What does victory look like for Ukraine?
The Big Ask | No. 08.2024
On 6th August, the Ukrainian Armed Forces launched a surprise offensive operation into Russia’s Kursk Oblast. Two weeks in, Ukrainian troops are believed to control more than 1,000 square kilometres of Russian territory and continue to make incremental gains and strike critical military targets. While the ultimate goals of the operation remain shrouded in the fog of war, the fact that Ukraine can take the fight to Russia shows that the outcome of this war remains in the balance. So, in this week’s Big Ask, we asked ten experts: What does victory look like for Ukraine?
Senior Lecturer in Post-Soviet Security, King’s College London
What victory looks like for Ukraine is for the Ukrainian people to decide. Ukrainians are too often treated by both Westerners and Russians as supporting actors in their own fight for survival. That’s not just offensive, it’s a recipe for further war.
The question for Ukraine’s partners is: what should a sustainable peace look like? They may be tempted to pressure Ukraine into a deal which will stop the fighting as soon as possible, but any agreement that Ukrainians won’t accept as final (for example, one that allows Russia to continue to occupy Ukrainian territory) would only create a frozen conflict. That has been one of Moscow’s favoured modes of trying to control its neighbours and it would make a continuation of the conflict highly likely.
A sustainable peace would be one in which the Ukrainians were satisfied that their borders were secure and there was no threat of future invasion by Russia. That would require both large-scale economic and military support from partner countries in the short term and a rapid pathway to North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) membership.
British Defence Attache to Ukraine (2008-2011) and Russia (2019-2022)
Although Ukraine’s limited incursion into Russia’s Kursk region reversed for now a sense of gloom over its prospects, a decisive Ukrainian military victory to force peace onto Russia is highly unlikely given the absence of the Western military support to do so and restrictions placed on the weapons provided.
Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, remains convinced about the rightness of his cause, public support, and material advantage. The incursion has not distracted him from continuing offensive operations in Ukraine while making ‘proposals for a peaceful settlement’ which call for the partition of Ukraine and an enduring Russian role in its affairs.
This is clearly unacceptable to Kyiv, strategically on the defensive, heavily dependent on allied support, and uncertain about United States (US) policy following November’s Presidential election. Although the incursion, catastrophic Russian casualties, and ongoing drone and missile attacks against Russian infrastructure bring the costs of Putin’s aggression home to Russians, the grim arithmetic of war points towards an unpalatable compromise. Another difficult winter in Ukraine because of severe damage to its energy infrastructure may further sharpen minds.
Through this lens on the likely trajectory of the war, the Kursk incursion can be seen as a territorial hedge for future political negotiations, should Kyiv be able to hold onto territory gained. In the absence of a decisive military success by either side, victory for Ukraine in the short-term looks like a messy, hard-fought truce along the current front line to ensure the survival of a viable, free, sovereign state. Long-term peace will depend on hard political, economic and, most importantly, military support from Kyiv’s international backers, coupled with security guarantees to prevent a renewed Russian assault.
Deputy Chairperson, Centre for Defence Strategies and Deputy Minister of Defence of Ukraine (2019-2020)
Ukrainians have not changed their vision for victory: restoration of territorial integrity, justice (punishment and compensation of losses) and security guarantees against Russian aggression in a postwar period. Ukrainians do understand that their vision cannot be fully reached in the short term. However, all those principal points are interconnected and territorial integrity is the basis for all others on the list. Because only the critical defeat of Russia can guarantee its real readiness to negotiate (or accept) a peace deal and at least a period of non-aggression. And Russia, as a colonial state, perceives defeat or victory only in territorial terms.
That is why the Kursk campaign is so important, because it is the first time within this war when Russia faces the loss of its own territory, which principally questions the legitimacy of Putin and his inner circle. This campaign also successfully addressed rising concerns among Kyiv’s international partners on the ability of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to change the situation on the battlefield and, therefore, to implement the desired endgame scenario. For now, because of the operation, we observe a new wave of admiration and political support for Ukraine, which opens the door for the Ukrainian vision of victory to be the leading one.
Director, Mayak Intelligence
This is one of the most urgent and also most troubling questions to ask. On the face of it, the answer is simple: Ukraine regaining its land, its sovereignty, and its security. In practice, Kyiv may find itself having to trade off between them. Expelling every Russian soldier from every square inch of Ukraine in itself does not end the war or bring security. It merely moves the frontline to the national border, behind which Putin can rebuild his forces and continue to bombard Ukrainian cities. Unless Ukraine is to become a perpetual security state (which would likely impede its aspirations to join the European Union (EU)), then it needs either Russia to accept its right to exist and chart its own path or – rather more credibly – proper security guarantees which are credible and serious enough to deter future hostilities.
Realistically, if it is to have peace, there may be territories Kyiv accepts as de facto if not de jure lost, at least for the moment, such as Crimea. However, the price for this must not only be defined negatively as the absence of war, but positively, in terms of meaningful guarantees for its security and prosperity. This means NATO membership, given that nothing has the same weight as Article 5, and a clear path to EU membership. Victory means not just an end to war, but the start of a new chapter in Ukraine’s story.
Assistant Professor of International Relations, University of Waterloo (Canada)
Victory for Ukraine can take several forms. A complete victory would involve the full expulsion of Russian forces from Ukraine’s internationally recognised territory, including Crimea. Unfortunately, that outcome looks unlikely considering how well entrenched Russia is in some areas and how slow and fitful military assistance has been. Lesser forms of victory would mean the liberation of more occupied territory and the people living on it.
That said, Ukraine’s daring incursion in the Kursk Oblast demonstrates (again) that what was once unthinkable can be realised, and that war is not a linear process. It is the most impressive result for Kyiv since it forced the retreat of the Black Sea Fleet earlier this year. Ukraine still faces relentless pressure in the Donetsk Oblast and the incursion itself is militarily risky because of the personnel, equipment, and ammunition it can divert. However, Ukrainian tactical boldness and resilience should not be underestimated. If key members of Russian society finally decide enough is enough and that Ukraine must be left alone, then that may be the most important victory that Ukraine can achieve.
Senior Lecturer in International Politics, Aberystwyth University
It is not difficult to find dire predictions of Moscow’s reactions to a Ukrainian victory in this war, which typically culminate in Putin authorising the use of nuclear weapons as a last ditch effort to avoid humiliating defeat. We won’t know for certain until and unless Ukraine is victorious, but we can learn from Russia’s reaction to serious setbacks over the past few years. We have seen Moscow respond with agitation and threats to try to avoid a potential setback, whether that takes the form of a step change in the provision of weapons to Ukraine from its international supporters, the loss of territory under Russia’s control, or the expansion of NATO to include new members such as Finland and Sweden.
When the adverse event happens, however, the rhetoric from Moscow changes. The threats are not carried out, the significance of the new reality is played down, and a new narrative is crafted to direct the attention of audiences in Russia elsewhere. While Putin is unlikely to acknowledge a defeat with any grace, he could nevertheless present it as a temporary setback on the road to an eventual Russian victory in its wider struggle against the ‘collective West’.
Research Fellow, Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Victory for Ukraine must be seen as the undisputed restoration of its sovereignty and territorial integrity within its borders as defined in 1991, but this is unlikely to be realised quickly. This will depend on a complex series of military and political dynamics in Ukraine, in Russia and in transatlantic relations bridging the US, Britain and the EU. For a just peace to be delivered, wider international resolve with principled non-recognition of any gains claimed by Russia from its aggression is vital. This will shamefully stigmatise Russia within the international community, maintaining pressure on the Kremlin domestically and internationally.
Western governments never officially recognised the Soviet occupation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania after 1940, creating a lingering stigma which offered continued hope to dissidents seeking the restoration of independence within these societies. This energised the Baltic revolutions when political opportunities opened after Soviet perestroika in the late 1980s.
Realising victory is likely to be a long process. In the Baltic example, the West maintained principled political pressure for 50 years until independence was restored in 1991. Ukraine will have its territory returned when Russia ceases being an empire, be this from eventual military overstretch in Ukraine or through domestic regime change. Ukraine’s borders of 1991 remain an important reference point, but returning to a European security configuration identical to the optimistic order of the 1990s and 2000s is impossible. Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine will continue to change the European security architecture. Rigorous collective security guarantees for a victorious Ukraine are essential if a lasting peace is to be maintained in Central and Eastern Europe. Depending on how the war culminates, security guarantees might be based on new treaties or, more likely, Ukraine will benefit from a pathway to NATO membership alongside parallel EU accession.
Eastern European Analyst, Polish Institute of International Affairs
In opinion polls, most Ukrainians believe that Ukraine will win. Many of those questioned also believe that this victory means a return to the 1991 borders. Is this just optimism on the part of Ukrainians because of high wartime morale? Is victory really only possible for Ukrainians if they manage to regain the completely Russified Crimea and the Donbas, destroyed at every level (economically, ecologically, demographically)? Is victory only about regaining territory?
The point is that a victory for Ukraine, however understood, would only be one side of the coin. The other side would be Russia’s defeat. In short, for the war to end, Russia must recognise that it has lost the conflict. And this is already an issue which is not necessarily strictly military, but more psychological. And here again, we return to the question of territory. Perhaps only the recapture of Crimea and Donbas by Ukraine would mean that Russia would understand that it had lost. This is also how the currently ongoing Kursk operation can be interpreted: it is a small step towards a Ukrainian victory, not by capturing enemy territory, but by clearly signalling to Russia that it can lose on its own soil. Because unfortunately, the best language that the Kremlin understands is force.
Co-founder and Director of Research, Council on Geostrategy
Just as Sir Halford Mackinder realised that peace in Europe would depend on ‘sweep[ing] the German mind clear of its black magic’, victory for Ukraine will depend on decolonising Russia’s psyche. This will involve humbling the Kremlin to the extent that it comes to realise that it no longer leads a great power in any sense other than the von Ranckian. If the British, Europeans and North Americans continue to provide support for Ukraine, this war will prove that Russia is not strong enough to possess its own sphere of influence.
To prevail, Ukraine must take on spinelessness and isolationism in its partners. Kyiv must wage a political offensive in London, Berlin, Washington, Brussels, Paris, Warsaw, Rome, Stockholm, Madrid – even Tokyo and Canberra – to maintain support for the Ukrainian cause. Ukraine needs more weapons and the permission to fire them at communications and transport infrastructure and non-strategic (i.e., non nuclear) military targets across the frontier zone in Russia itself. This will stymie Russia’s ability to operate and asphyxiate its war potential, reducing its ability to win.
This is why Ukraine’s manoeuvre into Russia is so important. It proves, once again, that the Kremlin’s words are bluff; it proves, once again, that a Russian victory is far from certain, and it proves, once again, that Ukraine has the will to secure victory.
Programme Director for Security Studies, Centre for Defence Strategies
The past two weeks have seen a major development in the Ukraine war, with the Ukrainian forces launching a significant offensive in the Kursk region. With 1,250 square kilometres of the Kursk region under control, Ukraine’s Armed Forces still have not found a single ‘red line’. However, this operation, meticulously planned and executed, showcases Ukraine’s ability to adapt and learn from the setbacks of the 2023 counteroffensive.
Recent statements from Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of Ukraine, and other Ukrainian officials have shed light on Ukraine’s objectives in this operation. Zelensky has highlighted that the Kursk offensive serves multiple strategic purposes. One of them is to boost allied support and readiness for a Ukrainian victory.
Reality? Well, several of Ukraine’s NATO allies are reportedly lagging behind on their promises to expedite the delivery of air-defence systems and other critical equipment needed to counter Russia’s offensive, despite reaffirming their commitments at last month's NATO summit in Washington. Ukraine is facing challenges in securing support from Berlin, and it is not just Germany causing concern – France, the US, and even Britain are also falling short. These issues collectively shed light on why Zelensky took the high-stakes gamble of sending troops into Russia, despite struggling to defend the front lines at home. American ATACMS surface-to-surface missiles, along with British, French, and German cruise missiles, would enable Ukraine to destroy more effectively strategic targets such as bridges, arms depots, and, crucially, the airfields from which Russian jets armed with glide bombs are launched.
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