How will political change in Europe affect British-EU relations?
The Big Ask | No. 2.2024
While the European Parliamentary elections saw the centre hold, the far right gained ground. The result led Emmanuel Macron, President of France, to call snap legislative elections in France, where the far left and far right surged and the centre weakened. The impact on French and European Union (EU) governance could be considerable.
These results are part of a pattern seen in recent European elections, which have been reshaping the continent's already intricate and unpredictable political scene. This fact will not be lost on the new Labour government as it prepares to ‘reset’ relations with the EU and consolidate Britain’s leading role in European security. So, we asked ten experts in this week’s Big Ask: How will political change in Europe affect British-EU relations?
Lotje Boswinkel
Researcher, Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy, Free University of Brussels
With the second round of French elections taking place on 7th July, Europe concluded three critical elections in barely a month’s time. Early in June, the far right in Germany and France achieved historic results in the European parliamentary elections, after which Macron dissolved his own parliament. In subsequent snap elections, French voters once more surprised many, as this time the left wing grouping Nouveau Front Populaire came out first. In between, British voters put the Labour Party back in power, ending 14 years of Conservative rule.
The concrete effects of these elections on European security remain largely to be seen, especially on the continent. Two key questions include future government effectiveness and policy directions. Paralysis is expected to rise in increasingly fractured national and European parliaments, slowing down decision making in a critical time when Europe faces its worst security environment in decades and uncertainty about the future American commitment. Meanwhile, the jury is out on far right and far left positions on the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Russia or Ukraine – not least because of large differences within these coalitions.
What is clear is that continental voters on the far right and far left share a scepticism towards international cooperation. Yet when Europeans are rebuilding their armed forces, there is a need to work more closely together, not less. Interestingly, the United Kingdom (UK) this time is pulling closer to Europe – and could come to lead in fostering unity and cooperation. In its early day signalling, the new British government is off to a promising start. The next months will tell whether it will be able also to deliver.
Chris Brannigan
Distinguished Fellow, Council on Geostrategy
The recent political changes across Europe, whether in France, Hungary or the Netherlands, have begun to generate diversionary directions on central EU policy which will undoubtedly reverberate into already pressured domestic spending priorities. For the fresh and ambitious UK Labour government, energised to ‘do something’ across each of its departments, the Ministry of Defence faces a conundrum. Labour’s aim to find ways of cooperating across common and uncontentious EU policy areas has been articulated by both David Lammy and John Healey, the new foreign and defence secretaries, respectively. But with unpredictable scenarios unfolding, when and where they should place their involvement carries unknowable risks.
Britain’s unique challenge is trying to place its defence policy piece – which will remain unrecognisable until Labour’s Strategic Defence Review is completed 12 months from now – neatly and effectively within the jigsaw puzzle of EU defence policy cooperation and integration. EU countries whose political form is subject to expansion, contraction and alteration are too unpredictable, despite knowing the complementary nature of each other’s military capabilities, to make long term arrangements at this stage. Healey’s pre-election intent to cooperate more closely with Germany, where Olaf Scholz’s government, already groaning under load bearing responsibilities, has begun to reduce its defence spending commitments by at least 20% is a good example.
It may be that reinforcing existing arrangements with Baltic and Scandinavian defence capabilities is Labour’s best strategic choice to enable closer EU involvement rather than risking a foolhardy foray in investing in partnerships subject to uncertain and shifting scenarios. The Labour government’s choice will reveal whether it is their heads or their hearts that are driving their decisions.
Gary Kent
Columnist, Progressive Britain
The days of ‘splendid isolation’ are long gone as is the mentality behind the possibly apocryphal newspaper headline ‘fog over channel, continent cut off.’ That trade, war on European soil, climate change, pandemics, crime, and much more make us interdependent is a truism.
Stability in Britain could also entice investment which might have gone elsewhere, a potentially big bonus for UK growth prospects and incentivising stability elsewhere. The move to the right in the European elections has not yet and may not feed through to changes in government in France and maybe Germany. It is too early to say. In any case, Brexit has curbed the appetite for other departures. In fact, various polls show large majority support for the EU in its member states and populist parties have been adjusting to this.
Labour has a mandate to reset relations and seek a security pact with the EU as well as strengthening NATO. Deals with neighbours and partners are central to British foreign and security policy and could be tied down ahead of any developments in the EU. However, any potential impact of EU politics may be accompanied by the possible re-election of Donald Trump. Time will tell on that and the course of Russia’s war against Ukraine. No man is an island, not even this island.
Prof. Alexander Lanoszka
Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Waterloo, Canada
Expectations of sweeping political change in Europe this year so far have gone unmet. The far right made gains in the European parliamentary elections held in June, but the political centre still held. At the cost of making France even more difficult to govern, Macron’s gambit for shutting out the Rassemblement National (RN) from governance seems to have worked. For its part, the Labour Party's move to the centre under Keir Starmer’s leadership has paid off, earning it a handsome majority in the recent general election.
With the spectre of Trump becoming US president again in January 2025, Europe on the whole is in a better position than most would have anticipated to handle that potential turbulence. Of course, old disagreements will remain. Starmer will restore some cooperation with the EU but there is little appetite in London for undertaking any major security initiative which would undermine the supremacy of NATO in European security affairs.
Crucially, Starmer can take up the best of the Conservative foreign and defence policy legacy by revitalising British leadership in providing material support for Ukraine. Although the battlefield situation is looking better for Ukraine these days, the winter ahead will be a challenge amid well founded fears of persistent energy shortfalls created by Russia's relentless bombardments. New announcements from London about military drone investments and fewer restrictions on the Ukrainian use of Storm Shadow missiles are steps in the right direction. Starmer would do well to take the lead in Europe and to push like-minded allies and partners in Europe to ensure that Ukraine is in the best possible position for achieving strategic victory against Russia.
Marie Le Conte
Freelance Journalist
For years, French political observers would look at the other side of the Channel and wonder what had happened to their British cousins. There was a coalition and a referendum on Scottish independence and on Brexit and an election and then another one, and another one. For a while there was Boris Johnson and that really confused the French, who saw him as nothing more than a buffoon; an unpleasant caricature of the English.
Britain finally decided to calm down earlier this month and, in that same week, France gladly pickled up the mantle, and decided to make itself ungovernable. There are now three blocs in the National Assembly – a united left ‘popular front’, Macron’s centre and the far right – and none of them has a majority, and none of them is currently open to a coalition.
What will France’s government look like over the next few months and years? Answers on a postcard. Though Starmer had what looked like a pleasant meeting with Macron in Washington on Wednesday, he cannot count on the president to be an ever-present ally. There are too many things happening on the home front for him to focus on anything else, at least for now.
On the bright side, it is unlikely that he will have to deal with Marine Le Pen’s RN party, which will come as a relief. Well, a temporary one at least – the next presidential elections will take place in three years, and it doesn’t look like the French far right is going anywhere. Would it be too much to ask for both countries to have stable governments at the same time? Apparently so.
Dr Timothy Less
Convenor, Geopolitical Risk Study Group, Centre for Geopolitics, University of Cambridge
Relations between the UK and the EU will become more complicated. The election results highlight the breakdown in the consensus that used to prevail in the EU, amidst a struggle for power at both the national and European level between the liberal establishment and its national conservative and socialist challengers. If the UK is to advance its various interests in the EU, it will have to win over representatives from all these three camps, wherever they are found in this more complex political environment.
The new government in London will also become less enthusiastic about closer integration. It is one thing to want to delegate powers to an EU which, as British Europhiles like to think, represents a bastion of enlightened liberal values in the face of an ugly populist challenge. It is another thing altogether to hand power to the EU if that gives control over aspects of British life to the representatives of these populist movements. The once popular idea among Labour members of rejoining the EU will not survive events.
However, the shifting politics in Europe will not prevent the UK from pursuing its core objective of securing Eastern Europe. While the elections may have given rise to anti-war parties of the left and right in Western Europe, liberals, socialists and conservatives in frontline states such as Poland, the Baltic states and Romania are united in their fear of Russia, and will continue to welcome the influence of the UK – even more so if the US under Trump starts to disengage from Europe.
Catarina M. Liberato
Researcher, University of Kent
Current political changes within the European landscape – including institutional and governmental shifts, the geopolitical context in Ukraine, the EU’s strategic positioning, commitments on climate and resilience, and populism – will complicate Britain’s relationship with the EU.
Resetting the UK-EU relationship could be more challenging for the Labour government due to the European Parliament's shift away from green and pro-EU parties. Despite internal calls from within the EU for deepened political integration, increased strategic autonomy, and reduced willingness to rely on external powers, there is potential for a new security pact. This pact – possibly with the UK leading a third-party country alliance – could pave the way for enhanced engagement and a more promising future for UK-EU relations.
Secondly, the European standards on climate and environment urge the UK to align its trade and environmental policies. Labour might not be willing to do so and may face public contestation. Still, this alignment is crucial for maintaining smooth economic relations, renegotiating access to the EU market, and stabilising the economy by overcoming the still present post-Brexit effects.
Thirdly, the rise of populism – characterised by anti-EU sentiments and nationalist agendas – will potentiate a fragmented EU, divided on the renewal of the UK-EU relationship.
The UK remains a significant European power, and its unique position presents an opportunity for cooperation in addressing European challenges. The EU should collaborate with the UK to tackle these issues, recognising Britain’s potential to contribute substantially. The urgency of this collaboration must be addressed in the current political climate, and the UK’s role in this cannot be understated.
Julien Lalanne de Saint-Quentin
Associate Fellow, Council on Geostrategy
The second round of the French parliamentary elections ended in a hung parliament, with the National Assembly divided into three ideologically disparate blocs. This unprecedented configuration under the Fifth Republic is neither in keeping with modern French political culture nor with its Constitution – which does not even acknowledge the principle of relative majority, and gives the President of the Republic the latitude to appoint whomever he or she wishes as Prime Minister.
This institutional framework is unique in Europe and it is understandable why countries accustomed to proportional representation and coalitions are unable to grasp how exceptional the situation really is. The formation of a new government is a headache: no bloc has a majority which would allow for a motion of confidence, or pass a budget in September.
One of the lessons to be learnt from the election is the extent to which the voting system is a major determinant of the form of government. With the same votes in the first round, with a ‘first past the post’ system as in the UK, the RN alone would have won 297 seats, i.e., an outright absolute majority. In a proportional system, with a 36% vote share, it would have come first, and would also have been entrusted with the task of forming a government. So, without prejudging the political choices which could influence future relations between France and the EU, it is already clear, by looking at the Gallagher Index, that the electoral system is, notwithstanding the nuclear deterrent and United Nations Security Council veto-power membership, the ‘elephant in the room’ of permanent misunderstanding with other EU nations.
Paul Mason
Associate Fellow, Council on Geostrategy
The Starmer government has pledged to lead its re-engagement with Europe through a security pact, and with new, bilateral treaties such as the one being mooted with Germany. On top of this, it is pretty clear it would like to renegotiate a trade treaty, and pursue voluntary alignment with aspects of the EU regime, without entering into a formal customs union.
The recent advance of the populist right, in the European Parliament elections should not, of itself, cause worry. Even the advance of Le Pen’s RN seems to have been stymied by a centre left bloc, leaving Macron considerable freedom in international relations.
The challenge for the UK, however, is to hold together an increasingly complex and interconnected system of bilateral and minilateral initiatives, without appearing to play the old game of ‘Perfidious Albion’. One of the unfortunate by-products of ‘global Britain’ and the Indo-Pacific ‘tilt’ was that it signalled both to Britain’s European allies, and the diplomatic apparatus, that British priorities lay elsewhere.
If the UK wants to deliver on the promise of being the leading voice in European security, then it must acknowledge the EU’s foreign and security competencies, and work long term to build a European pillar of NATO with strategic capabilities, which operates in synergy with the EU’s security structures.
Just as the new leadership at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office is signalling adaptation to the possibility of a Trump presidency, it may also have to adapt to – and at the very least learn to talk to – European political actors outside the mainstream.
Prof. Richard Whitman
Professor of International Relations, University of Kent
The UK’s General Election result has produced the prospect for an extended period of political stability for Britain and contrasts with Europe’s other two large states. France and Germany look set to be an ongoing cause for concern for the UK government as their domestic political challenges will likely make them less predictable partners in building security in Europe. Accompanied by the real possibility of a second Trump administration in the US, which changes the US approach to Russia’s war on Ukraine, this creates a context in which uncertain transatlantic leadership coincides with the prospect of an under-powered capacity for collective leadership by the ‘Big Three’ in Europe.
Consequently, if the UK government embarks on negotiations for its proposed ‘security pact’ with the EU, it would be changing the tone and tenor of the collective relationship with 27 EU states but not altering the fundamental challenge presented by the domestic preoccupations of Berlin and Paris.
With the Labour government reaffirming support for Ukraine and providing a further package of military equipment for Kyiv, Britain has demonstrated that there is a steadfast cross-party consensus for actively confronting Russia’s actions to create a European security disorder. The test for any enhanced foreign and security cooperation relationship between London and Brussels needs to be whether it will deliver more security for Ukraine. If a new UK-EU agreement furthers that objective, without being hostage to the vicissitudes of the politics of European capitals, it will be a positive development.
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