Labour’s first 100 days: A strategic success?
The Big Ask | No. 16.2024
On 12th October, the new Labour government passed the milestone of 100 days in office, providing a moment to reflect on its successes and failures so far. The new government stated its intention to develop its own distinct strategic outlook – focused on reconnecting the United Kingdom (UK) to the world and ‘progressive realism’ – to better tackle the challenges of the worsening geopolitical environment and changing balance of power. So, in this week’s Big Ask, we asked eight experts: Has Labour’s first 100 days in office been a strategic policy success?
Senior Lecturer in National Security Studies, King’s College London
In its first 100 days, the new Labour government has been finding its feet. Many seem to think that a new administration should hit the ground running despite most officials not yet having the required security clearance, insider information, or even sufficient personnel in place. In opposition, one could count the staff of John Healey, then Shadow Defence Secretary, on one hand. Taking office requires a rapid scaling up of capacity, knowledge and process, and it will take a bit of time to grease the wheels. If knowledge is power, then, it will be the outcome of the ongoing Strategic Defence Review (SDR) which will shape Labour’s long-term strategy and provide greater clarity to its future direction.
In the meantime, there has been no shortage of demands upon Labour in relation to defence. A year into the conflict in Gaza, the government remains under pressure to clarify the UK’s stance on arms exports to Israel, an issue stirring internal divisions within the Labour party. Continuing support for Ukraine remains a stated priority, but with ammunition dwindling and Russia having the upper hand in attritional warfare, the prospects for Ukraine appear troubling indeed.
On the home front, Labour’s pledges to veterans, including reinforcing the Armed Forces Covenant, signal a commitment to defence reform, though the specifics of these proposals remain unclear. Ultimately, Labour’s first 100 days have laid some foundations, but the real challenge will be on how to balance these global commitments with domestic priorities and maintain party unity. For defence, let’s hope that this will lead to a winter of determination, rather than one of discontent.
Research Fellow on National Security, Council on Geostrategy
Judging the ‘strategic’ success of Labour over such a brief time span is difficult, particularly as many important decisions on defence policy will be made after the publication of the SDR.
Labour inherited an unenviable geopolitical and fiscal situation, exacerbated by the Armed Forces suffering from the legacy of underinvestment. When Labour left power in 2010 2.6% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was being spent on defence; the average over the last 14 years was 2.15%. Some notable wins so far include a 6% headline pay increase for the Armed Forces and the announced relaxing of stringent medical requirements, which should ease the recruitment and retention crisis. Labour has also recommitted to several existing programmes, including AUKUS and the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), to reassure the defence industry and international partners.
However, Labour has avoided several other key decisions, for example: Government backing for Harland and Wolff shipbuilders never materialised; there is yet to be a resolution on pay disputes with the Royal Fleet Auxiliary; and we are still waiting on an outline for defence spending plans to reach 2.5%.
There has been a fair amount of kicking the can down the road on strategic decisions, understandable given the government’s desire to get to grips with what it has inherited before making long-term decisions. For defence, we won’t be able to judge the strategic wisdom or folly of the government properly until they publish the SDR. However, one thing is certain, the Ministry of Defence, Treasury, and Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office need greater unity for threat perception and strategic direction.
Director, Strategy, Statecraft, and Technology (Changing Character of War) Centre, University of Oxford
Since the summer of 2024, His Majesty’s (HM) Government has stumbled in its policy agenda in what has been an unprecedented series of blunders for an administration that had just won a landslide. The steep decline in public approval when one might have expected an electoral honeymoon period is striking.
Crucially, its foreign policy has drawn the ire of some, reflecting the rising discontent at home. There were negative reactions to the foreign secretary’s emotive speech in the United Nations (UN) General Assembly. The responses of the government to the Middle East conflict, for those on the ground, seem weak, contradictory, and irrelevant. Many nations disapprove of what they see as double standards because the British narrative is so unclear. The government’s silence on AUKUS and GCAP is raising widespread concerns, especially when the defence review consultation is already known to be determined by no additional defence spending. This perception is further fuelled by the description of the UK Armed Forces as a ‘hollow force.’
The solutions are threefold: One, a clear statement of UK foreign policy as interests and not just values; two, an integrated approach to the levers of national power; and three, firm investment to a minimum of 3% of GDP to address shortcomings in the UK Armed Forces and to deter their adversaries.
Dr Timothy Less
Convenor, Geopolitical Risk Study Group, Centre for Geopolitics, University of Cambridge
Labour’s report card, so far, provides a mixed picture. The government has acted strategically in emphasising British support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), seeking to shore up the UK’s relationship with the United States (US), developing a new security pact with the European Union (EU) as part of a broader reset in relations, and reiterating its support for Ukraine which, among other things, is seeking to contain Russia’s influence in eastern Europe. All this is consistent with Britain’s interest in shoring up its security at a time of growing international threat and advances the ‘realist’ dimension of its approach to foreign policy.
However, the government has not acted strategically by ceding sovereignty of the Chagos islands to Mauritius, which, if not already, is at risk of falling into the sphere of influence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Britain has also not acted strategically in qualifying its support for Israel, a long-standing ally in a region where the UK has strong interests and few friends. Nor are such policies very ‘progressive.’ The deal over Chagos was conducted over the heads of the islanders themselves who may or may not want to be ruled from Port Louis. Nor, in the Middle East, is there anything very progressive about constraining Israel if that means handing relative gains to Hamas, Hezbollah and their Iranian backers whose values are distinctly un-progressive.
Associate Fellow, Council on Geostrategy
The short answer is no, and I would not expect ‘success’ at this stage. What Labour has achieved is a signalling reset: on Gaza, blocking 10% of arms exports to Israel while lifting its objection to an International Criminal Court investigation of Benjamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister of Israel; on international law, resolving the Chagos dispute; and above all, by leading calls for a ceasefire in Lebanon.
To achieve real strategic policy success, the government would need demonstrably to alter the behaviour of one of the key actors driving the disintegration of the global order. If the Biden administration cannot do this with Netanyahu, neither can Sir Keir Starmer, Prime Minister. If Biden is unwilling to allow meaningful deep strikes into Russia, then Sir Keir’s hands are again tied.
We’ve seen a steady buildup of goodwill in Europe, in preparation for the concatenation of treaties and agreements that will collectively form the security pact. But ultimately, all this constitutes a holding pattern until we see the outcome of the US presidential election.
Labour as a party has sunk political capital into a potential Kamala Harris victory – with activists and officials offering input into campaign strategies and boots on the ground. But if Donald Trump wins, all bets are off. Labour’s task then will be to invoke the ‘realism’ aspect of its doctrine, to become the leading voice in European resistance to Russian aggression and American disengagement.
Programme Director for Security Studies, Centre for Defence Strategies
Under the leadership of Sir Keir, Britain has maintained its vigorous support for Ukraine, continuing the policies initiated by the previous Conservative government. This continuity in policy reflects the UK’s firm commitment to supporting Kyiv in defending itself from attack. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Britain has contributed £12.8 billion in military and other forms of aid to Ukraine, and over 200,000 Ukrainian refugees have sought temporary refuge in the UK.
Volodymyr Zelensky, President of Ukraine, has already visited Downing Street twice since Labour took power, and notably in July, he became the first foreign leader to be hosted at No. 10 after the formation of the new government. This underscores the close diplomatic ties between the UK and Ukraine during this challenging period.
Before assuming office, Sir Keir had already demonstrated strong support for Kyiv. In February 2024, as Leader of the Opposition, he visited Zelensky and subsequently held talks with him at the NATO summit in July 2024. At that summit, NATO members pledged Ukraine an ‘irreversible path’ to membership, a promise that the Ukrainian government views as crucial for ensuring long-term security.
While the recent visit by Zelensky has not yet led to permission for deep strikes using Storm Shadow cruise missiles, Ukrainians still view the new government as a steadfast ally in the war effort. Sir Keir will to join leaders such as Emmanual Macron, President of France, Joe Biden, President of the US, and Olaf Scholz, Chancellor of Germany, in Berlin this week to discuss Zelensky’s ‘victory plan’ and continued military support for Ukraine. Continued support from Britain will be crucial for Kyiv, particularly considering the upcoming US elections, which have entered the critical final stage.
Senior Research Fellow in Science, Technology, and Economics, Council on Geostrategy
Labour have spent their first 100 days firefighting, scrambling from one crisis to the next. If this is a sign of things to come, it will be a painful five years. Governing, it turns out, is far harder than opposition.
The legitimacy of office is derived, in part, from the correct execution of institutionalised ‘speech-moments.’ That is – a good prime minister does not just chase public opinion, they also capture and channel the national mood when needed. There are undoubtedly deep-rooted problems in the country, but Starmer misjudged the national mood when he stood behind a black sign bearing the words ‘Fixing the Foundations’, warning the Budget will be painful. Without tempering such a statement with hope and optimism, it feels like a funeral. Such a warning may have been more palatable if it had followed bold, positive announcements to signal change – but there was no ‘Bank of England independence’ moment.
There have been some very well-judged appointments, bringing expertise into the heart of government – notably Vallance and Gustafsson. There have also been a range of small positive steps, such as on onshore wind, the national wealth fund, and industrial strategy. But these have been piecemeal. Labour should do more to weave them into a broad, coherent and optimistic narrative about national renewal and economic development.
Labour has been caught up in dealing with minor policy issues and scandals, which show they are following, rather than setting the agenda. A government with a huge mandate should have far bigger fish to fry, particularly as the country faces a tough economic situation and a worsening geopolitical environment. If Labour is serious about growth and prosperity, it needs to be bolder, think strategically and have a firmer hand on the tiller.
Professor of International Relations, University of Kent
The early actions of HM Government suggest it has confidently grasped the significance of Russia’s war on Ukraine for the future of British and European security. The swift travel to Odessa by Healey, the commitment of new military support, and the address by Zelensky to the new Cabinet left no ambiguity in Britain’s support for Ukraine.
It has, however, been less shore-footed on the global challenge that the PRC presents to the UK. The UK’s strategic misstep in the Indian Ocean, where Beijing has been relentless in seeking to expand its influence, exemplifies this. The overly hasty completion of negotiations with Mauritius, on the basis of forgoing sovereignty over the British Indian Ocean Territory, is inexplicable. A much broader and deeper reflection on the consequences for the perceptions of Britain’s geopolitical astuteness was necessary in this matter. It is difficult to imagine any other major state that aspires to international leadership forgoing the possession – and the attendant obligations and responsibilities – of such a major geostrategic and geo-environmental location.
It is to be hoped that the exemplary interest-driven strategy demonstrated towards Ukraine is a better guide to how HM Government will approach the next American administration and the pledged reset of relations with the EU.
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