing – while HM Government is seeking to open new channels to work with the PRC where possible. Trump wants to ramp up fossil fuel exploration – while Labour is talking a big game on the green transition.
Some of the earliest flashpoints could be over trade if Trump follows through with his plan to impose blanket tariffs on American imports and on the recent deal to cede control of the British Indian Ocean Territory to the Maldives – a move the Trump orbit is dead against. Sir Keir’s efforts to court Trump ahead of the election might get him a hearing with the new president. But the conversations could be difficult when the discussions move from small talk to issues of substance.
Prof. Michael Cox
Emeritus Professor of International Relations, London School of Economics and Founding Director, LSE IDEAS
It really doesn’t matter who governs. The fundamentals of the relationship between established states such as the UK and the US rarely, if ever change, especially as we are told that the relationship is ‘special’. And there is no doubt some truth in this old adage. But does it still hold? After all, banks we were told back in 2008 were too important to fail. But one in the shape of Lehman Brothers was allowed to with near disastrous consequences for the world. Now in 2024 the line has gone out in London that the special relationship is also far too important for anybody serious to tamper with it – even an administration as committed to tearing up the rule book of international affairs as Trump’s. Perhaps so. But having vehemently hoped for a Democratic victory, Labour might now face an uphill struggle to build bridges back to the new look team in Washington.
Indeed, on several crucial issues from Russia’s war against Ukraine to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) there looks to be a gulf between the two sides. Ironically, relations with Europe and the European Union (EU) could prove to be the biggest sticking point. Sir Keir and his team may not be aiming to go back into ‘Europe’ anytime soon. But it is looking for an improved relationship, especially with France and Germany. And this at a time when Trump is threatening the Europeans – not to mention the UK – with a whole range of tariffs. With whom then will London ally? With those in Europe with which it is attempting to construct a new detente, or its closest ally in Washington whose new turbo-charged boss appears to view the Europeans with disdain sometimes bordering on contempt? Some testing times lie ahead for the special relationship.
The Rt. Hon. Baroness Neville-Jones DCMG
Member of the House of Lords and Member of the Advisory Board, Council on Geostrategy
Brace for uncertainty and turbulence! Trump has a mandate for a foreign policy which is non-interventionist leaning to isolation; which promises to close US borders against mass immigration and which intends to raise tariff barriers to new heights. Britain is not a direct target of any of these policies, but will not escape their side effects. Trump’s transactional style is designed to leave people guessing as to how much of any policy is leverage and how much is a genuine goal. Hard to plan for.
The biggest short-term risk for Britain is Trump’s desire to stop Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on unstated terms but which leave Europe exposed to further Russian aggression. The UK will soon be obliged to increase defence expenditure materially and may find itself working hard to keep NATO alive in a weak and divided Europe.
Possibly Britain will escape American tariff increases on its negative trade balance with the US, but the EU is unlikely to and will reciprocate. A transatlantic trade war could force uncomfortable choices for the UK about the side it joins. The overall international climate for the UK will however be determined by the PRC’s response to Trump’s pressure: will it tighten bonds with Moscow or seek its own accommodation with new style American leadership?
Charlotte Kleberg
Associate Fellow, Council on Geostrategy
Trump’s return to the US presidency in January is likely to have significant implications for Britain’s maritime security strategy. A continued emphasis on an ‘America First’ foreign policy casts uncertainty over overseas commitments and American support for European security, suggesting the need for greater European responsibility for its own defence, security, and stability. With US resources potentially shifting away from Europe, the Royal Navy will also face increasing pressure to take on more responsibilities. For the UK, this underscores an urgent need to take a more prominent leadership role in the European maritime security domain, where it has long been a key player.
This will require a bolstering and modernisation of naval capabilities, particularly in logistics, to ensure independent defence support, further integrating and deepening partnerships with European partners, key allies, and the commercial sector. Strengthening the UK’s presence in critical areas such as the North Atlantic and leading joint exercises will be crucial in safeguarding vital trade routes, critical chokepoints, and countering rising maritime threats from state and non-state actors.
With Britain facing increased pressure to assume a larger role in maritime security, the UK must develop a resilient maritime security strategy to deter adversaries, secure alliances, and safeguard its interests in a deteriorating geopolitical environment. As HM Government looks to boost defence spending, prioritising sea power – and the robust naval and maritime capabilities that support it – becomes essential given the prospect of reduced US engagement in European waters.
Associate Fellow, Council on Geostrategy
John Podesta, climate adviser to the president of the US, told COP29 delegates that Trump’s election would have a limited impact on global emissions. The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) – passed by Joe Biden, President of the US – which provides subsidies for clean energy supply chains, was designed to have ‘staying power’. Analysts have estimated that global emissions will rise by 0.04°C due to Trump’s election, and could increase by up to 0.1°C if Trump revokes America’s net zero by 2050 target. While this endangers global climate targets, the direction of travel remains clear, as between 2017-2021, coal-fire generation in the US shrank by 38% while renewable generation grew by 50%, despite the actions of the first Trump administration.
Additionally, the Trump administration may pause before revoking subsidies for certain industries wholesale. As they are largely deployed in Republican states and are critical for diluting the PRC’s leverage over critical sectors, such as batteries. And if Trump is to keep his promise to halve the price of energy, he will need more than fossil fuels: even if natural gas were free, consumers would still pay 85% as much as they do now because most of the cost of gas is delivery.
What does this mean for the UK? It is hard to tell. Trump may boost liquified natural gas (LNG) exports to improve the American balance of trade, but that would raise bills at home. If he reduces exports, that means higher costs for Britain, given the country’s dependence on American gas. Trump revoking IRA subsidies would mean European and Asian economies would have to do more of the hard work to scale up clean energy, pushing up costs, but it may also free up more investment to flow back to the UK, lowering them.
Co-founder and Director of Research, Council on Geostrategy
At this moment, it is unclear what Trump’s victory means for the UK other than he has politically swept the deck and a new era beckons. There has been trepidation as to what his second tenure in the White House will mean for UK-US partnership. But his soon-to-be predecessor’s foreign policy can hardly be endorsed as a ringing success, even if there were notable developments in the relationship, such as AUKUS and the New Atlantic Charter.
If Trump goes in hard against Russia to push it over the precipice to provide Ukraine with maximum bandwidth to negotiate from a position of strength, the UK can move fast to coax its European allies into supporting its long-favoured approach. But, despite appointing hawkish Michael Waltz and Peter Hegseth as National Security Advisor and Defence Secretary, respectively, it remains unclear whether this will be Trump’s preferred approach.
At the very least, the UK needs to prepare for a rougher, more transactional America. If Trump’s foreign policy pivots towards East Asia, Britain will need to step in to fill the European void. If Trump embraces a more isolationist approach, the same will apply. But there is opportunity in every loss. As a nuclear power, Britain’s defensive capabilities will be in high demand; given the strategic environment in Europe, HM Government can afford to ask a high price for any military support.
Come what may, Britain can be certain of one thing: similarly to his first administration, Trump will demand that his allies pay more to underpin their own defence. Here, he is not wrong. HM Government should commit to spend 2.5% of GDP on defence from next year, with a clear strategy to reach 3%-4% by the end of this parliament. This is how to ‘Trump-proof’ UK-US relations, and, in the process, ensure national success.
If you enjoyed this Big Ask, please subscribe or pledge your support!
What do you think about the perspectives put forward in this Big Ask? Why not leave a comment below?