International law is confusingly named, it isn't law, as one of the opinions pointed out, in any sense that is recognisable to domestic law. Enforcement is uneven, in places non-existent, there is no body of peers to form a jury.
It's a beautiful idea, ultimately one that could be hugely beneficial to the human race, but unless and until every state is equally subject to its enforcement then it is a prisoner's dilemma in which our rivals gain the ability to escape the game by choosing to "betray".
I have a lot of sympathy for Chinese pushback against international law - the rules were written largely without them, imposed (in part) at gun(boat)-point, exist without respect for their legal culture, and lack the equality before the law that underpins our own legal culture. Why would an ascendant China buy into this system? Why should they?
The reality is, as far as I can see, that this model doesn't work for China, is ignored outright by Russia, ignored in large part by the US. If the two great powers, and one of the largest major powers, aren't subject to it then we are on a hiding to nothing as long as we try to bind ourselves into its broader application. I hope one day we can reconstruct a form of international law that can be enforced seriously, and evenly, and which every major power buys into consensually. Until then, I think the model is not fit for purpose.
Is the UK overly subservient to international law? I wrote recently “the values of international law should always guide, even if the letter of the law does not always dictate, and any UK Prime Minister should combine a strong preference for legality with an aversion to needless wars” (https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/should-international-law-constrain-the-uks-foreign-policy-on-iran/) The overall criterion for complying with or side-stepping international law is the UK national interest, and more specific criteria include cementing links with allies. This latter is of interest vis-à-vis the isse of the Chagos Islands, where virtually all the UK’s allies in NATO and the Indo-Pacific regard the UK’s title to the Chagos Islands as flawed, as evidenced by the watershed vote in the UN in May 2019 when the UK/US position on UK sovereignty was supported only by Hungary’s Viktor Orban, Israel’s Netanyahu, and Australia’s Scott Morrison (all three close allies of Donald Trump). The welcome extended to the UK/Mauritius deal by countries like Japan and the US was genuine enough – certainly if you regard the US State Department as speaking for the US, rather than President Trump, who preferred populist politics to more practical geopolitics. It is for sure US hard power, rather than the Chagos agreement or any successor to it, that will ensure that the Diego Garcia Base can continue to play its role in the Indian Ocean and beyond, both in the near term and for as long as any future US President considers it to be of strategic value. But legitimacy still matters – both to cement the support of allies, and to increase the political risks of adversaries. Through the Chagos agreement the UK has offered universal legitimacy for the US presence on Diego Garcia and in the Chagos Archipelago. That is a step forwards rather than backwards, in terms of realpolitik as much as in terms of compliance with international law. I doubt the Trump position will endure - it could nudge Mauritius in the direction of third parties seeking a toehold in the Archipelago, while the deal currently on hold would do the opposite. For a longer discussion of the context to and details of the UK/Mauritius deal, see https://www.e-ir.info/2026/02/22/hard-power-and-legitimacy-in-the-chagos-archipelago/
International law is confusingly named, it isn't law, as one of the opinions pointed out, in any sense that is recognisable to domestic law. Enforcement is uneven, in places non-existent, there is no body of peers to form a jury.
It's a beautiful idea, ultimately one that could be hugely beneficial to the human race, but unless and until every state is equally subject to its enforcement then it is a prisoner's dilemma in which our rivals gain the ability to escape the game by choosing to "betray".
I have a lot of sympathy for Chinese pushback against international law - the rules were written largely without them, imposed (in part) at gun(boat)-point, exist without respect for their legal culture, and lack the equality before the law that underpins our own legal culture. Why would an ascendant China buy into this system? Why should they?
The reality is, as far as I can see, that this model doesn't work for China, is ignored outright by Russia, ignored in large part by the US. If the two great powers, and one of the largest major powers, aren't subject to it then we are on a hiding to nothing as long as we try to bind ourselves into its broader application. I hope one day we can reconstruct a form of international law that can be enforced seriously, and evenly, and which every major power buys into consensually. Until then, I think the model is not fit for purpose.
Is the UK overly subservient to international law? I wrote recently “the values of international law should always guide, even if the letter of the law does not always dictate, and any UK Prime Minister should combine a strong preference for legality with an aversion to needless wars” (https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/should-international-law-constrain-the-uks-foreign-policy-on-iran/) The overall criterion for complying with or side-stepping international law is the UK national interest, and more specific criteria include cementing links with allies. This latter is of interest vis-à-vis the isse of the Chagos Islands, where virtually all the UK’s allies in NATO and the Indo-Pacific regard the UK’s title to the Chagos Islands as flawed, as evidenced by the watershed vote in the UN in May 2019 when the UK/US position on UK sovereignty was supported only by Hungary’s Viktor Orban, Israel’s Netanyahu, and Australia’s Scott Morrison (all three close allies of Donald Trump). The welcome extended to the UK/Mauritius deal by countries like Japan and the US was genuine enough – certainly if you regard the US State Department as speaking for the US, rather than President Trump, who preferred populist politics to more practical geopolitics. It is for sure US hard power, rather than the Chagos agreement or any successor to it, that will ensure that the Diego Garcia Base can continue to play its role in the Indian Ocean and beyond, both in the near term and for as long as any future US President considers it to be of strategic value. But legitimacy still matters – both to cement the support of allies, and to increase the political risks of adversaries. Through the Chagos agreement the UK has offered universal legitimacy for the US presence on Diego Garcia and in the Chagos Archipelago. That is a step forwards rather than backwards, in terms of realpolitik as much as in terms of compliance with international law. I doubt the Trump position will endure - it could nudge Mauritius in the direction of third parties seeking a toehold in the Archipelago, while the deal currently on hold would do the opposite. For a longer discussion of the context to and details of the UK/Mauritius deal, see https://www.e-ir.info/2026/02/22/hard-power-and-legitimacy-in-the-chagos-archipelago/
Yes and add to that ECHR