Since its inception in December 2022, the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) has existed as a trilateral initiative between the United Kingdom (UK), Italy, and Japan, aiming to develop a sixth-generation combat aircraft. Other countries, including Germany, Saudi Arabia, and India, have also expressed interest in becoming involved in the programme, with Poland becoming the most recent to do so at the tail end of last week.
John Healey, Secretary of State for Defence, has expressed Britain’s openness to expanding the GCAP partnership in response to Polish interest. At the same time, however, Japan has signalled concern over what it perceives to be budgetary stalling by the UK. Building upon these developments, for this week’s Big Ask, we asked eight experts: What is the future of GCAP?
Senior Research Fellow, Polish Institute of International Affairs, and Senior Lecturer, Warsaw School of Economics (SGH)
Poland’s interest in GCAP reflects the need to expand its air power in the longer-term perspective in response to requirements for deterrence on the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) eastern flank. However, official communications concerning Polish participation in the programme emphasise rebuilding national aerospace industrial capabilities in the 2030s.
A comparison with Poland’s negotiations with Saab regarding the A26 Blekinge class submarine programme is instructive. The Swedish offer is structured around technology transfer, co-production, and the development of domestic industrial capacity, including Polish shipyards’ involvement in construction and lifecycle support.
By contrast, GCAP appears to require pre-existing advanced capabilities. Poland’s contribution could focus on component manufacturing, software integration, Artificial Intelligence (AI), and uncrewed systems, rather than the core platform design. For Britain and Italy especially, Polish participation would strengthen already intensifying defence-industrial cooperation, including programmes concerning frigates, rotary aviation, and air and missile defence. Moreover, it would reinforce GCAP’s position relative to the rival French-German Future Combat Air System (FCAS) programme.
However, Poland is testing parallel pathways. Cooperation with South Korea on the KF-21 Boramae fighter aircraft programme offers a credible route to industrial participation, on top of existing programmes in land warfare systems and FA-50 light combat aircraft, with proven potential for technology transfers. Engagement with Sweden on a successor to the JAS 39 Gripen multirole fighter aircraft presents yet another option.
The trajectory that could secure GCAP’s future growth would be a tiered expansion model, in which partners such as Poland are integrated into high-value industrial chains. This would enable the programme to shift the balance among non-American combat air initiatives in its favour.
PhD Candidate, Freeman Air and Space Institute, King’s College London, and Advisory Associate, Oxford Analytica
First flight in 2027 and entry into service in 2035 – at least, that is the plan. In practice, the scale and complexity of GCAP’s ambition make that challenging.
Beyond the technical risks – of which there are many – a central question is whether partner nations can reconcile immediate readiness requirements with long-term capability. The UK’s repeated delays in publishing a Defence Investment Plan, critical to funding GCAP, raise doubts on both counts. The frustration of its partners is palpable, as is the resulting erosion in deterrence.
GCAP nevertheless remains attractive relative to other sixth-generation fighter efforts. It promises the survivability, range, and connectivity required to operate in highly contested airspace while reinforcing industrial and operational sovereignty. Growing external interest is therefore unsurprising, but should be treated cautiously.
However appealing they may make the economics, additional partners risk diluting the programme’s current strengths: alignment of strategic intent and a pragmatic approach to collaboration. A lower-risk pathway for prospective collaborators may instead lie within the wider Future Combat Air System initiative, particularly in uncrewed elements designed to operate alongside the core platform.
These tensions show that GCAP is as much a test of statecraft as it is of metalwork and digital architectures. Can participating nations conceive and execute long-term strategies that combine military, economic, and diplomatic considerations – despite external shocks – to secure their national interests? If so, the future of GCAP is the future of Britain.
Wg. Cdr. Ben Goodwin MBE*
Adjunct Fellow, Council on Geostrategy
Whether a pocket of the air littoral over trenches or a suppressed corridor deep into enemy territory, combat air power is needed. GCAP will be part of the mix of systems to achieve this, and the programme is focused rightly on range and payload, the sine qua non of air power.
Autonomy is in an avalanche of development. It strikes me that we are at something like a Jackie Fisher moment, particularly for air power: an inundation of autonomous, cheap weapons, with very long range.
Range and payload still matter. These roles should be the boundaries of GCAP’s design. The bleeding edge of technology should sit in the supporting systems with which GCAP will integrate, be they weapons, decoys, or jammers: software-defined, autonomous systems.
Alongside range and payload, industrial impact and service entry date drive the programme. The design and manufacturing investment made by the UK – currently budgeted at over £12 billion – should advance British manufacturing capabilities sustainably and significantly, all the way along the supply chain. This is closely linked to when GCAP will be fielded. When the threat changes, so does the mission – the UK must be able to design and manufacture rapidly.
GCAP cannot do everything. However, the flexibility of its great range and payload, and its timely delivery, will make it a potent air platform for the constantly developing technology that Britain and its allies will need to deploy.
*This response was written by the author in a personal capacity. The opinions expressed are his own, and do not reflect the views of His Majesty’s (HM) Government or the Ministry of Defence.
Air Marshal (rtd.) Sir Christopher Harper KBE FRAeS
Member of the Air and Space Power Group, Royal Aeronautical Society
Having worked on international combat air programmes in the past, I can see both the promise and potential pitfalls associated with GCAP. As a relatively young officer in the Royal Air Force (RAF), I was involved in the design and development phases of the Eurofighter Typhoon; I later had some responsibility for bringing the aircraft into operational service. Those experiences left me in no doubt as to the challenges inherent in multinational collaboration.
GCAP is central to the future credibility of the UK’s air power. It offers a pathway into the sixth-generation era – something that cannot be taken for granted. Through the involvement of BAE Systems and numerous other British companies, the programme also carries significant economic weight, supporting highly skilled jobs and the growth of the wider defence-industrial base. It may also represent the UK’s last realistic opportunity to play a leading role in the development and manufacture of a crewed combat aircraft.
Against that background, I would welcome Poland joining GCAP. There is a clear geostrategic case; Poland is a committed NATO ally that invests heavily in defence. Furthermore, an additional partner could bring greater resilience and a more capable end product, while reinforcing the programme’s relevance to European security and enhancing interoperability.
However, expansion of GCAP would not be without risk. Multinational programmes struggle with bureaucracy and competing priorities, which can lead to sclerotic decision-making. Adding another partner could also complicate consensus on requirements, workshare, and export policy.
That said, such challenges are manageable. With lessons learned from past programmes, clear governance structures, proper and timely exploitation of technologies – such as digital safety assurance and certification – and well-defined roles within both the GCAP International Government Organisation (GIGO) and Edgewing, the risks of increased complexity could be contained.
A broadened partnership would enhance resilience and legitimacy. Poland’s inclusion in GCAP should thus be supported.
Dr David Jordan FRAeS FRHistS FRSA
Co-Director of the Freeman Air and Space Institute, and Senior Lecturer in Defence Studies, King’s College London
GCAP has enormous potential, although the planned 2027 maiden flight of the demonstrator aircraft will mark the first point at which a proper analysis of potential can begin to be made. With increasing mistrust over American supply of advanced combat aircraft and the trouble facing the FCAS project, the programme may become a huge export success.
All three GCAP nations need an aircraft with Tempest’s proposed capabilities of ‘stealth’, long range, heavy weapons load, and a sophisticated sensor suite. The three partners all have advanced aerospace industries, and GCAP’s potential to drive technological advances in industry and gain export success is considerable.
GCAP’s capabilities make it an attractive proposition to other countries with similar needs for advanced combat aircraft. In recent months, India and Poland have been mooted as possible new partners. It has even been suggested that the serious difficulties over FCAS might lead to Germany joining GCAP.
The reaction from the current partners has been polite at best. Japan has concerns about introducing new partners, and it is not hard to see why.
While diversification may increase funding for research and development, there are risks. Questions of workshare apportionment would be inevitable with more partners, although this might be ameliorated by a model not dissimilar to that of the F-35 Lightning II, in which partners can participate at ‘tiered’ levels.
The danger of work apportioned on the basis of project politics rather than ability to deliver has occurred in previous collaborations, and would need to be avoided, along with parochialism that seeks design leadership or greater control over the programme. If such pitfalls can be evaded, the admittedly limited evidence so far suggests GCAP could be a major success, even as a larger project than first envisaged.
Perhaps the biggest challenge so far lies in the growing concerns over the UK’s failure to produce a coherent defence investment plan. Japan, wishing to avoid delay, is particularly concerned, and there is a sneaking suspicion that HM Treasury might wish to delay investment decisions to make in-year savings, even if past experiences shows this increases programme cost overall. Sir Keir Starmer, Prime Minister, has sought to reassure Tokyo, but, it seems, not entirely successfully.
While GCAP’s future should be assured, it will need to rely on partners taking a long-term view and advancing together – whether as a trio or a larger collective.
International Fellow, Council on Geostrategy, and Assistant Professor of International Relations, University of Waterloo (Canada)
On the surface, Poland’s expression of interest in joining GCAP signals a promising future for the planned sixth-generation fighter aircraft. With an additional partner involved in the project, the costs involved with the design, production, and eventual operation of the aircraft could be diffused more broadly, so as to allow participants to achieve economies of scale.
Moreover, the more allies of the United States (US) that collaborate with one another without America, the less reliant they should become on Washington. Even the US might welcome this development – whatever the implications for its own aerospace and defence contractors – if it is as serious about burden-sharing as it says it is.
Yet, such optimism should be tempered. News of Poland’s stated interest should be balanced against news of Japan’s growing scepticism over the programme itself. London and Tokyo appear to have different perspectives on the timelines involved for the GCAP, as well as the scope of technological ambition that it should achieve. Funding gaps on Britain’s part also draw concern from Japan.
The result may be that Tokyo could resist any new entrants to the programme in order to restrain the complexity of an already very complicated and technically demanding endeavour. Whatever the long-term success of GCAP, uncertainty over cost, timetables, and project management will persist for the foreseeable future.
PhD Student, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University
The most plausible future for GCAP is not unlimited enlargement, but a stable core of the current partners combined with carefully staged forms of external participation. From Tokyo’s perspective, GCAP is not simply an international industrial project. It is the successor to the F-2 multirole fighter, and a strategic effort to preserve Japan’s freedom of modification, high readiness, and a domestic defence-industrial and maintenance base, while still meeting the service entry target of 2035.
This is why expansion is a double-edged sword. Additional partners could ease cost pressures, widen the production run, strengthen export prospects, and deepen the supply chain. These incentives are real. However, bringing in new core members too early could reopen disputes over requirements, workshare, technology protection, and governance, and in turn threaten the programme’s schedule.
For Japan, then, the preferred model is core stability first, selective widening second. Countries such as Poland may still be valuable as future customers, industrial participants, or partners in specific areas, but not necessarily as immediate co-equal members of the governing core. Tokyo’s priority order is clear: protect the timeline and sovereign operational flexibility, and only then broaden participation in ways that reinforce – rather than dilute – the strategic purpose of GCAP.
Senior Researcher, Centre for Security Studies, ETH Zürich
If a Polish participation in GCAP materialises – although at the moment, this is still a big ‘if’ – this step would further deepen trends that are already observed in the European security order. It is also very telling about the future of the European Union (EU) as a security actor, and about EU-only cooperation in security and defence.
First, Poland joining the GCAP would highlight the importance of minilateral initiatives in European security and defence for key players. Second, it would also imply that Poland, the EU member state with the most significant defence spending as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), is not looking towards EU partners for defence cooperation.
When more partners join GCAP – itself a project that unites European nations and Japan – these decisions also clearly demonstrate that European security and defence is increasingly being built across theatres. Despite the EU’s considerable funding initiatives, cooperation with partners outside the union remains an attractive option.
Lastly, Poland joining GCAP after previously expressing interest in FCAS is yet another blunder for the French-German project, as it shows that other EU members would prefer to look elsewhere rather than hedge their bets on a project that even the leading nations seem to have lost faith in.
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