How can Britain work with Trump’s America to secure strategic advantage?
The Big Ask | No. 04.2025
On 20th January, Donald Trump was inaugurated as the 47th President of the United States (US). Now the world is preparing for a new, more transactional and imperious approach to American foreign policy. In an era defined by geopolitical confrontation, political disruption, and for the United Kingdom (UK), financial constraints, His Majesty’s (HM) Government will have to work with the Trump administration to achieve its political objectives. So, in this week’s Big Ask, we asked eight experts: How can Britain work with Trump’s America to secure strategic advantage?
British Defence Attaché to Ukraine (2008-2011) and Russia (2019-2022)
To divine what is in Trump’s mind and predict what he will do is a fool’s errand. Marco Rubio, Secretary of State of the US, has given three helpful tests for any Trump foreign policy which can guide the UK: Does it make America safer? Does it make America stronger? Does it make America more prosperous? This will mean a renewed focus on hard power, and less sentimentality about the past. Greater doing, less talking. More realism, less progressivism.
This means increasing UK defence spending, probably beyond 2.5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), with investment in demonstrable capabilities to contain Russia, lead within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) especially at sea, and hedge against any loss of US interest in Europe. Trump 2.0 means articulating the personal costs to Trump’s legacy of any dishonourable ‘peace’ deal with Russia, supporting Ukraine militarily as much as possible, while stepping up to play a leading role in any post-peace settlement.
And it also means full-blooded commitment to the AUKUS partnership and abandonment of any deal over the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT). This will support the American focus on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Iran, demonstrate Britain’s enduring value to the White House, and show the UK means business.
Senior Vice President of National Security and Intelligence Programmes, Centre for the Study of the Presidency and Congress
If strategic advantage is defined as preferential relations for the UK, working with the new administration is likely easier than Whitehall anticipates. Trump’s ‘America First’ agenda provides an outline for the administration’s international outlook and expectations of allies – the prioritisation of American interests, de-risking geopolitics, and partners taking greater responsibility for defence, while acting in greater alignment with Washington.
At a political level, HM Government should separate the performative theatre of negotiating politics from policy substance – relearning a lesson from 2016. Discussions about bilateral relations, economic or otherwise, will need to demonstrate clear value to Washington. Strategically, London should keep to the 2.5% of GDP defence spending target. Any delay to or retrenchment of that commitment, or any perception of ‘weakness’ in America’s closest ally will not go down well with the new administration, especially at a time when some already question British military capability.
London should establish itself as the non-continental European standard, urging its counterparts to do ‘more’ – more NATO spending and more responsibility for Ukraine (which it has and continues to do). This will align with the White House’s expectations, enabling its rebalancing towards the PRC, the administration’s strategic priority. Here, HM Government should be careful to avoid the perception (or reality) of becoming too close with or enabling Beijing. The administration’s vocal concerns about the BIOT agreement is illustrative of the potential for friction.
Director, Strategy, Statecraft, and Technology (Changing Character of War) Centre, University of Oxford
The depth of the British-American relationship is such that it has survived a variety of governments and disagreements. In January 1943 at the Casablanca Conference, when their military cooperation was still in its infancy, there were some angry exchanges about policy, although Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, the leaders of both nations, knew that their closeness was vital in smoothing out the disagreements. This was also true throughout the Cold War and during the ‘global war on terror.’ There were moments, such as the Suez Crisis and the Iraq War, which were tense and disagreeable, but the shared goals, values, and interests have endured.
Today, HM Government does not enjoy close personal relations with the incoming president, and that should be addressed. Crucially, in terms of defence, the UK is not meeting the expectations of the new administration and that should be rectified with a defence budget which reflects the actual level of threat the country faces, not the years of the peace dividend. In addition, Number 10 should abandon its attempt to surrender the BIOT, and take more seriously the warnings and indicators that the PRC presents. It can make an important offer: the nuclear-armed UK and its close ties to the Commonwealth and to NATO represents a ‘free good’ to the US. That’s a deal with appeal.
Founding Partner and Senior Associate, China Policy
The return of Trump threatens harm on many fronts. Some salient ones are: climate catastrophe, an illiberal political culture and an isolationist economic outlook.
Unmitigated climate change is the worst of these: Trump is a climate change denier. Trump’s illiberalism is less harmful (as yet) than 20th century fascism. Were that to change, history suggests it would share fascism’s fate: anti-fascist coalitions may well prevail. Potential leaders of such coalitions need support, not least intellectually. Consistency requires illiberal political culture to be opposed, which applies to the PRC, Russia and potentially now the US under Trump 2.0.
Much but not all of this is true of Trump’s isolationist economic policies. Coalitions are likely to form to provide ‘open regionalism’, which urges:
Openness: non-discrimination in trade policy
Equality: mutual benefit and equal participation for all members
Evolution: a consensus-based, step-by-step approach to cooperation
These principles, conceived as a least-worst strategy for mitigating early threats to globalisation and the free and open international order. Seeming idealistic at one time, they would today help form counter-isolationist coalitions to mitigate the likely pressures of Trump 2.0.
‘Minilateralism’ is a notable trend, distinct from the superpower blocs. In its original form, and certainly as perceived in Beijing, it had a distinct theme of offsetting the ‘rise of the PRC’. Yet Beijing has developed its own minilateralist institutions, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). As a result, open regionalism is not distinctively anti-Chinese.
To achieve the maximum strategic advantage and flexibility in the coming years, the UK should give intellectual and practical support to minilateralism in geopolitical matters and open regionalism in economic ones. However, it needs to remain abstemious in its relations with the PRC, perhaps focusing on mitigating Trump’s isolationism – and certainly his climate change denialism.
Research Fellow in Energy Security, Royal United Services Institute
The second Trump administration will see a landmark change in the American attitude to energy and climate. Dealing with a president who does not believe in win-win agreements and is openly hostile to UK energy and climate priorities will undoubtedly be a challenge.
But there is scope to work with the administration. Should the US succeed in substantially increasing oil production, there should be more room for greater restrictions on Russian oil without upending global oil markets. There may also be scope to work on clean energy. In an early executive order, Trump set out his ambition for the US to be ‘the leading producer and processor of non-fuel minerals, including rare earth minerals.’ Similarly, while electric vehicle (EV) subsidies and mandates have been removed, Trump emphasised ‘fair competition’ which, alongside the presence of Elon Musk, CEO of Tesla, in government, suggests there may be common interests in reducing the structural costs of EV production outside of the PRC. A large build out of energy networks may also provide economic opportunities: the National Grid Group has a large presence in New York and Massachusetts, for example.
So while the UK will need to step up to maintain momentum on climate diplomacy and to shore up the offshore wind industry, there may be common interests with the US in important areas. Indeed, American investment in minerals and a focus on interconnection and clean energy cost competitiveness without subsidies could be welcome. The best approach may be to frame collaboration in these areas as standing with the US and will be most effective if accompanied by Trump-approved policies, such as increased defence spending. However, the outbreak of trade tensions between the US and the European Union (EU) could put paid to any UK ambitions for serious partnership.
Freelance Security and Defence Consultant
The UK should view Trump’s America for what it is: disruptive and lasting. The first Trump presidency could have been considered an aberration; still in line with Republican Grand Old Party traditionalism. Now, the second Trump Presidency trends towards anti-progressive domestic order and truculent foreign policy – with an unprecedented focus on personal enrichment. The great advantage for UK strategists, however, lies in the fact that there is not much mystery over the ultimate intentions of this administration.
It is easy to mistake the goals of the impending Trump presidency as wild or erratic, but the method and means are highly predictable. The Trump administration’s foreign policy goals consist of paying less for defence, acquiring resource rich territory and erecting real estate where possible. Global governance and serious partnership not included.
HM Government should not waste time hedging the direction of US foreign policy, or passively speculating on how the global leadership gap will play out. Strategic play-making should refrain from playing the role of junior partner to a much changed US, or be drawn-in by unsustainable practices. The UK should approach this administration with both caution and clarity. Speak the language of flattery and deal-making, but be precise and targeted about needs and wants. A strategic Britain should have no doubt as to the terms of the game, and play accordingly.
Associate Fellow in AUKUS and Britain in the Indo-Pacific, Council on Geostrategy
In the Indo-Pacific, one of the main avenues for Britain in securing strategic advantage will be through AUKUS. The Trump administration’s support for the agreement is clear; it is indeed a ‘deal’ he can support. Focussing on ‘Pillar I’, although much of what Britain stands to gain – next generation nuclear powered attack submarines (SSNs), military access to Australia, financial boosts to the UK’s submarine industry, etc. – hinges on Australia, there is still much to work through with the US.
One thing is ensuring the contours of the ‘Pillar I’ Optimal Pathway remain as close to their original inception as possible. There is every chance Trump attempts to renegotiate what is a Biden-era ‘deal’, with the most obvious thing to come under the microscope from an American perspective being the selling of Virginia class nuclear powered submarines to Australia in the 2030s. A capability gap in Australia is not in Britain’s or America’s interests, and will lessen Australia’s readiness to operate its own SSNs when they come into service.
Managing the political messaging around AUKUS may also be something Britain needs to become more attuned to. A careful diplomatic campaign spearheaded by Australia dispelled a lot of the initial negativity around the secretive and somewhat abrasive way AUKUS was announced, particularly in Southeast Asia where it was viewed by some as intensifying divisive and economically damaging great power competition. Trump is no fan of the ‘rules-based order’, but he also does not mince his words, something which may see him and his administration compartmentalise AUKUS as part of the US’ broader strategy for competing with the PRC. This is something Britain should try and avoid in order to gain the most from AUKUS and its engagement with Indo-Pacific nations more broadly, where it has currently been successful in separating security concerns from general development concerns in pursuing closer relations.
Economist, University of Oxford and Adjunct Professor, London Business School
Improving the UK’s growth prospects in the next few years will require making the most of international trade opportunities, including with the US.
Economic growth can be bolstered by selling to overseas markets as well as improving the quality of consumption through imports. Foreign investment is a significant source of capital, which is important as Britain lags behind comparable economies in its investments, a reason for its slow growth in recent years.
So, the UK’s relationship with the world’s largest economy will continue to be important. Both governments are pragmatic and focused on economic growth.
Even though the priorities will have changed, which is not unexpected with a new administration, the way of working with America should continue to be centred on opening up segments of each other’s markets to enable trade and investment. This will increasingly mean alignment on norms and standards in services markets, including in the area of technology.
With a deepening trade relationship, both countries will improve their growth, something which would appeal on both sides of the pond.
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What do you think about the perspectives put forward in this Big Ask? Why not leave a comment below?
The UK government needs to clarify its approach to China and stop pretending that we can leverage huge economic benefits but still have a stern word in private about human rights and democracy. The China “audit” seems to be a relic of the past now: whatever it decides, the prime minister, the chancellor and the foreign secretary have already visited China and tried to cosy up. This won’t please the new administration in Washington, so there’s a very delicate judgement to be made, but Whitehall can’t keep trying to be friends with everyone, or it will end up friends with no-one.