Due to the insightful leadership of Ernest Bevin, then Foreign Secretary, the United Kingdom (UK) was central to the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), which it has backed resolutely ever since. From resisting the Soviet menace to leading with the establishment of the Enhanced Forward Presence, Britain has proven itself a reliable and dedicated custodian of the alliance. Following the General Election on 4th July 2024, Sir Keir Starmer, Prime Minister, will head to the 75th NATO Summit taking place in Washington five days later. There he will join other leaders to discuss how the alliance responds to Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine and the rise of authoritarian, revisionist powers. So, we asked nine experts in this week’s Big Ask: How should Britain shape NATO under a new government?
Dr Hillary Briffa
Assistant Director, Centre of Defence Studies, King’s College London
Under a new government, there should be a reinforcing and upscaling of existing good practice, building on the robust methodology developed by the Secretary of State’s Office of Net Assessment and Challenge (SONAC) at the Ministry of Defence, which is tasked with bridging the gap between research and policy. SONAC examines British capabilities and identifies where strategic advantage can be sought, gaps which need to be resolved, and challenges that the team aspire to solve. Their key responsibility is to assess the likely success of different strategies to work towards desired future scenarios or mitigate the undesirable outcomes through red teaming, wargaming, alternative thought, and by bringing in ‘academics’ challenge. Through training of NATO partners, this knowledge can strengthen the future resiliency of the alliance.
At the same time, the UK should ensure NATO’s strategic decision making is more inclusive of partners such as the Baltic states to enhance overall alliance coherence and effectiveness. Junior partners are generally asked to carry out the directives of the NATO Strategic Concept, without having an equal opportunity to shape it. By involving partners more equitably in the strategic development process, NATO can leverage diverse perspectives – particularly deep understanding of Russian capabilities and intent – while strengthening collective defence capabilities, and ensuring all members are better prepared to implement shared strategic goals. This inclusivity would not only empower smaller allies, but also bolster NATO’s unity and adaptability in addressing emerging security threats. In doing so, Britain’s leadership would reinforce its commitment to a robust and cohesive alliance.
John Foreman
British Defence Attache to Ukraine (2014) and Russia (2019-2022)
In 1948, Bevin set out his vision for a new transatlantic alliance to protect against the Soviet threat and link the United States (US) to European defence. The new Labour government should display similar foresight to ensure NATO is able to contain the renewed Russian menace.
Despite the UK driving a remarkable NATO military transformation, much of this has ‘been reactive to Russian aggression, rather than proactive’. Similar to the 1984 Washington Statement on East-West relations, Britain should press for a renewed political vision on NATO-Russia relations. This will help the alliance to focus on its core mission, rather than getting steadily bogged down by an ever expanding list of lower order security initiatives.
Europeans have assumed for 75 years that the US will provide leadership and security guarantees to ensure Europe remains whole and free. This assumption is now in doubt. The 2% of GDP target for defence spending, first set in 2006, is insufficient. Labour must commit to spending 2.5% at the first opportunity. This will demonstrate leadership within Europe, encourage member states to display similar political solidarity, and address US rancour about freeloaders.
Finally Napoleon may have said ‘geography is destiny’. Britain is an island; foreign threats have always reached us by sea, then also by air, and then cyberspace. The UK can best shape NATO by re-embracing its core maritime character, strengthening the size and capability of British naval and aerospace commitments to defend the alliance’s maritime flank, and ensuring its nuclear deterrent is renewed and dedicated to NATO.
William Freer
Research Fellow, National Security, Council on Geostrategy
There will be many priorities for the new government in shaping NATO in the coming years. The three key tasks will be to: 1. Encourage allies to increase their defence spending; 2. To lead a renewed coalition of support for Ukraine; and 3. To broaden the alliance’s geostrategic focus. This will ensure for years to come that NATO keeps the Russians down, the Americans happy and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) out. In light of the connectivity between security in the Euro-Atlantic and in the Indo-Pacific this is the best way not only to guarantee peace in the Euro-Atlantic, but also to deter nefarious actors further afield.
The UK should encourage NATO allies to commit to spend not 2% but 2.5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence, and should move its own defence spending to 3% to convey its own commitment. This would help ease tensions between Washington and many of Europe’s free riders. The UK should then seek to lead a coalition of the more ardent supporters of Ukraine to provide the weapons needed to defeat Russia. The previous approach of moving at the pace of the least committed supporters is unwise; Ukrainian defeat is a far greater risk to NATO unity than irking the more cautious alliance members.
Britain should also take the lead in forging a growing NATO maritime presence in the Indo-Pacific. This will help keep open Europe’s economic arteries (much of Europe’s response to Houthi attacks in the Red Sea was weak), and complicate decision making in Beijing if it was to consider outright aggression. Reinforcing the military balance in the Indo-Pacific would also reduce the likelihood of the PRC growing its presence in the Euro-Atlantic.
Prof. Mark Galeotti
Director, Mayak Intelligence
On many key issues, the need for consensus in NATO decision making has meant policy by the lowest common denominator, and a series of broad objectives that, in practice, are deliberately ambiguous precisely to be as widely palatable as possible. To this end, London’s most productive role within NATO for the longer term would be to try and bring some clarity and honesty to a number of issues, of which the most pressing is Ukraine. Providing weapons and economic support is not, in itself, a strategy, but simply a means.
To what end? The mantra that only Kyiv can decide how the war ends is true, but not the whole truth. NATO allies also have their own interests, limits and tolerances, not least over the vexed question as to whether Ukraine ought to eventually be able to join the alliance. The Washington Summit may offer different rhetoric but it means little if membership is ‘irrevocable’ rather than ‘inevitable’ if there is no process, timeline or sense of the conditions in which it will be possible. It may be hard to envisage the kind of complete military and political victory which will return all the Occupied Territories to Kyiv – which many regard as a precondition for membership – but it is also hard to envisage the Ukrainians feeling secure with anything less than full Article 5 security guarantees.
There is a limit to the UK’s leverage, but a new government is in a better position to ask the tough questions – and push others to do the same – without feeling constrained by past compromises and expedients.
Harry Halem
Senior Fellow,Yorktown Institute
The UK has an opportunity to leverage all instruments of national power – and do so rapidly – under a new government in light of the NATO summit. The most critical question for European and British security, is Ukraine’s place in NATO. The issue remains political: NATO membership will take time and consensus among allies. Meanwhile, Russia will attempt to disrupt links between Europe and Kyiv, hoping to ensure Ukraine remains isolated , while fragmenting NATO’s cohesion.
The UK should thus couple its advocacy for Ukraine’s NATO membership with a concrete interim security system that it can offer to Kyiv during the accession process and thereby reduce Russia’s ability to manipulate the political environment. This would include: large scale training; military-industrial collaboration; and extensive intelligence sharing. But this system must be improved in two respects.
First, the UK should consider active training deployments on Ukrainian territory to integrate battlefield lessons into Ukraine’s training pipeline and improve long-term Ukrainian combat capacity.
Second, Britain should leverage relationships with Nordic, Baltic and Central European countries, to create an ad-hoc coalition that deploys forces to Ukraine when a ceasefire is concluded. The latter step will require creative policymaking, for it constitutes a military capacity in parallel to NATO – ideally approximating a robust version of the Joint Expeditionary Force with greater political commitment.
This policy will spark blowback in Washington. But the transatlantic relationship requires European leadership more than at any point in its history. Britain’s role as the essential Atlanticist connection between Europe and the US allows it to push European NATO towards a strategically coherent Ukraine policy.
Prof. Beatrice Heuser
Professor of International Relations, University of Glasgow
NATO’s origins lie in British-French cooperation, in the alliance which did not but should have existed to stop Nazi expansion in the 1930s and that was then finally concluded at Dunkirk in 1947. On it was built the Brussels Pact of 1948 which included also the Low Countries, and the British-French initiative to invite the US, Canada, and other countries to underwrite this mutual defence pact with the Washington Treaty of 1949.
The purpose of British-French cooperation was in future to uphold an international order based on the supreme rule that aggression is outlawed as an instrument of state interest, a rule enshrined in the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928. Yet, in the 1930s aggression emanated from some of its signatories – Japan, Germany, and Italy – with France and Britain the only two members of the League of Nations Council that consistently tried to promote the rule of non-aggression.
British-French cooperation was and is thus the bedrock of European defence. If NATO is to be made future-proof against the steady turn of American security preoccupations away from Euro-Atlantic and towards the Indo-Pacific, British-French cooperation must be at the heart of NATO. As Emmanuel Macron, President of France, put it in Strasbourg on 27th April 2024, Europe is defended through NATO, but NATO must function even without US leadership. On this, there seems to be widespread agreement, even in Washington. It remains to be seen what influence Macron will wield after Sunday’s election.
Zuzana Koskova
Head of Red Watch Programme, European Values Centre for Security Policy
NATO acknowledges that the ‘world faces the most dangerous security environment since the Cold War.’ It is more important than ever for democratically elected governments to find common ground with their like minded partners.
While many Europeans may disagree with Donald Trump on many issues, he is right in his critique of Europeans over-relying on the US as a guarantor of their security. Many European countries do not yet meet their own commitment to spend 2% of GDP on defence and increasing spending is politically unpopular. Therefore, the UK, with its praised strategic communications, can work on this and share its expertise with European partners.
Next, there is significant potential for the UK and the EU to cooperate in increasing defence-industrial capacity. By collaborating on defence research and development, production, and procurement, we can build a more resilient and self-sufficient defence industry.
Furthermore, Britain could emphasise to NATO allies the major impact that the Russia-PRC alliance has on European security. The UK, with its interests in the Indo-Pacific region, understands the broader implications of this alliance and can advocate for a more unified and proactive stance within NATO.
Finally, it is crucial to engage with partners outside of the alliance who share the same values and face similar threats, to enhance NATO’s resilience and defence. For example, the Individually Tailored Partnership Programme between NATO and Japan for 2024-2026 provides an opportunity to implement effective cooperation ‘in the area of defence innovation, scientific research and technology development’.
James Rogers
Co-founder and Director of Research, Council on Geostrategy
Starmer will join his NATO allies in Washington next week as the most powerful leader in the alliance, backed by a large parliamentary majority. He also has in John Healey and David Lammy, his probable Defence and Foreign secretaries, two individuals committed to ‘progressive realism’. This emerging doctrine is informed by the thinking of Bevin, whose innovative and decisive actions established NATO – and the entire post-war order.
By embracing Bevinism, Starmer, Healey and Lammy can see down the threat from Russia. Just as Bevin signed the Treaty of Dunkirk with France in 1947, they should begin by creating an ‘anchor point’ on the continent with Poland and Germany. Second, they should focus on building a minilateral coalition including the Baltic and Nordic states, the Netherlands, and a handful of Central European nations, just as Bevin drew together the Low Countries in 1948 with the Brussels Pact. If this does not create a centre of gravity with which to pull the broader alliance together, just as the Brussels Pact acted as the catalyst for NATO, it will have by itself the means to empower Ukraine.
In short, Britain should shape NATO to help Ukraine win. This should become the new government’s overriding strategic objective. Because if Ukraine loses, Pandora’s box will open. And all of Bevin’s work will be undone.
Prof. Doug Stokes
Director, Centre for Advanced International Studies, University of Exeter
Starmer will enter the global spotlight at the NATO Summit in Washington, marking his debut as prime minister. Foreign policy has not featured heavily in this election. However, the Labour Party’s foreign policy discussions, led by David Lammy, the prospective Foreign Secretary, have introduced the concept of ‘progressive realism’. This approach blends progressive values, with a realist perspective on national interests. However, reconciling these ideals presents challenges. Progressive goals often aim to reshape the world morally, while realism stresses caution against overreaching.
Lammy must navigate a transformed international landscape. European security dynamics have shifted, mainly due to Russia’s war in Ukraine and the altered balance of power in Europe. Additional risks loom due to the EU’s fragmented security cooperation, differences between France and Germany, and the shifting of power towards Poland and Eastern Europe. The rise of populism across the continent will also complicate supranational defence coordination.
A potential Trump presidency in the US will see a more significant push for European investment in security. This shift provides the UK with opportunities. Britain’s swift response to Russia’s aggression underscores its military prowess and strong ties with Eastern European and Nordic nations. Post-Brexit, with an increased budget, seriousness of purpose and seizing the nettle of UK defence procurement, London could leverage these relationships to enhance British diplomatic and commercial influence.
While Lammy’s progressive realism aims to balance ideals and national interests, the UK must maintain its core strategic goals: preventing European peer competitors, containing threats, and preserving NATO’s primacy. A cautious approach to progressive overstretch will be vital in this new era of geopolitical competition.
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