Shaping the international order
Shaping the international order
Open Briefing | No. SDR-07.2024
This is the seventh in a series of Open Briefings to the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) from the Council on Geostrategy. Our aim is to analyse ten key questions facing the Defence Review Team, from the vantage point of how the United Kingdom’s (UK) adversaries and strategic competitors see us (an approach known as Opposing Forces, or ‘OPFOR’). We will avoid euphemisms and address the challenges head-on. After holding an expert seminar, we will formally submit the briefings at the end of September. Our contributions are deliberately candid – and we invite comment and challenge from all quarters. This seventh Open Briefing evaluates Britain’s military capacity to shape the international order:
Promoting British national interests globally is one of the Ministry of Defence’s (MOD) core objectives. Alongside ensuring prosperity, homeland protection and overseas campaigning, the Defence Command Paper 2023 identifies shaping, or influencing, the actions of allies and adversaries as congruent to His Majesty’s (HM) Government’s wider aims. The UK is one of the foremost proponents of the open international order, characterised by the rule of law, freedom, and marketised trade and will seek to deploy military power in support wherever appropriate.
In supplementing traditional diplomacy, military power can be used to advance national interests in addition to common international objectives. As one of the four pillars of the British Government’s Integrated Review Refresh, published in 2023, shaping seeks to elucidate the UK’s navigation of an evolving threat perception, in which balancing, competing and cooperating behaviours are expressed. This framework can be viewed as reactive to emerging threats, in which an increasingly bold state or non-state actor warrants greater British involvement. Military power is therefore an inherent feature of the UK’s international engagement. This takes three primary forms:
Balancing. As contested spheres emerge, Britain has sought to complement rhetoric with mass in supporting the open international order. The UK’s role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) Enhanced Forward Presence, putting boots on the ground in Estonia and Poland, seeks credibly to deter Russia while acting in concert with allies throughout the Baltic region. This behaviour can be expected against explicit threats, such as Russia.
Competing. Though competition does not elicit as direct a response as balancing, military power is utilised to communicate British intentions and allegiances. This is primarily reflected by the UK’s approach to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Occurring outside of NATO’s formal framework, this requires a higher degree of independence in tackling perceived challenges. The Carrier Strike Group 2021 saw considerable British participation in Indo-Pacific deterrence through joint-exercises and freedom of navigation operations.
Cooperating. As a force multiplier, cooperation magnifies the UK’s role in the pursuit of common objectives and is often reserved for British allies and partners whose values and aims largely align. In addition to joint military exercises, this has borne several defence initiatives, typified by AUKUS and the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF). In addition to strategic convergence, economic opportunity through joint development is also created.
Britain’s membership in several institutions has enabled further shaping of multilateral defence objectives. Though primarily in the Euro-Atlantic, Britain has sought institutionalisation of its priorities in the Indo-Pacific. Accordingly:
NATO remains Britain's foremost strategic priority within the Euro-Atlantic, being at the heart of British defence planning. In addition to supplementing the UK’s nuclear deterrent, NATO membership affords the convergence of strategic interest at an institutional level. For the latter, the UK’s long standing assumption of alliance leadership has afforded several opportunities, such as leading NATO’s Rapid Response Force, and the loose precedent that Deputy-SACEUR will usually be a British flag officer. Despite Britain’s prominence in NATO, the alliance rests primarily on the active participation of the United States (US), whose recent political strife has stoked fears among members.
The JEF, was conceived in the 2010 Strategic Defence Review and introduced after the 2014 NATO summit and is a notable example of region-specific cooperation. Led by Britain through Standing Joint Force Headquarters, the JEF directly serves Britain’s near-abroad security interests in the High North and North Atlantic. The JEF has proved successful in effecting institutional change, notably shown by Sweden and Finland’s membership preceding their accession to NATO by almost a decade. JEF’s flexible and scalable multi-domain framework shows potential for replication in other regions.
AUKUS, announced in 2021, reflects Britain’s shifting international interests, whether through enhancing allied deterrence in the Indo-Pacific or the joint-pursuit of advanced technologies. In signalling to allies and adversaries alike, AUKUS emphasises the UK’s long-term interest in Indo-Pacific security. Despite the economic benefits expected to be derived from Pillar II, significant material resources and political capital have been devoted to securing nuclear powered attack submarines. This in turn has resulted in novel opportunities to sustain Britain's regional presence through Submarine Rotational Force West.
Overseas operations represent the application of British military power beyond simply expressing its desire to influence. Since 2022, Britain has acted upon its international commitments to draw upon military power in either a direct or supporting role. This demonstrates the range of outcomes the use military power can achieve:
Operation Poseidon Archer marks the most recent direct deployment of British military power. Amid ongoing attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea by the Houthis, the UK has supported the US through airstrikes and the deployment of surface combatants. In supporting the freedoms of navigation and trade, Britain has engaged in kinetic action to back up rhetoric.
Military assistance to Ukraine has emerged as another means of shaping the international environment, both in influencing the battlefield and through persuading allies to make similar lethal aid donations. Despite pace setting on the donation of battle tanks and cruise missiles, the UK’s ability to influence is not without limits. Extensive donations have raised questions over Britain’s ability to restore diminished stockpiles of a wide range of capabilities.
Overseas basing of British forces supports capabilities across all domains. Britain’s international presence spans the globe, ranging from British Forces South Atlantic Islands on the Falkland Islands to British Forces Brunei. These positions enable both multi-domain power projection and the opportunities to engage with allies and partners far from home. Overseas basing and overflight enhances readiness in responding to humanitarian or political crises and can provide greater logistical support at distance. Greater use of overseas basing also enables a higher tempo of participation in exercises and provides a springboard for regional force projection.
The Global Defence Network is an effective framework which enables the MOD’s interests to be communicated overseas. As the diplomatic side of the ministry’s activity, defence engagement plays a pivotal role in maintaining relations with allies, cultivating new opportunities for international collaboration, and signalling to potential adversaries. Ranging from individual Defence Attachés to dedicated British Defence Staffs, the MOD views these positions as tools integral to supporting British interests abroad.
Recommendations for the Defence Review Team:
With issues in generating manpower and materiel, more resources must be dedicated to the armed forces. Whether competing, cooperating or balancing, the current security situation requires meaningful British participation, often at short notice. Increased spending is at the root of this; ranging from settling Royal Fleet Auxiliary pay disputes to expanding the domestic industrial base, it all feeds into the ability to shape the international order in accordance with British interests.
Continue to invest in the Global Defence Network through formal attaché and Defence Staff postings. This includes the development of further fully-fledged Defence Staffs, especially within allies with whom Britain is engaged with at the minilateral level. As an example of the Defence Staff model paying dividends, the UK Defence Staff in Washington was integral in securing British exemptions from American International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and was arguably only possible due to targeted and bespoke relations.
Expand scope for extra-regional deployments. Despite Britain’s commitment to freedom of navigation, this must be met with commensurate action. In the Indo-Pacific, for example, it has been almost three years since a Royal Navy vessel has transited the Taiwan Strait. A greater presence in the Indo-Pacific ultimately signals commitment as an extra-regional power.
Expand overseas basing to support deployments. Though HMS Tamar and HMS Spey will likely remain in the Indo-Pacific for the foreseeable future, this ought to be supplemented by additional surface vessels. Touted as one of the smallest, yet busiest, Royal Navy logistical hubs the British Defence Singapore Support Unit (BDSSU) would benefit from expansion to serve both the interests of HM Government and encourage participation from allies and partners from outside the region.
Benedict Baxendale-Smith is the Cuthbert Collingwood Associate Fellow in Maritime Strategy at the Council on Geostrategy. He is also a doctoral researcher in the Department of Defence Studies at King’s College London, researching the role of the maritime-air domain in the Indo-Pacific strategies of Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom.
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