Welcome to the 76th Cable, our weekly roundup of British foreign and defence policy.

Last week, the United States (US) hosted a multinational ministerial meeting to develop a strategic alliance over critical minerals to counter the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) dominance in rare earth supply chains. During the meeting, the US administration proposed a new initiative to mobilise allies and partners: the Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement (FORGE).

Additionally, a number of bilateral agreements to enhance the production of these critical minerals were signed with American partner nations. The United Kingdom (UK) was one such country which signed a Memorandum of Understanding on critical minerals, with the partnership set to allow both nations to work closer together and encourage greater private investment into mining and processing.

As the PRC accounts for almost 70% of critical mineral ore production and over 90% of refining capacity globally, breaking Beijing’s dominance over these essential resources will be critical to ensuring Britain and its allies and partners can compete in producing many of the technologies that will dominate the 21st century.

Welcome back to The Cable!

• During a visit to Camp Viking to meet Royal Marine Commandos, John Healey, Secretary of State for Defence, announced that the number of British troops stationed in Norway will double to 2,000 over the next three years as part of efforts to combat the Russian threat in the High North. This announcement comes as the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) confirms Exercise LION PROTECTOR, which will see air, land, and naval forces from JEF nations train to protect critical national infrastructure. Later this week, Healey will travel to Brussels to discuss the British Armed Forces’ involvement in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) ARCTIC SENTRY mission later this year.

• His Majesty’s (HM) Government published its Advanced Nuclear Framework on 4th February, outlining how to stimulate private investment in innovative nuclear technologies. Advanced nuclear technologies – including advanced, small, and micro modular reactors – are manufactured in factories in modules, meaning they could be built quicker and at a lower cost. Developers are aiming for the first advanced nuclear reactors to be operational in the UK by 2035.

• According to reporting by the Financial Times, Britain could be included in a new €90 billion (£78.2 billion) European Union (EU) loan scheme for Ukraine, after member states agreed to allow British companies to win military procurement contracts to supply Kyiv (depending on certain conditions).

• Jimmy Lai, media tycoon and British citizen, has been sentenced to 20 years in prison in Hong Kong for ‘national security offences’ amid widespread criticism from press freedom groups. Lai is the founder of the now-defunct Apple Daily, a popular Hong Kong newspaper that supported the pro-democracy movement. Responding to the sentencing, Yvette Cooper, Foreign Secretary, said:

  For the 78 year old, this is tantamount to a life sentence. I remain deeply concerned for Mr Lai’s health, and I again call on the Hong Kong authorities to end his appalling ordeal and release him on humanitarian grounds, so that he may be reunited with his family…

• HM Government announced that the British Army Cyber Association will lead the Defence Cyber Marvel 2026, a multilateral exercise taking place in Singapore. Now in its fifth year, the week-long exercise will bring together more than 2,500 personnel from 70 different organisations and 29 countries.

• HM Government held a ‘record-breaking’ solar, onshore and tidal renewable energy auction this week. Contracts were awarded for 4.9 Gigawatt (GW) of solar capacity and 1.3GW of onshore wind. According to HM Government, this latest auction – coupled with last month’s offshore wind auction – ‘puts the UK on track for its 2030 clean power target’.

How competitors frame Britain

• TASS reported on a statement made by Alexander Gusarov, head of the North Atlantic Department in the Russian Foreign Ministry, in which he claimed that ‘British strategists are looking for creative ways to unite their remaining allies in Europe’ to escalate tensions in the Baltic and Black seas. Gusarov added that: ‘The intensity of military propaganda in the British Isles has reached a level we haven’t seen in a long time. Our country is constantly subject to fictitious and absurd accusations.’ Quite a take from Russian state media, considering that it is the Kremlin which has escalated tensions across Europe and enjoys spreading conspiratorial accusations.

• The Embassy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the UK responded to HM Government’s ‘erroneous statement’ on the sentencing of Jimmy Lai. It urged Britain to ‘abandon its colonial mindset’ and ‘stop meddling in China’s internal affairs.’ So much for the desire to ‘strengthen dialogue and cooperation’ between the two countries that was central to the visit of Sir Keir Starmer, Prime Minister, to the PRC last month.

Does it keep the rain out? NATO nerves on the nuclear umbrella

A suite of recent reports have alluded to a number of conversations between Europe’s non-nuclear powers and its nuclear ones. From Sweden to Germany and Poland, there are clearly growing nerves about the credibility of NATO’s extended nuclear deterrence. Vast tomes could be – and have been – written on the theories and practice behind extended deterrence, so what exactly is it that has caused these nerves, what do allies want, and what exactly might come of it?

To take the first point, non-nuclear European countries have always had nerves about extended deterrence. There have always been questions about whether the US, the UK and France would be willing to trade Washington, London or Paris for the cities of central and eastern Europe. Forward-deployed forces, nuclear sharing, and the use of rhetorical and physical signalling have been the tools with which allies have been reassured and foes deterred. Yet, recent transatlantic tensions, as well as more general American desires to retrench from Europe, have brought these nerves back to the surface – the US’ arsenal is the largest and most flexible in NATO.

Allies along NATO’s eastern front, facing Russia’s large and versatile nuclear arsenal, are keen to deepen the ties that bind the British and French nuclear arsenals to them in order to hedge against potential changes in US posture. However, these eastern front countries are technically already covered by the UK’s nuclear umbrella through Britain’s explicit extension of its strategic deterrence to NATO and (albeit more vaguely) the French arsenal through Article 42(7) of the Treaty of the EU and the French doctrine of loosely defined ‘vital interests’.

There is little more that London and Paris can do to reinforce the credibility of their strategic deterrents. Although warhead numbers have been much reduced since the end of the Cold War, they are more than sufficient to deliver utter devastation.

So what is it that the UK and France can do to deter the Kremlin and reassure allies better? The answer lies in sub-strategic nuclear capabilities. NATO’s only declared sub-strategic nuclear weapons are American. France possesses its own (the Air-Sol Moyenne Portée [ASMP] missile) but these are not declared to NATO, and Britain has none.

French signalling has evolved slightly in recent years, with Emmanuel Macron, President of France, attempting to expand the definition of ‘vital interests’, and visits by the wing of the French Air Force responsible for nuclear strike to eastern front allies. But, given the history of French nuclear doctrine, as well as contemporary French political views on extended deterrence from different parties, this is unlikely to go much further.

This means that the most effective means available would be for the UK to re-acquire its own sub-strategic nuclear capability; one declared to NATO and one that can be authorised for use by London rather than Washington. Given the cost of such an effort, the financial support of allies for this would make life much easier for Britain. And, with the aforementioned recent statements of allies, this may well be a possibility.

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Welcome to the 75th Cable, our weekly roundup of British foreign and defence policy.

Following his trip to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) last week, Sir Keir Starmer, Prime Minister, flew to Japan for talks with Sanae Takaichi, Prime Minister of Japan. These discussions centred on the two nations’ ‘joint values’ and boosting bilateral ties, especially in the trade, defence and technology sectors.

In a press statement following the meetings, Sir Keir stated that the relationship between the United Kingdom (UK) and Japan is the ‘strongest now that it has been in decades’, and set out clear priorities to ‘build an even deeper partnership’ for the future. His speech focused on three areas for collaboration, technology and innovation – including a new Strategic Cyber Partnership, enhancing energy security and resilience, and promoting free and open trade, including expanding the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTTP) and diversifying supply chains in sectors such as critical minerals.

As two large island nations with a shared desire to protect the free and open international order, while also having the fourth and sixth largest economies in the world by Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the relationship between Britain and Japan is one to watch in the coming years.

Welcome back to The Cable!

• Ministers from more than 20 countries, including the UK, United States (US) and Japan, as well as representatives from the European Union (EU), will meet in Washington today to discuss the development of a strategic alliance over critical minerals. The purpose of the meeting will be to ramp up non-Chinese supply chains as fast as possible, with potential pricing and investment support. This comes after Beijing imposed export restrictions on rare earths last year. The PRC also enjoys a near-monopoly in rare earth supply chains, accounting for almost 70% of ore production and over 90% of refining capacity.

• Navantia, a Spanish state-owned company, announced last week that construction on the Royal Fleet Auxiliary’s Fleet Solid Support (FSS) ships had begun in Spain. Construction of the three vessels is taking place at Navantia’s Puerto Real shipyard in Cádiz, where modules for the ships will be manufactured before being transferred to Britain for final assembly. The new FSS ships are expected to be delivered in 2031.

• Last week, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) announced the establishment of a defence Office for Small Business Growth (OFSBG) to support Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) operating in defence. The office is set to become a ‘central hub’, providing domestic and export guidance alongside other business support to the approximately 12,000 SMEs in the sector. The OFSBG appears to have been modelled on the US Department of War’s ‘Office of Small Business Programmes’, which was established in 2006 to bolster small business engagement.

  For additional defence news stories, follow this link to the DSEI Gateway news portal.

• The MOD has also announced that the British Armed Forces will receive new powers to ‘defeat drones’ following an increase in incidents near military bases. The Armed Forces Bill will allow personnel to destroy land drones or those that can be operated on or under water in addition to aerial drones. In 2025, more than 250 drone incidents occurred near UK military sites – double the number in 2024.

• According to new reporting, Britain installed 262,000 solar panel units in 2025, a 37% increase over 2024. Analysis by The Telegraph suggests that this growth was driven by households and businesses installing rooftop solar panels. Overall, the UK set a new record for solar power in 2025, generating 19 Terawatt hours (Twh); a 31% increase over 2024.

How competitors frame Britain

• Sputnik International published propaganda calling for any revised Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) – a proposed nuclear arms reduction treaty – to include Britain, France and the PRC. The article claims that both the UK and France should be included due to the fact that they are ‘actively building a “nuclear umbrella” over Europe “aimed squarely at Russia”.’ Britain and France have long maintained a nuclear deterrent for national security, and it is only Russia which has engaged in irresponsible sabre-rattling in recent years.

• The Global Times released an opinion piece on the domestic criticism Sir Keir has faced following his recent trip to the PRC. The article claims that these critiques stem from both partisan and ideological positions alongside the UK’s longstanding ‘alignment with US foreign policy.’ The piece continues that the Prime Minister’s trip was a ‘pragmatic attempt to adapt’ to the changing geopolitical environment and ‘strains within the transatlantic alliance’. While there are pragmatic and economic reasons to engage with the PRC, Sir Keir has made it clear that he is not choosing between Washington and Beijing.

Sharpening space competition puts pressure on Britain

The pace and scale of strategic developments in the space domain has increased markedly in recent years. But, even by these new standards, the past week has been remarkable. Preparations for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) Artemis II lunar fly-by mission – now postponed – became a global story, echoing some of the public fascination with the original Cold War race to the Moon.

It has been over half a century since any human ventured beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and onto the lunar surface. For new generations, the cultural impact of repeating the feat will be considerable. The strategic consequences are bound to be even more important, because this time the US is returning to the Moon to stay – and, in time, build a lunar economy.

All this may sound abstract now, but in a few years, images of astronauts walking on the Moon again will create a new reality and open a new chapter in astropolitics. The coming decades will inevitably see vast developments in space exploration, with the Moon likely at their centre. Britain opts out of a major role in this only at its peril.

This week’s announcement of the merging of SpaceX with xAI, with a view to build vast Artificial Intelligence (AI) training datacentres in orbit, confirms the immense stakes at play in the space domain – and the fact that the UK, as an aspiring space power, cannot wish them away. Technological and industrial advancements, such as ultra-heavy lift reusable rockets and megaconstellations, have unlocked a new strategic logic in this limitless arena which links AI, energy, dataflows and the global economy and security. The ability to launch orders of magnitude more mass into orbit enables, for example, the build-out of huge space-based solar farms that solve the energy problem limiting progress on Earth, or of other large infrastructures, including on the Moon.

The industrial and operational challenges will be huge, but Starlink has proved they can be managed. Space development will continue at an increasing pace, irrespective of the ultimate fate of any individual company.

This reality is now prompting a dramatic surge in European space spending. Germany, in particular, will pour €35 billion (£30 billion) in military space capabilities within the next five years. But, in Singapore this week, Maj. Gen. Michael Traut, head of German Space Command, made surprisingly explicit statements about Berlin acquiring counterspace systems to ‘disrupt’ hostile satellites.

Space weapons are no longer taboo, or marginal, but an open and urgent subject on the international defence agenda. Britain needs its own, and needs them quickly.

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Welcome to the 74th Cable, our weekly roundup of British foreign and defence policy.

On Friday, 23rd January, the United States (US) published its new National Defence Strategy (NDS), which reiterated the core message from its National Security Strategy released in late November 2025. The documents are clear; America is reorienting its strategic priorities towards Western Hemispheric security and the Indo-Pacific, and away from the Euro-Atlantic and the Middle East. The NDS also outlines the role that the US administration expects its allies to play in this new strategy – namely to take ‘primary responsibility’ for their own ‘conventional defence, with critical but more limited American support’.

While this transformation has been telegraphed for quite some time, the United Kingdom (UK) and its European allies and partners are not in a position to assume this primary responsibility effectively. This situation was made even clearer by the news last week that HMS Richmond, one of the Royal Navy’s Type 23 frigates, will likely be decommissioned by the end of 2026, leaving Britain with only six operational frigates and no new vessels expected to enter service before late 2028.

In an increasingly contested geostrategic environment, and with growing demands on the British Armed Forces, His Majesty’s (HM) Government should prioritise defence – in particular its naval forces – to enhance European security to the best of the UK’s abilities.

Welcome back to The Cable!

• On 28th January, Sir Keir Starmer, Prime Minister, flew to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the first visit by a British leader in over seven years. The trip will focus on boosting economic ties between the world’s second and sixth largest economies, and comes just days after HM Government approved the planning permission for the PRC’s so-called ‘mega-embassy’ in London. In an interview on 26th January, Sir Keir stated that he will not ‘choose between the US or China’ critiquing previous governments’ positions on the East Asian giant, stating ‘for years we have blown hot and cold…We had the golden age, which then flipped to an ice age. We reject that binary choice.’

• Air Chief Marshal (ACM) Sir John Stringer has been appointed North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR). The role is always held by a British representative, reflecting the UK’s central position in the alliance and its ‘NATO-first’ approach. ACM Stringer will take over from Adm. Sir Keith Blount in March 2026, who has held the position since July 2023.

• The Ministry of Defence (MOD) has announced that seven industry partners have been invited to bring forward their designs for ‘loyal wingman’ drones, which will accompany British Army helicopters. Known as Project NXY, these drones will work alongside Apache attack helicopters to perform a variety of complex tasks, such as reconnaissance and surveillance in contested areas, strike and target acquisition, and Electronic Warfare (EW). The project is expected to reach initial operational capability in 2030.

• Last week, a senior official responsible for the Ajax armoured vehicle programme in the MOD was removed from his post following a ministerial review which revealed that ministers were not fully informed of known safety concerns before the platform was declared safe for use. The future of the Ajax programme, already over budget and behind schedule, will be decided in the coming months. This comes after a number of soldiers became ill due to noise and vibrations during a training exercise in November 2025.

• On 21st January, the Prime Minister hosted Prabowo Subianto, President of Indonesia, at 10 Downing Street, following the signing of a New Strategic Partnership between the two countries. This partnership will focus on four strategic pillars: economic growth, climate and energy, defence and security, and people and society.

• On 13th January, several HM Government departments launched a joint call for a ‘fully-developed Counter-Unmanned Aerial System (C-UAS) solution’ to detect, track and identify threats using systems which are at a technological readiness level of eight or above. Interested suppliers will be required to submit their Expression of Interest by 30th January.

  For additional defence news stories, follow this link to the DSEI Gateway news portal.

• Ed Miliband, Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, was in Germany on 26th January for the Future of the North Seas Summit, where he signed a clean energy security pact – the Hamburg Declaration – with nine other European countries. The ten nations, including France, Germany, the Netherlands and Norway as well as the UK, will pledge to build 100 Gigawatts (GW) of joint offshore wind projects, including ‘offshore wind hybrid assets’ – wind farms at sea that are directly connected to more than one country through interconnectors. Miliband stated that the deal would ‘transform’ the North Sea into the world’s largest ‘clean energy reservoir’.

How competitors frame Britain

• The Global Times reported on comments made by Guo Jaikun, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson on the upcoming visit of Sir Keir to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Jaikun stated that ‘in a turbulent and volatile world, China and the UK, as permanent members of the UN [United Nations] Security Council, will benefit the world and the two countries themselves by stepping up exchanges and cooperation. For a warmer relationship between the two countries, Beijing must act as a responsible nation on the world stage.

• TASS released propaganda stating that the Coalition of the Willing’s primary objective is to ‘preserve the former Nazi regime within the remaining Ukrainian territory…and build a frontline of containment against Russia based on Ukraine.’ Russian state media is once again trying to shift the blame for the Kremlin’s current predicament onto Ukraine’s allies and partners.

Addressing the 56th World Economic Forum in Davos, Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada, counselled the world’s ‘middle powers’ – those nations that rely on multilateral safeguards for their security – to relinquish their fidelity to the ‘rules-based international order’. Instead, he urged them to embrace a ‘variable geometry’ of coalition building to protect their interests.

Given the mentions of ‘American hegemony’, it is clear that Carney’s speech was targeted at the administration of Donald Trump, President of the US. For this reason, the speech was roundly applauded; some analysts have even described it as one of the seminal geopolitical speeches of the modern era. Yet, upon closer scrutiny, the argument paradoxically exhibits the very deficiencies that the Canadian Prime Minister himself identifies.

One must question where the true responsibility for the erosion of the rules-based international order lies. While Trump is hardly exempt from criticism – especially in relation to his behaviour over Ukraine and Greenland – Canada and most European states have failed to maintain the essential instruments of national power – specifically, robust armed forces – needed to deter non-compliance. Rather than maintaining their defences, Canada and most European countries stepped back from geopolitics. They appealed to the rules-based international system, significantly reduced their defence budgets, and exposed themselves to exploitation.

Instead of demilitarising in tandem, their rivals, such as Russia and the PRC, merely stepped forward to fill the vacuum. This is most evident in the South China Sea, where the PRC has mounted a series of territorial seizures over islands and low-tide elevations, as well as in Europe, where Russia felt free to annex parts of Ukraine before mounting a full-scale invasion.

The UK began to acknowledge the necessity of a new strategic paradigm in 2021 with the publication of the Integrated Review. This document interrogated the efficacy of the rules-based international order, asserting that ‘a defence of the status quo is no longer sufficient for the decade ahead’. If Britain is to succeed in the 21st century, it must not only accept this rationale but extend it significantly. Rather than clinging to an outmoded multilateralism, the UK should prioritise minilateral frameworks founded upon shared strategic interests.

Yet, Britain must go still further; even interest-based minilateralism remains ineffectual without the requisite strength and will to underpin it. As a large advanced economy and nuclear-weapon state commanding a prime geographic location and strategic footholds around the world, the UK should reject calls for modesty – specifically the nomenclature of ‘middle-power’ status – and reclaim the mindset of a pivotal power.

As the old international order crumbles, Britain requires both the material capability and the political resolve to provide leadership. Absent this foundation, Carney’s ‘variable geometry’ risks succumbing to the very same infirmities that dissolved the rules-based international order.

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Welcome to the 73rd Cable, our weekly roundup of British foreign and defence policy.

Since the start of the year, tensions over Greenland have ratcheted up following renewed demands from Donald Trump, President of the United States (US), to take control of the world’s largest island from Denmark – a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) ally. The United Kingdom (UK), Denmark and six other European countries now face 10% tariffs from Washington, following their vocal support for Greenland’s self-determination.

In response to this development, Sir Keir Starmer, Prime Minister, gave a speech on 19th January, during which he called for ‘calm discussion between allies’ and remarked that the threat of tariffs against allies are ‘completely wrong’, before highlighting that the UK and US are ‘close allies and close partners. That relationship matters profoundly’.

Threatened militarily by the regime of Vladimir Putin, President of Russia; facing increasing geoeconomic challenges from the People’s Republic of China (PRC); and now with the decades-old transatlantic defence apparatus under strain, Britain and its European allies have an urgent need to increase defence spending and harden their societies to ensure their security in a new age of geopolitical fragmentation and competition.

Welcome back to The Cable!

• Britain and Ukraine marked the first anniversary of their 100 Year Partnership by announcing several new initiatives focused on enhancing Ukrainian security. This includes a £20 million package of energy infrastructure support to bolster Ukrainian energy security following the intensification of Russian attacks on Ukraine’s energy sector, and the expansion of a school twinning programme. On the anniversary, Yvette Cooper, Foreign Secretary, said:

  Our support for Ukraine as it continues to resist Putin’s barbaric war is steadfast, and our ongoing support for energy security and resilience will help to keep the lights on and Ukrainian homes warm when vulnerable civilians need it most.

• Sir Keir met Karol Nawrocki, President of Poland, on 13th January at 10 Downing Street to discuss bilateral relations between the UK and Poland. They agreed that both nations would deepen their relationship, including security cooperation in areas such as ‘enhanced training’ initiatives and an agreement to ‘explore the development and procurement of new capabilities to counter a range of air threats’. Turning to Ukraine, the two leaders agreed on the importance of securing a just and lasting peace, and will continue discussions around security guarantees to Kyiv as part of the Coalition of the Willing.

• The Ministry of Defence (MOD) has announced that new accommodation and specialist training facilities at the Duke Gloucester Barracks will benefit the 13 Signal Regiment, who deliver defensive cyber operations for the British Army. The £279 million contract will also see the barracks house the Army’s Cyber, Information and Security Operations Centre, which will protect networks from cyber threats – both at home and overseas on exercises and operations.

• The UK and Sweden are set to enhance bilateral defence cooperation in the Baltic and the Wider North to combat the growing security risks in both regions. In a speech on 13th January, John Healey, Secretary of State for Defence, outlined the threat Russia poses to both countries, and highlighted the activities of Britain and Sweden to counter these challenges. These include efforts to support Ukraine, increased activity by the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) and Sweden’s accession to NATO in March 2024.

• The Foreign Secretary gave a statement on Greenland and wider Arctic security to the House of Commons on 19th January. In her speech, she highlighted His Majesty’s (HM) Government’s position, firstly that the future of Greenland is a matter for ‘Greenlanders and the Danes…alone’, and secondly that the threat of tariffs against allies is unwarranted and counterproductive. Finally, Cooper stated that Arctic security is a ‘shared concern and a shared responsibility for both sides of the Atlantic’, which can only can only be addressed and maintained through ‘cooperation between transatlantic allies’.

• Last week, the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ) announced a ‘record’ 8.4 Gigawatts (GW) of offshore wind capacity secured during ‘Europe’s biggest ever offshore wind auction’. This auction round, known as Contracts for Difference AR7, will secure enough clean electricity to power the equivalent of 12 million homes.

How competitors frame Britain

• Dmitry Peskov, Press Secretary of the President of the Russian Federation, gave a statement in which he claimed that the UK’s position on Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is ‘of a destructive nature’. This was in relation to reports that France, Germany and Italy wish to ‘resume dialogue with Russia on Ukraine.’ Only Russia’s actions could be described as destructive in nature, as it is the Kremlin which has launched a war of conquest against its neighbour.

• TASS reported on a statement made by Andrey Kelin, Russian Ambassador to the UK, claiming that ‘British plans to intercept Russian vessels effectively represent a return to the age of piracy. Kelin warned that the UK ‘has long ceased to be the “ruler of the seas”, and its actions will not go unpunished.’ Russia only has itself to blame for the actions being taken by Britain and its allies and partners, and the Kremlin has a continuous track record of interfering in the activities of other states.

Show me the money

On 12th January, Air Chief Marshal (ACM) Sir Richard Knighton, Chief of the Defence Staff, was questioned by the Defence Select Committee. One of the key themes of the session was the issue of defence funding, arising from reports of a £28 billion funding gap over the next four years. While many of the UK’s European allies have laid out their fiscal plans for reaching 3.5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) spending on defence by 2035, Britain is yet to do so. The Defence Investment Plan was supposed to be published in autumn 2025, but continues to be delayed by several factors.

Despite these troubles, it is important to note one thing: for the first time in decades, planners in the British Armed Forces can work on the assumption of more investment to come. Defence spending has already grown (albeit not by much), with the expectation that it will hit 2.6% of GDP in 2027.

Yet, these incremental increases are not fit for the strategic context the UK faces. They may have been adequate a decade ago, but Britain now needs to go further and faster to restore its hard power capabilities.

Within European NATO, the UK risks losing the position of influence it has traditionally held, although its nuclear arsenal ensures this can only fall so far. Just a few years ago, Britain was the second highest defence spender in European NATO as a percentage of GDP. Now, it is no longer even in the top ten. Where European allies are rapidly expanding and deepening capabilities, the British Armed Forces face numerous capability gaps, which look set to linger for the time being.

ACM Knighton faced a difficult challenge in explaining delays, and made many good points. In particular, he noted that it is more important for the Defence Investment Plan to be good than for it to be published as soon as possible, and that defence planners can only spend what HM Government is willing to give them.

Given all the geopolitical shocks to date, it is difficult to imagine what sort of disaster it would take for HM Treasury to change its mind on allocated budgets.

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Welcome to the 72nd Cable, our weekly roundup of British foreign and defence policy.

In recent months, the United States (US) has made it clear that it intends on strengthening its strategic position in the Western Hemisphere. In December, the Trump administration released the latest National Security Strategy, which placed significant emphasis on tackling the challenges of migration, crime, and securing access to critical resources in Latin America and the Caribbean. This has been backed up by the raid into Venezuela by American forces to capture Nicolás Maduro, the deposed President of Venezuela, on 3rd January, and renewed interest in acquiring Greenland.

However, the American operation last week to seize the Marinera, a Russian-flagged oil tanker in the North Atlantic – with support provided by the United Kingdom (UK) – and the threats of intervention made by Donald Trump, President of the US, to the Iranian regime in response to the killing of protesters in the nation show that American retrenchment is not as set in stone as it may seem.

Welcome back to The Cable!

• On 7th January, John Healey, Secretary of State for Defence, provided an update to the House of Commons on the UK’s assistance to the US military operation to intercept the Marinera tanker in the North Atlantic. This entailed the use of British bases by American forces and the deployment of UK assets, including airborne surveillance and RFA Tideforce. Healey went on to update the House on British support for Ukraine.

• On 8th January, Sir Keir Starmer, Prime Minister, held calls with Donald Trump, President of the US; Mark Rutte, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO); and Mette Frederiksen, Prime Minister of Denmark, following the White House’s continued desire to exert control over Greenland. In these calls, the Prime Minister discussed the importance of security in the Wider North and the threat posed by Russia in the region.

• His Majesty’s (HM) Government has announced that the UK will develop a new ‘tactical ballistic missile’ to boost Ukraine’s long-range capabilities. In November 2025, it launched a competition – under the name Project Nightfall – to develop a ‘ground-launched ballistic missile with a range of more than 500 kilometres and designed to operate in high-threat battlefields with heavy electromagnetic interference’. The deadline to receive Nightfall development proposals is 9th February 2026, with development contracts aimed to be awarded in March 2026.

• On 9th January, Maj. Gen. Phil Prosser CBE was appointed as the next Chief of Defence Logistics and Support (CDLS), in the rank of Lieutenant General. As CDLS, Maj. Gen. Prosser will be responsible for ‘overseeing the continued implementation of the Defence Support Strategy, the delivery of strategic military logistics and support advice, and, as the Functional Owner, developing, cohering and assuring support across defence’. He will take up the position from October 2026.

• Sir Richard Knighton, Chief of the Defence Staff, appeared before the House of Commons Defence Committee on 12th January, where he stated that Britain is ‘not as ready as we need to be for the kind of full-scale conflict we might face’. This comes more than six months after HM Government published its Strategic Defence Review, detailing its core priorities and requirements for bolstering the military. Reporting by The Financial Times suggests that the Ministry of Defence (MOD) believes it will need an ‘additional £28 billion to meet its costs over the next four years’ which has prompted a delay to the publication of the Defence Investment Plan.

  For additional defence news stories, follow this link to the DSEI Gateway news portal.

How competitors frame Britain

• TASS reported on a statement made by Maria Zakharova, Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, where she claimed that ‘Brussels, London and others have been dismantling the existing system of regional security in Europe in favour of throwing the changing balance of power their way…where the European colonial powers supposedly dominate the region [and are] openly hostile towards Russia.’ The only imperial power in Europe is Russia, which is now nearly four years into a war of conquest against its neighbour Ukraine.

• Russia Today released propaganda following the news that British and other European nation’s forces could be deployed to Ukraine following a ceasefire. The article states that the Kremlin has warned that ‘foreign units would be treated as “legitimate targets” and that plans by Kyiv’s backers would amount to outside intervention.’ The only reason why British and allied troops would be deployed to Ukraine is to ensure that it remains a safe and sovereign nation on the world stage.

Developments between the Coalition of the Willing and Ukraine

On 6th January, during the meeting of the Coalition of Willing leaders, only two leaders demonstrated genuinely decisive leadership: the host of the summit – Emmanuel Macron, President of France – and Sir Keir.

Together with Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of Ukraine, they signed a Declaration of Intent to deploy units of their armed forces on Ukrainian territory within the framework of Multinational Force – Ukraine (MNF-U).

The Multinational Force is envisaged to be deployed ‘to create stable conditions for a lasting peace and for Ukraine’s sovereignty’, subject to a critical condition: its activation would occur ‘following the achievement of an agreement on a ceasefire in the armed conflict caused by the Russian Federation against Ukraine.’

Importantly, under international and domestic legal interpretations, the Declaration of Intent constitutes an official request by Ukraine for military assistance aimed at ‘supporting Ukraine’s security and defence forces in preventing armed aggression by third states.’

The next step should be the establishment of a dedicated negotiating group tasked with drafting a signature-ready international agreement. Such an agreement would formally codify the parties’ commitments, including the size, mandate and legal status of British and French personnel and equipment deployed on Ukrainian territory. Crucially, the framework would also allow for the participation of additional states.

The question of what contingent the UK and France might deploy to Ukraine remains open. There is no official binding figure at this stage. Macron has indicated that France could send several thousand troops, while HM Government has so far refrained from providing a concrete number.

At the same time, sources cited by The Times report that the United Kingdom is preparing to deploy up to 7,500 troops, with the combined British-French contingent potentially reaching around 15,000 personnel.

In any case, a lengthy process of political coordination and legal ratification still lies ahead. Sir Keir has previously stated that any decision to deploy British forces to Ukraine following a ceasefire would require a vote in the House of Commons. Comparable parliamentary requirements apply in France.

The UK went even further, however, and three days after the Coalition of the Willing meeting, Healey was already in Kyiv to sign a 2026 defence cooperation roadmap and meet with Ukrainian authorities.

Strengthening Ukraine’s air defence and ensuring sustained supplies of ammunition for these systems remain a core priority. In parallel, Britain and Ukraine agreed to advance joint strategic projects in the fields of air defence and long-range strike capabilities.

The UK has also confirmed plans for Ukraine to reach a production rate of 1,000 Octopus interceptor drones per month starting in February. In addition, the parties discussed prospects for localising the production of Gripen fighter aircraft, which incorporate technologies developed by British companies.

Particular attention was devoted to strengthening security in the Black Sea. It is reasonable to assume that this discussion also covered coordination between the UK and Ukraine on countering the so-called ‘shadow fleet’.

Finally, the two sides discussed preparations for the upcoming ‘Ramstein’ format meeting scheduled for February. Beyond this, Britain also engaged with Ukrainian counterparts on preparations for a potential meeting with American representatives, which could take place as early as next week.

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Welcome to the 71st Cable, our weekly roundup of British foreign and defence policy.

2026 looks set to be another eventful year in international relations with the geopolitical environment looking ever more unstable and uncertain. The United Kingdom (UK) faces numerous challenges, both from revisionist countries such as the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Russia, Iran and North Korea – the so-called ‘CRINK’ nations – and from a United States (US) which continues to refocus its efforts away from the Euro-Atlantic.

What is clear is that we are witnessing a transformation of the free and open international order. Reminders about the need to possess hard power capabilities in an uncertain world will continue to be reinforced. In this new era, Britain should focus on building up its military power while also enhancing its national resilience to sub-threshold and economic warfare. Tectonic shifts are afoot and the UK must prepare itself for this new world.

Welcome back to The Cable!

• Sir Keir Starmer, Prime Minister, gave a statement on 3rd January in response to American military action in Venezuela. He stated that the UK has long supported a ‘transition of power’ in the Latin American country, but reiterated His Majesty’s (HM) Government’s commitment to upholding international law. However, a number of Labour Members of Parliament (MPs) have criticised the US administration’s actions, most prominent among them being Dame Emily Thornberry, Chair of the Commons Foreign Affairs Committee.

• On 3rd January, the Prime Minister spoke to Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of Ukraine, during which the leaders welcomed American efforts to ‘push for a just and lasting peace’. Sir Keir also paid tribute to the Ukrainian people and discussed the ongoing work to ensure a multinational force could deploy to Ukraine in the days following a ceasefire.

• The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) issued a statement following the PRC carrying out large-scale military drills around Taiwan on 29th and 30th December. An FCDO spokesperson said:

  China’s military exercises around Taiwan…increase cross-strait tensions and the risk of escalation. A peaceful Taiwan Strait is critical to global prosperity and the UK economy. We consider the Taiwan issue one to be settled peacefully…without the threat or use of force or coercion.

• The Ministry of Defence (MOD) announced that the Royal Air Force (RAF) carried out strikes in Syria against Daesh in a joint operation with France over the weekend. The strikes, which form part of the UK’s ongoing counter-terrorism operations in the region, successfully targeted an underground facility.

• Last month, TheCityUK, a financial sector advocacy organisation in London, launched a Defence and Resilience Group (DRG), which aims to ‘leverage the UK’s financial sector’ to tackle funding and investment barriers in defence. The DRG is set to focus on Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) within the ‘defence and dual-use arena’, with the intention of scaling them up to enhance the UK’s ‘defence capability and national resilience’.

  For additional defence news stories, follow this link to the DSEI Gateway news portal.

• HM Government has signed a £52 million contract with Germany as part of a joint procurement deal for the RCH 155 Self-Propelled Gun module to bolster the UK’s artillery capabilities following the transfer of the British Army’s AS90 systems to Ukraine. The deal will see Britain receive an Early Capability Demonstrator (ECD) platform of the RCH 155, with two more going to Germany for joint testing. Additionally, the UK and Germany will share test data and facilities, accelerating procurement timelines and reducing costs. The RCH 155 will be mounted onto Boxer armoured vehicles, and is expected to enter service by 2030 at the earliest.

• According to new data released by Cornwall Insight, an energy market consultancy, a ‘record number’ of renewable energy projects in Britain received planning approval in 2025. These new battery, wind and solar projects are set to provide 45 Gigawatts (GW) of capacity once operational, almost double the capacity approved in 2024. This increase was primarily driven by a rapid expansion of battery storage and healthy growth for offshore wind projects.

How competitors frame Britain

• TASS released propaganda claiming that Britain and the so-called Coalition of the Willing were ‘involved’ in the supposed ‘attempted strike’ on the state residence of Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, in the northwestern Novgorod region of Russia. The article claims that ‘Western’ countries provided ‘target coordinates and flight instructions’ for the drone strikes. Not only has this story been met with scepticism in many European capitals, it is Russia which is guilty of bombing its neighbour continuously and has, on multiple occasions, attempted to assassinate its leader.

• On 27th December, Russia Today published an article claiming that British defence exports saved the UK economy from ‘bankruptcy’, which explains why HM Government is ‘uninterested in a peaceful settlement’ of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The piece concludes by reiterating a Kremlin talking point that Britain and its European allies are risking ‘sparking a wider conflict on the continent’ by pursuing ‘rabid militarisation’. Russian state media continues to blame European countries for escalating tensions, but it is the Kremlin which has raised the risk of further conflict via its invasion of Ukraine and sub-threshold activities against European nations.

Venezuela, not a ‘green light’, but two warning lights

The recent US actions in Venezuela – the capture of Nicolás Maduro – has led to an outpouring of commentary on the issue. One of the most common themes from commentators in free and open countries, but especially in the UK and Europe, has been that this action serves as a ‘green light’ for assertive autocratic regimes to be even bolder in their aggression. This overlooks the fact that the good behaviour of free and open countries has extremely limited impact on the aggression of adversaries compared to more significant factors such as the balance of hard power capabilities and judgements on willpower. Rather than a ‘green light’, recent events in South America have shown two very different warning lights.

The first of these is another reminder – if one was needed – that the supposed ‘rules-based international order’ is a relic of a bygone era. This of course assumes it ever existed: there are strong arguments it was never the rules, but the dominance of the combined economic and military might of free and open countries which kept the general peace, rather than an inherent love of the rules. The action in Venezuela is yet another signal that military capability is of growing importance on the international stage. For a continent which allowed its military capabilities to atrophy, this should further reinforce the urgency of rebuilding hard power – an urgency some, such as Poland, have to their credit understood.

The second warning light is one which adversaries will take serious note of, far more so than believing this action could legitimise their own aggression. The American action is a real-world demonstration of incredible military competence. This operation required a perfect combination of intelligence, power projection, operational know-how, and the logistics to underpin all of the above. The fact that the US military was able to fight their way into the capital of Venezuela and then capture and exfiltrate the President of the country, all without the loss of life of a single American life nor the loss of any military equipment, is remarkable. Even if Venezuela is no military giant, this is still impressive.

Demonstration of military competence is far more useful for deterrence than unbacked moral grandstanding.

Of course, big questions remain to be answered. Especially those related to the endgame the US hopes for, or whether the resources allocated to this operation could have better served American interests elsewhere. Additionally, the fact this episode has been followed by renewed US rhetoric towards desires on Greenland is deeply troubling. The UK and European partners should be clear that going after a hostile, illegitimate and terrible dictator is one thing, but that an act of aggression against a longstanding and supportive ally is totally different. Such talking points would be better reinforced by bringing meaningful hard power to the table than by citing international law.

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Welcome to the 70th Cable, our weekly roundup of British foreign and defence policy.

On 26th November, Rachel Reeves, Chancellor of the Exchequer, unveiled her second autumn Budget since Labour came into power in July 2024. The Budget focused on new taxation and benefit reform, with limited time given over to defence. However, in her speech to the House of Commons, Reeves did reaffirm last year’s commitment to increase defence spending to 2.5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 2027. The document also included multiple references to defence spending being a catalyst for economic growth.

Nevertheless, raising the defence budget to reflect the worsening geopolitical environment accurately continues to prove financially and politically difficult. An issue was highlighted by the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR), which calculated that for Britain to reach the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) target of spending 3.5% of GDP on defence by 2035, it would cost the United Kingdom (UK) an additional £32 billion in today’s money.

Welcome back to The Cable!

• On 25th November, Sir Keir Starmer, Prime Minister, co-chaired a meeting of the Coalition of the Willing with France and Germany. Also in attendance were Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of Ukraine; Marco Rubio, Secretary of State of the United States (US); and representatives and leaders from 35 other countries. In the meeting, the co-chairs reiterated support for a peace deal in Ukraine, but underlined that it would only be acceptable, and lead to a just and lasting peace, with Kyiv’s full involvement, long-term security guarantees and borders that remain unchanged by force.

• The Ministry of Defence (MOD) has announced it has halted the use of the Ajax armoured fighting vehicle after more than 30 soldiers were taken ill during recent exercises using the Ajax due to vibrations and intense noise. This comes after the MOD declared the vehicle was at Initial Operating Capability (IOC) on 7th November.

• The UK Space Agency has announced that it is investing £6.9 million into five British-led satellite communications (SATCOM) projects under the European Space Agency’s (ESA) Advanced Research in Telecommunications Systems (ARTES) programme. The projects will include work on satellite refuelling, advanced 5G networks, and optical and lunar communications. This announcement comes ahead of the ESA’s Ministerial Council on 26th-27th November, where further financial commitments will be negotiated.

  For additional defence news stories, follow this link to the DSEI Gateway news portal.

• Earlier this week, HMS Severn, a River class Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV), intercepted two Russian warships, the RFN Stoikiy and Yelnya, transiting the Dover Strait in the English Channel. This follows the reemergence of the Russian spy vessel Yantar last week and John Healey, Secretary of State for Defence, labelling its movements as ‘deeply dangerous’.

• According to reporting by Sky News, the UK’s military chiefs, led by Sir Rich Knighton, Air Chief Marshal, held a ‘very difficult’ meeting with senior MOD officials this week to discuss funding to rebuild the British Armed Forces. Reports have shown growing concern over a gap between the promises made by His Majesty’s (HM) Government and the reality of the size of the defence budget.

• The Nuclear Regulatory Taskforce has published the final report of its Nuclear Regulatory Review 2025, which calls for a ‘radical reset’ to reverse the ‘relative decline’ of the UK’s nuclear industry. The report highlights the ‘overly complex nuclear regulatory system’, which has made Britain the ‘most expensive place in the world to build nuclear projects’, and includes 47 recommendations aimed at simplifying and streamlining regulation in the UK’s nuclear industry.

How competitors frame Britain

• Andrey Kelin, Russian ambassador to the UK, stated on Rossiya-24 that the UK continues to ‘live in a fantasy world’ in regards to Ukraine. He said that Britain’s strategy of supplying weapons to Kyiv and continuing sanctions on Moscow is ineffective, as it misunderstands what is happening on the frontline and in wider negotiations. Kelin concluded that ‘London is currently living in a world of political illusions’, as the UK constantly ‘twists things for their own benefit’. Britain’s one concern is to ensure peace and independence for Ukraine and will continue to pursue that goal.

• The Global Times published a piece on the upcoming approval of the new Chinese embassy in London, labelling the delays to the project as unnecessary and contradictory. It argues the latter by highlighting that the UK continues to ask to ‘accelerate its own project in China while indefinitely delaying China’s lawful application in London’. The article goes on to dismiss all concerns over espionage risks as unsupported accusations that ‘veer into the absurd’. The threat to British interests from Beijing are far from absurd and any delays in approval reflect this.

Fallen stars: US Navy cancels the Constellation class

Earlier this week, the US Navy cancelled the Constellation class, its current frigate programme. Of the more than 20 ships planned, only the first two will be completed.

The Constellation programme is a warning of how good defence procurement ideas can be undone. It is also a lesson in taking brave decisions to cancel a programme which is not achieving what was needed, going back to the drawing board, and avoiding a sunken cost fallacy. The decision also opens an opportunity for the UK to attempt to muscle in with its own frigate designs.

On paper, the approach taken to the Constellation class was correct. The US needed Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) platforms capable of operating in a high-threat environment in and around its Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs). After the Cold War, it saw little need for ASW capabilities, but Russia modernised its submarine fleet and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has invested heavily in catching up.

Now the US needs ASW frigates, and quickly. The decision was taken to go for an ‘off the shelf’ design of over 20 frigates, to be modified to fit American equipment. This saw the FREMM (Franco-Italian frigate design) selected, where the plan was for around 20% modification to the base design. This would have helped to keep costs down and do away with time-consuming design phases, allowing production to start as soon as possible.

Unfortunately the programme quickly ran into problems. Limited shipyard capacity and a shortage of workers were always going to constrain construction. Additionally, constant design tinkering – ongoing even while construction was underway – led to far more changes than envisioned. Rather than 80% commonality and 20% modification, the design had morphed closer to the inverse. Delays and cost-overruns led to the programme to be scrapped.

Now, the US must go back to the drawing board for its ASW. Time will be even more of the essence. Britain should seriously consider whether it could persuade America to select the Type 31 or Type 26 design. There are a host of advantages (e.g., Aegis is already integrated on some Type 26 designs, and the Type 31 can be built relatively quickly and for relatively low cost), but also a number of drawbacks for each option. And competition will be tough; Japan, South Korea, and a suite of US companies will be looking to offer solutions.

Though by no means a shoe-in, there is an opportunity for HM Government to show its new partnership with industry in action, and present a united front in pushing for a British-American frigate partnership.

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Welcome to the 69th Cable, our weekly roundup of British foreign and defence policy.

As Europe’s security environment worsens, exemplified by recent incursions into North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) countries airspace and an increase in espionage and sabotage across the continent, the House of Commons Defence Committee has published a report on the United Kingdom’s (UK) contribution to European security. A critical assessment, it claims that Britain, is ‘nowhere near’ ready to defend itself, its overseas territories and allies from a military attack.

The report highlights that the UK remains reliant on the United States (US) and is not spending enough on its own security. It calls for ‘readiness’ as a key objective, preparing the defence industrial base for extended collective defence and initiating national conversations on national security. Tanmanjeet Singh Dhesi, Chair of the Defence Committee, said ‘wars aren’t won just by generals, but by the whole of the population getting behind the Armed Forces and playing our part.’

The report also argues that while the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) and National Security Strategy (NSS) should be commended for their ambitious goals, they need further detail on prioritisation and capability trade offs to deliver His Majesty’s (HM) Government’s NATO-first approach.

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• On 13th November, Yvette Cooper, Foreign Secretary, hosted Andrii Sybiha, Foreign Minister of Ukraine, to discuss the next steps of the UK-Ukraine 100-year partnership. Ukrainian recovery was underlined as a priority for British security, with HM Government pledging £5.2 million to fund critical national infrastructure, such as hospitals and roads.

• MI5 has issued a new espionage warning following reports of Chinese spies posing as recruitment agents on Linkedin, in a ‘widespread’ operation to access UK government information. A letter was sent out to Members of Parliament to warn them of ‘relentless attempts’ to interfere in British sovereign affairs.

• The Ministry of Defence (MOD) has scoped 13 disused oil refineries and chemical plants for redevelopment into explosives and ammunition factories. It has done so as part of a £6 billion programme to increase munitions and energetics production in support of NATO-wide rearmament plans.

• On 13th November, the MOD launched a £50 million funding opportunity for the development of novel blood products, to improve emergency trauma care and address critical blood challenges. The outcomes of this funding opportunity are expected to be published by Spring 2027.

  For additional defence news stories, follow this link to the DSEI Gateway news portal.

• On 18th November, the United Nations Security Council voted to adopt the US resolution for the Gaza peace plan presented by Donald Trump, President of the US. Following the vote, Cooper called for international cooperation to increase humanitarian aid to Gaza.

• The Department for Energy Security and Net Zero announced a new Energy Resilience Strategy to set out priorities for safeguarding critical energy infrastructure, such as cables and substations, against evolving risks. The strategy follows a fire at the National Grid’s North Hyde substation, which led to widespread disruption at Heathrow Airport.

How competitors frame Britain

• Russia Today released propaganda this week claiming that Britain ‘can’t afford peace in Ukraine’ as it needs war to conceal economic stagnation, fill political vacuums and restore international relevance. The article claims that the war in Ukraine continues ‘not because diplomacy is impossible, but because London has built a political and economic machine that depends on conflict.’ This is another clear example of Russia avoiding blame for its own actions.

• Following recent reports of MOD staff being instructed not to discuss sensitive topics or connect work devices to People’s Republic of China (PRC) made Electric Vehicles (EVs). The Global Times released a response this week implying that British preventative measures amount to ‘presumptions of guilt’ and do not stem from security but ‘discomfort and alert towards China’s technological leadership’. It claims that free and open nations, unable to win in market competition, have to resort to using ‘national security’ as a trade weapon. Beijing is once again attempting to deflect from the legitimate security risk it poses to free and open nations.

Is the UK SAFE?

Ongoing negotiations between the UK and the European Union (EU) for London to join the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) defence fund are stalling. Britain has offered to pay 1% of Brussels’ initial demand of £5.8 billion, Brussels has countered this offer with a reduction to £1.7 billion. A significant cut, but still considerably more than what the UK appears to be willing to pay.

Agreement before the 30th November deadline is looking unlikely. For starters, there are entrenched internal EU divisions. Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands have reportedly warned that not reaching an agreement would send retrograde signals to Russia. Whereas other countries, supposedly led by France, argue that the UK should not be allowed to benefit from EU schemes without making the necessary contributions or abiding by the common rules: and of course that competition with British firms for contracts is not desired by many European countries out to defend the interests of their own industry.

The UK, for its part, has been keen to stress the importance of signalling collective strength to Russia and contributing to European (rather than limited to just EU countries) defensive autonomy.

It is also important to note that lack of access to SAFE does not lock British industry out of defence contracts with EU allies, or SAFE funded programmes for that matter. As it stands, EU countries can already spend up to 35% of rearmament funds with UK defence companies, if the deal with SAFE goes through this increases to 50%, a 15 percentage point difference. Additionally, SAFE – if fully utilised – only accounts for 10% of total expected EU defence expenditure. These factors are reflected through statements given by UK officials, one of which was quoted as saying ‘It is not reasonable for the UK to pay additional costs to the EU just for the privilege of our industry supplying EU customers’ equipment at market prices.’

The long story short is this: while access to SAFE is preferable, especially as a way for British firms to achieve a competitive advantage against other non-EU countries seeking to do defence business in the EU, this is only if it comes at a much, much lower cost. Britain would otherwise face the prospect of paying money into a pot it has no guarantee of getting anything out of. It is worth highlighting that if the £5.8 billion the EU is asking for was simply spent by HM Government on its own defence needs, this would guarantee an economic return.

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Welcome to the 68th Cable, our weekly roundup of British foreign and defence policy.

Last week, Sir Keir Starmer, Prime Minister, flew to Brazil to take part in the United Nations (UN) Climate Change Conference (COP30), which began in Belem on 10th November. In a speech delivered at the World Leaders Summit in the days leading up to COP30, Sir Keir warned that the consensus on tackling climate change ‘is gone’, but that the United Kingdom (UK) remains committed to its climate goals. He also urged global leaders to ‘strengthen international collaboration’ to mitigate global warming.

However, with the leaders of the world’s three largest polluters – the United States (US), the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and India – not in attendance, and coupled with the worsening geopolitical environment, the likelihood of greater global cooperation on the climate looks less likely than it did when the Paris Accords were signed ten years ago.

Welcome back to The Cable!

• Following a spate of incursions into Belgian airspace by suspected Russian drones, His Majesty’s (HM) Government has announced that Britain will provide military support to deter further violations. The incursions into Belgian airspace follow similar incidents across European nations including Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Germany.

• Last week, the UK-led Carrier Strike Group 2025 (CSG2025) arrived in the Mediterranean Sea, via the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, following its deployment to the Indo-Pacific. CSG2025 is now participating in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) Exercise FALCON STRIKE. This is an Italian-led large-scale air and maritime exercise, where Britain will integrate its air and maritime forces while working in support of NATO.

• On 7th November, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) announced that the Ajax armoured fighting vehicle has entered Initial Operating Capability (IOC), with this key delivery milestone meaning that it can now deploy a squadron on operations. Ajax will replace the Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance (Tracked) (CVR[T]) family of vehicles, which first entered service in 1971. The British Army has 589 Ajax vehicles on order, which will form the ‘heart’ of both the Armoured and Deep Recce Strike Brigades.

• On 5th November, the Royal Navy put out a tender to acquire 20 Uncrewed Surface Vessels (USVs) to support training and enhance its ‘tactics, warfare and capability development’. The project, codenamed ‘BEEHIVE’, is part of the Royal Navy’s plans to expand its surface fleet into a hybrid force of crewed and uncrewed vessels. Project BEEHIVE is expected to run between February 2026 and February 2028, with successful candidates receiving £10 million in funding from UK Defence Innovation.

  For additional defence news stories, follow this link to the DSEI Gateway news portal.

• New figures released by the MOD have revealed that the British Army has seen a 38% decline in new recruits over the past year, compared to 2019-2020. The data also showed that the number of recruits failing to complete basic training has also risen from around one in four to one in three over the same period.

How competitors frame Britain

• Russia Today released propaganda this week claiming that Ukraine, with the support of the British intelligence services, planned to ‘steal a MIG-31 fighter jet’ from Russia to create a diplomatic incident by flying the aircraft over a military air base in Romania. The article states that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) ‘foiled the plot’, and that the operation was organised by Ukraine ‘in coordination with the UK’s MI6’. The usual spiel from the Russian security apparatus, who see British operatives in every shadow.

• Following recent reports that academics from a British university were prevented from carrying out research in the PRC, the Embassy of the PRC to the UK released a statement rejecting these claims. The spokesperson said that ‘China firmly opposes activities by any institution or individual to slander and smear China by fabricating falsehoods and spreading lies’. The statement concluded by claiming that the researcher was part of a ‘disgraceful political campaign’ to ‘defame’ the PRC. This is clearly the latest example of Beijing forcibly censuring investigations into human rights abuses taking place in Xinjiang.

The Joint Expeditionary Force and Ukraine

Ukraine’s accession as the first ‘Enhanced Partner’ of the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) represents a positive strategic development. It is the logical next step in the growing and deepening bilateral partnership between the UK and Ukraine. It formalises a relationship built on successive agreements and practical support, further embedding Ukraine within the Euro-Atlantic security architecture while enhancing military interoperability.

The geostrategic implications of this decision are significant. As a British-led coalition of ten nations, the JEF has, until now, focused on Northern Europe and the Baltic Sea. Ukraine’s admission as an enhanced partner, however, fundamentally extends the JEF’s strategic geography by linking the Baltic to the Black Sea. As the Baltic and Nordic states are drawn south, two of Europe’s most important and contested maritime areas are now connected.

Ukraine’s participation, in effect, also mirrors the JEF’s original intent. When established, it was conceived not only as a rapid-reaction force in defence of NATO, but also as a means to enhance NATO ties with Finland and Sweden – then non-NATO partners. Admitting Ukraine – a non-NATO country with unparalleled contemporary experience in high-intensity warfare – as an enhanced partner reinvigorates this original mission. Drawing Ukraine closer to the JEF may prepare it more effectively for NATO membership.

But Ukraine’s admission as a new partner also throws up new questions. As originally conceived, the JEF was to be explicitly expeditionary; it was to provide a platform for close British allies – such as Estonia, which had been under British command in Afghanistan – to continue to operate and gain experience alongside the British Armed Forces when they deployed overseas.

As the JEF’s nuclear custodian, the UK will remain central. But as the grouping links the Baltic and Black seas closer together, it is transcending its original purpose. Today’s JEF is starting to act as NATO’s outer bulwark or praetorian guard: the most agile and politically responsive ‘first responder’ to potential Russian aggression.

This begs two vital questions: Has the time come to rebrand the JEF as the Joint Deterrence Force? After all, its strategic objective is now unambiguous: it serves to harden NATO’s long eastern front. And after Ukraine, could additional countries be invited to join as Enhanced Partners – such as Poland, Romania and Germany?

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Welcome to the 67th Cable, our weekly roundup of British foreign and defence policy.

The Department for Business and Trade announced on Friday 31st October a new policy to cut industrial energy costs for the United Kingdom’s (UK) ‘most energy-intensive businesses’. British industries, including steel, chemicals, cement, glass and paper, will benefit from a 90% discount on their electricity network charges from April 2026, providing savings for these companies of up to £420 million per year. These industries are also set to receive support as part of the British Industrial Competitiveness Scheme in 2027. Such measures aim to bring industrial energy prices in Britain ‘in line’ with other major European economies to keep the UK industrial sector competitive on the global stage.

His Majesty’s (HM) Government’s support for industry is welcome, as sustaining Britain’s heavy industry is critical for national security, which forms the foundation of national power. From ensuring sovereign capabilities in a more competitive world to securing the supply chains and skilled workforce required for Britain’s defence sector, it all starts with industrial capacity.

Welcome back to The Cable!

• During her visit to the Arabian Peninsula last week, Rachel Reeves, Chancellor of the Exchequer, announced trade and investment deals with Saudi Arabia worth £6.4 billion. These new deals build on the £4.1 billion secured at last month’s UK-Saudi Great Futures Summit in London, bringing the total value of trade and investment agreements signed in recent months to over £10 billion between the two countries.

• Britain and Germany have signed a contract for new bridging equipment. The deal will see the UK purchase 36 large amphibious bridging vehicles produced by General Dynamics European Land Systems (GDELS) in Germany, which help to transport troops and heavy equipment. Germany, in turn, will buy a number of General Support Bridge (GSB) systems made in Britain.

• During his visit to Doha, John Healey, Secretary of State for Defence, signed a new defence agreement with Qatar. The agreement sees the UK and Qatar commit to increasing interoperability between their armed forces. While in Qatar, the Defence Secretary also joined Sheikh Saoud Bin Ali Al-Thani, his Qatari counterpart, in co-chairing a discussion covering the latest security developments in the region.

• Airbus confirmed last week that the company will open a new facility in the UK specifically targeted at supporting small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in the space sector. The so-called ‘Airbus Launchpad’ is expected to open early next year in Stevenage, and aims to stimulate innovation and the creation of new technologies in the space sector. The facility will be supported by the UK Space Agency’s Space Clusters Infrastructure Fund, with £50 million set aside for space research and infrastructure projects.

  For additional defence news stories, follow this link to the DSEI Gateway news portal.

• The Royal Navy confirmed the successful test of an experimental quantum optical atomic clock called ‘Tiqker’, marking the first time such a device has been operated underwater. The trial saw Tiqker placed on XV Excalibur, an uncrewed testbed submarine, which performed a number of dives and other manoeuvres. Quantum technologies will provide improved Precision, Navigation and Timing (PNT) for submarines, which cannot always rely on Global Positioning Systems (GPS) for navigation, therefore allowing submarines to remain submerged for longer periods of time. Technology such as Tiqker also provides a precise onboard reference for other critical submarine systems such as sonar, fire control, and secure communications, improving mission performance.

• The Department for Energy Security and Net Zero published its Carbon Budget and Growth Delivery Plan on 29th October, which sets out how the UK will continue to reduce emissions in line with the 2008 Climate Change Act. This includes: working with private companies to invest more in clean energy, to deliver 400,000 extra jobs in the green energy sector by 2030; and upgrading 5 million homes through the Warm Homes Plan.

How competitors frame Britain

• TASS reported on comments made by Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Security Council, where he stated that ‘the more money the Western world spends supporting [Ukraine], the worse the outcome will be for the regime of the bloodthirsty Kiev clowns and, eventually, the more land will return to Russia’. Britain and its allies have only one goal from their support of Ukraine, ensuring that the country remains a sovereign and free nation on the world stage.

• Russia Today released propaganda last week, calling into question whether the UK and France should remain nuclear powers due to their ‘unstable governments’ and ‘long declines’. The piece goes on to say that the world ‘should be discussing how to limit their [Britain and France’s] capacity for geopolitical mischief’. An interesting take for a country which regularly engages in nuclear sabre rattling and is currently waging a war of conquest against its neighbour.

Britain enhances its relationship with Vietnam

For observers of last week’s meeting between Sir Keir Starmer, Prime Minister, and Tô Lâm, General Secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party, the headline was surprising: the UK and Vietnam have upgraded their relationship to a ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’. This would seem to be a significant step in the language of relationships between the two countries, implying not only a broad scope relationship relating to trade and investment, but also to regional security. The line in No. 10’s press release provided more grist for the mill: ‘they reiterated their commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific’. For those unfamiliar with such terms, there is a very subtle hint that the two nations align with each other, as well as allies and partners such as Japan, Australia, and the United States (US) against the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

Such language was possibly one of the strongest top-level drivers of the visit. The second was economic growth – a major part of HM Government’s agenda. While Britain and Vietnam are already linked through a bilateral free trade agreement and the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the full trade gains have not been fully realised – some allege due to the opaque rules that govern Vietnam’s economy. But here again, both countries sought deliverables in finance, investment, trade, technology and green energy – with the two committing to a UK-Vietnam annual dialogue mechanism between business leaders and senior government officials.

There was also a politically charged commitment to come down on illegal migration of Vietnamese nationals to Britain, fast-tracking the removal of non-legal migrants, and cracking down on human trafficking gangs that charge migrants between £15,000 and £35,000 to make the trip to the UK – Vietnamese migrants coming over from France on small boats made up the fourth largest group in 2024. The exchange of biometric data and cooperation between security forces is perhaps a sensitive one, given the continued nature of Vietnam as a one-party (communist) state, but such is the domestic pressure in Britain on this issue that Sir Keir has been keen for some symbolic gains in this area.

For some, the question will be where does the relationship go next? There are real questions about the sustainability of the UK’s defence posture in the Indo-Pacific. However, Vietnam does present a close regional partner (alongside the Philippines) inside the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), providing a glimpse of where Britain will likely drive the relationship.

For Vietnam, there is much to be gained by having powerful friends in Europe, and with ties to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). However, it is likely to continue prioritising advanced technology trade as it seeks to move up the value chain. Time will tell whether this flourishing bilateral relationship continues, or runs into speedbumps.

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Welcome to the 66th Cable, our weekly roundup of British foreign and defence policy.

On Monday, 27th October, Sir Keir Starmer, Prime Minister, visited Turkey for bilateral talks with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, President of Turkey. During the visit, the two leaders signed a deal worth up to £8 billion for Turkey to buy 20 Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jets from the United Kingdom (UK). The deal is the largest ‌fighter jet export deal for Britain since Saudi Arabia purchased 72 Typhoons in 2007. This news comes as part of a concerted effort by His Majesty’s (HM) Government to secure investment from key partners in the Middle East, with Rachel Reeves, Chancellor of the Exchequer, flying to Saudi Arabia and Qatar this week to advance negotiations for a free trade agreement with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which could add £1.6 billion annually to the British economy.

Securing Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is a critical pillar of HM Government’s policy to deliver economic growth, with the UK having joined the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), while signing new trade agreements with the United States (US) and India since the Labour government came to power in July 2024.

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• On Friday, 24th October, the Prime Minister and Emmanuel Macron, President of France, co-chaired a virtual meeting of the so-called ‘coalition of the willing’, which was attended by Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of Ukraine. The leaders attending the meeting gave their support to Donald Trump, President of the US, who recently called for the current line of contact to be the starting point for any ceasefire talks and introduced new sanctions on Russian oil and gas. They also reiterated their support for Ukraine and the need to increase economic pressure on the Russian economy, including further steps to take Russian fossil fuels off the global market. Finally, they stated their determination to put in place robust arrangements for Ukraine’s future security, so that it can deter and defend against future aggression.

• Britain hosted a summit of Western Balkans countries in London on 22nd October to promote regional cooperation on issues of security and growth. The leaders of six Balkan nations met with Sir Keir, Kaja Kallas, European Union (EU) Foreign Policy Chief, Friedrich Merz, Chancellor of Germany, and diplomats from several other European nations to discuss migration, organised crime, security and economic growth in the region. During the summit, the UK announced its plan to extend its participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)-led peacekeeping force in Kosovo until the end of 2028.

• NATO’s Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) has opened a £2.7 million Counter-Uncrewed Aerial Systems (C-UAS) procurement project, following a spate of airspace incursions by Russian drones into NATO nations. The notice states that the C-UAS solutions will be required to include a ‘multi-sensor suite, omnidirectional electronic and cyber countermeasures, and Command and Control integration’. These C-UAS solutions will be deployed to support a range of missions, including convoy protection, critical infrastructure protection and border protection. Alongside this, Britain is advancing its own procurement of C-UAS, with the Ministry of Defence (MOD) announcing plans to develop ‘advanced (C-UAS) capabilities from UK manufacturers’ while also enhancing drone deliveries for the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

  For additional defence news stories, follow this link to the DSEI Gateway news portal.

• John Healey, Secretary of State for Defence, gave the Lord Mayor’s Mansion House Defence and Security Lecture on 20th October. In his speech, he made it clear that the UK finds itself in a ‘new era of threat’, which requires a focus on ‘hard power, strong alliances and sure diplomacy’. To achieve this, the Defence Secretary outlined four key ways in which Britain was rising to the challenge: increasing defence spending; providing support for Ukraine; enhancing relations with allies and partners; and developing industrial strength in the UK while also modernising and innovating so that NATO remains ‘ahead of our adversaries.’

• To commemorate the one-year anniversary of the Trinity House Agreement with Germany, Healey hosted Boris Pistorius, his German counterpart, at RAF Lossiemouth on 23rd October. The visit demonstrated the growing cooperation between Britain and Germany in the air and on the sea, with the two defence ministers joining an operational flight on one of the RAF’s Poseidon P-8A maritime patrol aircraft. The countries have also agreed to work more closely on cyber security, including introducing mechanisms to enhance data sharing, intelligence and operational tools securely with each other and NATO allies.

• The Telegraph reported on the announcement by Cornish Lithium that the company has produced lithium hydroxide from Cornish granite rock at one of its mines for the first time. Lithium hydroxide is a key material in the production of battery-grade lithium. The resource was produced from a mine near St Dennis, which is on course to begin ‘full-scale production’ in 2029, producing around 10,000 tonnes of lithium hydroxide a year. Another mine near Redruth is also expected to begin production in 2027. The combined mines will be able to supply around 20% of the UK’s lithium needs, helping Britain reduce its dependence on Chinese sourced lithium – which makes up more than 60% of global supply.

How competitors frame Britain

• TASS reported on comments made by Rodion Miroshnik, the Russian Foreign Ministry’s ‘ambassador-at-large for crimes of the Kyiv regime’, in which he claimed that the coalition of the willing is united ‘only by desire to continue conflict in Ukraine’, and stating that European nations wished to continue ‘pumping weapons into Ukraine’ to ‘compensate’ for the loss of American support in arming Ukraine. A typical retort from the Kremlin; the coalition has stated that it supports a ceasefire along the current battlefront, and it is Russia that refuses to come to the negotiation table.

• The Embassy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to the UK released a statement in response to the recent publication of HM Government’s 57th Six-monthly Report on Hong Kong. A spokesperson for the Embassy said that Beijing ‘firmly opposes the UK’s fabrication of the so-called report, which…meddles in China’s internal affairs’. The statement concluded by warning Britain to ‘abandon its colonial mindset, respect facts and stop interfering in Hong Kong affairs, which are China’s internal affairs. Otherwise, it will only bring further humiliation upon itself’. Yet another example of Chinese disregard for the One Country, Two Systems agreement, which was supposed to be in place for 50 years. Britain has every right to raise concerns over Beijing’s increasingly autocratic rule over Hong Kong.

The Russian Northern Fleet’s renaissance

Despite the jibes made by Mark Rutte, Secretary General of NATO, at the expense of the Novorossiysk, a Russian Kilo class submarine, earlier this month, the Russian Navy poses a credible and growing threat to European NATO – particularly the UK, which sits directly in its line of sights down the Norwegian Sea from its main base in Murmansk.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviet Union built up a formidable fleet, initially the brainchild of Adm. Sergey Gorshkov. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the vast majority of this fleet lay in disrepair and saw little activity and little investment. Yet, this has changed fundamentally since the late 2000s, buoyed by investment made possible by lucrative Russian hydrocarbon exports.

Indeed, the naval balance between European NATO and Russia at sea is arguably the worst it has been since the 1970s, when Gorshkov’s programme caught NATO napping. Then, maritime supremacy was eventually rebuilt, in part under the leadership of John F. Lehman, Ronald Reagan’s Secretary of the Navy from 1981-1987. The post-Cold War decline of European naval power is well documented; Jeremy Stöhs, for example, has written extensively on this topic.

Even if the concerning struggles with warship readiness and personnel challenges were overcome, over half of the vessels in European navies were commissioned more than 15 years ago, and many of those which were recently commissioned are equipped for low-intensity operations (such as counter-piracy), not peer naval conflict. The fact that not a single European navy possesses a ship with Ballistic Missile Defences (BMD) is staggering.

While the US Navy brings immense capabilities to the table, there is a growing likelihood that European NATO would face the Russian fleet without American support were Washington to face a simultaneous Indo-Pacific contingency.

At the same time, Russia has undergone an impressive naval modernisation and expansion programme, though evidently not without its challenges. Moscow has 25 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) in its order of battle, with several more of the advanced Yasen class under construction. Most of its older Soviet-era boats have also received extensive refits.

Indeed, the Northern Fleet is bristling with literally hundreds of long-range strike weapons. Though Russia would face serious challenges in operating far from its Barents Sea ‘bastion’, Britain – as well as numerous vital Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) – is within range just a short sally from this stronghold.

For too long, NATO leadership has overlooked this Russian naval renaissance; a sentiment deepened by the initial poor performance of the Russian Black Sea Fleet against innovative Ukrainian tactics. However, these were Ukrainian tactics and Russian performance specific to that fleet in those conditions. No longer can European NATO assume it would have uncontested control of the seas in a conflict. Firm action is needed – in the words of Lehman when he initiated the Reagan-era naval buildup: ‘clear maritime superiority must be reacquired’.

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Welcome to the 65th Cable, our weekly roundup of British foreign and defence policy.

In response to a number of recent airspace violations by the Russian military on European countries on the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) eastern flank, His Majesty’s (HM) Government announced that Britain’s participation in NATO’s EASTERN SENTRY air policing mission will continue to the end of the year, to ‘continue to deter [Vladimir] Putin from further testing the alliance.’

In a demonstration of the United Kingdom’s (UK) resolve and deterrent capabilities, the Royal Air Force (RAF) revealed last week that on 9th October, two of its RC-135W Rivet Joint electronic surveillance aircraft flew a 12-hour mission along the Russian border to monitor NATO’s eastern border and gather intelligence. The mission, which saw the planes travel nearly 10,000 miles from the Wider North down to the Black Sea, was supported by a United States (US) Air Force KC-135 Stratotanker. This was followed last week by another RAF Rivet Joint intelligence gathering mission, in which the aircraft circled Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave.

As Russian provocation continues, Britain has enhanced its material support for Kyiv, investing £600 million this year alone to accelerate drone deliveries for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, with 85,000 military drones delivered by the UK to Ukraine in six months. While co-chairing the latest meeting of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group in Brussels on 14th October, John Healey, Secretary of State for Defence, called for allies to ‘ramp up drone production to outmatch Putin’s escalation’.

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• On 15th October, Yvette Cooper, Foreign Secretary, gave a ministerial statement to the House of Commons on Britain’s support for Ukraine. She reiterated that the UK will continue to stand with Kyiv, and condemned Russia’s actions and the Kremlin’s desire to escalate the conflict rather than negotiate its end. Cooper reinforced the idea that ‘Ukraine’s security is Europe’s security’ and the strategic necessity for London to ensure Kyiv succeeds. The Foreign Minister outlined four ways in which the UK is supporting Ukraine and will continue to do so: military aid, financial aid (including the potential to use frozen Russian assets), sanctions and other economic mechanisms to pressure Moscow, and long-term diplomatic support for Kyiv.

• Britain will transfer 12 RAF C-130J Hercules transport aircraft to Turkey for maintenance and modernisation following the conclusion of negotiations. The RAF retired the Hercules in 2023 with its replacement, the A400M Atlas, expected to have ‘full operational capability’ next year following the delivery of the last of the RAF’s 22 aircraft.

• Plans for a rare earths refinery to be built in East Yorkshire have been scrapped, with Pensana, the company behind the project, deciding to invest in the United States (US) instead. Pensana said market dominance by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has allowed it to keep rare earth prices low, making refining in the UK uneconomic without significant government backing, whereas the US is offering the sector more support. The project in East Yorkshire would have aided Britain in decoupling its supply chains from the PRC, which produces almost 90% of the world’s refined rare earth metals. A spokesperson from the Department of Business and Trade responded to the news by stating that while the decision was ‘disappointing’, HM Government will publish a new Critical Mineral Strategy soon to ‘help secure our supply chains for the long term’.

• The UK’s new Cyber and Specialist Operations Command (CSOC) revealed its blueprint for the British Armed Forces future Digital Targeting Web, which aims to improve battlefield decision making by ‘connecting sensors, effectors and decision makers into a system-of-systems’. Speaking at DSEI 2025, R. Adm. Paul Stroude, Director of Capability at CSOC, outlined that the Command, Communications, and Intelligence/Surveillance (C4ISTAR) architecture, which is the key requirement for the DTW, should cover ‘...data-centric security, zero trust architectures and data gateways that can operate across the entire defence estate to allow information to flow at machine speed, securely and seamlessly across classifications.’

  For additional defence news stories, follow this link to the DSEI Gateway news portal.

• The Department for Energy Security and Net Zero published its Clean Energy Jobs Plan on 19th October, which lays out HM Government’s new policy scheme to double the size of the UK’s workforce in green industries to 800,000 by 2030. The plan aims to develop a skilled workforce in the green energy sector, focusing particularly on training those coming from the fossil fuel industry, school leavers, the unemployed, veterans and ex-offenders. These include measures such as the establishment of five Clean Energy Technical Excellence Colleges across the country, investing £625 million and £100 million into a Construction Skills Package and Engineering Skills Package respectively, and the creation of the Office for Clean Energy Jobs (OCEJ) to coordinate these efforts.

How competitors frame Britain

• Russia Today reported on a speech made by Alexander Bortnikov, Director of the Federal Security Service of Russia (FSB), at an intergovernmental meeting of security chiefs in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. In his speech, Bortnikov accused Britain of ‘masterminding’ Ukraine’s recent campaign of long-range strikes against Russian energy infrastructure, and claimed that it is also planning ‘acts of sabotage’ against the TurkStream pipeline, which supplies Russian gas to Turkey and a number of European nations. He also stated that London has been guiding Brussels’ ‘anti-Russian stance’ and ‘obstructing diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict in Ukraine’. The UK’s support for Ukraine and its European allies is strictly defensive in nature, and Russia has only itself to blame for the European Union’s (EU) increasingly hostile stance to Moscow.

• Following the decision by HM Government to delay the approval of Beijing’s planned mega-embassy in London, Lin Jian, Spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, released a statement attacking the decision. Lin said that Britain has ‘shown a total lack of the spirit of contract, credibility and ethics, and has repeatedly put off the approval of the project citing various excuses…politicising the matter’. He concluded with a warning that HM Government should ‘fulfil its obligations…otherwise the consequences arising therefrom shall be borne by the UK side.’ It appears as though the mask has slipped for Beijing; Britain has many reasons to review the approval of the new embassy, and threats are unlikely to aid the Chinese case.

The PRC’s 15th Five-Year Plan and how it impacts Britain

This week, the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) started its fourth plenary session in Beijing. Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the CCP, delivered a work report on behalf of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee, and gave a speech on the draft proposals for the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030). These Five-Year Plans – and the Party machinations around them – sound dreadfully dull, but they have had a deep impact on British workers and British manufacturing, and will do so again. As free and open nations consider the PRC’s manufacturing domination and its stranglehold over rare earth minerals, these Five-Year Plans have become of great importance.

In essence, this Five-Year Plan is part of a critical phase in supporting the PRC’s stated goal of ‘basically achieving socialist modernisation’ by 2035. There are five objectives to this goal, with the first two directly impacting the UK. The first is transitioning towards high-quality growth based on domestic consumption and innovation (upgrading manufacturing technologies), while the second is making significant progress in critical technologies to become less dependent on foreign nations (assuming self-sufficient leadership in Artificial Intelligence [AI], quantum technology, advanced materials and other sectors).

In 2015, Beijing published the famous Made in China 2025 strategy. It was notable for having a two-pronged strategy, which many in free and open nations found alarming. Analysis by the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS), a German think tank, showed how the zero-sum strategy would bolster Chinese tech champions in the domestic market – while being disadvantageous to foreign firms – and boost Chinese champions to gain global market share.

Over the past 10 years, this has occurred across a number of sectors, including solar, telecommunications, lithium batteries, and Electric Vehicles (EVs) through the use of subsidies, non-market loans, credits and discriminatory access for local firms.

As we consider this week’s Five-Year Plan, we can anticipate that it will result in greater Chinese pressure on developed nations such as Britain for more ‘win-win’ economic trade, which will be designed to reap remaining UK technological assets aggressively, and seek a greater British market share for Chinese technological goods. As HM Government determines its own ambitions for innovation and growth, it should consider the following recommendations to help weather the next Five-Year Plan:

1. Firmly restrict the transfer or acquisition of UK companies in the 17 sensitive areas listed in the 2021 National Security and Investment Act, and widen the definition of a ‘national security threat’ to include protecting the future of British economic growth;

2. Seek opportunities to engage with the EU, Japan, and the US in World Trade Organisation (WTO) actions on glaring Chinese violations;

3. Promote collective action at the Group of Seven (G7) which looks at protecting G7 markets from Chinese dumping in strategic sectors;

4. Provide the new Industrial Strategy Advisory Council with briefings from the national security services on the PRC’s industrial strategy (and others); and

5. Increase the national security briefings and geostrategic training to Trade and Treasury officials who manage the economy – particularly on Chinese industrial and technological strategies.

For those interested in the potential downsides of this predatorial industrial system, ‘Chinese industrial policy, trade and the global order’, an Explainer by George Magnus published earlier today, explores its impacts in greater detail.

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Welcome to the 64th Cable, our weekly roundup of British foreign and defence policy.

Last week, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) tightened export restrictions for rare earth minerals, with foreign companies now requiring a licence from Beijing to export magnets which contain Chinese-sourced rare earth material. The new measures also restrict Chinese firms from sharing magnet-making expertise with foreigners.

This escalation has the potential to cause significant disruptions to global supply chains, as the PRC is responsible for almost 70% of rare earth mining worldwide, and enjoys a near monopoly on rare earth refining. It is being seen as the latest move by Beijing in the trade war between the PRC and the United States (US), especially with the upcoming talks between Donald Trump, President of the US, and Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). However, it also provides valuable data to Beijing on the vulnerability within often opaque supply chains.

For the United Kingdom (UK), these restrictions will impact a vast range of industries, but will affect the defence and automotive sectors in particular. His Majesty’s (HM) Government’s response should be firm and made alongside allies and partners. More than anything, however, these export controls demonstrate the overreliance on Chinese critical resources and the need to develop resilient supply chains to ensure that the PRC’s influence over Britain and its allies is readily reduced.

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• The leaders of the European Three (E3) nations – Britain, France and Germany – announced in a joint statement on 10th October that they are ‘ready to progress towards using…the value of the immobilised Russian sovereign assets to support Ukraine’ to bring Russia to the negotiation table. They added that the move would be made ‘in close cooperation’ with the US. Ensuring continued support for Ukraine has been a key element of British foreign policy since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, as a recent article by PISM, a Polish foreign policy think tank, demonstrates. The authors argue that the UK views Ukraine as a central pillar to European security and British defence policy, with London providing critical support to Kyiv and enhancing diplomatic and defence relations over the last few years.

• Sir Keir Starmer, Prime Minister, attended the signing ceremony of the Gaza Peace Plan in Egypt on 13th October, marking a potential turning point in the Middle East conflict. The Prime Minister announced £20 million of UK aid to provide water, sanitation and hygiene services for civilians across Gaza. Sir Keir also pledged Britain’s full diplomatic support to ensure the success of the peace plan, with the UK hosting a three-day conference on Gaza’s recovery and reconstruction starting on Monday 13th October.

• On 13th October, the Royal Navy announced that HMS Agamemnon had successfully completed its first dive during trials at BAE Systems’ Barrow-in-Furness shipyard. HMS Agamemnon is the sixth of seven Astute class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), with HMS Achilles, the final boat of the class, expected to enter service by 2029.

• The Ministry of Defence has issued a Request for Information (RFI) to industry for a fixed-wing drone capable of operating from Royal Navy aircraft carriers under Project VANQUISH. The Royal Navy is seeking to test the system, or Autonomous Collaborative Platform (ACP), at sea by the end of 2026. The information provided in response to the RFI will contribute to the future development of the ACP, which will be required to work with fighter jets on aircraft carriers and operate at high subsonic speed.

  For additional defence news stories, follow this link to the DSEI Gateway news portal.

• HM Government has announced the appointment of Rupert Pearce as the National Armaments Director (NAD). The NAD will implement the Defence Industrial Strategy and oversee a single new investment budget, consolidating eight separate procurement budgets across the organisation. Pearce previously was Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Inmarsat, a satellite telecommunications company, for nine years, and brings decades of private sector experience to the role. He has been appointed on a five-year fixed-term contract and started the position on 14th October.

• New research carried out by Ember, an energy think tank, showed that renewable energy overtook coal as the world’s leading source of electricity in the first half of 2025, making up 34.3% of global output while coal made up 33.1%. In a mid-year global electricity insight report, Ember stated that solar and wind growth exceeded global electricity demand growth in the first half of 2025, leading to a slight fall in fossil fuel generation. The latest data for Britain shows that in 2024, renewables made up 36% of the UK’s energy mix, with fossil fuels providing 34%.

How competitors frame Britain

• The Global Times published a response to the recent dropping of charges in the case of two men in Britain who were accused of spying for Beijing, stating that the incident was ‘political, not legal’. The article adds that anger at the decision in the UK does not ‘arise from a genuine concern for national security’, but rather because it has ‘stripped them of a convenient excuse to amplify the “China threat”’. The PRC might have got their way this time, but the threat to British interests from Beijing is both real and growing.

• TASS interviewed Andrey Kelin, Russian ambassador to the UK, in which he claimed that ‘London remains determined to bring the Kyiv regime into NATO [the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation] and deploy NATO strike capabilities on Ukrainian territory.’ He went on to state that Britain has been ‘fanning the flames’ of war following Russia’s full-scale invasion of its neighbour in 2022, with the goal of ‘inflicting a…strategic defeat on Russia.’ Britain’s support for Ukraine has always focused on ensuring the country remains a safe and sovereign nation, despite what the Kremlin says.

Why the UK-India deal matters for London

The UK-India relationship received a major bump this month as the two nations finalised a wide-ranging Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and several initiatives in technology and defence. The FTA is expected to boost bilateral trade by £25.5 billion annually, resulting in an added £4.8 billion boost to Britain’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) every year.

Furthermore, the Prime Minister said that nine British universities will open campuses in India – a neat way of maintaining the UK’s education-as-export strategy, while delicately tiptoeing around the migration issues which beset domestic British politics with overstays. Given India’s drift back towards Russia and the PRC, the strategic importance of the outreach cannot be overstated. Keeping India friendly is as much a good thing for the US and European Union (EU) as it is for the UK.

When it comes to Britain’s current foreign policy, India provides the answer to London’s ‘China problem’. That ill-fated relationship is once again in the news this week due to the allegations in The Telegraph that Jonathan Powell, National Security Adviser, leant on the Ministry of Justice and Prosecution to drop a criminal case against two alleged spies for Beijing.

The dissonance inside Whitehall over the PRC is nothing new; it has occurred previously and has long been driven by the conflict between trade and defence – the dilemma between guns and butter. However, India’s rise presents the UK with an alternative market, a diversification from Beijing’s economic embrace and a safer source of technology cooperation.

Indeed, it is odd that HM Government insiders make so much of Chinese investment. India is second only to the US as a top source of inbound investment, while the PRC is not even among the top ten. True, the relationship between London and New Delhi is not without its complications; the colonial era and visas remain ‘sensitive’ for both sides. And, in terms of strategic alignment, India is still some way from the UK’s hawkish position on Russia. Indeed, New Delhi has long held an oddly soft position on Moscow in the post-invasion of Ukraine era, increasing its oil imports some 35-40%.

Despite all this, the London-Delhi bilateral is moving forward, and HM Government is to be commended. The growth of military-to-military cooperation and defence trade are marked successes. The UK-India bilateral naval Exercise KONKAN has been taking place since 2004 and its 2025 iteration was notable in featuring Carrier Strike Groups from both navies. Furthermore, a modest £350 million deal to provide the Indian Army with short-range missiles has been inked, providing a tangible deliverable in trade.

When it comes to technology cooperation, there is much which can be done, but the two countries must build the right frameworks for cooperation – ties between universities and research centres. All of this is very promising, and certainly provides a safer alternative to Chinese technology cooperation, which seems to offer multiple security challenges for its partners.

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Welcome to the 63rd Cable, our weekly roundup of British foreign and defence policy.

On 2nd October, leaders from over 40 European countries descended on Copenhagen, Denmark, for the seventh European Political Community (EPC) Summit, which focused on enhancing European security following a growing number of air and drone incursions into European airspace.

Despite the increasing sub-threshold threat to European countries from Russia, the nations of the continent remain divided on how to enhance security and maintain support for Ukraine, with no decision being made on using frozen Russian assets in support of Kyiv, and the idea of a drone wall to protect Europe facing significant obstacles. While obfuscations persist, European countries will need to find common ground to ensure Russia cannot continue its campaign against free and open countries across the continent.

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• Details emerged last week that fighter jets from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) carried out simulated attacks on HMS Richmond, a Type 23 frigate, as it passed through the Taiwan Strait in September. HMS Richmond is part of the United Kingdom (UK)-led Carrier Strike Group 2025 (CSG2025), and entered the Strait alongside the United States (US) Navy’s USS Higgins, an Arleigh Burke class destroyer, as part of a freedom of navigation exercise. While the ships conducted the exercise, Chinese jets carried out ‘constructive kills’, which is when a fighter jet performs the manoeuvres necessary to launch an attack but stops short of launching a missile.

• Last week, His Majesty’s (HM) Government confirmed it has resumed negotiations for a UK-Greenland trade deal focused on seafood and critical minerals. Beneath Greenland’s territory lie 40 of the 50 minerals which the US Government designates as vital for national security, including uranium, copper, graphite, nickel and rare earth metals. While these resources remain mostly unexploited, interest in mining them is growing, with British firms currently holding a third of mining licences in the autonomous territory.

• The Ministry of Defence (MOD) has announced £2.5 billion in public funding to support defence skills and jobs in Scotland, which will include a new welding skills centre in Glasgow to create the workforce required to support the delivery of the Royal Navy’s fleet of submarines. The centre will initially be operated by Rolls-Royce Submarines, in partnership with Malin Group and Strathclyde University, with potential future capacity for other organisations.

• Both the UK and Germany are enhancing their space capabilities, with Berlin announcing that it will invest €35 billion (£26 billion) to bolster its space capabilities by 2030, while the MOD has revealed that it is developing new sensors which will be able to identify laser threats from adversaries to military and civilian satellites in space. This is in response to the rising threats in the space domain from Russia and the PRC, with Maj. Gen. Paul Tedman, Head of UK Space Command, recently revealing that Russia has been attempting to interfere with British satellites on a ‘persistent basis’.

  For additional defence news stories, follow this link to the DSEI Gateway news portal.

• Ed Miliband, Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, announced plans to introduce legislation to ban fracking for shale gas in England permanently. This was a pledge in the Labour Party’s 2024 manifesto, with Miliband stating that he wishes to introduce this legislation at ‘the earliest opportunity.’ While Britain is believed to have considerable reserves of shale gas, estimates vary as to how much could be economically viable to extract. The industry has been controversial in the UK for decades, with a moratorium on fracking in England first being introduced in 2019, and reinstated in 2022.

• On 5th October, CSG2025 started its participation in Exercise KONKAN with the Indian Navy in the western Indian Ocean. The four-day exercise focuses on increasing combined maritime and air capabilities between the Royal Navy and the Indian Navy, and marks the first time that British and Indian carrier strike groups will conduct maritime exercises together.

How competitors frame Britain

• Sputnik International published propaganda stating that the UK is compensating for its domestic problems by ‘fostering Russophobia’. The article further states that Sir Keir Starmer, Prime Minister, is ‘100% committed to continuing the Ukraine war until a military solution is found. Therefore, traditional Russophobia is coming to the forefront.’ A ridiculous claim from Russian state media; HM Government’s position focuses on ensuring that Ukraine remains a sovereign nation, secure from the imperialist ambitions of the Kremlin.

• Russia Today reported on a claim by Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) that Britain ‘is furious’ over its failure to inflict a ‘strategic defeat’ against Russia, and HM Government is preparing ‘new provocation’ in response. The SVR also claimed that pro-Ukrainian Russian fighters are receiving instruction in the UK on ‘sabotage training’ to cause a false flag incident on either a European port or civilian ship. The Russian intelligence community continues to delve further down the conspiracy rabbit hole – no surprises there.

Last weekend, the ANO Party (an acronym for ‘Action of Dissatisfied Citizens’ in Czech, but also translated literally as ‘yes’), led by billionaire Andrej Babiš, won the parliamentary elections in Czechia. ANO is described as a populist right wing party, and to achieve a majority it will require negotiations with other parties to form a coalition.

The direction of Czech foreign policy under Babiš is yet to be clarified. Coalition partners will have an impact, and Babiš himself has both criticised the extent of Czech support for Ukraine – including the lack of transparency of the Czech ammunition initiative – but has also attempted to ease concerns by emphasising that the ANO Party will be a reliable North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) partner. British-Czech relations are rarely given much limelight, so just how extensive are they?

Trade relations remain relatively limited. The total value of bilateral trade over the last year was around £10.7 billion, of which £3.6 billion was British exports to Czechia, and £7.1 billion was British imports from Czechia. This accounts for 0.6% of the UK’s total trade, and makes Czechia Britain’s 30th most significant trading partner. However, bilateral trade relations look set to grow in the coming years, driven by strategic factors rather than economic ones.

Although defence industrial relations have grown, this has been, for the most part, driven by British subsystems and components rather than direct exports. The only notable direct export has been the recent order for 18 vehicles from British company Supacat.

Yet, equipment with significant parts from UK-based businesses have seen real success in Czech defence order books. Prague signed a £1.7 billion deal with BAE Systems’ Swedish subsidiary to provide almost 250 CV90 infantry fighting vehicles, as well as announcing its intention to place a multi-billion pound order of 24 F-35A Lightning II Joint Combat Aircraft from the US; a design of which between 15-20% is British-built.

The UK and Czechia have also signed a deal which will see Rolls-Royce support the delivery of up to six Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) in Czechia, and also opens the way for joint delivery of further SMRs to other European countries.

Much more could be done with the bilateral relationship to build on existing ties. For example, Czechia is a participating country in the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), a NATO Corps with Britain as the framework nation.

Both the UK and Czechia are NATO leaders in counter Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) warfare, which provides options for potential routes the bilateral relationship could take. Czechia is one of only a handful of European countries to maintain a CBRN formation of regiment size or larger. This is an area ripe for deeper collaboration. Some degree of joint training and exercising already takes place, albeit infrequently.

Given the need to expand and modernise CBRN capabilities – the British Army’s TPz Fuchs vehicles have received upgrades, but they first entered service in 1990 – and that the two countries are arguably the best at counter-CBRN in Europe, collective procurement could help deepen bilateral ties and reduce costs for equipment which is highly specialised and therefore typically only ordered in small quantities.

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Welcome to the 62nd Cable, our weekly roundup of British foreign and defence policy.

On 28th September, Moldova held its parliamentary elections. The results showed a clear victory for the pro-European Union (EU) Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) with at least 50% of the vote, despite Russian efforts to destabilise the country. For the Kremlin, the defeat of its political allies is another nail in the coffin of its dream of maintaining control over countries once under Soviet occupation or influence, and putting pressure on Ukraine from its border with Moldova.

On the other hand, the result is a clear victory for the EU, which has invested significantly in Moldova in recent years. Likewise, with Chișinău beginning accession talks in 2024, this vote is another indicator that Moldova sees its future as part of Europe rather than a satellite of Russia.

There are many challenges still in store for the small republic, which is likely to face repercussions from the Kremlin. It will be up to the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and particularly the United Kingdom (UK) Germany and Poland, to guarantee Moldovan sovereignty, and in doing so, enhance their own credibility in the region.

Welcome back to The Cable!

• On 26th September, Sir Keir Starmer, Prime Minister, spoke with several world leaders:

  • Sir Keir called Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, President of Turkey, to discuss the ongoing crisis in the Middle East. The Prime Minister explained His Majesty’s (HM) Government’s decision to recognise a Palestinian state, and called for international partners from the region to ‘make practical progress’ to secure a pathway to peace and ensure the viability of a two-state solution.

  • Sir Keir hosted Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada, at 10 Downing Street, where they discussed Russia’s recent incursions of NATO airspace in recent weeks. Both leaders condemned the incursions into Poland, Romania and Estonia as ‘reckless’ behaviour, and reiterated the importance of intensifying international pressure on Russia. The pair also discussed their countries’ recent recognition of the State of Palestine and enhancing economic growth through the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).

  • The Prime Minister also hosted Anthony Albanese, Prime Minister of Australia, where they discussed their close bilateral ties. Both leaders stated their desire to explore opportunities to ‘harness Australia’s critical mineral reserves’ for both civilian and military needs. They also reaffirmed their commitment to AUKUS and support for Ukraine.

• HMS Somerset, a Type 23 frigate, announced the first successful test of the new Naval Strike Missile (NSM) at a Norwegian Arctic rocket range during‌ Exercise AEGIR 25. The NSM is set to replace the Harpoon missile system, providing increased range and precision capabilities. It will be deployed on a number of the Royal Navy’s current escort fleet and will later complement the heavier Stratus (previously called the ‘future cruise and anti-ship missile’) in next-generation naval vessels, such as the Type 26 frigate.

• Last week, David Lammy, Deputy Prime Minister, gave a speech at the United Nations (UN) Security Council meeting on Artificial Intelligence (AI), in which he stated that: ‘We must ensure AI strengthens peace and security’. After highlighting the multiple benefits which AI could bring, Lammy laid out the multitude of risks and challenges this nascent technology could also cause, from disinformation to new chemical and biological weapons. He then went on to call for additional safeguards and guardrails to be developed at the international level.

• The UK and Canada have begun negotiations to participate in the EU’s Security Action for Europe (SAFE) defence fund, a mechanism designed to enable common procurements among EU member and partner states. These negotiations will focus on the financial contributions which both nations will have to pay for access to the defence loans. While certain EU countries, such as France, call for higher contributions, others are keen to ensure Ottawa and London can participate in SAFE.

  For additional defence news stories, follow this link to the DSEI Gateway news portal.

• The European Three (E3) nations – Britain, France and Germany – have activated ‘snapback sanctions’ on Iran following the failure of Tehran to limit its nuclear programme, as stipulated in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement of 2015. In a joint statement by the E3, they regretted the need to reimpose sanctions on Iran, but urged all UN member states to implement them. The statement concluded by reiterating that the E3 nations will ‘continue to work with all parties towards a new diplomatic solution to ensure Iran never gets a nuclear weapon’.

• New data released by the Department of Energy Security and Net Zero shows the installed solar power capacity‌ in the UK. The data suggests that, as of the end of August 2025, there is a total of 19.6 gigawatts (GW) of solar capacity in Britain across 1,869,000 installations. Between August 2024 and August 2025, the UK saw solar capacity increase by 9.8%, a capacity increase of 1.7 GW. However, as approximately 68% of solar panels imported by Britain originate from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), this increase of capacity brings with it greater dependency on Chinese technology, which often contains parts produced using forced labour in Xinjiang.

How competitors frame Britain

• TASS reported on comments made by Dmitry Peskov, Press Secretary of the President of the Russia, in which he suggested that the future of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) should ‘begin between Moscow and Washington’ but should also consider the ‘nuclear arsenals of London and Paris’. Peskov explained his rationale by stating that Britain and France are ‘part of the overall problem of global European security and strategic stability’. At a time when Russian state media regularly threatens the UK with nuclear annihilation, perhaps Peskov should focus on his own country’s failures.

• At the UN General Assembly, Sergei Lavrov, Foreign Minister of Russia, stated that European countries have allowed Ukraine to ‘commit acts of terror, extrajudicial executions and reckless sabotage’ due to their obsession with the ‘utopian goal of inflicting a strategic defeat on Russia.’ Lavrov is up to his usual tricks, forgetting that it is his country which is engaged in a war of conquest. Britain, alongside a plethora of European countries, has no interest in defeating Russia; their sole occupation is preventing Ukraine from being violated by its aggressive neighbour.

Back to the future: Kremlin-NATO air incursions past and present

On the night of 9th-10th September, around 24 Russian drones entered Polish airspace. It is unclear whether this was by mistake or intentional, as this is not the first time Russian drones have entered NATO airspace during their bombardments of Ukraine. However, several days later, on 19th September, three (armed) Russian MIG-31s – a multi-role interceptor and strike aircraft – entered Estonian airspace for a total of 12 minutes. This incursion was undoubtedly intentional, and a provocative attempt to probe NATO responses.

Air incursions are nothing new, yet this recent case was brazen in its timing and duration. It has led to fresh questions about whether NATO’s current rules of engagement and response mechanisms are suitable.

During the Cold War, when tensions between the Kremlin and NATO were often high, it was understood that acts such as this were dangerous, and would undoubtedly lead to aircraft being shot down at a minimum. In fact, even outside of proxy conflicts such as the Korean or Vietnam wars, this did happen on occasion.

Famously, the Soviets shot down an American U-2 spy plane in 1960, but this was by no means the only incident. Some other examples include when the Soviets downed an American maritime patrol aircraft in 1950, and again in 1964 when an American RB-66 light bomber was shot down over East Germany (its navigation equipment had malfunctioned). There were even rarer cases of minor air skirmishes, such as a 1952 incident which resulted in a Soviet loss of multiple MIG-15 fighters, kept closely under wraps by both sides.

NATO and Warsaw Pact airspace was much more closely guarded during the Cold War, but the knowledge that incursions would most likely lead to aircraft being shot down meant both sides tended to avoid making incursions in the first place. This helped avoid the risk of escalation, and it is no coincidence that most incidents occurred in the early phases of the Cold War. There are lessons to be learnt.

To be clear, this does not mean automatically shooting down Russian aircraft the second they enter NATO airspace, but foreign armed aircraft loitering for several minutes violates allies’ sovereignty. The lack of a firm response only encourages further probing actions.

NATO should explore options for establishing firmer rules of engagement, to include shooting down Russian aircraft which do not immediately leave NATO airspace when instructed to do so. The alliance should also consider options for horizontal escalation, such as seizing one or more Russian ‘shadow fleet’ tankers, for example, in response to a provocation.

Risk tolerance in too many NATO members is concerningly low, which ironically increases risks by emboldening adversaries. It is time that old Cold War muscle memories were exercised once more.

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Welcome to the 61st Cable, our weekly roundup of British foreign and defence policy.

Last week, Donald Trump, President of the United States (US), travelled to the United Kingdom (UK) for his second state visit to the country. While in Britain, Trump met with His Majesty King Charles III, and was hosted by Sir Keir Starmer, Prime Minister, at Chequers. Following their meeting, the Prime Minister gave a speech emphasising the close bond between the two countries, describing what he called the ‘renewed special relationship for a new era’.

Alongside the political show of unity, a flurry of new bilateral deals were announced between the UK and US, including a package of investment into Britain worth around £150 billion, focused on clean energy, defence, science and emerging technologies. These include the Technology Prosperity Deal and the Atlantic Partnership for Advanced Nuclear Energy. This investment could be a critical injection of funding for the British economy, aiding in the development of key industries and deepening economic ties between the two countries.

The role of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in strengthening the UK’s economy was highlighted in a recently published a Report by the Council on Geostrategy as part of its Caudwell Strong Britain programme, entitled: ‘Fixing the foundations: Making Britain a more attractive destination for Foreign Direct Investment’. Read the Report for a greater understanding of the UK’s strategy to attract FDI.

Welcome back to The Cable!

• On 22nd September, Yvette Cooper, Foreign Secretary, made a statement condemning ‘Russia’s imperialist warmongering’ at the United Nations (UN) Security Council meeting, following Russian fighter jets violating Estonian airspace on 19th September. Cooper highlighted the ongoing escalation of Russian actions on the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) eastern flank, with drones entering both Polish and Romanian airspace in recent weeks. She went on to reiterate Britain’s ‘full solidarity’ with its NATO allies, before warning Moscow that its:

  reckless actions risk a direct armed confrontation between NATO and Russia. Our Alliance is defensive. Be under no illusion. We stand ready to take all steps necessary to defend NATO’s skies and NATO’s territory. We are vigilant.

• His Majesty’s (HM) Government has formally recognised Palestine. The move came following months of warnings by HM Government for Israel to end its military actions in Gaza.

• On 16th September, HMS Richmond, a Type 23 frigate, arrived in Manila, Philippines. As part of the port visit, Lord Coaker, Minister of State for Defence, met with representatives of the Government of the Philippines to discuss expanding defence cooperation between the two countries. Following the meeting, both countries have agreed to start negotiations for a Status of Visiting Forces Agreement (SOVFA), paving the way for military exercises between the two countries on each other’s territory.

• The Ministry of Defence (MOD) sourcing portal has issued a notice for a new medium surface Commando Insertion Craft (CIC) for the UK’s Commando Force. These platforms must support the Commando Force’s ‘surface manoeuvre’ and the military’s ‘littoral strike’ capabilities. Likewise, the craft must be able to embark, transport, disembark and operate a range of payloads including ‘commando teams, ultra-light vehicles, fires, offboard uncrewed systems and medium combat loads’.

  For additional defence news stories, follow this link to the DSEI Gateway news portal.

• On 22nd September, King Charles III participated in the commission ceremony for HMS Agamemnon, the Royal Navy’s latest Astute class nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN), at the BAE shipyard in Barrow-in-Furness. HMS Agamemnon is the sixth of seven Astute class vessels, with HMS Achilles, the final boat, under construction and projected to enter service in early 2029. In a separate ceremony, led by John Healey, Secretary of State for Defence, steel was cut on HMS King George VI, the fourth and final Dreadnought class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), marking the start of its construction.

• Last week, the European Council opened negotiations with Britain on its participation in the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) defence loan mechanism. SAFE will allow participating nations to borrow from its €150 billion (£130 billion) pot to support joint defence projects. For the UK, negotiations will focus on its entry fee and the limits of British defence firms in supplying the ‘total value of finished defence products’. HM Government welcomed the opening of talks, stating it was in the interests of both sides to ‘bring together our unique capabilities and expertise to make Europe a safer, more secure and more prosperous place’.

• Navantia, a state-owned Spanish shipbuilder, has confirmed that most of the construction of the first of three Royal Navy vessels (as part of the £1.6 billion Fleet Solid Support [FSS] programme) will now take place in Spain. In the original plans, the midsection of the first ship was to be built at the Harland and Wolff (H&W) Belfast shipyard, but due to these shipyards still ‘undergoing upgrades’, the midsection will now be built in Cadiz, Spain. The bow will still be built at the H&W Appledore facility in Devon. A spokesperson for the MOD confirmed that the final assembly of the three ships will still be done in Belfast.

How competitors frame Britain

• TASS interviewed Alexander Stepanov, military expert at the Institute of Law and National Security of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), in which he stated that the UK is ‘creating a military protectorate in Ukraine’. Stepanov argued that the ‘Paris-London axis’ was playing the ‘dominant role’ in obstructing the peace process between Kyiv and Moscow, with Ukraine losing its sovereignty due to its reliance on European allies in supporting its economy and military. More insanity from the Russian political class; Britain is supporting an ally invaded by its imperialist neighbour, which does, in fact, wish to turn independent Ukraine into a vassal state.

• Last week, following HMS Richmond and USS Higgins sailing through the Taiwan Strait, the People’s Liberation Army’s Eastern Theatre Command warned the UK and US that they were engaged in ‘trouble-making and provocation’, and their actions send ‘the wrong signals and undermine peace and stability’. Perhaps Beijing should look in the mirror and realise that its provocative stance towards Taiwan and its encroachment on its neighbours’ maritime territory is the true destabilising force in the region.

What does the alleged re-prioritisation of the US National Defence Strategy to the Western Hemisphere mean for Britain?

In May, Pete Hegseth, US Secretary of War, sent a memorandum to Elbridge Colby, US Undersecretary of War for Policy, tasking him to write the new National Defence Strategy (NDS). On 5th September, Politico published a piece predicting a major shift in direction in the upcoming NDS. While many were anticipating something akin to the PRC-focused strategy of the 2018 NDS, or something drawn from Colby’s 2021 book The Strategy of Denial, Politico alleged that three people briefed on the draft had stated it represented ‘a major shift for the US and its allies’.

The draft was said to lay more emphasis on national and Western Hemisphere (particularly Latin America) regional security than on the competition with the PRC. Right off the bat, this would seem to fit the desired drawdown of the US’ global commitments by elements of the American electorate, alongside the use of US military units to police the southern border and coerce Venezuela over alleged support to drug cartels. If one had to guess, it would seem that immigration has become the central principle deciding the future of American national security strategy.

It is certainly not about the balance of power in the international system, since Latin American power – even when aggregated – is only half that of the US. Asia, with 40% of global domestic product is – according to The Strategy of Denial – the world’s most consequential region.

It may well be due to the growing war which the Trump administration has declared on the drug trade, with cartels such as the Sinaloa Cartel and the Gulf Cartel recently being designated as ‘Foreign Terrorist Organisations’ by the White House. It has also used the US military to strike and sink three different vessels alleged to be engaged in drug trafficking.

What does this mean for Britain? In some ways, it contradicts the overall trend of US allies – in both the Indo-Pacific and Europe – to prioritise competition with the PRC and Russia. It might signal a downgrade in American global commitments, as well as a push for allies to take responsibility for security in their own regions – both worrying, if true.

On the other hand, it does represent some shared interests and opportunities for the UK and US to cooperate, since much UK-bound drug trafficking originates from Latin America as well. One might imagine the Royal Navy and US Navy cooperating more closely in the region on this. Nonetheless, counter-narcotics and immigration operations are peripheral to the broader strategic competition taking place, and were not even mentioned in June’s Strategic Defence Review. If the rumours about the NDS are true, this portends a lack of American leadership that would be a blow to Britain and its closest allies.

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Welcome to the 60th Cable, our weekly roundup of British foreign and defence policy.

On 10th September, Polish forces shot down at least 19 Russian drones which had entered the country’s airspace in what is being seen as an escalation by the Kremlin against the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). While the incursion thankfully led to no casualties, it highlights NATO’s limited counter uncrewed aerial system (C-UAS) capabilities – in particular those of European NATO allies – to respond to such a provocation without depleting already limited stockpiles of air defence missiles. Likewise, it is yet another example of Russia probing the political will and unity of both NATO and the European Union (EU).

So far, the political response has been strong, with NATO launching a new mission – EASTERN SENTRY – to enhance air, land, sea and cyber capabilities across the alliance’s eastern flank. His Majesty’s (HM) Government has announced that the United Kingdom (UK) will contribute Eurofighter Typhoon jets to join the mission alongside allied forces from Denmark, France and Germany.

However, the ability of European countries to produce the equipment and munitions for C-UAS remains an ongoing problem. More should be done to scale up the production of interceptor missiles, but cheaper forms of tackling the challenge should also be found. Anti-aircraft artillery and, in the near future, direct energy weapons, such as Britain’s DragonFire military laser will be essential for the security of Europe against an adversary which is willing to test the continent’s defences.

Welcome back to The Cable!

• Sir Keir Starmer, Prime Minister, spoke to a number of world leaders over the last week, which included:

  • On 11th September, the Prime Minister spoke with Emmanuel Macron, President of France, and Friedrich Merz, Chancellor of Germany, in separate phone calls. Both calls focused on Russia’s violation of NATO and Polish airspace, with all leaders involved agreeing that it was clear Moscow is ‘continuing to ramp up its aggression…through a campaign of increasingly belligerent actions’. In the call with Merz, Sir Keir underscored the importance of defending NATO from both conventional and sub-threshold threats posed by Russia. With Macron, the Prime Minister discussed how the UK and France could bolster Poland’s defences.

  • On 12th September, Sir Keir held a call with Karol Nawrocki, President of Poland, in which he congratulated the new President on his election. The Prime Minister also reiterated the ‘UK’s steadfast support to Poland and NATO’ following the incursion of Polish airspace by Russian drones.

• John Healey, Secretary of State for Defence, gave a speech at the Defence Investment Summit on 10th September, in which he laid out why Britain needs to enhance its defence industry. Using the drone incursion into Polish airspace as a case in point, Healey stated that: ‘we’re in a new era of threat. This demands a new era for defence.’ He went on to highlight that deterrence capability ‘rests…on the power of industry…when a nation is under threat, its forces are only as strong as the industry that stands behind it.’ The Defence Secretary also made the case for the so-called ‘defence dividend’, the need to reform the procurement processes in the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the necessity of developing a skilled workforce, all central factors in the recently published Defence Industrial Strategy. He concluded by saying:

  Defence is changing. Our relationship with business will change. We’re a government with a clear plan backed by record investment. We are opening new doors. We are bringing people together in new ways, and we are drawing on new talent and expertise. And together, we will provide not only the security we need today, but the prosperity that we need for tomorrow.

• New figures released by the MOD showed a 6% rise to £31.7 billion in expenditure on the defence industry by HM Government, with figures covering the 2024-2025 financial year. This includes a 21% uplift in investment in the weapons and ammunition sector. Following the announcement, Healey said:

  This record investment shows how we are making defence an engine for growth, supporting jobs and prosperity for British working people and boosting businesses across the United Kingdom.

• The MOD is set to launch a new Test and Evaluation (T&E) Marketplace to act as a hub for users to access T&E facilities and support services, while also giving industry a single ‘portal’ to promote their capabilities. T&E facilities are specialised facilities found across the UK, which are used to ensure defence systems are safe and reliable. The Marketplace is expected to launch by the end of 2026, but a pilot scheme will be rolled out earlier in the year with select industry partners.

  For additional defence news stories, follow this link to the DSEI Gateway news portal.

• On 15th September, the MOD announced that the UK’s largest drone production facility will open next year in Swindon, at the cost of £400 million. The new factory, operated by Tekever, will allow for ‘large-scale production’ of Tekever platforms in Britain – including the Royal Air Force’s (RAF) StormShroud capability. The site will support the full drone production lifecycle, ‘from rapid prototyping to manufacturing and research and development.’

• The UK and the United States (US) will sign a new multi-billion pound deal to ‘turbocharge the build-out of new nuclear power stations’ and create a ‘new golden age’ of nuclear power during the state visit to Britain by Donald Trump, President of the US, starting on 16th September. The Atlantic Partnership for Advanced Nuclear Energy will ease regulation barriers to allow companies to build new nuclear power stations at a faster rate in both countries, and cut the average licensing period for nuclear projects from up to four years to two. The announcement also revealed at least five new commercial nuclear projects to be developed between British and American energy companies, which include up to 12 Advanced Modular Reactors in Hartlepool and Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) for data centres to be built in Nottinghamshire.

How competitors frame Britain

• TASS reported on a statement made by Andrey Kelin, Russian Ambassador to the UK, in which he claimed that HM Government has been ‘unable to provide…evidence of Russian military involvement in launching drones into Poland’. Kelin stated that Kyiv might have carried out the incursion as a ‘false flag operation’ before asserting that Moscow ‘has no interest in escalating tensions…with NATO’. The Kremlin is up to its old tricks again; feigning innocence and acting like the victim is a tried and tested method for Moscow, but its actions can only be considered as aggressive and escalatory.

• Following the announcement that the Crown Prosecution Service has dropped charges against the two British individuals accused of spying for the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Chinese Embassy to the UK released a statement, claiming that the entire case was ‘fabricated and malicious slander’. It went on to warn ‘certain individuals in the UK to stop this kind of self-staged anti-China political farce’. While this case has been dropped, Beijing is not an innocent actor, having been accused of spying and other means of subterfuge against the British state.

The Pacific Future Forum: Enhancing British collaboration with Japan

By Hirohito Ogi, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Geoeconomics, Japan

It was impressive to see participants at the Pacific Future Forum (PFF) rigorously discussing future operational concepts, defence industrial mobilisation and international collaborations among partners onboard the HMS Prince of Wales. Such discussions were confined not only to the maritime domain where the carrier strike groups mainly operate, but extended to issues across multiple domains, including how to draw lessons from drone warfare in Ukraine in maritime settings. This indicates the UK’s diverse strategic interests and willingness to collaborate with its partners, such as Japan, through a variety of policy options.

The Japanese media tends to simplify the implications of Operation HIGHMAST, and ponders to what extent Britain would – and could – assist Japan’s defence effort in regional contingencies. Such a question is, however, based on an incorrect assumption that Japan’s international partners always act like the US, its only treaty ally with defence commitments.

Probably, Japan has been accustomed to the asymmetrical security relationship for too many years. But the UK is not the US. Japan has to think about how to expand symmetrical collaborations with partners such as Britain, Australia and South Korea in an uncertain moment, when the US alone may not be able to sustain the free and open international order.

This would require creative solutions between both rims of the Eurasian continent in sharing advanced defence concepts, technologies, industrial capacity and experiences in public-private partnerships to augment their capabilities mutually. The PFF in Tokyo possibly hinted at opportunities for Japan in such diverse and nuanced collaborations.

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Welcome to the 59th Cable, our weekly roundup of British foreign and defence policy.

It has been a big week for defence. The Defence and Security Equipment International (DSEI) 2025 exhibition is taking place in London from Tuesday, 9th September, to Friday, 12th September, and will see some 45,000 attendees from 90 countries interact with the United Kingdom’s (UK) defence industrial suppliers, buyers and military. It was fitting, therefore, that the Ministry of Defence (MOD) should publish its Defence Industrial Strategy 2025 (DIS) this week.

The Defence Industrial Strategy – Statement of Intent of December 2024 was a great forecast for this document, since it highlighted six key areas. These were:

• Making defence an engine for growth;

• Backing UK-based industries;

• Making Britain lead in innovation;

• Developing a resilient industrial base;

• Transforming procurement; and

• Forging new partnerships across society and with allies.

Some initial thoughts are as follows:

First, much of the Strategy was presaged in the Strategic Defence Review (SDR); a fact noted repeatedly in the DIS. Elements such as innovation and integration feature heavily in both documents.

Second, the Strategy emphasised the ‘defence dividend’. While this is laudable, it seems a lost opportunity for political leadership to emphasise defence’s inherent value in an age of uncertainty.

Third, the DIS seeks to reform defence acquisition. However, defence acquisition reform has been carried out by nearly every recent government. What is different this time, and how will we know it has worked where others have not?

Fourth, the latter part of the Strategy has an implementation plan and a timeline. This is to be commended. Too many strategies have gone gently into the night without a plan or a timeline, only to be forgotten over time.

Time will tell as to how the DIS fares. We can suspect it will be more impactful than many others.

Welcome back to The Cable!

• Sir Keir Starmer, Prime Minister, has carried out his first major reshuffle of his premiership, following the resignation of Angela Rayner, Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for Housing. Of particular note was the move of David Lammy from Foreign Secretary to Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for Justice, and his replacement with Yvette Cooper, who was formerly Home Secretary.

• On 4th September, Sir Keir attended a virtual summit of the so-called ‘coalition of the willing’ to discuss potentially providing Ukraine with security guarantees following an end to hostilities. The Prime Minister stated that Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, ‘could not be trusted’, as he delays peace talks while simultaneously continuing to attack the embattled nation. He went on to emphasise that the coalition had ‘an unbreakable pledge to Ukraine’, with backing from Donald Trump, President of the United States (US), and that further action is needed to apply pressure on Putin to secure a cessation of hostilities, which includes partners supplying long-range missiles to Kyiv alongside other forms of military aid.

• Also on 4th September, John Healey, Secretary of State for Defence, flew to Stavanger to sign a strategic partnership agreement with Tore O. Sandvik, his Norwegian counterpart, establishing the framework for closer cooperation in maritime capabilities. This agreement comes days after Oslo announced it would purchase at least five Type 26 frigates from Britain in a deal worth £10 billion. The new partnership will enable both nations to collaborate much more closely, with a Norwegian Government press release stating that, in practice, ‘we will have an integrated frigate fleet’. Following the signing, Healey said:

  Our close bonds are built on a shared geography and history, and this deal will see our navies work as one, creating a combined fleet to defend NATO’s [North Atlantic Treaty Organisation] northern flank and strengthen our deterrence against Russian aggression.

• On 8th September, His Majesty’s (HM) Government published the Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS). It highlights five key areas for the country’s defence industry: supporting the sector as an engine for economic growth (the so-called ‘defence dividend’), especially outside London and the South East of England; backing British companies in the sector; placing a focus on ‘cutting-edge technologies’; hardening supply chains and reforming procurement processes to create a more resilient and efficient defence industry; and ensuring the UK enjoys strong international partnerships to enhance security and also open more markets to British defence exports. Upon its release, Healey made a statement, in which he said:

  Our Defence Industrial Strategy will make defence an engine for growth, backing British jobs, British industry and British innovation. The UK has one of the most advanced and innovative defence industrial bases the world over, but we are in a new era of threat, which demands a new era for UK defence. To move to warfighting readiness to deter threats and strengthen security in the Euro-Atlantic, we will REFORM procurement, INNOVATE at wartime pace and GROW our industrial base.

• On 9th September, the Defence and Security Accelerator (DASA) launched a £1.5 million competition to find new methods of addressing non-compressible haemorrhages (NCHs). An NCH refers to bleeding deep inside the body, and is a leading cause of death in conflicts. DASA aims to utilise the UK’s technological innovation to discover ways of mitigating the effects of NCHs, thus reducing wartime casualties.

  For additional defence news stories, follow this link to the DSEI Gateway news portal.

• Sir Richard Knighton, Air Chief Marshal, has officially taken over from Adm. Sir Tony Radakin as Chief of Defence Staff. With reforms to defence, the Chief of the Defence Staff will now command the service chiefs and is the head of the newly established Military Strategic Headquarters, responsible for force design and war planning across an integrated force.

• Michael Shanks, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State (Minister for Energy), gave a speech last week at the Society of Petroleum Engineers’ (SPE) Offshore Europe Conference. He highlighted the role of the North Sea for Britain’s energy security, and argued that for the country’s sovereign energy and to mitigate the impacts of climate change, HM Government should support and pursue both renewable and fossil sources of power in the short term. Shanks went on to state that HM Government is making a significant investment in the North Sea, particularly in offshore wind, carbon capture and storage (CCS) and green hydrogen production, but clarified that support for communities focused on the production of fossil fuels will be protected during the transition.

How competitors frame Britain

• Russia Today released comments from Nikolai Patrushev, presidential aide to Putin, claiming that the UK was likely behind the September 2022 Nord Stream pipeline explosions and sabotage in the Baltic Sea. Patrushev stated that ‘highly trained NATO special forces’ were behind the act, highlighting that the British Special Boat Service was an example of a unit possessing the ‘necessary skills’ to conduct the explosions. Such unfounded allegations are rich, given the steady wave of sabotage acts and disinformation campaigns we have seen deployed by Moscow across Europe in recent years.

• TASS published a statement by the Embassy of Russia in London, calling the UK’s use of frozen Russian assets to fund Ukraine military aid ‘theft’. The embassy said using these assets to cover the purchase of weapons for Ukraine was ‘criminal seizure’ and ‘illegal in any jurisdiction’, warning that ‘any unfriendly steps against Russia and its legitimate interests will not go unanswered’, and cited it as understandable given Britain’s ‘increasing socio-economic problems’. These are intriguing comments, considering the recent warning issued by a Russian banking chief over the poor state of the nation’s economy.

Japan’s recent development in defence industry

By Takeshi Ishikawa, former Commissioner, ATLA, Ministry of Defence of Japan

Since Japan made a significant change to its defence equipment and technology transfer policy in 2014, DSEI has functioned as a core platform for exhibiting and introducing them to the world. Japan’s original attitude was gradual and cautious, but it has become more open due to changes in the recent international security situation. This also reflects Japan’s equipment and technology transfer policy.

Before 2014, Japan’s basic thinking was to withhold anything other than the bare minimum, because defence equipment and technology transfer could exacerbate international conflicts. However, considering the increasingly severe international security situation, such as Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Japan changed its equipment and technology transfer policy in 2014, adopting the view that it should engage in more proactive international cooperation.

Under this new policy, Japan can transfer defence equipment and technology to allies and partners under certain conditions, and with strict export controls. This was essential for Japan to cooperate internationally to realise a free, open and rule-based international order. Such equipment and technology cooperation, combined with other cooperation in policy and operation, creates robust international deterrence and stability.

In 2022, Japan revised its National Security Strategy and Defence Strategy, accordingly launching a more proactive equipment and technology transfer policy. This coincided with the launch of the Global Combat Aircraft Programme (GCAP); a programme for the joint development and production of a sixth-generation fighter by three strategic partners – Japan, the UK and Italy. To succeed in this pivotal and gigantic programme, it was absolutely necessary to facilitate the large-scale international transfer and sharing of advanced technologies.

Moreover, Japan embarks on a new equipment and technology transfer programme this year with Australia; another strategic partner. Though details are under negotiation, Australia will procure 11 frigates based on Japan’s latest stealth frigate, the Mogami class.

The Mogami class frigate is designed by MHI, Japan’s all-round defence company. It is difficult to detect by radar due to applying stealth technology from fighter jets. Additionally, while securing sufficient capacity to carry various weapons, the number of personnel is halved by automation. The Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF) will procure 24 Mogami class frigates – making up almost half of its future surface combat fleet. In other words, both navies will operate this common ship as the core of their future maritime surface combat power, which will naturally lead to sharing various information – such as maintenance and sustainment information for roughly half a century of buildup and operation period.

This will render the Japan-Australia strategic partnership much more substantial. This upgrade of the strategic partnership is truly essential, and will undoubtedly strengthen deterrence and contribute to international peace and stability.

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Welcome to the 58th Cable, our weekly roundup of British foreign and defence policy.

On Wednesday, 3rd September, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will stage a large-scale military parade to mark 80 years since the end of the Second World War. However, this parade has little to do with remembrance and instead is a chance for Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), to demonstrate his country’s growing military prowess, technological advancement and geopolitical clout.

In Beijing this Wednesday, Xi will be joined by the leaders of Russia, Iran and North Korea – a grouping of authoritarian revisionist powers known collectively as the ‘CRINK’ – and the leaders of nations which are members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO is an economic and security grouping of Eurasian nations – sometimes described as a potential rival to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) – which concluded its most recent summit on 1st September.

For the United Kingdom (UK) and its allies and partners, the PRC’s economic and industrial heft is one of the greatest challenges they face. Beijing’s ongoing support for its CRINK partners – in particular supplying dual-use technology for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine – is essential to their shared revisionist goals of reshaping the global international order.

For a more in-depth analysis of the parade, read the most recent Investigator by Charles Parton on Observing China, our sister site.

Welcome back to The Cable!

• The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) summoned Andrey Kelin, Russian Ambassador to the UK, following Russia’s aerial strikes against Kyiv on 27th August, which killed at least 23 Ukrainian civilians and damaged the offices of the British Council and European Union (EU) Delegation. Following the summons, a spokesperson for the FCDO stated:

  The UK condemns in the strongest terms these outrageous attacks…We have made clear to the Russians that such actions will only harden UK and Western resolve to support Ukraine and bring an end to this unjustified war. Russia must stop this senseless killing and destruction immediately.

• On 31st August, the Norwegian Government announced it had selected Britain’s Type 26 class frigate for the country’s armed forces. The £10 billion deal – the UK’s largest warship export deal by value – will see Britain supply at least five Type 26 class frigates to the Royal Norwegian Navy, with deliveries expected to begin in 2030. The decision comes ahead of a new UK-Norway defence agreement to strengthen Euro-Atlantic security, while also bringing the two allies’ defence industries closer together. By operating the same anti-submarine frigate, the Royal Navy and Royal Norwegian Navy will improve interoperability while reinforcing NATO’s northern flank.

• On 28th August, the foreign ministers of Britain, France and Germany – the European Three (E3) – released a joint statement on the initiation of reimposing ‘snapback sanctions’ on Iran in 30 days following the Iranian regime’s ‘deliberate non-compliance’ in limiting its nuclear activities to civilian needs. These sanctions were previously lifted under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement in exchange for curbs to Iran’s nuclear programme under a United Nations (UN)-backed deal.

• The Ministry of Defence (MOD) has announced its intention to pursue a new ground-launched tactical ballistic missile under the name Project NIGHTFALL. The requirement is at an open early engagement stage, with manufacturers having until 18th September to respond before a competition is launched.

  For additional defence news stories, follow this link to the DSEI Gateway news portal.

• On 28th August, John Healey, Secretary of State for Defence, and Nakatani Gen, Defence Minister of Japan, held a UK-Japan Defence Ministerial Meeting in Tokyo. Following the meeting, a joint statement was published in which the ministers reaffirmed their commitment to the UK-Japan Enhanced Global Strategic Partnership. They also emphasised their support for the open international order, and condemned North Korea’s weapons programmes, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and Beijing’s support for Russia, Iran and North Korea. Both ministers said they look forward to advancing the partnership further at the 2026 UK-hosted 2+2 meeting.

• On 1st September, the MOD announced the establishment of the Cyber and Specialist Operations Command (CSOC), formed from the previous UK Strategic Command. This decision was first announced in July 2025, due to the growing importance of cyber and electronic warfare, bringing all cyber and specialist capabilities under a single command. CSOC now stands as the fourth military command, alongside the Royal Navy, British Army and Royal Air Force.

  For more on the integration of Artificial Intelligence (AI) into the UK’s defence ecosystem, watch the bonus conversation from the Council on Geostrategy’s podcast Defence Talks: Securing UK Advantage here.

• On 2nd September, Électricité de France (EDF) and Centrica announced that two of Britain’s oldest nuclear power plants, which they run, would have their operational life extended until March 2028. The Heysham 1 and Hartlepool plants were both due to close in 2027, but they were given a one-year extension following positive inspections of their reactors. Heysham 1 and Hartlepool both began generating electricity in 1983, and were originally slated to be retired in 2014.

How competitors frame Britain

• The PRC’s Embassy to the UK responded to the joint statement from the UK-Japan Defence Ministerial Meeting, which condemned Beijing’s support for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and expressed concerns over Chinese actions in the South and East China seas. A spokesperson from the embassy ‘firmly rejected the groundless accusations’ and ‘urged’ the UK and Japan ‘to seriously reflect on their wrongful statements’. The spokesperson called for both nations to ‘stop interfering with China’s internal affairs and to cease stirring up trouble…in the Asia-Pacific’. Absurdly, it concluded by stating that the PRC has ‘been committed to promoting peace’ in Ukraine.

• In a statement, the Russian Foreign Ministry ‘strongly condemned’ the announcement that E3 countries are set to reimpose sanctions on Iran and called on the international community to ‘reject them’. The statement warned that ‘new escalation…will have grave consequences for international peace and security’. An interesting time for Moscow to raise concerns over nuclear recklessness, after years of nuclear sabre-rattling of its own – including fantasising about Britain’s nuclear decimation.

Pacific Future Forum meets in Tokyo

Last week, HMS Prince of Wales, one of the Royal Navy’s two aircraft carriers, steamed into Tokyo harbour and docked at Tokyo Cruise Terminal. It marks the first time an aircraft carrier has docked at that facility, courtesy of the Mayor of Tokyo, to symbolise the growing closeness of British-Japanese relations. In many ways, the carrier’s visit marks the apex of Operation HIGHMAST – the 2025 deployment of the Royal Navy’s Carrier Strike Group to the Indo-Pacific. Four years ago, in 2021, a British Carrier Strike Group led by HMS Queen Elizabeth was the first to venture into the region since 2009.

HMS Prince of Wales’ deployment coincided with the Atlantic and Pacific Future Forum (APFF), now an annual geopolitical gathering which switches between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theatres. Led by Lord Sedwill, a former National Security Adviser, and Stephen Watson, an Honorary Commodore in the Royal Navy, the conference has become one of the most prestigious of its kind anywhere in the world. It is also unique in that it is often hosted on board British aircraft carriers, whether in Portsmouth (2022), New York City (2023) or Tokyo (2025).

Convening over 350 stakeholders from politics, the civil service, the armed forces, business and research institutions, the APFF acts as a force multiplier for British narratives and influence, while acting as a forum to consult with Britain’s closest and most important allies and partners. That the forum was hosted in Tokyo this year is indicative: alongside Ukraine and Australia, Japan can now lay claim to being one of the UK’s three most important strategic partners. Indeed, both the British and Japanese defence secretaries spoke in person at the event.

Personnel from the Council on Geostrategy have participated in the APFF since 2020, though this year we were more involved. As an official partner of the APFF 2025, we hosted the first satellite event of the International Sea Power Conference – focusing on the ‘Wider North’ as a new front connecting the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific – and all three of our leadership team moderated or spoke on panels at the forum.

The APFF delivery team can be congratulated for delivering a fascinating and challenging conference. We look forward to the 2026 iteration, where plans are afoot to host it in the United States to mark the 250th anniversary of the American declaration of independence. Next stop, Boston?

For more information about the APFF, click here.

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Welcome to the 57th Cable, our weekly roundup of British foreign and defence policy.

On Sunday, 24th August, Ukraine celebrated its 34th independence day following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. In a televised address, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of Ukraine, vowed to continue fighting, stating: ‘Ukraine has not yet won, but it has certainly not lost’ and calling for a ‘just peace…where our future will be decided only by us’.

However, with Russia gaining momentum on the battlefield and the intensification of Moscow’s aerial bombardment of Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure in recent months, pressure on Ukraine is growing. Additionally, diplomatic attempts to end the full-scale invasion have achieved little so far, with summits between Donald Trump, President of the United States (US) and Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, as well as one with Zelenskyy, failing to lead to a ceasefire agreement or a meeting between the leaders of Russia and Ukraine.

In recent weeks, the United Kingdom (UK), one of Kyiv’s staunchest allies, has announced further measures to support Ukraine. Operation INTERFLEX, the UK-led training mission for Ukrainian recruits, is being extended to the end of 2026, while the so-called ‘coalition of the willing’, spearheaded by London and Paris, continues to develop its strategy to deliver ‘robust security guarantees’ and prepare for the ‘deployment of a reassurance force’ when the hostilities end.

But European nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) remain dependent on American support to provide credible guarantees. Britain, at the forefront of the coalition of the willing, will have to dig deep to ensure Ukraine’s independence and Europe’s long-term security.

Welcome back to The Cable!

• His Majesty’s (HM) Government has announced that the UK Space Agency will join the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT) by April 2026, a move aimed at ‘streamlining support’, reducing duplication and cutting bureaucratic hurdles for Britain’s space industry. Alongside this move, DSIT published a report outlining over 60 recommendations from industry leaders on how to improve the UK’s regulations for space missions, with a focus on Rendezvous and Proximity Operations (RPO).

• The Ministry of Defence (MOD) has revealed a new ‘30 by 30’ initiative to boost the cadet forces by over 40,000 (a 30% increase) by 2030. The plan – backed by £70 million in government funding – will also include new joint Army and Royal Air Force (RAF) Air Cadet centres; streamlining the adult volunteer process; improving regular and reservist support for the Cadets; and new training programmes in the Cadets to boost Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) skills, such as drone piloting for Air Cadets.

• HM Government has announced that Operation INTERFLEX, the British-led mission to train Ukrainian soldiers, has been extended to ‘at least the end of 2026’. Since its inception in July 2022, Operation INTERFLEX has trained more than 50,000 recruits. The mission has also adapted ‘to best suit Ukraine’s evolving military requirements’, with additional programmes focused on developing leadership skills and instructor training.

• The MOD – in partnership with the international Drone Capability Coalition (DCC) – has issued a request for information (RFI) to explore the possibility of using interceptor drones as a means to counter jet-powered one-way effector (OWE) uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs). The proliferation of jet-powered OWEs – which can operate at over 350 kilometres per hour and reach altitudes of more than 12,000 feet – has been identified as a growing threat to the British Armed Forces. According to the RFI, the MOD is looking for an affordable and scalable system which could face down swarms of adversarial drones.

  For additional defence news stories, follow this link to the DSEI Gateway news portal.

• Last week, Catherine West MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State (Indo-Pacific), co-chaired the second bilateral Senior Economic Dialogue in Seoul with Kim Jina, Second Vice Minister of South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the joint communique which followed the meeting, both nations reaffirmed the strength of the UK-South Korea Global Strategic Partnership and recognised both governments’ efforts to deepen cooperation across a broad range of areas, including economic security, defence-related industrial cooperation, scientific and technological innovation, renewable energy and other economic diplomacy issues.

• HM Government has announced a £118 million deal to purchase six Land Ceptor air defence missile systems to enhance Britain’s air defence capabilities. The Land Ceptor forms part of a wider system called Sky Sabre, consisting of radar, command and control, and missile launchers. A full Sky Sabre battery will be capable of engaging multiple targets simultaneously at ranges up to 120 kilometres.

• According to analysis by the Financial Times, more than 16.1 gigawatts (GW) of new renewable energy capacity, across 323 projects spread around the UK, were given planning permission in the second quarter of 2025. This represents a 195% rise compared to the same period last year. Likewise, over 100 planning applications were filed for energy storage projects between April and June 2025, with a combined storage capacity of 8.4GW, more than double the amount in the same quarter last year. However, the rapid growth in renewable energy infrastructure remains curtailed by slow grid connections coupled with legal challenges by local opponents to such projects.

How competitors frame Britain

• Russia Today released propaganda claiming that Britain’s ‘soaring debt and borrowing costs’ might force the country to seek an International Monetary Fund (IMF) rescue package. It went on to note that HM Government’s pledge to raise military spending to 2.5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 2027 and continuing to deliver billions in military and financial aid to Ukraine is ‘squeezing already stretched public finances’. Russian state media should look at its own country’s financial situation – with high inflation, falling energy exports and growing deficits – before it lays judgement on the far larger and diverse British economy.

• TASS reported on a statement made by Dmitry Peskov, Press Secretary of the President of the Russian Federation, about the potential for European troops being deployed to Ukraine following an end to hostilities. Peskov stated that the Kremlin views ‘such discussions negatively’, as most European nations are also NATO members and the ‘expansion of NATO…into Ukraine has become one of the root causes of the current conflict’. Once again, Moscow claims victimhood while continuing its imperialist conquest of its neighbour.

Anticipating the Defence Industrial Strategy

As the probable publication of the Defence Industrial Strategy 2025 approaches, previous British defence industrial documents can be examined to anticipate the contents of the upcoming strategy.

Firstly, Britain’s last Defence and Security Industrial Strategy (DSIS) was in 2021. It set out to reform procurement and acquisition, create better government-industry synergies, support greater defence exports and emphasise the development of new technologies – and to do all of this evenly across all parts of the country.

Secondly, the Modern Industrial Strategy of June 2025 put forward a ten-year plan to emphasise eight growth areas (the IS-8). These include defence, digital and technologies, financial services, life sciences, and professional and business services.

Finally, there is the Defence Industrial Strategy – Statement of Intent, which highlights six key areas. These comprise prioritising British businesses for defence investment; creating partnerships between government, industry, and allies and partners; providing certainty and stability for long-term investment; focusing on new technologies; spreading prosperity across the wider UK; and enhancing deterrence through defence industrial capability.

Drawing from this, one might predict that new technology adaption will be emphasised in the DIS, as something which is very much a part of the Strategic Defence Review’s conception of an ‘integrated force’. Such a force is reliant on new technologies for the kill chain, as well as at the backend, logistics, the supply chain, and even Research and Development (R&D). A discussion might be anticipated on how UK Defence Innovation (UKDI) will harness private innovation and R&D spending.

Regardless of this, Britain will have to work hard to raise its R&D levels, and will have to find new ways of ‘fusing’ the more innovative ‘civilian’ startups with the legacy primes. This will require market intelligence normally held by venture capitalists within the MOD.

What has thus far been missing from the preceding strategies – as in the US’ National Defence Industrial Strategy of 2024 and the UK’s Defence White Paper from 2005 – is an emphasis on education and training the workforce, and what HM Government intends to do about it. Another missing element is any sort of discussion of an implementation plan. The DSIS in 2021 lacked one, but the 2005 White Paper laid out an entire section on concrete steps which the Blair government needed to take. Let’s hope that the Defence Industrial Strategy 2025 will do likewise.

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