This is the final in a series of Open Briefings to the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) from the Council on Geostrategy. Our aim is to analyse ten key questions facing the Defence Review Team, from the vantage point of how the United Kingdom’s (UK) adversaries and strategic competitors see us (an approach known as Opposing Forces, or ‘OPFOR’). We will avoid euphemisms and address the challenges head-on. After holding an expert seminar, we will formally submit the briefings at the end of September. Our contributions are deliberately candid – and we invite comment and challenge from all quarters. This final Open Briefing looks at how Britain can boost investment in defence:

1. Britain’s unwillingness to invest in defence since the early 2010s has undermined its security and prosperity. Low defence investment makes generating additional ‘strategic advantage’ impossible, undermines the deterrent effect of the British Armed Forces, and harms the country’s long-term interests. Leaning further into alliances and partnerships to make up for capability shortfalls will reduce the country’s strategic autonomy and render it increasingly dependent on its allies and partners’ goodwill. And efforts to extract greater efficiency from military units – especially warships and auxiliary vessels – have already undermined morale and stressed well-worked equipment, often to breaking point.

2. If the UK is to remain a major military power as the international order comes under strain from large and determined authoritarian powers, it will need to invest a greater proportion of its national resources – Gross Domestic Product (GDP) – into defence. The proportion of GDP His Majesty’s (HM) Government allocates to defence reached a nadir in 2018 (at 1.9% of GDP) and it has not increased substantially since. In 2023, British defence spending stood at £60.4 billion – equivalent to 2.3% of GDP, or 5.2% of total government spending. To put this into perspective, British investment into defence as a percentage of GDP averaged at 2.5% for 2000s, 3.1% for the 1990s, and in excess of 6% of GDP for the duration of the Cold War (i.e., 1949-1989). 

3. Even if increased to 2.5% of GDP, as pledged by the prime minister, defence spending would still be close to its post-Cold War lows – a status entirely at odds with HM Government’s appraisal of the scale of the threat. According to Lord Robertson, the Lead for the Strategic Defence Review (SDR), the UK is now ‘confronted by a “deadly quartet” of nations increasingly working together.’ These countries – including the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Russia, Iran and North Korea – intend to revise the prevailing international order, and degrade the power and authority of democratic nations, of which Britain is a leader. Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine and the PRC’s naval build-up in the South China Sea demonstrates their determination to achieve their goals and highlights the interconnectedness of Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions.

4. The UK will face demotion to a second-tier regional military power within the next decade if it does not increase defence spending. This will have severe consequences for the nation’s ability to defend itself and protect its allies and partners. The change in Britain’s status will become qualitative, rather than quantitative. The UK will be less able to convene and align allies and partners – with knock-on effects for British influence – if it lacks the wherewithal to deter threats to their interests or shape the international order. It will also undermine Britain’s capacity for defence engagement, as well as degrade the country’s ability to project military power to all major geostrategic theatres. And it will degrade the British defence industrial and technological base, which remains cutting-edge, despite being starved of resources for over 15 years.

5. Though the SDR’s remit is to match military capabilities to geopolitical threats, Britain cannot do this in a fiscal vacuum. If HM Government’s target of spending 2.5% of GDP on defence were regarded as a hard limit by the SDR, there would be no prospect of matching capabilities to threats, achieving a rational integrated force design or of stabilising the Ministry of Defence’s budget.

6. However, set at a higher and more realistic level, a hard limit – of, for example, investing 3%, 4% or even 5% of GDP in defence – would allow British policymakers to manage the macro-economic impact of rearmament rationally and situate it within HM Government’s economy-wide growth strategy.

7. The Labour government’s mission-led growth strategy is premised on the argument that, by creating long-term regulatory certainty, the state can stimulate private investment alongside public, triggering increased growth and productivity and – ultimately – reduce the ratio of debt to GDP.

8. That rationale is given added credibility by two recent papers from the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR):

   1. In ‘Public Investment and Potential Output’, the authors suggest that if public investment were to be increased permanently by 1% of GDP, then in addition to its short-term impact on demand, it should permanently raise the output potential of the economy by 0.5% within five years, and 2.5% in 50 years. Though such percentages sound small, their impact on fiscal sustainability would be large.

   2. In ‘Fiscal Risks and Sustainability’ the authors predict that, despite the negative long-term impacts on the public finances arising from ill health, ageing and climate change, these could be entirely offset if the post-2008 decline in productivity were to be reversed. If the UK’s output potential were to rise by one percentage point of GDP, debt would remain below 100% of GDP beyond the mid-century.

Recommendations for the Defence Review Team:

1. The implications for the SDR are clear: a substantial increase in defence investment would both enhance Britain’s national security and its long-term growth potential, by:

   1. Expanding its gross fixed capital formation, through the domestic production of weapons, machines, intellectual property, accommodation, energy and base infrastructure; and 

   2. Boosting productivity through more effective research and development, streamlined defence production, and higher skills.

2. The question remains: how would Britain finance rearmament? Using International Monetary Fund figures, raising defence spending to 2.5% of GDP by 2029 would cost £6.6 billion more per year at current prices, while 3% costs £23.1 billion more a year, 4% costs £56.1 billion more a year, and a notional 5% would see the defence budget rise by £89.1 billion per year, dwarfing current expenditure.

3. The UK’s history suggests that borrowing is the only rational and morally acceptable means of financing rearmament:

   1. Between 1933 and 1938, the UK’s defence budget grew from 2.2% to 6.9% of GDP. The aim was to boost the capabilities of the armed forces – primarily the Royal Air Force – to a level where they could deter an attack by Nazi Germany;

   2. During the Second World War defence spending then climbed above 50% of GDP;

   3. During the Cold War (1949-1989), defence spending averaged out at above 6%; it was only reduced below 4% after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

4. As the Nazi German threat grew, HM Government scheduled a £400 million National Defence Loan in 1935 once the primary surplus was run down during the first two years of rearmament. Though it later attempted to impose a windfall tax on the profits of defence firms, this was never designed to raise more than 10% of the money needed, and was withdrawn. Increased taxation was never seriously considered an appropriate source for most funds needed to rearm.

5. High borrowing costs and illiquid markets posed challenges in raising debt, leading to ‘rationing’ defence spending. However, HM Government never considered not rearming due to fiscal constraints. Indeed, as Sir Anthony Duff Cooper, First Lord of the Admiralty, insisted after the Anschluss: fiscal penury might be ‘severe embarrassment’; defeat by Nazi Germany would mean ‘complete destruction.’

6. Today, with borrowing costs high, debt standing at 100% of GDP and HM Treasury pointing to a £22 billion in-year spending gap, any proposal to fund rearmament through borrowing would need to be structured to produce maximum economic benefits, in terms of growth, productivity and the creation of higher fixed capital.

7. Numerous principles outlined in the Ministry of Defence’s forthcoming ‘Defence Industrial Strategy’ would promote the long-term growth impact of rearmament, namely: ‘Build in Britain’, spreading defence investment to every region, creating certainty and stability for suppliers and their investors. In addition, the SDR should recommend:

   1. For non-combat related investment, pursue wherever appropriate public-private partnerships;

   2. Structure the rearmament programme to promote investment spending over current spending;

   3. Structure the timing of investments to achieve their long-term growth effects as early as possible.

8. In sum, on the basis of new OBR calculations modelling the impact of public investment on future GDP, the Defence Review Team could confidently make the case that an investment-led rearmament programme is fiscally sustainable.

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James Rogers is the Co-founder and Director of Research at the Council on Geostrategy.

Paul Mason is the Aneurin Bevan Associate Fellow in Defence and Resilience at the Council on Geostrategy and a journalist, author and political researcher.

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This is the ninth in a series of Open Briefings to the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) from the Council on Geostrategy. Our aim is to analyse ten key questions facing the Defence Review Team, from the vantage point of how the United Kingdom’s (UK) adversaries and strategic competitors see us (an approach known as Opposing Forces, or ‘OPFOR’). We will avoid euphemisms and address the challenges head-on. After holding an expert seminar, we will formally submit the briefings at the end of September. Our contributions are deliberately candid – and we invite comment and challenge from all quarters. This ninth Open Briefing dwells on Britain’s ability to work with allies to multiply its defence interests:

1. Alliances and strategic arrangements have been a core element of British foreign and defence policy since the early 20th century. When the UK has used alliances and partnerships well, they have catalysed British power in support of the national interest. But alliances and strategic partnerships have the potential to divert Britain from the pursuit of its national interests, particularly when British policymakers have seen them with undue sentimentality and idealism. 

2. Since the instrumental role of Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary, in establishing the alliance in the late 1940s, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has been the bedrock of the UK’s security. While the alliance has faced many challenges in recent years, this is unlikely to change in the near future:

   1. The new Labour government is deeply Atlanticist and has reprioritised the alliance in British defence policy;

   2. The collective strength of NATO’s conventional forces and the arsenals of its nuclear custodians – of which the UK is one – remain a powerful deterrent;

   3. In part due to British and American pressure, NATO members, especially on the eastern and northern flanks of the alliance, are rebuilding their defence forces.

3. The UK has strongly entrenched assumptions regarding alliances which have underpinned British defence thinking since the 1960s. These assumptions contribute towards a level of strategic paralysis:

   1. Since deciding to relinquish a sovereign capability to fight peer conflicts, the UK has – save for some limited exceptions (such as the Falklands War) – become increasingly dependent on allies and partners for military support. This has gone so far that the Royal Navy, Royal Air Force, and the British Army may be unable to deploy (and sustain) meaningful fighting formations against a significant adversary, especially if Britain seeks to uphold existing commitments simultaneously.

   2. The UK also sees unity within NATO as paramount, sometimes to the extent that the alliance becomes an end rather than a means to an end. This has held Britain back from pursuing its national interest more effectively. In reality, the credibility of Article 5 is paramount in the minds of adversaries rather than broader political unity – in the 1960s political disagreements led France to withdraw from NATO’s command structures, but this had little strategic impact on the alliance.

4. Relying excessively on allies and partners and concentrating overly on NATO unity presents an opportunity to adversaries. This problem has become apparent in relation to Ukraine. When Britain feels that it can only support Ukraine at the pace of the slowest movers in the alliance, it becomes simpler for adversaries to hinder British interests. They only have to target the ‘weakest links’ in the alliance with economic and/or diplomatic pressure to place serious brakes on any efforts they are unhappy with. A Ukrainian defeat would be more problematic for British security than a less united NATO.

5. Accordingly, Britain has employed minilateralism to strategic effect in recent years to bolster its interests both within and beyond NATO. Minilateralism brings together smaller groups of like minded nations which collaborate to pursue specific goals or tackle particular issues. For the UK, recent examples include AUKUS, the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), as well as older frameworks such as the Five Eyes and Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA). Minilaterals present several challenges to adversaries and possess inherent or complementary strengths when compared to larger multilateral frameworks:

   1. They are more focused: Minilaterals tend to have a much more focused remit than larger arrangements. Large alliances or strategic arrangements are more prone to losing focus or expanding their remit to the point where the original focus is lost, whereas minilaterals tend to come together with a very specific objective in mind. For example, AUKUS aims to assist Australia in acquiring nuclear-powered attack submarines to enhance deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, the FPDA protects the independence of Malaysia and Singapore to strengthen stability in Southeast Asia, GCAP develops a sixth generation combat aircraft, the Five Eyes share intelligence, and the JEF supports a multinational rapid reaction force.

   2. They are more flexible: With fewer members, minilaterals tend to find it easier to respond to shifts in geopolitics, or embrace new objectives or members. The JEF, for example, was able to expand to include Sweden and Finland – then not in NATO – to help bolster Nordic security and facilitate better cooperation between NATO members and Stockholm/Helsinki. AUKUS members are also exploring options for ad-hoc cooperation with non-members within Pillar II (technology sharing/collaboration). However, it only takes one ‘bad apple’ in a group to create problems, as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has seen with Cambodia acting at the behest of the PRC within the minilateral: when minilaterals do not exercise sufficient caution in their membership, opportunities for sowing division can be reopened.

   3. They are harder to ‘divide and conquer’: Because minilaterals are formed by small groups to deal with specific issues or goals, their participants are often closely aligned over key issues. This makes it harder for an adversary to coerce a ‘weakest link’ into slowing down or halting the actions of the larger group.

6. Although NATO will continue to be the bedrock of Britain’s alliance portfolio, the UK’s strategic focus has started to shift:

   1. Within NATO, Britain has built deeper ties in Eastern and Northern Europe. Relations with Western European allies remain strong and are a fundamental part of UK strategic thinking, but its interests are now more closely aligned with those along NATO’s eastern and northern flanks which take the threat of Russian aggression far more seriously than Western Europe.

   2. Beyond NATO, Britain has built new or refreshed ties in the Indo-Pacific. Japan and Australia are now two of Britain’s closest partners and the UK is further enmeshing itself within the patchwork of regional minilaterals to bolster the free and open order in the Indo-Pacific. Indeed, His Majesty’s (HM) Government has been at the forefront of efforts to draw together the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific into a single, integrated geostrategic space, where free and open countries work together to reinforce an international order which supports their interests.

7. The UK sits at the heart of a web of interweaving multilateral, minilateral, and bilateral alliances and partnerships. Since the late 1940s, it has oscillated between periods of dynamism where new alliances and partnerships have been established or refreshed, and periods of paralysis where alliances have been seen as little more than an end in themselves. It remains unclear whether the UK will employ a more dynamic approach in the years ahead, or whether it will sink into a more passive posture where alliances are seen as an objective rather than an instrument.

Recommendations for the Defence Review Team:

1. Appraise Britain’s alliances and strategic relationships. As the world becomes more volatile, the UK’s ability to leverage the most strategic advantage from its allies and partners will be crucial. Given the worsening geopolitical picture, this appraisal should be informed by the national interest instead of sentimentality. Which allies and partners are closest to the UK’s positions? Who offers the most support? Who will be the strongest and most determined over the next 20 years? Where can Britain not risk over dependence on allies and partners? The answers to such questions may require a different set of allies and partners than in the past.

2. Consider deepening bilateral relations and forming new minilaterals to further the national interest. AUKUS and GCAP are two examples of recent minilaterals which will help boost, simultaneously, Britain’s economic prospects and its military capabilities. HM Government should explore where minilaterals can serve or reinforce additional British geoeconomic and/or geopolitical interests. Britain has a broad range of global interests and faces limits on its power (as all countries do). For example, in the Arctic, Middle East, Africa, the Mediterranean and, the Caribbean, and across the Indo-Pacific, the UK has interests which could potentially be better served by economic, military, or diplomatic minilaterals.

3. Establish a more unified government approach to alliance management and alliance oversight to help exploit Britain’s growing network of alliances and strategic relationships: Often these relations cut across domains which are the remit of different parts of HM Government such as the Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office (FCDO), the Ministry of Defence, the Security Service and the Secret Intelligence Service, and others. One body with central oversight and evaluation of the UK’s existing network of allies and partners, with a secondary role of considering new ones, could provide real value.

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William Freer is a Research Fellow in National Security at the Council on Geostrategy, where he works on strategic advantage and maritime affairs.

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This is the eighth in a series of Open Briefings to the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) from the Council on Geostrategy. Our aim is to analyse ten key questions facing the Defence Review Team, from the vantage point of how the United Kingdom’s (UK) adversaries and strategic competitors see us (an approach known as Opposing Forces, or ‘OPFOR’). We will avoid euphemisms and address the challenges head-on. After holding an expert seminar, we will formally submit the briefings at the end of September. Our contributions are deliberately candid – and we invite comment and challenge from all quarters. This eighth Open Briefing looks at Britain’s military enabling capabilities:

1. Enablers are a crucial aspect of military power. These include reconnaissance capabilities, space-enabled navigation, heavy lift transport aircraft, air-to-air refuelling, sealift, and command, control, and communications systems. The UK and other advanced armed forces rely on enablers to offset limited mass. Since the 1980s, a wealth of enablers has been a key strength in every conflict the British Armed Forces have fought or planned to fight. The compounding effect of multiple enablers generates strategic advantage while affording the UK, United States (US), and others significantly greater military options in crises across Eurasia. Enablers are also crucial to British and allied support for Ukraine – the UK in particular has leveraged its intelligence and communications expertise to assist Ukrainian operations, allowing the Ukrainian military to fight smarter against a much larger adversary. 

2. Enablers are a key British military strength against a broader hollow force. Since the Cold War’s conclusion, the British military has traded capacity – the raw amount of combat power it can deliver – for advanced capability and reach, affording it remarkable interoperability with US forces: 

   1. The UK fields 30 medium and heavy-lift transports and another nine tankers, for a fleet only slightly smaller than France’s older sustainment force;

   2. It is a core contributor to the combined UK-US RC-135W Rivet Joint reconnaissance fleet and operates the American-designed P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft;

   3. British intelligence support for Ukraine has been essential since 2022, while British experience in communications technology is an invaluable training tool for the UK’s partners.

3. The British Army is increasingly hollow, and the Royal Navy struggles to sustain its operational tempo. But the British Armed Forces still understand these technically complex, operationally essential, enabling capabilities. Without this experience, UK participation in multilateral initiatives such as AUKUS would be far more difficult.

4. When considered against British military requirements, however, the UK’s enablers are insufficient for strategic demands. If considered in isolation, certain British enablers would be sufficient to sustain combat operations, although the scale at which these operations could be conducted is unclear given the broader force hollowness. But the UK military is not designed to deploy independently for good reason. British strategy centres upon alliances, whether the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Special Relationship, or now AUKUS. Allied security is inseparable from British security. Hence, when evaluated against broader alliance needs, and the UK’s position in its alliances, British enablers are increasingly insufficient to the task.

5. The risk of American retrenchment increases the need for independent European enablers, placing greater responsibility on the UK. Regardless of the result in the US presidential elections in November, Washington, DC will de-prioritise Europe throughout this decade. Over the coming years, there is a growing risk that the US redeploys many of its airborne and naval enablers to the Indo-Pacific, which will place significant stress on European deterrence. European security will retain obvious relevance to the UK given geographic reality. Ensuring the gap can be filled by European members of NATO, of which the UK is well placed with its extensive military experience, will be crucial. Moreover, if the European powers can fulfil their enabling functions without collaboration with the UK, London risks being isolated from maturing European defence structures.

6. British adversaries understand the centrality of enablers to the UK and allied combat model, and will target them in a future war. Russia has targeted enablers in Ukraine, jamming satellite guidance, disrupting Ukrainian command-and-control, and demonstrating a growing ability to strike high-value targets in rear areas. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has developed anti-satellite capabilities which can hit British or allied space assets. Both the PRC and Russia may be developing full-blown offensive space- based capabilities, while cyberspace operations are clear tools that can disrupt allied capacity.

7. British aerial enablers look good on paper, but have serious operational issues. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) allowed a two-year airlift gap with the early retirement of its 15 C-130J Super Hercules transport aircraft. Procuring additional A400M transport aircraft is essential to close this gap unless the UK is to lose the leverage the Royal Air Force (RAF) airlift capacity provides it in Europe. Britain’s early warning gap is more critical – the RAF still awaits its E-7 Wedgetails early warning and control aircraft, and has already cut its purchase from five to three aircraft. These moves come just as NATO’s European pillar will need such capabilities to back-fill for American assets.

8. British air-to-air refuelling is better than most allied counterparts, but remains limited in capacity. The RAFs A330 refuelling aircraft are capable, but the UK’s P-8 Poseidon patrol fleet struggles to operate with them given technical differences. Moreover, a baseline fleet of nine aircraft, with five more in reserve, is a fraction of total continental European capacity. British tactical air forces are likely to be surged forward in a crisis, but limited air-to-air refuelling hampers the UK’s leverage over a more robust European conventional defence.

9. The UK’s naval sustainment system is showing signs of exhaustion owing to years of underinvestment. The Royal Navy’s deployment struggles are well known, from an insufficient number of conventional and nuclear-armed submarines given operational requirements, to the British Carrier Strike Group’s struggle to deploy with a sovereign air wing and escorts. Even more worrying is the state of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA), the crucial sustainment force for the Royal Navy, and for British and allied expeditionary operations:

   1. The UK is proceeding with a contract for three Fleet Solid Support Ships (FSS), but the yard tasked with the contract has gone into administration, with no sign of fiscal support from Westminster;

   2. RFA personnel numbers are also shrinking. RFA Mariners have had a real-terms 30% pay cut since 2010, and are going on strike. RFA Cardigan Bay, previously forward-deployed to Bahrain as a crucial sustainment ship and test bed for advanced unmanned systems, has returned to the UK. But it cannot be moved from Portsmouth to Falmouth for refit, since the RFA lacks the mariners to put together even a skeleton crew. 

   As British naval sustainment atrophies, it will rely even more on allied goodwill and availability of the relevant allied assets, a dubious proposition as the US shifts its focus to Asia.

10. British reconnaissance capabilities work well in a US-enabled system, but poorly without American assistance. The UK does field Rivet Joint aircraft, highly sophisticated signals intelligence platforms which have proved their value in supporting Ukraine. Its nine P-8 Poseidon aircraft have also proven critical for anti-submarine operations against Russia. But both fleets require extensive US sustainment, and the Rivet Joint fleet is part of a pooled capability, not a sovereign asset. Moreover, while high-endurance unmanned systems are central to modern reconnaissance, the UK’s fleet is concentrated on more vulnerable, lower-endurance drone aircraft, such as the MQ-9A Reaper and the upgraded Protector.

Recommendations for the Defence Review Team:

1. Enablers should be the UK’s central contribution to NATO in Europe. The UK provides a wealth of high-technology expertise and extensive experience in joint and combined operations, along with a direct line into sensitive intelligence-sharing relationships with the US and other Five Eyes partners. The UK also has established a robust partnership with both Ukraine and other Eastern flank states which centres upon its enablers, particularly intelligence and reconnaissance. British defence should prioritise expanding enablers over and behind front-line combat elements in the next six years, particularly given the scale of UK force hollowness.

2. The UK should expand its Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEWC), Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), airlift and refuelling capacity well beyond current plans. The Wedgetail aircraft buy should be returned to five aircraft and ideally expanded after that. Similarly, sovereign airlift, refuelling, and ISR capacities should be increased by a quarter to a third, in a broader shift towards enablers in the RAF. The Rivet Joint fleet could also be increased depending on procurement timelines,production capacity and budgetary considerations. The UK should also invest in a larger fleet of high-altitude long-endurance ISR platforms, comparable to the RQ-4 Global Hawk or MQ-4 Triton drones – at minimum, this will significantly bolster British ISR capacity.

3. British sovereign sealift requires a comprehensive reboot, beginning with personnel. RFA pay should be increased rapidly to attract new personnel and retain talent. Procuring the FSS and Multi-Role Ocean Surveillance Ship (MROS) is a good first step, but the UK should expand its numbers of the latter to at least three, given clear gaps in British and allied force structure.

4. The UK should emphasise sovereign enablers where possible, rather than relying too heavily on pooled capabilities with the US and NATO. Sovereign enablers will provide the UK with significantly greater leverage over shifting European defence structures, particularly in ISR contexts, even if they are operated under NATO command structures. The platforms themselves need to be British-owned, allowing the UK to contribute to European defence in a much more comprehensive way than simply providing combat power. 

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Harry Halem is an Associate Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

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This is the seventh in a series of Open Briefings to the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) from the Council on Geostrategy. Our aim is to analyse ten key questions facing the Defence Review Team, from the vantage point of how the United Kingdom’s (UK) adversaries and strategic competitors see us (an approach known as Opposing Forces, or ‘OPFOR’). We will avoid euphemisms and address the challenges head-on. After holding an expert seminar, we will formally submit the briefings at the end of September. Our contributions are deliberately candid – and we invite comment and challenge from all quarters. This seventh Open Briefing evaluates Britain’s military capacity to shape the international order:

1. Promoting British national interests globally is one of the Ministry of Defence’s (MOD) core objectives. Alongside ensuring prosperity, homeland protection and overseas campaigning, the Defence Command Paper 2023 identifies shaping, or influencing, the actions of allies and adversaries as congruent to His Majesty’s (HM) Government’s wider aims. The UK is one of the foremost proponents of the open international order, characterised by the rule of law, freedom, and marketised trade and will seek to deploy military power in support wherever appropriate. 

2. In supplementing traditional diplomacy, military power can be used to advance national interests in addition to common international objectives. As one of the four pillars of the British Government’s Integrated Review Refresh, published in 2023, shaping seeks to elucidate the UK’s navigation of an evolving threat perception, in which balancing, competing and cooperating behaviours are expressed. This framework can be viewed as reactive to emerging threats, in which an increasingly bold state or non-state actor warrants greater British involvement. Military power is therefore an inherent feature of the UK’s international engagement. This takes three primary forms:

   1. Balancing. As contested spheres emerge, Britain has sought to complement rhetoric with mass in supporting the open international order. The UK’s role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) Enhanced Forward Presence, putting boots on the ground in Estonia and Poland, seeks credibly to deter Russia while acting in concert with allies throughout the Baltic region. This behaviour can be expected against explicit threats, such as Russia.

   2. Competing. Though competition does not elicit as direct a response as balancing, military power is utilised to communicate British intentions and allegiances. This is primarily reflected by the UK’s approach to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Occurring outside of NATO’s formal framework, this requires a higher degree of independence in tackling perceived challenges. The Carrier Strike Group 2021 saw considerable British participation in Indo-Pacific deterrence through joint-exercises and freedom of navigation operations.

   3. Cooperating. As a force multiplier, cooperation magnifies the UK’s role in the pursuit of common objectives and is often reserved for British allies and partners whose values and aims largely align. In addition to joint military exercises, this has borne several defence initiatives, typified by AUKUS and the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF). In addition to strategic convergence, economic opportunity through joint development is also created.

3. Britain’s membership in several institutions has enabled further shaping of multilateral defence objectives. Though primarily in the Euro-Atlantic, Britain has sought institutionalisation of its priorities in the Indo-Pacific. Accordingly:

   1. NATO remains Britain's foremost strategic priority within the Euro-Atlantic, being at the heart of British defence planning. In addition to supplementing the UK’s nuclear deterrent, NATO membership affords the convergence of strategic interest at an institutional level. For the latter, the UK’s long standing assumption of alliance leadership has afforded several opportunities, such as leading NATO’s Rapid Response Force, and the loose precedent that Deputy-SACEUR will usually be a British flag officer. Despite Britain’s prominence in NATO, the alliance rests primarily on the active participation of the United States (US), whose recent political strife has stoked fears among members.

   2. The JEF, was conceived in the 2010 Strategic Defence Review and introduced after the 2014 NATO summit and is a notable example of region-specific cooperation. Led by Britain through Standing Joint Force Headquarters, the JEF directly serves Britain’s near-abroad security interests in the High North and North Atlantic. The JEF has proved successful in effecting institutional change, notably shown by Sweden and Finland’s membership preceding their accession to NATO by almost a decade. JEF’s flexible and scalable multi-domain framework shows potential for replication in other regions.

   3. AUKUS, announced in 2021, reflects Britain’s shifting international interests, whether through enhancing allied deterrence in the Indo-Pacific or the joint-pursuit of advanced technologies. In signalling to allies and adversaries alike, AUKUS emphasises the UK’s long-term interest in Indo-Pacific security. Despite the economic benefits expected to be derived from Pillar II, significant material resources and political capital have been devoted to securing nuclear powered attack submarines. This in turn has resulted in novel opportunities to sustain Britain's regional presence through Submarine Rotational Force West.

4. Overseas operations represent the application of British military power beyond simply expressing its desire to influence. Since 2022, Britain has acted upon its international commitments to draw upon military power in either a direct or supporting role. This demonstrates the range of outcomes the use military power can achieve:

   1. Operation Poseidon Archer marks the most recent direct deployment of British military power. Amid ongoing attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea by the Houthis, the UK has supported the US through airstrikes and the deployment of surface combatants. In supporting the freedoms of navigation and trade, Britain has engaged in kinetic action to back up rhetoric.

   2. Military assistance to Ukraine has emerged as another means of shaping the international environment, both in influencing the battlefield and through persuading allies to make similar lethal aid donations. Despite pace setting on the donation of battle tanks and cruise missiles, the UK’s ability to influence is not without limits. Extensive donations have raised questions over Britain’s ability to restore diminished stockpiles of a wide range of capabilities.

5. Overseas basing of British forces supports capabilities across all domains. Britain’s international presence spans the globe, ranging from British Forces South Atlantic Islands on the Falkland Islands to British Forces Brunei. These positions enable both multi-domain power projection and the opportunities to engage with allies and partners far from home. Overseas basing and overflight enhances readiness in responding to humanitarian or political crises and can provide greater logistical support at distance. Greater use of overseas basing also enables a higher tempo of participation in exercises and provides a springboard for regional force projection.

6. The Global Defence Network is an effective framework which enables the MOD’s interests to be communicated overseas. As the diplomatic side of the ministry’s activity, defence engagement plays a pivotal role in maintaining relations with allies, cultivating new opportunities for international collaboration, and signalling to potential adversaries. Ranging from individual Defence Attachés to dedicated British Defence Staffs, the MOD views these positions as tools integral to supporting British interests abroad.

Recommendations for the Defence Review Team:

1. With issues in generating manpower and materiel, more resources must be dedicated to the armed forces. Whether competing, cooperating or balancing, the current security situation requires meaningful British participation, often at short notice. Increased spending is at the root of this; ranging from settling Royal Fleet Auxiliary pay disputes to expanding the domestic industrial base, it all feeds into the ability to shape the international order in accordance with British interests.

2. Continue to invest in the Global Defence Network through formal attaché and Defence Staff postings. This includes the development of further fully-fledged Defence Staffs, especially within allies with whom Britain is engaged with at the minilateral level. As an example of the Defence Staff model paying dividends, the UK Defence Staff in Washington was integral in securing British exemptions from American International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and was arguably only possible due to targeted and bespoke relations.

3. Expand scope for extra-regional deployments. Despite Britain’s commitment to freedom of navigation, this must be met with commensurate action. In the Indo-Pacific, for example, it has been almost three years since a Royal Navy vessel has transited the Taiwan Strait. A greater presence in the Indo-Pacific ultimately signals commitment as an extra-regional power.

4. Expand overseas basing to support deployments. Though HMS Tamar and HMS Spey will likely remain in the Indo-Pacific for the foreseeable future, this ought to be supplemented by additional surface vessels. Touted as one of the smallest, yet busiest, Royal Navy logistical hubs the British Defence Singapore Support Unit (BDSSU) would benefit from expansion to serve both the interests of HM Government and encourage participation from allies and partners from outside the region. 

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Benedict Baxendale-Smith is the Cuthbert Collingwood Associate Fellow in Maritime Strategy at the Council on Geostrategy. He is also a doctoral researcher in the Department of Defence Studies at King’s College London, researching the role of the maritime-air domain in the Indo-Pacific strategies of Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom.

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This is the sixth in a series of Open Briefings to the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) from the Council on Geostrategy. Our aim is to analyse ten key questions facing the Defence Review Team, from the vantage point of how the United Kingdom’s (UK) adversaries and strategic competitors see us (an approach known as Opposing Forces, or ‘OPFOR’). We will avoid euphemisms and address the challenges head-on. After holding an expert seminar, we will formally submit the briefings at the end of September. Our contributions are deliberately candid – and we invite comment and challenge from all quarters. This sixth Open Briefing appraises Britain’s ability to strike enemies:

1. As an island power, the UK has always been expeditionary and able to strike from the sea, or the air, with appropriate levels of force. There were several phases in the UK’s approach.

   1. Sea Power. Once its internal consolidation as a nation state was complete, Britain prioritised its navy in order to keep its adversaries at bay. This privileging of the navy meant that, in time, it could project power across the world’s oceans and profit immeasurably from internationalised trade. The sheer size of its merchant fleet and the Royal Navy meant that it could conduct maritime and limited littoral operations around the globe. Its priority was to protect its commerce and entrepots on foreign shores. Small land-based security cordons could be sustained from the sea, but by the middle of the 18th century, the British found themselves drawn into continental interiors. The country therefore developed small expeditionary forces which could be deployed rapidly to any threatened point and overmatch local enemy defences. Protected by the firepower of Royal Navy warships, and benefiting from the mobility offered by the sea, the UK could sustain both a worldwide commercial and a security apparatus.

   2. Air Power. The advent of air power in the early 20th century offered a cheaper alternative to large-scale land garrisons through air policing. The Royal Air Force could also provide a bomber fleet with which to project power in the event of conflict. At the same time, the Royal Navy developed naval aviation which had the added advantage of worldwide mobility for aircraft carrier platforms which could strike enemy shipping or deep into hostile nations.

   3. Nuclear Armaments. After 1945, the advent of nuclear weapons launched from fast jets and then long range missile systems gave new meaning to the idea of strike through strategic air power. It was now possible to project force into the heart of hostile powers territory with devastating effect. Britain’s nuclear capability meant that it was now possible to maintain a posture of deterrence to defend the UK homeland and its allies.

   4. Precision Strike. After the Cold War, terrorist and insurgent organisations could be interdicted with precision strike from air and sea launched platforms, including uncrewed but remotely piloted air systems. In defence, British aircraft and ships could also intercept and defeat incoming hostile missiles and drones, protecting both themselves, their allies, and their partners.

   5. Automated Systems. The rapid evolution of automated, uncrewed, air, maritime, and subsurface systems means that the UK can invest in a variety of cheap and numerous strike weapon systems. Instead of a few, expensive, and exquisite platforms, Britain has the opportunity to move to a new regime of ‘small, cheap, and precise’ ordnance and associated sensing capabilities.

2. Alongside this high-intensity capability, the UK can continue to deploy smaller expeditionary elements appropriate to the task and escalate that force projection as it requires. This might be called the ‘new British way of war’. Stealthy Special Forces will lead the penetration of hostile territories while National Cyber Force operations permeate through their electronic systems. Meanwhile, a cloud of sensing assets, from space down to ground level provide the intelligence picture component commanders require to unhinge and dismantle hostile air defence and area denial defences. Secure communications enabled by quantum encryption and the filtration of data by Artificial Intelligence (AI) augment the picture available to the commands at each level of the operation.

3. Orchestrating fires, directly from sensors in pre-designated zones, with mobile land and air forces striking against individual targets which are attempting to conceal themselves among civilians in other zones, the British Armed Forces will progress through an area with precision. The expenditure of ordnance is carefully calibrated, reducing the burden on the logistics chain and making the system of supply less vulnerable.

4. This is the new theory of war, a force of precision, speed, secure communications, agility, and lethality. The challenge for the SDR is realising this ambition.

Recommendations for the Defence Review Team:

1. Ensure all services are integrated: into a single sensor, fires, and communication grid, to be networked for multi-domain operations (MDO).

2. Accelerate enhancements in software and AI: to ensure a form of encryption that quantum enabled decryption could not keep up with.

3. Abolish the blockers: Terminate the rigid, ‘process’ culture of the UK defence and unnecessary tribalism between the armed services, the careerism of ambitious middle ranking leaders, and vested interests of the veterans’ lobby and replace it with the identity that the United States (US) Marine Corps has managed to achieve. In combat settings, the British Armed Forces cooperate extremely well, thanks in part to a unified staff college system, but diminishing and therefore competitive budgeting has generated an unhealthy and continued rivalry.

4. Embrace new technological opportunities for network warfare: Delaying modernisation programmes will, as in the past, increase costs over the long term, put jobs at risk, but, crucially, increase the risk to the armed forces personnel in the operational space. It also increases the risk that inevitable technological diffusion will weaken the UK’s third offset advantage.

5. Prioritise effects: Britain’s capability priorities are to maintain an effective nuclear deterrent, possess the ability to strike at range, ensure survivability of its forces, provide secure communications to protect and deliver lethal force, effect a decisive outcome, and be able to endure a sustained and protracted war.

6. Accelerate munitions production: Stocks are only reportedly sufficient for approximately eight days at the level of intensity seen in Ukraine. Manufacturing of new munitions and expansion of capacity takes a minimum of three years, and up to ten years to reach required levels.

7. Continue to invest in intelligence, advanced computing, AI, and communications for early warning, defence, security, and economic interests.

8. Develop technical education, staff, institutions, and scholars, to equip defence with the personnel and systems needed for multi-domain strike.

9. Combine technological development with the advanced technology nations, in the US, Japan, Australia, and Europe, to sustain a third offset advantage.

10. Organise for rapid decision making and decision support to the primary mission (defence design for decision, not process [campaigning], which will always change and demand a dilution of resources). Build no institution one would not need in wartime.

11. Assert operational security at innovation sites in electromagnetic and digital systems which are at risk from security threats. UK universities have large numbers of foreign students which are used as the means to acquire British intellectual property and conduct intelligence operations in sensitive scientific areas.

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Dr Rob Johnson is Director of the Strategy, Statecraft, and Technology (Changing Character of War) Centre at the University of Oxford. Previously, he was Director of the Secretary of State’s Office of Net Assessment and Challenge in the Ministry of Defence.

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This is the fifth in a series of Open Briefings to the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) from the Council on Geostrategy. Our aim is to analyse ten key questions facing the Defence Review Team, from the vantage point of how the United Kingdom’s (UK) adversaries and strategic competitors see us (an approach known as Opposing Forces, or ‘OPFOR’). We will avoid euphemisms and address the challenges head-on. After holding an expert seminar, we will formally submit the briefings at the end of September. Our contributions are deliberately candid – and we invite comment and challenge from all quarters. This fifth Open Briefing assesses Britain’s military logistics:

1. Military logistics are the means by which armed forces are sustained, whether on operations, in training, or in the home base. The term commonly covers the supply and resupply of goods including armaments and fuel, but often incorporates personnel, repair facilities, administration and medical services.

2. In British doctrine, military logistics has traditionally comprised four critical components, known colloquially as the ‘Four Ds’. They are:

   1. Demand: The resources, supplies, and services required to sustain the force;

   2. Destination: Where the goods or services are required, which could be at home or away;

   3. Distance: How far the materiel needs to travel to be of use, and whether there will be atrophy along the way;

   4. Duration: How long for? A day-long fight or a multi-year campaign?

3. Superficially the Four Ds make sense and have helped to shape logistic thinking over decades. However, they are very linear and have not developed sufficiently to meet the challenges that the British Armed Forces face today, specifically:

   1. Global supply chain vulnerabilities: The global supply chain increasingly is vulnerable to disruptions caused by geopolitical tensions, pandemics, natural disasters, and cyber-attacks. These disruptions can severely impact the availability and timely delivery of critical supplies. In addition, many military operations rely on international suppliers for key materials and components. This dependency can be a weakness in times of conflict or global crises. 

   2. Rapidly changing technology: As military and logistics systems become more digitised, they are increasingly susceptible to cyber-attacks. Protecting the integrity and security of logistics data and infrastructure is crucial but challenging. Incorporating advanced technologies such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), autonomous systems, and blockchains into logistics operations presents challenges in terms of integration, training and reliability.

   3. Complex multi-domain operating environments: Contemporary and future military operations span the land, sea, air, space and cyber domains. The logistic systems supporting them must be equally applicable to each domain. Distance, for example, poses very different challenges in the physical domains than it does in cyberspace.

   4. Environmental concerns: Military operations require vast amounts of energy, and there is growing global and societal pressure to adopt more sustainable practices. Balancing operational effectiveness with environmental sustainability is a significant challenge. This is not simply about being ‘green aware’; it is about acting responsibly in the disposal of waste, including hazardous materials, in conflict zones or remote areas, where they can have significant environmental and operational impacts.

   5. Integration: Coordinating logistics among different branches of the military or between allies and partners requires interoperability in terms of systems, procedures, and communication. Achieving seamless coordination can be difficult due to varying standards and capabilities. As military forces become more disaggregated and decentralised, and as agile logistics must be able to support dispersed units without traditional supply lines, innovative approaches to distribution and resupply are required.

   6. People: There is a growing need for highly trained people who can manage and operate increasingly complex logistics systems. Recruiting, training, and retaining such personnel is a challenge, especially in an era of rapid technological change and better offers elsewhere.

   7. Resilience: The cost of maintaining and upgrading logistics infrastructure, coupled with the need for advanced technology, is rising. Budget constraints often force difficult decisions about where to allocate limited resources. Balancing cost efficiency with the need for redundancy in supply lines to mitigate risks is a persistent challenge, especially in an unpredictable global environment.

4. Addressing these and other challenges requires the UK, along with its allies and partners, to review the way that they do business now and how they are likely to do it in the future. The complexities of modern warfare, technological advancements, and global geopolitical dynamics, plus new and evolving concepts such as multi-domain operations and integration, require a different approach. Logistics planning should leverage technology, enhance coordination, and prioritise sustainability and resilience.

Recommendations for the Defence Review Team:

1. Strengthen supply chain resilience: Britain should reduce its dependency on single or foreign suppliers by diversifying its supply chains. This could involve sourcing critical materials domestically or from multiple allied nations to mitigate the risk of global disruptions.

2. Stockpile strategic reserves: The UK ought to establish and maintain strategic reserves of essential supplies, materials and people to ensure availability during crises.

3. Shine a light on supply chains: Supply chain transparency is critical. Britain should do more to implement advanced tracking and monitoring systems using technologies such as blockchain to enhance visibility and accountability across the supply chain, ensuring rapid response to potential disruptions.

4. Adopt new technologies: AI and machine learning can improve demand forecasting, optimise supply chains, and anticipate maintenance needs. The UK should also invest in autonomous systems and drones for transport, resupply, and reconnaissance. These technologies can improve efficiency, especially in contested or remote areas.

5. Enhance cybersecurity: Strengthen cybersecurity measures across logistics networks to protect against cyber-attacks. This includes planning regular assessments, adopting robust encryption methods, and ensuring secure communication channels.

6. Focus on sustainability: Britain should invest in energy-efficient technologies and explore alternative fuels to reduce the environmental impact of military logistics. This could involve the adoption of hybrid or electric vehicles and the use of biofuels. It should integrate sustainability into procurement and supply chain management by selecting suppliers committed to environmental standards and practices. This approach has the added benefit of reducing the military's carbon footprint and progressing Net Zero targets. The UK should also implement robust waste management systems, focusing on recycling and the disposal of hazardous materials in an environmentally responsible manner.

7. Build and retain a skilled workforce: By attracting talent, training and educating personnel, and retaining a logistics-aware workforce, military operations will be better mounted. New skills are needed to manage advanced technologies and complex supply chains, including cybersecurity, AI, and supply chain management.

8. Explore more and better public-private partnerships: Explore partnerships with private sector companies to leverage their expertise and resources, especially in areas such as transportation, warehousing, and technology development. Encourage career flexibility to develop and retain talent across the enterprise to strengthen the British economy as a whole.

9. Rationalise logistics command and control: Empower the Chief of Defence Logistics within the Military Strategic Headquarters to provide pan-domain oversight and leadership.

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Dr Kevin Rowlands is the Julian Corbett Associate Fellow in Naval Strategy at the Council on Geostrategy. He is also the Head of the Royal Navy’s Strategic Studies Centre. (He writes here in a personal capacity).

Dr Emma Salisbury is the Robert Whitehead Associate Fellow in Military Innovation at the Council on Geostrategy. She is also an Associate Fellow at the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre in the Ministry of Defence.

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This is the fourth in a series of Open Briefings to the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) from the Council on Geostrategy. Our aim is to analyse ten key questions facing the Defence Review Team, from the vantage point of how the United Kingdom’s (UK) adversaries and strategic competitors see us (an approach known as Opposing Forces, or ‘OPFOR’). We will avoid euphemisms and address the challenges head-on. After holding an expert seminar, we will formally submit the briefings at the end of September. Our contributions are deliberately candid – and we invite comment and challenge from all quarters. This fourth Open Briefing looks at Britain’s ability to deter opponents:

1. The ability to deter a rival from undertaking a course of action one finds undesirable has always been central to national strategy. Deterring hostile action is normally cheaper than intervening to punish an enemy or reverse aggression.

2. Deterrence takes two principal forms:

   1. Maintaining the military capability and demonstrating the political willingness to use it to punish infraction or aggression;

   2. Denying an opponent the ability to pursue their goals, such as seizing an ally’s territory, without imposing a cost which they deem too high to bear.

3. Deterrence takes two supplementary forms: 

   1. Direct deterrence, whereby a country takes measures and signals its willingness to respond if it comes under direct attack; 

   2. Extended deterrence, where a country takes measures and signals its commitment to defend its allies and partners should they come under attack.

4. Direct deterrence is simpler than extended deterrence. An enemy normally understands that attacking another country or its critical interests will solicit a direct and forceful response. But even then, poor signalling on the deterrer’s part, and/or miscalculation on the part of the aggressor, may lead to the breakdown in deterrence, with the most famous example being the Argentine decision to invade the Falkland Islands in 1982 – a consequence of Britain’s decision to withdraw military assets from the South Atlantic in 1981 and the Argentine misunderstanding that His Majesty’s (HM) Government lacked the capacity and motivation to recover the islands.

5. Extended deterrence is more complex because it is harder to signal that a nuclear-armed ally will come to the aid of a non-nuclear ally should it come under attack. This requires a sophisticated system of general deterrence involving numerous interlocking components, such as a treaty-based defence commitment, a potent military industrial base, nuclear forces with a guaranteed second strike capability, the forward deployment of conventional forces to extend a nuclear-armed ally’s nuclear forces over a vulnerable non-nuclear ally, and deny enemies access to its territory.

6. Since 1952, the UK has been a declared nuclear weapons state. HM Government states that the purpose of the British nuclear forces is to protect the country from the most extreme threats to national security, in particular nuclear coercion or attack.

7. From 1968, the Royal Navy has maintained a Continuous At Sea Deterrent (CASD). This has come in the form of four nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), the minimum necessary to ensure the availability of at least one at all times. Initially provided by the Resolution class submarines, British nuclear forces are now based on the Vanguard class SSBNs. These are due to be replaced by the Dreadnought class from the early 2030s. Presently, Britain has at least 40 operational nuclear warheads on its deployed SSBN – which would allow it to wreck any conceivable opponent. Maintaining CASD absorbs approximately 6% of the defence budget.

8. Besides deterring attacks on itself, Britain also declares its nuclear forces to the defence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). This shields NATO allies from aggression which bolsters Britain’s national security and increases its influence within the alliance. But this declaration relies on credible signalling.

9. HM Government has signalled again and again its willingness to escalate to protect its treaty allies, both through prime ministerial intervention and in national strategic doctrine. More importantly, the UK has taken measures to extend its deterrent over its allies. During the Cold War, up to 55,000 troops were deployed permanently to West Germany alongside a tactical air force to deter a Soviet attack; today, HM Government maintains a far smaller number of persistently deployed forces along the eastern front of NATO, though not in every exposed ally. While contemporary Russia does not have the strength of the Soviet Union, it remains unclear whether exposed allies, such as Latvia and Lithuania, without a British (or American) contribution remain more vulnerable than those, such as Estonia and Poland, which host their forces.

10. But Britain’s nuclear posture is not without problems. In recent years, the UK’s CASD fleet has been facing serious strains. HMS Vanguard, the first of its class, was commissioned in 1993, while HMS Dreadnought, the first of the new class of SSBN, is not expected to enter service until after 2030. As they age, the Vanguard class need to spend longer periods undergoing maintenance, which has had a knock-on effect in requiring longer patrols due to limited maintenance infrastructure. This has also led to struggles to retain and recruit adequate numbers of personnel. For example, on average a United States (US) SSBN spends 77 days on patrol, while a Vanguard class SSBN recently came home from an almost 200 day patrol. The credibility of the British CASD could be jeopardised over the next few years if the strains worsen.

11. In addition, it is not clear whether the UK will retain the capability to protect CASD – vital to maintaining a credible deterrent. Due to a lack in availability of nuclear-powered attack submarines, frigates, and maritime patrol aircraft – a consequence of successive cuts and historically-low investment in defence – Britain is struggling to protect its SSBNs as they leave and enter their base in Faslane. Allied assets are often called upon to help provide this protection.

12. Unlike the other officially recognised nuclear powers, including Russia, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the US and France, the UK no longer maintains a ‘tactical’ nuclear delivery system. This is a gap which an adversary in possession of such a system and sufficient risk appetite could attempt to exploit. A tactical delivery system provides additional rungs on the escalatory ladder before one gets to strategic nuclear release. Although Britain can deliver a tactical (i.e., lower yield) effect using its strategic delivery system, it may never do so because such a release may be misconstrued by a well-armed enemy for a strategic attack. Britain retired its complementary air-launched nuclear delivery system in 1998; since then, the gap between initial hostilities and strategic nuclear strike has reduced HM Government’s ability to deter aggressors. This scenario becomes more problematic if tactical nuclear weapons are employed against a UK ally rather than Britain itself.

13. Finally, it is unclear whether NATO allies see the current British nuclear deterrent as sufficient in scale or depth to provide for an adequate deterrence in the future, especially as Russia has grown more aggressive and unpredictable and other nefarious actors (such as Iran) are pursuing nuclear programmes. This concern may be compounded if the US continues to focus more on the Indo-Pacific, especially as the PRC expands and modernises its own nuclear arsenal, creating an additional nuclear challenge.

14. So long as Britain maintains a functional guaranteed second strike nuclear system, it seems unlikely that enemies will attack direct British interests. But the situation becomes more uncertain in relation to the UK’s NATO allies or any other allies or partners HM Government may seek to cover. Unless, HM Government provides sufficient resources and political drive to ensure the timely renewal of the British nuclear forces and, potentially, the regeneration of a tactical delivery system, the UK may be less prepared to deter future contingencies. This may result in a reduction in its ability to lead and align its allies and partners and, consequently, reduce its geopolitical influence.

Recommendations for the Defence Review Team:

1. Maintain a minimum, credible, nuclear deterrent; particularly as the number of hostile states grows in scale and intensity. Britain should invest in expanding the nuclear submarine support and construction infrastructure. This may not be completed in time to bring forward the first Dreadnought class SSBN’s service date, but it can help the later vessels (and will allow for SSN-AUKUS production to be increased). Investing now in improved support facilities will avoid the maintenance scheduling issues which have forced the Vanguard class SSBNs into prolonged patrols. This would also support SSN availability, allowing for more adequate independent protection of the Royal Navy’s SSBN fleet.

2. Regenerate a small but credible tactical nuclear arsenal. This would avoid the risk of an adversary taking advantage of the existing gap, especially should the US become less committed to NATO in the future. The UK could develop its own free-fall bomb (akin to the previous WE 177) small enough for internal carry within the F-35B Lightning II Joint Combat Aircraft or buy a small number of F35A Lightning II warplanes, which are designed to carry tactical nuclear weapons. In the longer term it could develop a nuclear capable cruise missile for either the SSN-AUKUS or the Tempest warplane.

3. Expand the depth and presence of British forces in other exposed allies to provide them with nuclear cover. Given that NATO allies such as Poland are modernising their own forces, this should not take the form of a ‘British Army of the Vistula’ or ‘British Army of the Emajogi’. Rather, British forces deployed to Estonia and Poland should be made more permanent and additional battlegroups should be deployed and integrated into the national defence forces of other exposed allies, particularly Latvia and Lithuania.

4. Enlarge the SSN, frigate and maritime patrol fleets. This will ensure that in addition to other important tasks for these assets, the UK is able to guard its SSBN fleet independently. Becoming over reliant on allies for such a key capability signals a lack of determination to Britain’s nuclear armed opponents.

5. Signal, clearly, decisively, and frequently, the UK’s willingness to fight for every inch of NATO territory; ministers should continue to make regular visits to the most exposed NATO allies to reiterate HM Government’s view that any attack on them will be met with a full and decisive military response.

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James Rogers is the Co-founder and Director of Research at the Council on Geostrategy.

William Freer is a Research Fellow in National Security at the Council on Geostrategy, where he works on strategic advantage and maritime affairs.

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This is the third in a series of Open Briefings to the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) from the Council on Geostrategy. Our aim is to analyse ten key questions facing the Defence Review Team, from the vantage point of how the United Kingdom’s (UK) adversaries and strategic competitors see us (an approach known as Opposing Forces, or ‘OPFOR’). We will avoid euphemisms and address the challenges head-on. After holding an expert seminar, we will formally submit the briefings at the end of September. Our contributions are deliberately candid – and we invite comment and challenge from all quarters. This third Open Briefing appraises Britain’s national powerbase:

1. The UK's defence industry is a cutting-edge, high-technology sector which is critical to British national security. A robust domestic defence industrial base with the capacity and expertise to deliver these capabilities is vital for preserving the UK's freedom of action in an increasingly volatile and unpredictable world. Without this, Britain risks compromising its ability to respond effectively to emerging threats and challenges. The UK’s strength comes not through the size of its military, but through its technological sophistication.

2. However, the British defence technology and industrial base faces challenges, both in terms of mass, such as the ability to produce high volumes of ammunition, and at the cutting edge, such as the ability to develop critical future technologies:

   1. The maritime defence industry is a key British strength. Multiple shipyards are building advanced warships – such as the Type 26 frigate at Govan, the Type 31 frigate at Rosyth, and the Astute and Dreadnought class submarines in Barrow. For the first time in many years, the maritime defence industry has a problem of lack of capacity rather than lack of orders. The UK remains constrained in how many vessels it can produce at speed;

   2. The aviation defence industry is another British strength. The UK was the only Tier 1 partner in the F-35 Lightning II Joint Combat Aircraft programme and was a leading member of the Typhoon fighter programme. British expertise in this field is wide ranging from Martin Baker ejection seats to Rolls Royce jet engines. Britain is also heavily involved in developing low cost drones, particularly for Ukraine, where the UK is the leader of the Drone Capability Coalition;

   3. Britain’s ability to produce equipment for land warfare has somewhat atrophied. In the early Cold War, Britain built (and exported) thousands of Centurion tanks. Today, the UK is facing struggles to upgrade 148 of its existing Challenger 2 tanks. Britain even lost the ability to produce its own barrels for tanks and artillery, but this capability is now being regenerated. Part of the problem is the UK struggles on land warfare exports compared to Germany or the US, which dominate the market;

   4. Britain has some promising leads in terms of future military technologies – from directed energy weapons to quantum positioning –  but it cannot afford to do everything. Spreading itself too thin in developing cutting-edge technologies remains a risk. Leaning into strengths and leveraging the expertise of allies to cover weaknesses will provide the most cost effective approach – for example the AUKUS partnership with Australia and the US and Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) with Japan and Italy; 

   5. Since the end of the Cold War, Britain’s defence industry has had to deal with a ‘feast and famine’ approach, whereby industry gears up to deliver a large order and then shuts things down once the order is completed or due to a lack of follow up demand signal. This can lead to a loss of skills, expertise, and facilities, which then have to be rebuilt in the future at great cost. 

3. Several of these problems result from structural problems within the British economy. On the face of it, Britain is, by international standards, an innovative and dynamic economy with a strong scientific heritage and higher education sector, a thriving technological base, and a leading-edge, high-technology defence industry:

   1. The UK ranks first in the world in the Future Possibilities Index, which measures the capacity of countries to leverage possibilities for their future economic growth and societal wellbeing. It also ranks fourth in the world in the Global Innovation Index – an annual ranking of countries by their capacity for, and success in, innovation;

   2. Britain’s aerospace, defence, security and space sector contributed £38.2 billion to the UK economy in 2022/2023, employing around 427,500 people;

   3. The UK is the world’s seventh largest defence exporter, but over the last decade Britain’s share of global defence exports has fallen by 14%.

4. However, UK public investment is well below the Group of Seven (G7) average, and it has been as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) almost consistently since 1990. Business investment is also lower in Britain than in any other G7 country. The UK’s real defence spending has been in decline, which has eroded the credibility of the armed forces and led to fears Britain may be left increasingly reliant on its allies.

5. The UK, is one of the most unequal and overly-centralised countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), with deep spatial inequalities and regional productivity divergence. In addition, UK living standards have lagged behind most peer nations since 2010:

   1. His Majesty's (HM) Government has committed to investment in the security sector and the development of regional defence clusters. It has done so in order to invigorate the country’s defence industrial base by facilitating industry, academia and government sharing ideas, promoting collaboration and identifying routes to market through exploitation and commercialisation;

   2. Barrow-in-Furness, for example, is central to Britain’s defence nuclear enterprise. However, it is deeply deprived, poorly connected to the rest of the country, has the highest percentage of people aged 65 and over living alone with no central heating, and many young people who leave the town for university do not return. Investment in housing and infrastructure around defence sector clusters is needed to attract more people to live and work in them.

6. Britain lacks a long-term strategic vision for industrial strategy. There has been significant policy churn in the UK’s industrial strategy and attempts to address regional inequalities. Constant policy rehashing is not good for productivity or investor confidence.

7. UK universities are on the brink. Universities are a fundamental part of Britain’s defence industry, providing critical R&D and training scientists, technicians and engineers. However, many are facing severe financial issues, even closure. In addition, British universities collaborate with a wide range of countries on basic scientific research, such as on AI and quantum. Such areas are often dual use, and may help unfriendly nations – such as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) – gain crucial knowledge and capabilities which may have military application. Universities have yet to find a way to draw the best talent while protecting strategic research from falling into hostile hands.

8. The UK has reverted to being a net importer of electricity in 2023 after being a net exporter in 2022, with its import dependency being 40%. Over 90% of Britain’s energy imports are oil and gas, primarily from the United States (US) and Norway, respectively. UK production of oil, natural gas, and nuclear power fell from 2022 to 2023, while the increase in energy production from other sources was comparatively small.

9. These structural challenges have become a key concern for the UK’s defence industry. Some primary causes of bottlenecks, both for industrial capacity and R&D, range from workforce, to supply chain and materials, and access to finance:

   1. The defence industry is facing shortages of skilled workers in many areas. The changing nature of the labour market has contributed to the challenge; for many young people, the defence sector is simply not an attractive field to work in. These sentiments will need to be overcome. For AUKUS, for example, this challenge is particularly acute in areas such as nuclear, quantum, cybersecurity, and artificial intelligence;

   2. More broadly, the UK risks becoming an unattractive environment for the world’s best and brightest researchers. Britain’s visa system is one of the most expensive in the world, and the upfront costs of visas are substantially higher in the UK compared to other research intensive countries;

   3. Public opinion on defence also has an impact on investment habits and therefore access to finance. Access to money is crucial for defence firms small and large for building capacity and R&D. With an increase in so-called Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) informed investment decisions, this has become increasingly difficult;

   4. In addition, access to cheap electricity and key resources and components will be vital, especially those critical to future capabilities (resources such as uranium, silica, nickel, cobalt, and titanium) and in high demand both with allies and adversaries.

Recommendations to the Strategic Defence Review:

1. HM Government should generate a long-term plan for British science and technology skills and talent, including defence applications. This includes reform of its visa arrangements to improve the movement of workers between allied countries, particularly those who are partners on minilateral initiatives such as AUKUS and GCAP.

2. HM Government should view R&D spending as foundational to UK security and prosperity, and ring fence it. At the same time, Britain should increase investment in defence to at least 2.5% of GDP with immediate effect. Investment is needed to recapitalise the UK’s defence industrial capacity, which has been allowed to atrophy since the end of the Cold War.

3. In addition, HM Government should find ways of increasing the private finance available to the defence sector, and for UK R&D more broadly. Lessons can be drawn from the way in which NATO’s Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) or the European Union’s Defence Equity Facility have been implemented.

4. HM Government’s defence industrial strategy should focus on key sovereign capabilities which the UK cannot risk relying on others for, and where British technology and industrial expertise can add most value. This specialisation approach does not necessarily mean a sudden increase in defence imports, although in some cases these can provide a cost effective solution. For significant orders licence producing foreign designs in the UK can and should be pursued. The approach taken with the Boxer fighting vehicle provides a good example of this.

5. Procurement should continue to be reformed to ensure waste in defence spending is minimised. Companies should be incentivised, such as through tax incentives, to support British small and medium enterprises in procurement, where doing so would help establish UK capabilities in critical areas. And, rather than allow orders to end, low rate production should continue or be switched to adjacent industries (although this will incur costs) until new contracts are placed to keep defence production alive.

Dr Mann Virdee is a Senior Research Fellow in Science, Technology, and Economics at the Council on Geostrategy and leads the Caudwell Strong Britain project.

William Freer is Research Fellow in National Security at the Council on Geostrategy, where he works on strategic advantage and maritime affairs.

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This is the second in a series of Open Briefings to the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) from the Council on Geostrategy. Our aim is to analyse ten key questions facing the Defence Review Team, from the vantage point of how the United Kingdom’s (UK) adversaries and strategic competitors see us (an approach known as Opposing Forces, or ‘OPFOR’). We will avoid euphemisms and address the challenges head-on. After holding an expert seminar, we will formally submit the briefings at the end of September. Our contributions are deliberately candid – and we invite comment and challenge from all quarters. This second Open Briefing assesses Britain’s national resilience in defence:

1. The Strategic Defence Review should begin from the assumption that war with a peer adversary is possible within the decade, and that the UK is already the subject of sustained ‘hybrid’ or ‘grey zone’ aggression by Russia.

2. The UK is strong in military power but weak at the level of potential economic resilience in wartime, in its energy security, and in the level of societal support for its geopolitical stance. 

3. This combination – an eroded industrial base, a vulnerable energy supply and a fragmented national culture – provides the ideal point of attack for Russian and other hostile hybrid warfare. Consequently, the SDR should consider not only the military-technical challenges facing the armed forces (drones, electronic warfare, and integrated air and missile defence, and so on) but address weaknesses of the UK as a potential ‘state-victim’ (per the Kartopolov doctrine).

4. Key elements of hybrid aggression against the UK include:

   1. Large scale disinformation via social media, aimed at the delegitimisation of the state and mainstream media and fuelling social unrest; 

   2. The presence of willing UK-based proxies (for Russia, Iran and the People’s Republic of China (PRC)), both on the far right and far left of politics;

   3. Influence operations carried out via high-net-worth individuals and public affairs companies;

   4. Threat-induced restraints on defence investment, and foreign penetration of strategic industries through ownership and financial control.

5. In the acute phase of any global crisis – e.g., Russian aggression against a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) ally, or a threatened invasion of Taiwan by the PRC – the UK should expect the adversary to mobilise these efforts towards specific ends:

   1. To isolate the British Armed Forces and UK intelligence and law enforcement services from the general population;

   2. To mobilise opposition to the use of armed force among groups inclined to distrust the narratives and aims of the political mainstream, sometimes for legitimate reasons;

   3. To create the fear among mainstream political parties that a significant portion of their voting base will desert them for the extremes, should they support military action;

   4. To make it impossible for the civil power to impose legitimate wartime restrictions on, for example, protest and communication (which the adversary already operates in peacetime), or to perform civil contingency operations;

   5. Thus, to achieve the classic doctrinal goal of ‘winning without fighting’, by inculcating in the minds of decision makers the belief that defending UK national security is not the ‘will of the people.’

6. At a society-wide level, this challenge can be addressed within the framework of ‘securonomics’ as outlined by His Majesty’s (HM) Government: to align the objectives of economic growth, wealth redistribution, energy security and greater social cohesion with those of national defence. However, there are defence-specific aspects of the resilience challenge that fall within the remit of the SDR.

7. The armed forces, by their own admission, are rooted too narrowly in the civil society they are designed to defend. No matter how active the current leadership works to overcome this, it is a glaringly noticeable opportunity for hostile states and one which they will certainly exploit. Namely:

   1. The improved representation of ethnic minority Britons in the armed forces (11% versus 18% across society) is offset by the low representation of Muslims, who make up just 800 (0.6%) members of the armed forces, despite numbering 2.9 million (6.7%) of the UK population;

   2. The unacceptable rates of sexual violence and harassment reported within the armed forces, which – together with the toxic contents of anonymous military bulletin boards – limit the attractiveness of service careers to female recruits;

   3. The mismatch between the ‘political tribes’ which make up the British electorate and their representation in the armed forces and defence industry. Ben Wallace, the former defence secretary, called this the military’s ‘Gen Z Problem.’ It would be amplified if new fighting forces had be recruited in a crisis;

   4. Satisfaction with service life is at an all time low – a problem which was recognised by the current defence secretary while in opposition – and translates into negative concepts about the armed forces among the civilian population.

8. Until now, each of these problems has been dealt with managerially and separately. But hostile states will seize on them as part of a single, strategic opportunity – to undermine societal support for national defence, and thus to reduce the supply of willing recruits, reservists and defence industry workers in a time of crisis.

9. If Britain is serious, this should be recognised in the SDR as a first order threat. It cannot be met simply by better recruitment practices, or fairer selection criteria, but instead has to be met with a mixture of society-wide delivery on securonomics, winning the battle of the narrative and coordinated reforms to the structure of the armed forces, reserves, defence industry and higher education.

Recommendations to the Strategic Defence Review:

1. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) should state its overt, strategic aim that the armed forces will recruit from every community and culture in the UK. It should be made clear to all leaders that there is no alternative to this; the status quo – where officers and other ranks are recruited from traditional, limited demographic groups is no longer supportable.

2. The armed forces leadership should consult with ethnic and religious minority organisations, and with relevant allied countries, on the design of a programme to radically improve minority recruitment. This effort should be framed around the aim of rooting the armed forces more deeply in British society. Likewise in the creation of a zero tolerance culture for sexual harassment and violence.

3. The UK should reconstitute the Territorial Army as a self-sufficient second-line force, allowing the Field Army to be redesigned for dynamic forward deployment and the current Volunteer Reserve to operate as its auxiliary. The new Territorial Army should be given a specific remit to recruit for diversity and with service regulations that allow its members full participation in civil society, including politics. Its potential operational roles and size will be the subject of a future Open Briefing, but might range from guarding routes and installations to Ukraine-style territorial defence in time of need. In all events, the new Territorial Army should be designed to scale-up rapidly in times of crisis.

4. Information warfare should become embedded in the practice of every formation, right down to sub-unit level, rather than centralised in a single, opaque brigade. All branches, including the Reserve and the proposed Territorial Army, should practise information warfare. This will require cross-party political consent and scrutiny, but is necessary in order to make the forces and the civilian infrastructure supporting them resilient against hybrid attack and capable of conducting counter-hybrid operations against the adversary. (see, for example, how OPFOR at the US National Training Centre simulates information war against the families/communities/social media of units rotating in).

5. The armed forces should offer an 18 month ultra-short service option for up to 10,000 graduates (or equivalent qualified) per year. The aim would be to create a pervasive cadre of potential small unit leaders, which could be called on in times of crisis, enabling the forces and reserves to scale rapidly, and whose presence in society would enhance the rootedness of the armed forces.

6. HM Government should stage a major, realistic civil emergencies exercise, premised on an Article 5 type crisis, and drawing in the widest possible range of civil society institutions, within 12 months of the SDR.

7. The aim of these measures is to make the armed forces more scalable and more broadly rooted in the society they are defending. Each of these measures needs to be executed in a way that promotes an overarching narrative, which needs to be explicitly stated by the SDR, where:

   1. The UK is a country worth defending – and will scale its reserves in order to defend itself in depth; 

   2. The British Armed Forces represent all Britons and intend to recruit the best of all citizens; 

   3. Service careers and defence-industrial careers are something to be proud of, and in which all sections of society are welcome; and 

   4. Democratically controlled, defensive information warfare is legitimate for a society under hybrid attack.

Paul Mason is the Aneurin Bevan Associate Fellow in Defence and Resilience at the Council on Geostrategy and a journalist, author and political researcher.

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This is the first in a series of Open Briefings to the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) from the Council on Geostrategy. Our aim is to analyse ten key questions facing the Defence Review Team, from the vantage point of the United Kingdom’s (UK) adversaries and competitors (an approach known as Opposition Forces, or ‘OPFOR’). We will avoid euphemisms and address the challenges head-on. After holding an expert seminar, we will formally submit the briefings at the end of September. Our contributions are deliberately candid – and we invite comment and challenge from all quarters. This first Open Briefing assesses Britain’s geopolitical standing in the 2020s:

1. The UK is a highly developed and compact country at the heart of the Euro-Atlantic world. As an island state, Britain is completely dependent on the sea for its prosperity and security, but its proximity to the European continent means it ignores European geopolitics at its peril. Thrice in the 20th century, a major threat emerged with the capacity to overwhelm British defences.

2. By international standards, Britain remains a major power. It has the world’s sixth biggest economy, ranks 15th for Human Development (or second among larger nations, i.e., those with a population over 50 million), holds one of the global economy’s two ‘command centres’ (London), and excels in terms of research and tertiary education, financial services, and advanced manufacturing. Despite the recent instability resulting from Brexit and sectoral agitators, including environmental and religious extremists, the UK’s system of government enjoys broad support and minimal corruption.

3. This national powerbase supports the world’s fifth largest defence budget, which amounts to 2.3% of GDP – higher than British spending in the late 2010s, but very low by historical standards. During the Cold War, the UK’s defence budget averaged at over 6% of GDP per year, meaning His Majesty’s (HM) Government has considerable bandwidth – politics willing – to redirect resources to strengthen the British Armed Forces.

4. Britain, the third country to develop atomic weapons, possesses a small but potent nuclear deterrent with a guaranteed second strike delivery system. Despite a noisy anti-nuclear fringe, including the main regional secessionist parties in Scotland and Wales, the largest political parties all support the UK’s position as a nuclear power. There is also broad backing for Britain’s policy of extending its nuclear deterrent over its allies using forward deployments of conventional forces, such as those stationed permanently in Estonia, Norway, Germany and Poland, and persistently in Iceland, Lithuania and Romania.

5. Despite the commitment of successive governments to enhance and modernise the British nuclear deterrent, worries persist that the UK may encounter serious obstacles in deploying on time its next generation nuclear platform. Because previous governments delayed the introduction of the new system, the current submarine launch platforms, known as the Vanguard class, may struggle to maintain a continuous at sea deterrent by the 2030s. And, although the UK can calibrate its nuclear system for a lower-yield release, it lacks a tactical or theatre level delivery system, which nuclear peers such as Russia possess.

6. In terms of Britain’s conventional forces, the picture is mixed. On the plus side, the British Armed Forces are technologically advanced and have extensive operational experience, most recently in their efforts to suppress the Houthis and assist Ukraine. The British military is also unique in its ability to project force over long distances:

   1. The Royal Navy is second only to the United States (US) Navy in being able to operate at all times a carrier strike group and a fleet of nuclear propelled attack submarines armed with ‘long-throw’ cruise missiles; 

   2. The UK maintains an array of sovereign and non–sovereign military bases and logistics facilities in every geographic theatre. Some of these are next to crucial strategic choke points, such as the straits of Gibraltar, Hormuz, Malacca, and Magellan. With Gibraltar and the Sovereign Bases in Cyprus, Britain is the only pan-European power.

7. Less positively, the British Armed Forces suffer from several growing defects. The conventional forces lack mass and face difficulties in mobilising in the event of an emergency:

   1. The Royal Navy has been reduced to a skeletal force of just six destroyers, nine frigates and seven nuclear attack submarines, while the Royal Fleet Auxiliary lacks a modern flotilla of solid support ships. A lack of hulls and problems with support infrastructure has reduced Britain’s ability to generate presence or a large battle force – just as the Russian and Chinese navies have grown in strength;

   2. Although the Royal Air Force (RAF) is one of only a few air forces to operate ‘fifth generation’ warplanes and a plethora of unmanned aerial vehicles, it has been cut to only a handful of operational squadrons, which are thinly spread;

   3. Lacking vision and still impacted by the legacy focus on counter-insurgency operations rather than general deterrence, the British Army requires wholesale reform to reinforce European allies along the northern and eastern flanks of the alliance and support naval- and air-led operations in pursuit of UK objectives;

   4. In terms of critical enablers, including space, reconnaissance and command and control, Britain is largely deficient. Strangely for a country responsible for exploring and mapping much of the world, HM Government has failed to understand the need for a well-funded and politically backed national strategic space programme.

8. To compensate for these shortcomings, the UK has become more and more dependent on alliances and strategic arrangements as ‘force multipliers’. Of particular note are the:

   1. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), to which the UK was crucial to creating, and the Joint Expeditionary Force – a kind of ‘sub-alliance’ within NATO;

   2. Five Eyes, a unique intelligence sharing partnership with numerous spin-off arrangements between the largest Anglophone powers;

   3. Group of Seven, where the UK has convinced its partners to accept a wider remit touching on security and defence (including issuing Ukraine with security commitments);

   4. AUKUS, where the UK will be the largest beneficiary not only in terms of defence industrial collaboration but also in using Australia’s Fleet Base West for naval deployments to the Indo-Pacific;

   5. Bilateral relations with the US, Ukraine, Poland, Japan, Germany, France and South Korea – some of which have growing profiles and the propensity to resist authoritarian aggression.

9. The material and relational foundations of British power have been further undermined by deficient strategy. Most importantly, unlike during the Cold War, Britain’s political and economic establishment lacks a sense of national purpose and has fallen for several fallacies. Chief among these has been the idea that apparently teleological forces – globalisation or the guiding hand of the market – are inevitable and highly desirable. More cynically, some British business owners and executives have promoted these ideas to discourage policies which may jeopardise their own economic interests, particularly in countries such as the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

10. Given the lack of intellectual leadership, various foreign policy advocacy groups have emerged to fill the void, sowing further confusion:

    1. Post-nationalists‌, in the liberal centre, promote the idea that a weakened Britain should do little more than reinforce global, multilateral structures;

    2. Isolationists‌, on the right, seek to stay out of other countries’ affairs; sometimes isolationism morphs into an outright rejection of the threat posed by authoritarian regimes;

    3. Compensationists, on the left, promulgate the notion that British foreign policy should centre on dispersing ‘reparations’ or aid to developing countries to make up for Britain’s past historical faults, real or imagined.

11. At the same time, HM Government has often been too passive and afraid of escalation. Its unwillingness to punish misbehaviour emboldened Britain’s opponents and increased their propensity to engage in greater aggression. For example, it failed to: 

    1. Punish Russian ‘wet work’ against British residents and citizens, most famously in 2006 and 2018, when the Kremlin brazenly targeted opponents in the UK with radioactive poison and nerve agents;

    2. Chastise Bashar al-Assad’s regime for the mass murder of civilians in Syria in 2013;

    3. Discipline the Kremlin for invading Ukraine and annexing Crimea (despite signing the 1994 Budapest Memorandum) in 2014;

    4. Challenge Russian and Chinese attempts to ‘continentalise’ the seas, critical to international trade and prosperity;

    5. Resist Russian and Chinese disinformation, narrative projection and ‘discursive statecraft’, which often aims to undermine Britain.

12. Equally, the UK has made itself an easy target. Because of its inherent openness and pluralism, Britain’s political system is susceptible to interference, especially when the nation’s political and economic establishment lacks consensus over its geostrategic direction. That the country lacked legislation such as the National Security Act until 2023 allowed hostile states to turn it into a political and economic playground.

13. However, the fact that it has punched below its weight for the past two decades does not guarantee that the UK’s geopolitical rivals will have such an easy time securing their interests in the future. Britain’s political elites are awakening from their strategic slumber: there is a broad consensus that investment in defence must increase, that Russia and the PRC are in alignment with one another, and that Britain must provide international leadership in response – note HM Government’s vigorous retaliation to Russia’s ‘special military operation’ against Ukraine.

14. In short, if HM Government pursues ‘securonomics’, accelerates economic growth, and hones national strategy, Britain has the potential to be a potent and dangerous adversary.

Recommendations for the Defence Review Team:

1. Appraise Britain’s global position, identifying geopolitical threats to its national interests and objectives, particularly across the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theatres.

2. Advocate for investment in defence to 2.5% of GDP. Without additional resources, Britain will decline in power and lose its leadership position, especially as the geopolitical environment worsens and allies and partners rearm and seek greater influence;

3. Evaluate Britain’s alliances and strategic arrangements relative to its needs and interests, with a particular emphasis on their instrumentalisation as ‘force multipliers’ for British objectives;

4. Commit to amplify, extend and accelerate the introduction of platforms the UK can use to lead and generate geopolitical effect, such as the nuclear deterrent, carrier strike groups, nuclear attack submarines, and logistical capabilities. Calibrate the British Army to extend the British nuclear deterrent more effectively over NATO allies in Europe, by integrating British forces with larger Polish, German and Baltic formations.

James Rogers is Co-founder and Director of Research at the Council on Geostrategy.

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