How can Britain use minilateralism to achieve its strategic objectives?

The Big Ask | No. 3.2024

Jul 19, 2024

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We have entered an era of heightened geopolitical tension. War has returned to Europe with Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine, while revisionist powers are challenging the open international order which has been constructed since the end of the Cold War.

While the major multilateral institutions and alliances which bind free and open countries together are robust, they have to move at the pace of laggards and are therefore often slow to act and struggle to make decisions. As a result, small coalitions of the willing have become ever more important to British statecraft. So, in this week’s Big Ask, we asked seven experts: How can Britain use minilateralism to achieve its strategic objectives?

Benedict Baxendale-Smith

Researcher, Defence Studies Department, King’s College London

Minilateral groupings often prove to be an effective expression of common strategic interest while offering a greater degree of flexibility as found in larger multilateral settings. Britain has long realised the potential for minilateral groupings and is actively seeking new opportunities in the near and far abroad. The United Kingdom’s (UK) involvement in Five Eyes, AUKUS, and the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) successfully complements its presence in larger institutions, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and highlights the applicability of engaging with the framework across other domains. Regardless of its application, minilateralism will continue to prove agile in creating opportunities to solidify British influence and values abroad.

With the desire of Sir Keir Starmer, Prime Minister, to ‘reset’ relations with Europe, the E3 arrangement between the UK, France and Germany may see new life. A revitalised E3 could prove invaluable amid political uncertainty in the United States (US) and provide a basis for the Labour government’s desired UK-EU security pact. Though attention of Europe’s foremost military powers would primarily seek to assist Ukraine, a refocused E3 could also foster greater cohesion on meeting the challenges posed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). As an explicit grouping orienting Britain as EU-adjacent, E3 could again reinvigorate Whitehall’s position as the transatlantic conduit between Brussels and Washington.

Dr Hillary Briffa

Assistant Director, Centre of Defence Studies, King’s College London

Minilateral arrangements can often facilitate a nimble response to addressing shared problems, even among states that would not ordinarily work together. The proliferation of diverse groupings to confront aspects of the COVID-19 pandemic, ranging from restarting economies to reopening schools, rolling out vaccines, and sharing information about test-and-trace mechanisms, demonstrated how smaller arrangements can serve as a safety net when larger and more unwieldy multilateral fora, such as the EU, NATO, and the United Nations, struggle to achieve a timely and coordinated response to crises.

Although many of the ad hoc groupings during the pandemic were temporary, Britain should continue to recognise the agility and benefits that may be accrued by collaborating with a range of partners through the more long standing minilateral groups it is a part of. For instance, as Russian activity and capabilities have been growing in the High North, coupled with increasing Chinese presence in the Arctic, ongoing learning from Nordic partners with deep understanding and experience of operating in the region through the JEF is invaluable. Likewise, the UK, Ukraine, and Estonia signed a Memorandum of Cooperation on e-governance in 2023 – enabling Estonia to share its insights as a leading digital nation. These are but two examples of many.

While small states are challenged by scale and suffer capacity constraints, lack of quantity is not necessarily a reflection of quality. Furthermore, they have much to offer in terms of experience, expertise, innovation and ideas, which both Britain and its allies stand to benefit from through equitable partnership that recognises the unique strengths that each and every member state brings to the table.

Eoin McNamara

Research Fellow, Finnish Institute of International Affairs

Minilateral initiatives are often deceptively important when security systems are either in flux or in fragmentation, as can be seen in European and wider global security today. The UK can use minilateral initiatives to support defence capacity with smaller European partners and build stronger military interoperability with them. Minilateral security cooperation comes in many shapes and sizes. Arrangements tend to be flexible and ad hoc. Enthusiasm to drive mutual cooperation tends to result from any added value perceived in a particular initiative.

Some initiatives are more successful than others, previous EU Battlegroup models for peacekeeping were unsuccessful because there was not enough ‘buy-in’ from participants. A strong and committed framework nation, routinely a major power, is vital to manage cooperation and guarantee added value that continues to keep others interested. The UK-led JEF has bucked the trend of previous EU Battlegroups.

The JEF’s members, mostly smaller northern European states, believe it offers considerable added value for land, sea and air manoeuvres to complement regular NATO and EU exercises. JEF exercises enhance interoperability and keep national armed forces in northern Europe sharp and ready. The UK can also use minilateral cooperation to save time when building security cooperation when political progress is slow within larger institutions such as NATO. The Trilateral Initiative between Britain, Poland and Ukraine has an important role here while discussions continue on broader security commitments for Ukraine. Minilateral cooperation assists Ukraine to establish a better sense of NATO’s modus operandi, supporting Kyiv on its path to NATO.

Jennifer Parker

Expert Associate, National Security College, Australian National University

AUKUS is often mistakenly viewed as predominantly benefiting Australia. However, AUKUS is a critical element of Britain’s strategic framework, bolstering its position in the Indo-Pacific while supporting its strategic stance both in the Euro-Atlantic and globally.

The Indo-Pacific is the decisive region of the 21st century. Home to 60% of the world’s population and 60% of the world’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), it is a region where the global security framework is being challenged. The rotation of a British Astute class nuclear attack submarine (SSN) through Western Australia under Phase 1 of AUKUS Pillar 1 provides the UK access to prime real estate at the fulcrum of the Indo-Pacific, enabling power projection into this decisive region, which would be difficult to maintain otherwise.

Of course, access is only one element. Britain’s strategic position in the Euro-Atlantic and globally is underpinned by its status as a nuclear power. Since 1998, the UK’s classification as a nuclear power rests solely on its ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). Beyond Australia’s AU$5 billion cash injection into the British submarine industrial base, AUKUS mitigates risks to the UK’s submarine industrial base. An industrial base critical to the maintenance and replacement of Britain’s SSBNs, as well as the production of the SSNs which are essential to their protection. AUKUS not only provides Britain relevance in the Indo-Pacific, but it also is critical to the maintenance of the UK’s nuclear deterrent which underpins its strategic position.

Prof. Alessio Patalano

Professor of War and Strategy in East Asia, King’s College London

In a world in which advanced capabilities are going to be key to underwrite strategic advantage to deter competitors – and, failing that, to fight foes – technology minilaterals are key accelerators to define how far and how deep such an advantage can be. AUKUS has set the tone of the crucial value of working with trusted allies and partners to redefine the political signalling capacity of minilaterals, and to ensure Britain can secure advanced capabilities – in this case next generation SSNs.

The Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) – is the AUKUS of the air. Working with two close and trusted allies, Italy and Japan, both possessing world leading excellence in technology and industrial power, the new UK government has the unique opportunity to redefine the relationship between advanced capability and domain advantage, if not superiority in the air.

GCAP, in particular, has a unique strategic value that not even AUKUS possesses. It focuses on a capability – the next generation fighter jet – that all members will pursue, developing it with the intent of exporting it to other like-minded partners. In this respect, therefore, GCAP is a technology accelerator agreement as well as a down payment towards increased international influence and economic prowess through defence exports.

That’s how technology minilaterals matter to the UK. They speak to the country’s need to get relevant cutting-edge technology for deterrence and operational advantage faster; they speak to a Britain that is connected to leading stakeholders to shape the future of international security; they strengthen the economic foundations of the UK’s resilience as a credible defence industrial power of international significance.

James Rogers

Co-founder and Director of Research, Council on Geostrategy

Often, minilateralism is the precursor of multilateralism. Take NATO, for example. Widely acknowledged as the world’s most effective multilateral defensive alliance, NATO began as a minilateral effort brought about by the insight and drive of Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary, in the late 1940s. His decision to issue British security guarantees to France and then the Low Countries to form the Western Union in 1948 created a centre of gravity to draw in others – not least the vast resources of the US and Canada. Without preparatory minilateralism, it is not clear if NATO would have ever got off the ground.

Equally, minilateral groupings can serve as a vanguard to stimulate a broader formation. British efforts during the early phase of Russia’s renewed offensive against Ukraine were instrumental in encouraging others to provide Kyiv with political support, weapons and financial assistance.

So, as it ‘resets’ relations with various European countries and the EU, the new Labour government should not forget the significance of minilateralism. It allows for more rapid and effective decision making which really can shift the dial on key issues. Should the more established multilateral organisations fail to mobilise or in the event of a strategic shock, Britain’s minilateral groupings – from AUKUS and the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) to the JEF and the Trilateral initiative with Poland and Ukraine – will only grow in importance. Nurturing them besides the multilateral channels should remain a priority.

Dr Victoria Vdovychenko

Programme Director for Security Studies, Centre for Defence Strategies

While not a new concept, minilateralism offers flexibility and agility, allowing it to be tailored to the importance of specific issues within various frameworks. AUKUS, the G7, the JEF and the FPDA all exemplify minilateralism with strategic impacts extending well beyond the borders of the UK and its partners. By establishing and leveraging minilateral structures, Britain can convene and align countries in support of its interests, thereby shaping narratives and policies within existing multilateral organisations.

In particular, Britain can form minilateral groupings to address specific security threats. For example, it can collaborate with European and Indo-Pacific allies to counterbalance the PRC’s rising influence and Russian aggression. Such partnerships could include intelligence sharing, joint military exercises, defence policy coordination or hardening sanctions regime.

With Russia showing no sign that it is abandoning its aggressive plans towards Ukraine, and is instead adapting to a protracted war, amassing resources to exhaust Ukraine and exert political pressure on Europe and NATO, minilateral groupings such as the Trilateral Initiative and JEF can play an important role in countering the threat which Moscow presents. Additionally, the Ukrainian experience in resisting Russian aggression is invaluable for understanding the ‘grey zone’ methods Moscow uses to undermine democracy – knowledge which can benefit the UK via its deepening relationship with Kyiv.

In conclusion, by strategically utilising minilateral groupings, Britain can enhance its global influence, strengthen its security, and drive economic and environmental progress, all while maintaining flexibility and focus in its international engagements.

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