Should Britain have a foreign policy doctrine?
The Big Ask | No. 18.2025
In September last year, His Majesty’s (HM) Government ordered a series of reviews into Britain’s foreign policy, as previously outlined in the 2021 Integrated Review and 2023 Integrated Review Refresh (IRR). Notably absent from the reviews, however, was the intention to create a definitive foreign policy doctrine.
The Integrated Operating Concept (IOC) provides a doctrine on how the Armed Forces should operate in an increasingly volatile world, but there is no equivalent for the diplomatic service. With geopolitical tensions rising, and the emergence of a multipolar world order occurring faster than expected, questions arise as to whether the time has come for the United Kingdom (UK) to take a clearer approach towards its global outlook. Using this as the basis of our question, for this week’s Big Ask, we asked five experts: Should Britain have a foreign policy doctrine?
Research Fellow (National Security), Council on Geostrategy
In theory, Britain already has a foreign policy doctrine – that of Progressive Realism. But it has not been entirely clear what this has meant in practice, nor how this doctrine fits with the approaches being taken by other bodies within HM Government, such as the Treasury, the Ministry of Defence (MOD), and Number 10. This must make life for British diplomats abroad far more difficult than it needs to be.
What is needed is a clearer overall grand strategy, answering the big questions about which interests the UK wants to prioritise and how it envisions pursuing them. This can then allow for a clearer foreign policy doctrine to be developed to support the wider goals.
Different departments are pursuing different goals and have different outlooks. This pulls British strategy in awkward directions – the approach to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the most obvious (but by no means the only) case: a serious challenge which needs to be deterred, but also the key to the growth agenda?!
Progressive Realism can still be made to work, but it needs a reinterpretation, one which redefines and refocuses on ‘Realism’. The doctrine originally stated that ‘[Ernest] Bevin was committed to realism, a politics based on respect for facts’. A more accurate depiction, and one which should be brought back, is that Bevin was committed to realism, a politics based on respect for power. The starting point of any such reshaped doctrine should be an honest approach to the fact that without a love for power, Britain cannot pursue its progressive interests. The more fractured and uncertain the world becomes, the more important power will become.
Columnist, Progressive Britain
The Labour government of 1997 supposedly supported an ‘ethical foreign policy’. But that was a journalist’s sloppy summary of the advocacy of Robin Cook, then Foreign Secretary, of a foreign policy with an ethical dimension. They are not the same.
Lammy transcended that with Progressive Realism. Labour’s progressive values include development (although this is temporarily reduced), active diplomacy and soft power, tackling climate change, and feminist foreign policies. They are also part of a realist imperative to reduce the drivers of conflicts which usually reach our shores in an increasingly shrinking world.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has been central to Labour realism since the 1940s, but whether this is with or without the United States (US) is to be determined. This leads to greater self-reliance through re-industrialisation and allies we can trust to share responsibilities, plus more defence spending which deters adversaries.
The priorities and balances for a small, relatively rich and strategically placed island with global trading interests always depend on domestic and external constraints. The UK’s traditional role as a bridge between America and Europe, refusing to make a choice, depends on the direction of the Trump administration (and its recent development in its relations with Ukraine looking better than before) and its stamina in advancing its policies.
It is difficult to finalise a foreign policy doctrine in a world which is changing at such a frenetic and frightening pace. Progressive Realism will do just fine.
Co-founder (Research), Council on Geostrategy
If strategy explains the ways an organisation intends to achieve its objectives, a doctrine explains the principles and concepts behind strategy. What are the guiding assumptions British diplomats will embrace as they execute UK foreign policy in the late 2020s? Before the 2024 general election, Lammy attempted to sketch out such a doctrine in his article on Progressive Realism.
Through Defence Futures (previously the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre), the MOD provides the British Armed Forces with an array of doctrines for operating in the field. Chief among these is the IOC of 2020. This explains the nature of strategic competition, and how the Armed Forces should operate and engage in the field. Given that diplomats are, just like military personnel, instruments of national power, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) should also generate its own professional doctrine.
As the UK moves into a geopolitical age where rivals – even enemies – push back against British policy with integrated power, the need for firmer, more resolute and more agile diplomacy grows stronger. Gone are the days when public relations and ‘gentlemanly diplomats’ could serve British interests effectively; the time has come to firm British diplomacy up. Under these circumstances, more thought must be given to the principles which underpin British foreign policy, and how they align with the national interest.
Policy Fellow (China Observatory), Council on Geostrategy
‘Doctrine’ is perhaps slightly too strong a word in this case – how can a country like the UK, deeply economically integrated with countries of various governance and value systems, apply a ‘one size fits all’ approach to its diplomacy?
For the Armed Forces, a doctrine is absolutely necessary, but where diplomacy really shines is in setting the long-term vision of a country’s international relations – always with a view to avoiding conflict where possible to achieve its interests.
This is why in the case of the PRC, HM Government should release a public version of the ‘China Audit’, the internal cross-government review commissioned by the FCDO to evaluate Britain’s interests with the PRC. A ‘doctrine’ as such on the UK’s relationship with Beijing is not necessary. The PRC is so diverse that it is almost a continent in itself, and alongside the rapid progress of science, technology and geopolitics, a ‘doctrine’ would hold the government to a strategy which may have to change before the next general election.
The PRC represents a long-term challenge to Britain. A public version of the China Audit should include a basic framework – with a more detailed strategy outlined in the classified version – of how Whitehall recognises this, and its intent for a regular review of the evolution of the PRC and its place in the world.
Currently, HM Government’s actions prove its acknowledgement of the public’s increasing sense of unease around closer ties with Beijing. For example, in February this year, HM Government deliberately did not announce the visit of Wang Yi, Foreign Minister of the PRC, to London in order to avoid criticism. Diplomacy in and of itself is a good thing, but when it comes to the PRC, Whitehall clearly needs to address some concerns.
Professor of International Relations, University of Kent
If we take doctrine to be understood as a set of fundamental beliefs which underpin the actions of a nation in its foreign policy (as well as security and defence) policy, then there is no question that these are essential for any state seeking to be successful in their diplomacy. A lack of certainty over doctrine runs the risk of an overemphasis on the means necessary for diplomatic influence, rather than the ultimate ends which they should serve.
The UK has run through a very large number of ideas about the role it wants to play in recent decades: ‘force for good’, ‘pivotal power’, ‘networked power’, ‘thought leader’. None of these were a foreign policy doctrine.
For more than 70 years, particularly since the Suez Crisis of 1956, Britain’s foreign policy has revolved around a core belief: that aligning with the US was a central national interest. This was a shift from the previous position in which the UK’s relationship with America was a crucial means to facilitate the ends of a determining role in the international order.
However, as the US redefines its view of international relations and reassesses its alliances, Britain must undertake a fundamental reassessment of its own foreign policy doctrine. At the heart of this reset should be a renewed recognition of the UK as a consequential European power. This means playing a central role in shaping Europe’s international relations to serve its own interests and actively contributing to the development of a European security architecture which best suits its needs.
If you enjoyed this Big Ask, please subscribe or pledge your support!
What do you think about the perspectives put forwards in this Big Ask? Why not leave a comment below?